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Four year.® ago I became interested in Schleiermacher's
theology. i think that it is Schleiermacher who first
elaborated a theology based on the general truth of man.
Two and a half years ago when I first came to Edinburgh, it
was with the purpose of furthering my Old Testament studies.
But then, I actually ignored the fact that the most urgent
need for the Younger Churches in the Far East is not Old
Testament scholars who are competent to write books on the
interpretation of the Old Testament in terms of their an¬
cient literary backgrounds, but. Christian apologists who
are able to answer questions put before them by the modern
idealists of to-day in the Eastern countries.
Perhaps I ought to mention here the structure of this
thesis, which consists of two parts. The first part may
3eem not immediate relevant to my specific subject, but it
is my purpose first to present a study of the theological
thought of Schleiermacher before I come to my proper re¬
search area. Since Schleiermacher's theological system is
most adaptable, it is essentially vague and it seem? to me
most necessary to make this presentation. It seems import¬
ant to make sure what Schleiermacher actually says before
turning to Erunner'8 and Earth's criticism of him, as well
as to provide evidences for their critique.
iii
Many thanks are due to Prof. Dr. Torrance who sug¬
gested to me this subject for my studies at Edinburgh. I
realize now how much I have been benefited for my future
service for the Church of Christ in the other part of the
world by taking up the study of this most worthy subject.
I am most grateful to my supervisors, Prof. Dr. Tor¬
rance and Prof. Dr. Mclntyre, for their encouragement and
their guidance of my work. Their suggestions and their
corrections are most valuable. I am also thankful to
Dr. Larab, the librarian of the New College, who helped me
in many ways to find the books I needed. Furthermore, I
must mention the generosity of Prof. Dr. JJrunner who so
kindly gave me his only copy of the second edition ctf his
book, Die Mystik and das Wort, which is out of print at
the present day and is most difficult to obtain.
I wish also to thank the Rev. Logan kirk, Mr. Duncan
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PART I.
A CRITICAL PR/. ,'TATIjH OF
THE THEOLOGICAL THOUGHT OF SCHL IKRMACHBR
INTRODUCTORY
Friedrich 3chleiermacher (1768-1854) was an excellent,
original, and extraordinary Christian thinker of trie 19th Cen¬
tury. He was a rare genuis with an artistic and creative mind,
lis religious enthusiasm and very individual background, his
scientific knowledge of the modern spirit, "his wealth of moral
ideas, his faculty of applying divine principles to the wants
and events of the time, and the deeply penetrative and persua¬
sive character of his words,ail exercised a remarkable ana
oeaeficial influence in his own day aid have since left their
mark on Christian thought.
His writings reveal that he lived during the age of geae-
2
ral unrest coming long after the Reformation and apparently
falling under the influence of the Enlightenment (Aufkldrung).
People were led to think in different ways: everything had to
be subjected to rational examination or to re-evaluation. There¬
fore, people became very confident about their ideas, or subjec¬
tive reasoning, and this brought them to despise their entire
cultural background. Religion, as well as other areas, could
not escape this fate. Rationalism arose among religious circles
as well as in the whole culture of the ge. There were some
reactions to this rationalism or, more properly, counter-reac¬
tions of rationalism and other movements to eacn other. The
1. nooert iunro, Schieiermacher. rersonai and '.Speculative.
(Paisley: Alexander Gardner, 1903), p.82.
2. wilhelm illthey, ueben Sohleiermachers, dand 1. (Berlin
und ueipzig: Vereinigung wissenschaftiicher Verleger, 1922), "So
steht Schleiermacher in der itte alier Bestrebungea seiner Gene¬
ration. ir umfasste das Grdsste, was seine ~eit oewegte, was aie
Generation vor inm voroereitet hatte." pp.xxviii f.
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religious aspect of tnis reaction was Supernatural ism. Ration-
alism attacked their frozen confessional heritage "under the
x
envelope of the traditional system" with serious criticism,
saying that the religious organ, i.e. reason, and reason alone,
should dictate personal beliefs. It forraed its own system and
made knowledge of principle the only acceptable form. Thus ra¬
tionalism had degenerated into religious indifr'erence because
it merely viewed tne Christian faith as but a product of ration¬
alistic thinking. On the other hand, tne supernaturalists thou¬
ght that they should confine themselves to organizing conscien¬
tiously the historical materials inherited from their predeces¬
sors, while trying their best to rejuvenate and accommodate them
to txie taste of the contemporary theories.^ iowever, they con¬
ceived tne Christian faith as a doctrinal authority ,;iven us
from without; they thus had petrified i ito a lifeless, hereai-
tary acquiescence in an historically transmitted faith." Nei¬
ther of these theological i terpretations was satisfactory for
the combined factors of the inquisitive spirit and the emotional
aspect of humanity or even for either one singly against the
other. This questioning of the confessional heritage came after
the Reformation and in the waKe of the modern scientific spirit.
Christian thinkers had been seeking for a new form of expression
of religion in order to meet the challenge of their contemporaries.
Schieiermacher, in light of ail this, never ceased to la¬
bour towards the reconciliation of Christianity and science,ufor
he realized that "a definitive divorce between them would oring
5. F. i.icnteuberger, Fi.tory of German Theology in the
Idth Century. (Transl. by a. Hastie), (Fdinburgh: T. .1. Clark,
lvJ12), p.65-
xbid.. p.24.
5. Frederics Rowan, (Trans!. by; The Life and betters
of Schieiermacher, (London: Smith, Cider and Co., 1 >60), 1.
p. xv.
6. Licntenberger, op. cit.. p.150; cf. Dilthey, op. cit..
p.641.
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ia its train the most fatal consequences."' He too*. up a posi¬
tion of modern idealism as the basis of truth upon which he op¬
posed supernaturalism and introduced the Christian elements of
feeling, warmth, ana devout personal experience to the dry ra¬
tionalism. His endeavours have often been misunderstood; such
was the case even ia his lifetime. 3ut Schleiermacher's great
contribution to religion is to be assigned to the level which
is above the contradiction and antagonism of rationalism and
q
supernaturalism.
In the time of Schleiermacher religion had been corrup¬
ted or artificialized by each of trie mental tendencies of the
age. The state of theological scholarship was very unsatisfac¬
tory; people were tired of the old, lifeless dogmas on one hand
and they equally despaired of the arid scepticisms which attemp¬
ted to usurp their place on the other.Religion was regarded
as an antiquated prejudice, or on the other hand as a moral
agency or an intellectual system. Schleiermacher with his sen¬
sitive and inquisitive mind, his understanding of man as an emo¬
tional being possessed of something more than mere thought and
will, Knew that a true religion must plumb the innermost fee¬
lings and instincts of man, and that snallow Enlightenment (Auf-
klhruag) had no correspondence^ with the deepest longings of
12
the human heart. In his Manifesto of Eeligion (Heden), he
rightly claimed for religion not only an independent but also a
universal and necessary place in human experience; he refused
7. Lichtenberger, op. cit.. p.130.
8* -ibid.« P*o3»
y. ibid.. p.142.
10. Muaro, op. cit., p.62.
11. Johannes «endland, Die Heligioese antwioKlunK Schleier-
machers. (Tttbingen: Verlag von J.8.3. »>1ohr, 1015), "Die AufKlfl-
rung ubersieht den innersten wuellpunKt der Religion im Oemilt,
in dem Sinn, der das awige im beitlichen ahnt und anschaut."
p.228.
12• teden Ueber die Religion an die Uebiideten unter
Verhchtern (first appeared in 17JO).
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to defend it on any basis other than religion itself. As he
says: "I fear religion is only comprehensible through itself."
Religion is essential to human life, it is not "a mixture of
fragments of metaphysics and ethics""^ which try to distort or
obscure its original spirit. It is the religious feeling that
constitutes the central and Kindling point in the entire area
of life, therefore religion is "not given for cold . nalysis out
15
to be lived in anf» en joyed. "
Schleiermacher himself admitted that he was a philosopher
and a Christian, he writes: "un point of understanding, I am a
philosopher; for to oe sucn is to exercise the original and in¬
dependent activity of the understandj.ng, and in point of feeling
1 am religious and a Christian, and have entirely renounced ail
heathenism, or rather 1 have never possessed any.,,J"b Regardless
of whether he is considered as a great theologian or as a philo¬
sopher of religion, his excellent background in philosophy led
him to approach the Christian faith from a philosophical view¬
point, except perhaps at a iater and more mature stage of his
thought.Schleiermacher was vitally influenced as well by the
j W
contemporary Romanticism. Here Scnlegel's concept of indivi-
19
duality, wnich tended to spiritualize nature, influenced him
and it was bchlegel who led him to an advanced study of litera¬
ture and art which in turn widened the scope of his Knowledge.^
15. Schleiermacher, On Religion. Speeches to its cultured
uespisers. (Transl. by John uman, London: Regan Paul, 1reach,
Tritbner at Co., Ltd., 1603), p.236. This book is referred to as
"Speeches."
14. Speeches, p.27b.
15« iugh Ross acxiatosh, Types of uodern Theology,
(London: Jisbet and Co., Ltd., 1937), p.43.
16. .Rowan, op. cit., II. pp.260T.
17. 0. - fleiderer wrote that "in the two decades which
lapsed between his Discourses and his Olaubensiehre. Sehleier-
macher nan thrown, off the extravalences of Romanticism, and had
brought his entire mode of thought much more into accord with
the faith of the Churcn. ' Pfieiderer holds that the lature of
the book ^iaubenolehre ia more theological than philosophical.
The Development of Theology. (London: wan Sonne iscneiu and Co.,
1690), p.104.
5
Iftis contemporary movement, in spite ox" its aany defective as¬
pects, powerfully advocated tiie inner spirit of individual dig¬
nity. Although Schleiermacher has his own style of organization
of theological ideas which is altogether independent of other
styles, yet both his study of philosophy ana this movement so
regulated his thought"1 to an extent that he himself even seemed
to be aware of its influence ana though he tried to escape from
its entanglements in his interpretation and systematization of
Christian doctrines, yet he failed to do what he intended. His
theology is heavily coloured by this movement ana characterized
by his study of philosophy.
Schleiermacher, during his writing of the Reden. once
wrote in a letter: "We are all victims of our times, and each
22
person is so in a sense peculiar to himself." One could easily
wonder why nis sermons are not quite consistent with his tneoio-
23
gical thought and ask how such a powerfully inspired preacher
la. The Romanticism was a reaction to tne dry rationalism:
it protested against the supremacy of intellect ana reason and
glorified the imaginative and the natural; it reinforced human
life with fresh interests and creative power, thus liberating
the inner impulses of tne soul.
19• Schlegel, fhilosopnie ues hebens. p.d'o. , quoted by J.
B. Robertson in tne unilosoph.y of history by F. ehiegel, Uon-
don: Henry G. Bonn, York ft., Covent Garden, 1846). "Mature, too,
is a boox written oi both aides, within and without, in which
the tinger of God is clearly visible: a species of Holy «rit, in
a bodily form e glorious panegyric, as it were, on God's omni¬
potence, expressed in the most vivid symbols.' p.oO.
20. 'ilthey, op. cit.. pp.268f.
21. "Wir erblicken nun Schleiermacher iamitten iter mannig-
faltigen philosophischen Bewegung der Zeit, als Aanehmenden wie
Ablennenden." ibid.. p.335.
22. Rowan, op. cit., i. p.130.
23. Dilthey, chleiermacher war ein geborener Redner. die
hdchsten virxungen seines Ge.nies waren von der Kanzel. .acn alien
Bchilderungen waren sie mit nichts zu vergleichen, was man seit
der Generation Luthers an Sinwirkung von der kanzel aus in Deut-
schland erlebt hat." op. cit., p.76.
6
could write such a theology from which revelation is absent.c'^
it is because Schieiermacher lived in an eventful age of unins¬
pired rationalism that he fell a victim to it; he was busily
26
engaged with apologetic purposes; and because nis endeavours
at this task ail showed an evident and intimate relation to his
time. Munro points out that "it was principally in trie reli¬
gious sphere that he influenced his age and is an influence
still."26
Schleiermacher*s intention was to help the people "to
re-discover in religion that wnich had a function and a value
27of its own, independent of culture and criticism." Religion,
according to him, belongs to the very nature of man. It is an
inborn capacity, in the sense that man is absolutely dependent
and inevitably becomes conscious of Eternity. Prom the start
Schleiermacher wrestled with the great problem of 'reconciling
his religious experience, which, under Moravian influence and
example, had been very real, with the critical philosophy which
had won his intellectual consent." As Seibie pointed out that
/
"he found the solution of his problem in giving to the feeling,
on which he believed his experience to be based, an equal im¬
portance with the ideas and theories arrived at by purely ra-
28
tional process." " fife must remember that ./chleiermacher, even
lying on his death-bed, admitted: "i feel constrained to think
the profoandest speculative thoughts, and they are to me iaen-
2Q
tical with the deepest religious feelings." He thus confidently
reconciled the free investigation of science with the religious
consciousness of human instinct, without the confusion which
24. Mackintosh says: "To Schleiermacher, on the whole,
revelation is only another name for human discovery." op. cit..
p. 71.
25* Horace Leiand Priess, Schleiermacher' is soliloquies,
an English translation of the .:onolo-,en witn a critical intro¬
duction and appendix. (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co.,
1926j, p.xxxix.
26. i«unro, op. cit. . p.lj.
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might easily have been caused by the contemporary movements of
his age.
Although, oa the whole, his interpretation of Christian
faith is incomplete and his theology is regarded as one-sided
and of too exclusive an anthropocentric emphasis,^ his work is
not easily overlooked, whether one now believes that his ap¬
proach towards religion was right or was overemphasized on one
side, it certainly marked in its day a new era in the history
of dogmatics, and yet it bears certain values ana some sort of
significance for students of theology. He actually served as
a stimulant to theological thinking. It was Schleiermacher who
first introduced a new method and a different outlook to the
o
task of reconciling the traditional doctrinal system from the
standpoint of the independence of religion and of the evangeli-
'51 K
eal religious experience. His importance lies in having ins-
K
pired much the work of rejuvenescence of Protestant theology,
and in Schleiermacher one observes tne first real effort of
32
Christian theology to come to terras with the modern spirit.
It is scarcely an exaggeration to recognize him as tne father
of modern scientific theology.
This part consists of five chapters, Chapter One will
discuss a general survey of his starting-points; Chapters Two,
Three, Pour and Five, the cardinal themes of his theology
27. W.B. Selbie, Schleiermacher. (London: Chapman and
Hall, 1913), p.4.
28. Ibid.. p.3; cf. Rowan, op. cit.. I. p.57.
29. Rowan, op. cit.. II. p.>37.
30. J.L. Seve, A History of Christian Thought, (Philadel-
phia: The Muhlenberg Press, 1946), pp.114; 118.
31. Ceorge Cross, The Theology of Schleiermacher. (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1911), p.104.
32. J. Arundel Chapman, An Introduction to Schleiermacher.
(London: The Lpworth Pre;a, 1932), p.15; cf. John Bailiio, The
Interpretation of Religion. An introauctory Study of Theological
Principles, (Edinburgh: T. ... 1. Clark, 1929), p.29.
8
respectively. It must be pointed out tnat owing to the strong
unity of his theology, some expressions which first appeared




I. Aesthetics and piety as the origin of reli, ion.
not do matic or traditions.
Aesthetics is the fundamental attitude in one's approach
to religion. Religion, therefore, is essentially aesthetic.
2
That is to say that it is a "sense and taste for the infinite."
The genuine form of religion is the intuition (Anschauung) of
the Universe; Schleiermacher then defines religion tnus: "It is
neither think.ing nor acting, but intuition and feeling Q?eftihl}.
It will regard the Universe as it is." when man, as a finite
being, encounters the infinite (Unendliche), religion takes its
form; "It is reverent attention and submission, in childlike
passivity, to be stirred and iilled by tne Universe's immediate
influences.In all this, man, at least originally, must be
seen as a part of the- Whole (das Game) and as being receptive
to the action of the Universe. Oman points out tnat according
to Schleiermacher; "Religion...is neither metaphysics nor morals
but as essentially a part of human nature as either knowledge or
5action.'"^ Thus, religion is a part of human nature and human
nature is a part of the great Whole; all is articulated and iden
tified. The aesthetic feeling in religion is, therefore, a pro¬
cess of awakening man's sense for and awareness of tne Universe.
1. in regard to Schleiermacher's method, the writer feels
that his starting-points are to be first found in tne .teden ra¬
ther than in tne first parts of nis Niaubonaiehre wnicn is but
a modified or elaborated wor*. at a later period of nis life.
2. ..-peaches, }.39•
3« Referring to these two terms: "intuition and feeling,"
Baiilie points out that "in tne second edition of the Speeches
the distinction is retained in one passage ana tnen allowed to
lapse; in the Christian -aitn intuition...entirely disappears
and the new phrase 'i mediate self-consciousness' (uiuittelbare
UelbstbewusBtsein} is introduced as equivalent to feeling."
op. cit.. p.203-
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.*e then determine the nature of religion and fix ita boundaries:
religion is essentially the contemplation (Betrachtung) of the
religious (frommea); tne contemplation is 'trie immediate coa-
ciousness of the universal existence of all finite things, in
and through the Infinite, and of all temporal things in and
through the ternal." Religion is to seek this and find it in
the natural and its operation. As cnleiermacher says: "It is
to have life and to Know life in immediate feeling, only as
such an existence in the Infinite ana Eternal. »Vhere this is
found religion is satisfied."0 The true criterion of religion
is affirmed as one's sense for the Universe, and riot any exter¬
nals of religion, Seibie comment on this point: "mere is no
necessity to seek for any outward guarantees for religion be¬
yond this immediate feeling, for ail . ucn guarantees tend to
lower the conception of religion and <ake it depend on something
less than the highest."' Thus dogma is denounced and religious
discipline but slightly regarded.0 This is due to human effort
which tends to belittle the content of das Ganse. in his
Speeches. Schleiermacher did not appear as "tne defender of a
dogma o a creed, of a priesthood or a Cnurch. His purpose was
higher." As funro puts it: "Religion, he taught, is inward, of
the soul, independent of holy records, dead traditions and po¬
litical systems." Schleiermacher felt that if "tne doctrines
and the ceremonies, and the usee of religion wnich they mistook
for the thing itself, were in reality not religion at all: they




7. Selbie, o,o. cit.. pp. .of.
d. The writer wonlu suggest tnat later Schleiermacher,
in his :Uaubenslehre♦ modified this unfettered and extravahgant
romanticist-flavored denunciation of dogma and religious
discipline.
9. <unro, op. cit., p.t>B; cf • Speeches, p. 37.
li
According to him, dogmatics arises primarily out of the demands
of the religious consciousness. Religious men are throughout
historical because of their sense of intuition and their centre
of religion. But their religiousness does not provide a stan¬
dard faith for others: it cannot be regarded as a decisive sa¬
cred source for others who have the same standing in the Universe,
J- J
but is in fact the continual source of great misunderstandings.
Schleiermacher says: "This has misled almost everyone and dis¬
torted the view of almost all religions,"1"1' since "religion never
appears quite pure; its outward form is ever determined by some¬
thing else."1^ «hen referring to tne character of religion, ne
adds: "Religion is of course finite, and therefore subject to
imperfections, but it nust be apparent to you that, in a heal¬
thy state, man cannot be represented as actin; from religion or
being driven to action by religion."1^ Religion bears one's
very own stamp and arises from man's i .tuition of the Universe,
fiety is the essential measure of one's religiousness.
Schleiermacher thus turned down the traditional validity
of dogma and directed attention instead to man's inner life.
This does not mean merely tne emotional side of a man, but some¬
thing far more real and effective which needs to be cultivated
the mystical side of human nature must not be left out.11
Schleiermacher stated that "religion...in its own original,
characteristic form, is not accustomed to appear openly, but is
lb
only seen in secret by those who love it." Religion is in man:
it is to oe considered from the centre outwards, that is accor¬







based in o le of its necessary modes of acting or impulses or
1 h
whatever you like to call it. ' And, on the other hand, man
is in religion: ''It is found only among those who live in it
as their element, and ever advance ii it without cherishing
the folly that they embrace it all.its mystical absorption
is twofold: religion absorbs man and man ab orbs religion, its
action is therefore reciprocal and identical.
Therefore, "all pious emotions exhioit through feeling
the immediate presence of God in us"; but "the existence of God
generally can only be active, and as there can be no passive
existence of God, the divine activity upon any ooject is the
divine existence in respect of that object.By this, he
means that originally our being contains a divine component. By
this mystical theorizing, Schleiermacher posited a harmony of
the inner man which would issue forth in selfless devotion to
iq
the highest aims.
With regard to Schieiermacher's more decisive attitude
toward, or more mature concept of, dogma in relation to his
theological method, we note tnat he actually holds the opinion
that if piety originates from conviction and if conviction will,
in turn, originate from clear and complete thinking, the des¬
cription of such thinking will become the content of dogmatics,
if, on trie other hand, piety itself dominates this thinking,
then dogmatics will take its true origin from piety, Schleier-
macher very confidently asserts tnat 'the description of human




i9» elbie, op. cit.. p.27.
20. Mackintosh, o:. cit., p.67; cf. Bchleiermacher, Ihe
Christian Faith, (edited by a. ft. Mackintosh and J.S. Stewart,
Kdinburgh: 1i. Clerk, 1948), p.76. This book is referred to
as Christian Faith, unless otnerwi e indicated.
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Dogma may claim validity only insofar as the religious man pos¬
sesses it in his inner state of mind. Ho matter what form doc¬
trines may taxe, they are in ail forms so ultimately and exciu-
•ively cased in the emotion of the religious self-consciousness
as actually to be unable to arise where this seif-consciousness
21
does not exist.
2. individual experience ana tne mystical concept as two sides
of one and the same religion, the function of dogma
eventually restored.
It is individual religious experience tnat mystifies
Schleiermacher. To him t ie subject and object, and thought and
the topic of thought, are presupposed as united via tne seif-
consciousnees. His epistemology nere has its forerunner in
Lamanuel Kant. Since t e condition of our Knowledge is only
limited to the sphere of' the phenomenal, ana we nave no Know¬
ledge of "the thing-in-itself" (das Ding an sich), Schleier¬
macher acquiesces to tne limitation of naving to start with ex¬
perience. For him, suojective experience is the Key to objec-
22
tive knowledge, even though ne must also affirm tu&t 'we are
something more than mere thought, and all tnat we are thus
otheriwse, nay, even thought it eif, can become for us tne ob¬
ject of thought. Now if we call that concerning which we think
2 3
being, we are at once being and thought." {ere we observe
that Schleiermacher, with his theory of the subjective unity of
the self-consciousness of thought and being, also works out an
objective unity in virtually the next breath. He posits two
21• Christian Faith, p.78.
22. As Prices commented on Dchleiermacher: 'Existence per
se is infinite being, and hence unknowable, but phenomena exist
in and through it. * op. cit.. p.123.
23. uoted by /unroj Hchleiernacncr, p.133* (Dialectics,
p.54).
14
elements in the self-consciousness: "the one expresses the exis¬
tence of tne subject for itself, tne other ics co-existonce with
an Other.One ventures to asx whether there be, for Schleier-
aacher, any difference between the Knowledge of the transcenden¬
tal an * that of tne formal. ieopie mi^ht easily mistake in him
a little world all is own, as could be the case if he started
from the viewpoint of subjective individual experience and then
maintained that religion is but a matter of contemplation of the
Universe. But Schleiermacher presupposes tne existence of the
objective in the subjective, man being but a part of the whole
and essentially one of the elements of the All. His theory
makes sense only if a true religious significance be imparted
to it, with a mystical concept presu posed. Otherwise, the whole
system is but a matter of immanence. Schleiermacher sees the re¬
ligious experience as caused by the Unknown, and the religious
content as resting upoa a given ground. The important Key to
religion is expressed in a typical pnrase: "feeling of absolute
dependence." But if one asks on what one shall depend, one
2b
finds that Schleiermacher has not precisely pointed this out.
Schleiermacher does insist that religion must be one's
own, tnat it is elementary and authentic to human nature. Re¬
ligion is not a derived datum: it is not thought or will. It is
the subjective individual experience stretched out and, so to
speate, melted into tne realm of btennal. it is already true to
24. Christian Paitn. p.13. In this line of tnought, it
may be as well to point out that Schieiermacher essentially
agrees with Hegel's wild speculation tnat "reason is real" or
even vice versa is permissible except perhaps he puts it in a
slightly different way. of. John iclntyre, Tne Christian Doc¬
trine of History, (London and ,ainburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1937),
p. 16.
23« The farthest we can get from dchleiermacner in this
aspect is: "The consciousness of being absolutely dependent, or,
which is tie same thing, of being in relation with God."
Christian Faith, p.12.
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oneself even before one can discern for oneself trie "I" and the
"It", and this fact makes religion, anterior to philosophy and
ethics, in this negation of philosophy and ethics as Identifi¬
cations of religion, Schleiermacner probably wrote with Kant or
trie whole Rationalist movement in mind.
Schleierraacher' v8 concept of individual life essentially
views man's individuality as bound up in humanity as a whole
(das Oesamtleben der lenschheit). He explains that in religion
all things issue from the individual life the more individual,
the more effective * and sees all common elements as arising
simply from "observing affinity and connection." it is impor¬
tant to note that friess nas pointed out that Schleierraacher
emphasises 'a type of experience in which there is productive,
inner continuity between the individual and the universal.^
ffleiderer asserts tnat such claims of individuality are of per¬
manent value as "a principal criterion of true theological edu¬
cation that the theologian should remain conscious of tne indi¬
viduality of his way of looking at things, and should renounce
all claims to doctrinal authority of universal validity.In
this connection Wendland further points out Schleiermacher*s
importance: "He is and remains the great teacher of t ;e signi-
29
ficance of individuality for Christianity."
Prom his youth Schleiermacher was profoundly influenced
by the Moravians, so much so tnat even though he later renounced
'50
them, he called himself a He.rrnhti.ter of a higher order. i'he
26. Speeches, pp.82; 262.
27. .'chleiertaacher' s Soliloquies, p. 128.
28• Development of Theology, p.105•
29* "Sr ist und bieibt der grosse Lehrer der Bedeutung der
Individualist fUr das Chrxstentum. " Die Aeli. ioese Entwic&luna:
Schleiermachers, p.242.
50. Dilthey, "Er ist den Herrnhutertum eigen, dass die
Frommigkeit in iam Famiiienleben, 6emeinde, Lebenseinrichtungen,
alle Kunst und alles Denken durcn ringt. Schleieraacher hat
sicn einen Herrnhhter hflheror Oranung genannt." oa. cit., p.420.
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religious experience nad been ever true and real for nim throu¬
ghout his life, generating nia concept of infinite subjectivity
which dominated the whole of hi:; theological thought. But
Schleiermacher, knowing well the limitation of all human at¬
tempts at the analysis and synthesis of religion, fra.nK.iy re¬
minds us that he has taken us as ar as anyone can possibly go.
"Here," he said, "is tne end and summit of religion for all to
whom humanity is the whole world. But consiuer that in your
feeling there is something that despises these bounds, something
in virtue of which you cannot tay where you are. Beyond this
51
point only infinity is to oe looked into. ' Here we see that
Scnleiermacher began with an individual experience of tue spi-
32
ritual life and developed towara an ap renensiou of mysticism.
Thus the feeling or the immediate seif-consciousnt as in religion
is a dominant factor in the religious realm, although it is free
from all traditional doctrinal authority, ana yet for Bchieier-
macher, particularly In The Christian Faith, the feeling is one
of dependence. it seems to be free from all human efforts which
would tend to degenerate its very essence, and yet it is abso¬
lutely dependent at tnis more advanced stage of its development.
To apprehend this, Schleiermacher stressed tne importance of a
doctrinal system. Oman remarks: "Thus the mind can make its
feelings the object of its thought, and doctrines arise. Reli¬
gious ideas are reflections on religious feeling. This is the
55
conception he works out in tne Glauoenslenre. This is said
because Schleiermacher believes this re ling of absolute d pen-
dene e to be "the result of tne operation of the Universe, of
31- Speeches, p.62.
52. -11they, "tfenu der Sinn nun auf aaa unendlicne gerich-
tet ist, so entsteht Religion. In ihr versenxt sich das Auge des
Geistes in das Unendliche, Eine, Jwige, willenlos, refl xionslos."
op. cit.. p.540.
35. Speeches, p.xliii; cf. aic. Hermann -ulert, Scnleier-
macners Sendschreiben (fiber seine Giaubenslehre) an hficke. (Gie3-
sen: Veriag von Alfred Tdpelmann, 1906), p.17.
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personal experience, not merely of personal excitability."
one cannot afford to overtook a very profound significance in
it. it would not b^going too far to deem nis so-called "feeling"
as the point of contact of the human with tne divine, or as Otto
named it "divination.it is mystical because it has aivine
element in it. Schieiermacher is conscious that there must be
some way of tenowing it, even though he admits tnat knowledge is
'if
determined by existence no matter who might claim the contrary.
Schieiermacher actually did not change the basic princi¬
ple laid down in the Speeches: he merely developed it into an
assertion that the highest Knowledge comes through feeling. He
had already mentioned in his Speeches that the Knowledge of
faith is probable. He spoke in a challenging voice: "You would
not agree, yoa would never grant tnat our faith is as surely
founded, or stands on tne same level of certainty as your sci¬
entific knowledge! Your accusation against it is just that it
does not know how to distinguish between the demonstrable and
37
the probable." Thus, according to Schieiermacher, we do have
a Knowledge of faith, but, human knowledge and experience have
their definite limitations, we can Know only what is intelligi¬
ble to us.
3• Feeling as the rudimentary cause of universal religious-faith
"St O
(allgemeln-religioesen Glauben), common to all religions.
34. Speeches, p.xliii.
35- Xudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy, (Tranel. by John
is. Harvey, Humphrey Kilford: Oxford university Press, ly23),
p.021.
36. "Our Knowledge does not determine the existence of a
thing, but is determined by it then we have at least an indi¬
cation as to how to avoid as far as possible too great a humani¬
zing of the divine Knowledge." Christian Faith, p.203.
37. Speeches, p.30.
38. Wendland, op. cit.. pp.1-3*
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Since religion is primarily an human element, it is uni¬
versal and necessary to human life. Religion is a great spiri¬
tual phenomenon; a quality of mankind's inner life if, "accord¬
ing to the definite attitude and form it assumes in particular
cases, it is a product of time ana nistory." Schieiermacher
felt tnat the significance of the religious consciousness of
ail religions could not be ignored, ail of them being equally
manifestations of human life even though they were not ail of
equal value. Schieiermacher tolls us that the "multiplicity of
religions is based in the nature ffteeen^ of religion." lie re¬
gards it as self-evident that "no man can perfectly possess all
religion" and that, b cause "men are determined in one special
way, religion is endlessly determinable. But it must be equally
evident that religion is not dismembered and scattered in parts
by random among men, but that it must organize itseif in mani¬
festations of varying degrees of resemblance.""^ Any religion,
furthermore, that would resign its infinity could only appear
among men indeed in sorry form, in that event, religions are
only la vague, sorry, poor thought that corresponds to no reality.
Human religious expression is always deficient and incompetent
as an instrument of tne divine, yet tne divine element in the
religious consciousness would not be negatively influenced by
such a deficiency. The inadequacy of this deficiency can have
influence only on the human side: it always reacts upon mankind.
But, if one be willing to perceive it, this insight regarding
the divine element in the religious consciousness can always
be re-discovered. Thus Schieiermacher says: "I would nave you





earthly and impure, the same for , of heavenly oeauty tnat i
have tried to depict is to be sought in them."^ furthermore:
"jfou will iind tnat in tne positive religions alone a true in-
4 3
dividual cultivation of the religious capacity is possible."
In explicating the basic relations of other religions to ihe
Religion, Schleierraaoher shows that all have in their inner or¬
ganic unity the common element of feeling, an element which is
immediate and effective, and real ana true lor all and in all.
It is unnecessary that the Deity should be presented as a dis-
44
tinct object. with such a presupposition Schleiermacher ven¬
tures tnat as many iaaiviuuais as can feel may have just as many
religions, though they be religions without God preferably to
religions with Him. Rchleiermacher's concept of the origin of
religion is pushed in the Speeches to a point which is not simply
artistic or even mystical, but utterly fantastic. What, seen
from a more mature vantage point, does Schleiermacher actually
mean? Mackintosh comments: "Peeling is a mode of objective ap¬
prehension, a species of emotional perception or awareness of
spiritual things, and God is viewed as confronting tne soul in
4b
ilia real and infinite causality." Anu Selbie continues: "it
is through feeling, that the immediate and original existence
of God is presented to us," Schleiermacher is far more interes¬
ted in the subjective presence of God with us, than in any objec-
A K
tive certainty that we can attain about him. ' lowever, we see
that Schleiermacher himself lixed to express his conviction:
"true feeling is the highest attribute of man,"^ an attribute
to be understood as the approximating element whicu limts the
48




45» I.vpes of oder t Iheolox.y, p.48.
48. Schleiermacher, p.47.
47. Rowan, op. cit., 1. p.306.
48. peeches, p.82.
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into a new world. Sued ideas are presented in a more poetic
4a SO
and novel vein in his booic Christmas Eve. in which Irnest
51
says:
vVe become conscious of the inmost ground and of the inex¬
haustible power of a new untroubled life, and that in the
first germ of it we at the same time behold it© fairest
blossom and even its highest perfection. However unconsci¬
ously it may exist in many, the wondrous feeling connected
with tne miraculous cannot be resolved into anything exse
than into this concentrated vision of a new world.52
Thus this highest human attribute, as he calls it, is the most
significant important avenue whereby we apprehend this wonder¬
ful spiritual phenomenon. At tnis stage, it is still a very
artistic approach, since Schleiermacner sees religion and art,
especially music, as closely related. And it will not be going
55
too far to say, they are twins, they co-operate in this pro¬
cess of contemplation of the Universe.
4. Becoming as the evolutionary nature of specific Christian
54
faith (speaifischer Christusglaube), only Tne Religion
possesses it. not tne other religions.
It is understood that religion is at once one's very own
and something universal. Through the common possession of the
religious consciousness, ail religions are to be approximated
as the sum of Heligion which appeared and varied in different
forms according to their stage or direction of development.
49» Dilthey, op. cit.. p.xxix.
50. Chrlsttbas Sve, Cb'nglish Translation by w. Has tie,
Edinburgh: T. :.T. ClarK, 18^0).
51. In the Christmas ^ve, Schleiermacner was represented
by several persons who are his different elements of thought in
the dialogue! cf. Christmas Eve, p.77.
52. Christmas Eve, p.06.
53. Schleierraacher says: "ftere I to compare religion in
this respect with anything it would be with music, wnicn indeed
is otherwise closely connected with it." speeches, p.51*
54. 4endland, op. cit.. pp.2f.
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This is why chleiermacher reminds us never to forget that "the
fundamental intuition of a religion must be some intuition of
the Infinite in the finite, some one universal religious rela¬
tion, found in every other religion tnat would be complete, but
in this one only placed in the Centre.
According to Sc ileiermacher, this universal religious
consciousness is originally receptive to the action of the Uni¬
verse; ^ and the existence of God in us can only be active,^
with these two points in view. In this case ne means tnat all
mankind is destined to be incorporated eventually into this
58
All. The force of incorporation is Christianity. This very
nature of Christian faith is summarized by Cross in the follow¬
ing passage: 'this faith contains within itself the impulse to
unlimited expansion ana the power to appeal to the receptivity
59
of all men." Undoubtedly Schleiermacfter adopted the modern
thought of the time to explain the ethical life of religion.
Oman has pointed out the effect of Kant's epistenology, viz.,
the two great implicit conceptions of Idealism and Evolution^
which Schleiermacher felt attracted to apply at tnis point,
thus interpreting the Christian life as an awakening life or a
situation in which "the new life is present as something in the
1
process of becoming." Soteriologically, Scnleiermacher views
man's state as but a continuous personal life in the shaping of
man's own activity. Regeneration is but an assumed turning-point
55* Speeches, p.237.
56. Baillie, 'According to Schieiermacher's psychology,
then, mental life begins in a purely passive reception of im¬
pressions from the surrounding universe." op. cit., p.205.
57. Speeches, p.115*
58. Friess, 'The worx of humanity is promoted throughout
tne world; everyone feels tne influence of otners as part of
his own life." For they all are "members of a great organism,
and whatever they may have done severally, is instantaneously
consummated as its work." op. cit., p.52.
59. The Theology of Schleiermacher, p.129.
60. The Problem of Faith and Freedom in the Last Two
Centuries. (London: Hodder end Stroughton, 1906), pp.l97ff.
61. Christian Faith, p.47b.
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at which the continuity of the old ceases and that of tue new
begins. Similarly, by sanctification ue means the growing con¬
tinuity of the new life and the steady weakening of the old
t O £ 7
life.^ It is not a sudden change, but a gradual one0 of ever
advancing progress, it is a victory of tne good principle over
the bad: it is an inward deliverance of man's higher divine
nature0^ from the hindrances of his lower nature; it is a re¬
newal in the individual life as evoked and sustained by Chris¬
tianity, i.e. the moral community, the foundation of which must
in turn be traced to Jesus, ifleiuerer says that chleiermacher
system of salvation agrees essentially with Kant's philosophical
h Gy
doctrine. Mackintosh points out that his "underlying assump¬
tions are those of a monistic and evolutionary optimism. Con¬
tinuity, rather than crisis was Schieiermacher's guiding tnought
It might be interesting to note that Schleiermacher, even at an
early age, believed that God has created men for a striving
perfection: "For God cannot want to punish men eternally because
they have not become perfect, if He apparently aid not create
til
them for perfection, but only to strive after it." The Chris¬
tian life is assumed to have "the possibility of a continued
progress in the potency of tne God-consciousneso, while denying
that its perfection exists anywhere, we can also no longer main¬
tain that the creation of man has been or will be completed,
since undoubtedly in progress thus continual perfection remains
Art
always only a bare possibility." Tne present writer feels
62. Ibid.. pp.4(of.
6?. ibid., p.67Q.
t>4. Dilthey, "Das Christentuai ist nicnts anderes als das
hdhere Selbstbewusstsein der 'enschheit von inr seiber und ihrer
Aufgabe." op. cit., p.793.
6i>. evelopment of Theology, p. 118.
66. Types of 'odern Theology, pp.71f.
67. Dilthey, "dean Gott uann die enschen, die er offenbar
nicht zur Vollkomasenheit, sondern nur zum Streben nach derselben
geschaffen hat, unmdgiich darum ewig strafen wollen; well sie
nicht vollkoramen gewordea sind." op. cit., p.31.
68. Jhrlatian Faith, pp.37 • f.
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the anove passage to be in accord, in this respect, with the
Christian spirit as revealed in the New Testament.°* The Chris¬
tian attitude is to pursue perfection, although human ability
may only assume to perceive perfection. Real perfection is
viewed as one views the horizon at the ocean's edge from on
board a ship. It seems not to be too far away, but all we may
do is to aim at and not to reach it. According to Schleier-
macher, this might be an analogy of the creative act, which is
ever continuous, having completed a certain state and intending
to continue toward another and still another as each successive
70
state is concluded. It might be pointed out that Schleiermacher
does not mean to deny that our striving for good can bear fruit.
On the contrary, our attitude of pursuing the good implies always
the possibility of pursuing that which is better. Schleiermacher
formulated this conception not merely to follow the modern spi¬
rit of the time as just another modern idealist, but it may
71
also be seen from his basic conception of the nature of religion.
69. Luke 17:10
70. Friess, "The rationalistic ideal of science is main¬
tained as expressing an unattainable perfection of one of man's
eternal interests. But since it is clearly recognized to be
both an unattainable and a one-sided interest, there appears in
Schleiermacher's philosophy a certain antithesis or tension,
very characteristic and fundamental in all German thought of re¬
cent times, between the supposed claims of order and system, on
the one hand and the supposed claims of life and being, on the
other." op. cit.. pp.xxf; cf. p.l65«
71. It was found in chieiermacher's Speeches, even some
twenty years ago, that he reserved the right to state that be¬
cause mankind has no real knowledge of religion, religion is a
mystery to man, remaining on a higher-than-human level. He says:
"What we feel and are conscious of in religious emotions is not
the nature of things, but their operation upon us. What you may
know or believe about the nature of things is far beneath the
sphere of religion." It is because "the Universe is ceaselessly
active and at every moment is revealing itself to us." Speeches,
p.48. Thus, not only is religion expressed as a representation
of "the exhibition of the Infinite" in human life, but it also
is presupposed that the Universe is ceaselessly unfolding it¬
self, in which case the uncertainty of our Knowledge of religion
is twofold: for our Knowledge is then inadequately expressed
24
The word 'perfection" (Vollkommenheit) itself, as used in this
context, is to him essentially a contrauiction in terms; for,
according to nis concept, it is but "an aim for perfection,"
72
and the word "perfection' has no human co-ordinate. it is but
a stimulation of effort for our continual progress. Actually
according to Schleiermaoher*s basic principle of religion, he
has warned us that "anything beyond this, any effort to pene¬
trate into the nature and substance of things is no longer re-
7 5
ligion, but seeks to be a scienc of some sort." To criticize
Schleiermacher as having "humanized and moralized i \e work of
74
redemption in an entirely healthy way" without noticing his
honest and difficult attempt to reconcile idealism and healism
is to state only a half-truth. Schlelermacher himself maintains
that since man does not or cannot Know the real nature of reli¬
gion, even while and although he i3 inevitably conscious of it,
the only really reconciling way to find it is to have apprehend¬
ed it in feeling. Thus, a feeling of becoming perfect is essen¬
tially and eventually hie interpretation of the Cnristian life:
"An infinite holiness is the aim of Christianity. Mover content
with its attainments, it seeKS even in its purest productions,
even in its noiiest feelings, traces of irreligion and of the
tendency of all finite things to turn away from the unity of
the Whole."^
Therefore, Christianity is superior to all other forms
of religion, and its distinctiveness and its most effective na¬
ture is partly due to this noblest attitude of ever seeding and
from our side; and from the side of the Universe it is in a state
of moving or acting. That is why '•ehleierinacher even later alle¬
gedly adopted an evolutionist viewpoint, deeming it an appro¬
priate attitude for Christians in their pursuit of perfection.
72. "For perfection cannot be obtained by adding together
things that are imperfect." Christian faith, p.3/9*
73. Speeches, p.4y.
74. cf. Selbie, op. cit., p.liM.
75. Speeches, pp.243f.
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never being satisfied with what is found, even after having ar¬
rived at its nighest attainment. It was, in fact, originally
proposed for Christianity to establish man's incapacity and his
redemption, and their connection with each other, on one hand
and the work of redemption universally and completely accompli-
7
shed by Jesus of Nazareth on tne other. A Christian's life is
in a struggling condition which is the process of salvation, ana
in this process its basic principle is automatically worked out,
and its destiny advanced, a de tiny already determined by Jesus
and sealed through [Jis successful work of redemption. In Chris¬
tianity, religion is fully idealized just because "through its
original postulate, perpetual warfare against ail that is actual
in religion is presented as a duty that can never be sufficiently
77
fulfilled, ana just because tne ungodly is everywhere operative."
5• Christianity as modification of religious-con piousness,
together v.ith method of cio, mafic treatment.
The religious consciousness, i.e. the immediate feeling
within the Christian experience of absolute dependence, is the
essential origin of all doctrines which, in turn, are merely a
78
record or product of the Christian consciousness. ' lacxintosh
says:
The development and the eh racteristic facts of the Chris¬
tian mind are Schleiermaoher's tneme; he is speaking throu¬
ghout of the believer's religious states or affections, as
they testify of this or that beyond themselves. Not the
creative self-revelation of Goa is the object of his study,
but the modifications of the feeling of absolute dependence,
as that feeling taxes shape and colour within the Christian
Church. Thus doctrines looks in than out.79
76. Cnristian 2aith. pp.55f•
77. Speeches, p.245*
78. Earth, "Die cnristliche Lehre war, ist und vvird sein
ein Produkt der christlich-religidsen Affektion des raenschli-
chen Gemtites, nie sioh u.a. in dieser weise za adssern pflegt."
Die fheologie und uie Kircne, ( dncnen: Cnr. kaiser Verlag,
192d), p.140.
79 • Types of ..o era 1'neolo; y, u.74.
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Gross has summarized his method of dogmatics in this sentence:
"Christianity ia a modification of the self-consciousness, Chris¬
tian doctrine will be the expression of that self-consciousness
and all alleged doctrines of Cnristianity must be tested by the
OA
same." Doctrines serve, of necessity, as a means of communica¬
ting the religious Knowledge (or, more explicitly, of imparting
the Christian experience to knowledge). This does not mean that
Schleiermacher has completely changed his attitude towards dog¬
matics from his earlier romantic denunciation of dogma in the
fpeecnes, Therefore, there is no evident or ultimate contra¬
diction in the reconciling of certain emphases, viz., as to the
first and essential factor of religion, with that expression of
the Christian spirit whicn is common to possessors of Christian
consciousness.
Scnleiermacher says tnat a dogmatic delineation necessa¬
rily portrays two characteristics: viz., assertory and divinatory:
"In the former is manifested the author's confidence in nis own
theory; in the latter, the clearness witn which he apprehends
82
the existing state of things upon the whole." Again, ne says:
"A dogmatic treatment of the System of Doctrine, apart from per¬
sonal conviction is not possible, on the other hand, it is not
necessary tnat ail tnose elaborations of it wnich nave reference
to the same period of the same Church-Community should agree
83
amongst themselves. " * .From these two passages quoted above, we
80. The Theology of Schleiermacher. p.144.
81. Schleiermacher nas merely delivered religion from its
identification as dogmatics and has affirmed its independence
of all that tends to distort or obscure the very nature of reli¬
gion. As has been pointed out, he speaics with an apologetic pur¬
pose which, in turn, truly reflects the ferment of nis time.
But now, at this more matured stage in nis theological thought,
he feels the need for dogmatics ana affirms tnat dogmatics stands
in relation, if only in a "derivative relation," to Christian
experience (rather than the reverse), of. Cross, op. cit.. p.142.
82. Schleiermacher, Brief outline of the Study of Theology,
translated by William Farrer, to which are prefixed Reminiscences
of 'chleiermacher by Friedrich Lttcxe. (Edinburgh: T. -.!. Ci rx,
r.-DCCCL. p. 16$.
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deduce that Schleiermacner actually presupposes a supernatural
kind of knowledge which, in its very nature, not only could fina
its full expression in the individual as his personal conviction,
but also could nelp to apprehend the present states of the exis¬
ting orders of the "Whole." The reason is that Schieiermacher
postulates a transcendental power which lies in tne general union
of all existing forces since in the world-whole, all are seen
as interrelated or interdependent. Therefore, a uniform elabora¬
tion of this phase of knowledge in dogmatic treatment is virtually
unnecessary. He also states that the dogmatic treatment has to
p. A
do merely with the doctrines current at the given time. This
means that doctrinal statements are valid only in their own par¬
ticular age, but must leave room for further theological develop¬
ments in other times. For what one age may consider as valid
doctrines may not sufficiently meet tne needs of another age, be¬
cause Schieiermacher thinks that this phase of adjustment invol¬
ves and is conditioned by a situation which is historieo-
85
empirical.—^ Finally, Schieiermacher continues, "ail points of
doctrine which are developed by the dominant principle of the
period, must agree amongst themselves."05 This means it must be
87
scientifically true, i.e. logically self-consistent expression.
This process of harmonizing tne r ligious spirit and the modern
scientific spirit of human nature validates dogma for the Chris¬
tian communion. "As to its content," as Cross puts it, dogma,
"is not maue up of a series or system of propositions unfolded
from some objective truth obtained by a speculative process, nor
is it a combination of doctrines supernaturally revealed," for
Ibid., p.162.
84* xbid», p.130.
85- cf. Barth, op. clt.. p.141.
86. Brief Outline of the Study of Theology, p.l64«
87. Cross, op. clt.. p.149* Schieiermacher here xa conscious
of the historical character of the principle, and is not demanding
a uniform elaboration of doctrines (as we have discussed above).
88. Ibid.. p.142.
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except insofar as the individual originally belongs to a part
of the great whole; his self-consciousness is essentially or
teleologically related to the larger individuality of the hu¬
manity (das Gesamtleben des vlenschen). As to this point of
view, Schleiermacher does involve or incorporate some superna¬
tural concept about the origin of the content of dogma, as the
religious consciousness is being traced this one-step further
(The doctrine of the Great Whole, and tne way in which indivi¬
duals are related to humanity as a whole, will be discussed in
the next chapter).
What of Schleiermacher's attitude to Scripture in rela¬
tion to his doctrinal system? This does not seem to vary much
from what he has said in his Speeches, and his purpose and at¬
titude seem ever the same. Sacred writing, however, is by then
"a glorious production" to him, and "a peaxing monument from
the heroic time of religion, but, through servile reverence, it
would become merely a mausoleum, a monument that a great spirit
once was there, but is now no more." Schieiermacher has a fresh
outlook in his attitude to sacred writing. He regards this wri¬
ting as originally aimed at communicating religious experience
and ideas. So far as the exposition of its content is concerned,
one has to take notice of its subjection to historical limita¬
tions, and so, Schleiermacher holds the same view in regarding
religious feeling to be the primary and holy records the deriva¬
tive and secondary, not vice versa. As he says: "Not every per¬
son has religion who believes in a sacred writing, but only the
man who has a lively and immediate understanding of it, and who,
therefore, so far as he himself is concerned, could most easily
89
do without it." Schieiermacher might well nave thought that
Scripture is not necessary for one's religion; and perhaps one's
own scripture, if one co.tld produce it, would be better tnan
89. Speeches, p.91 •
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tne traditional writings. No doubt at a later viewpoint this
philosophical approach to religion in relation to the sacred
Scriptures is modified into a theological approach to the
Christian faith. Ail this assumes that 'we must, in the first
place, ratner have regard to the spirit than cling to the let¬
ter, and, in the second place, we must apply the exegetical
on
art to the letter itself, in order to make a right use of it."
Schleiermacher has already pointed out the need for ouard-
Q1 f
ing ourselves with respect to language and expression, so as
to discern form from nature and expose its true nature rather
than assume that the outward form and the true nature are the
qp
same. It is necessary to differentiate between what is origi¬
nal (tne natural) and what is artificial (the affected). This
he says because the sacred writings include metaphysical and
moral conceptions which are treated "in the creative, poetic
impulse," and though it necessarily works "in a poor and thanx-
iess speech, an endeavour to break through from a lower region
to a higher," one can easily see that any communication of this
93
sort could be nothing other than poetical or rhetorical."
Finally Schleiermacher's appeal to Scripture must be to
tne New Testament only not the Bible in general. He insists
that:-
Everyone must admit that if a doctrine nad neither direct
or indirect attestation in the Hew Testament, but only in
the Old, no one could have much confidence in regarding it
as a genuinely Christian doctrine; whereas if a doctrine
is attested by the New Testament, no one will object to it,
because there is nothing about it in the Old. ience the Old
Testament ap,ears simply a superfluous authority for
dogmatics.94
90. Christian Faith, p.lib.
91. Friess, "Language has exact symbols in fine abundance
r'or everything thought and felt in the world* s sense; it is tne
clearest mirror of the times, a work of art revealing the cur¬
rent spirit. But for our purposes language is still cruae and
undeveloped, a poor instrument of communion." op. cit., p.o4.
92. Speecnes, p.33.
93• ibid., p.34.
94» Christian Faith, p.lib.
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His attituae toward the relation of Christianity to Judaism is
that "Judaism is long since dead." He said: "My reason is not
that it was tue forerunner of Christianity. I hate that Kind
of historical reference. Each religion has in itself its own
eternal necessity, and its beginning is original. But the
beautiful childliKe eh racier of Judaism charms me.' His
Knowledge of the old Testament is obviously inadequate, for
Sehleiermaoher makes the cardinal mistake of relativizing the
Old Testament concept of revelation via a scientific approach
to the style and form of the Old Testament. The result? He
finds a beautiful childlike character that "charms" him. »hat
does he know about the relation of the Old Testament to the Hew
qg
Testament? Is tne old Testament an introduction to the Hew
Testament, or a preparation for it? —— or is the Hew Testament
the fulfillment of the Old Testament? Sohleiermacher*s attitude
is too arbitrary. Of course, according to his viewpoint, the
Hew Testament and the Old Testament portray -— to ail intents
and purposes two different religions, and Old Testament re¬
ligion is juet one religion among many whicn ail have some value
97
and origin in the religious consciousness. The present writer
thinks he could just barely escape reproof for being contradic¬
tory to his method of dogmatic treatment in this aspect (as he
put it, to discern the form from the nature). However, the
problem has been discussed above, he has found his solution in
the area of the religious consciousness, thus arbitrarily re¬
conciling his scientifically self-assumed judgment with his de¬
fective self-asserted theory.
sohleiermacher*s basic conception of ine modification
of Christian expression assumes precisely that Christianity is
a living, ever self-renewing religious communion; that it is a
spiritual p enomenon in history and an empirical fact, the
93- Speeches. pp.2>3f.
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existence ana nature of which cannot be deduced from the abs¬
tract conception of Christianity. Similarly, "the historical
96
facts cannot be aade to correspond with dialectical process."
96. According to schleiermacher, the Old testament is to
be valued as "the most general auxiliary to the understanding
of the few." Brief Outline of the Study of Theology, p.144•
97• Speeches, p.230.
96. Cross, op. cit.. p.147-
CHAPTER 11
THE GREAT WHOLE
Schleiermacher emphasizes the contemplation of the uni¬
verse and the receptivity of its action upon us in trie religious
consciousness through which is immedi teiy awakened a sense of
uniting with the great <mole (das Ganze). Oman points out that
it was Kant, once again, wno propounded this organic law which
"at once became the predominating scientific idea" for the cen¬
tury; for Kant seeics to establish "a law whereby it appears that
the whole is in all the parts.Schleiermachtr, in principle,
agrees with hi®, as may be seen in hie letter to E. von Willich
in which he says: "Every detail is 'out a part of a wnole, and
that we must first have mastered t-e.several parts in order to
understand the whole; it is, therefore nothing more than a pa¬
tient waiting for a perfect comprehension, and a sincere dis-
p
litte of all one-sided conclusions." " fchleieraiaeher views this
conception of a universally interrelated ivnole as originally
arising from the religious consciousness; and he meanwhile main¬
tains that
do man is in a position to draw by his representation and
speech from all who come oefore him the hidden gems oi re¬
ligion to light, for tne sphere of religion is far too
comprehensive. Remember tne different ways oy which men
pass from consciousness of the individual and particular
to tne Whole arid the Infinite: remember that, by this very
mode of transition, a man's religion assumes its own dis¬
tinct character. Thin*, of the various influences whereby
the universe affects man, of the thousand single percep¬
tions and of the thousand ways of combining them and show¬
ing one in the li-ht of tne other, tefiect, that if reli¬
gion is actually to stir a man's own feeling.3
1. Tne Problem of Eaitn r Freedom, p.lid.
2. Rowan, op. cit., I. p.•6i.
3. Speeches, pp.i72f.
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When we clarify ourselves, tne sense of the Whole will be found
"within our own minds and from thence transferred to corporeal
4
nature." Scnieiermacner' e basic conception nere involves not
only the feeling which serves to connect man with the world
without, but also the pnysical organization of the human being,
K
in which the feeling is to oe caused and which is originally
a part of the Whole. Schieiermacher is bold enough to venture
this concept of materially tracing a connection from feeling to
human corpus, and from the abstraction of the interrelated
Whole to the world without, thus working out his theory of the
Great Whoie from both the material and abstract sides. Scnleier-
macher, with this theory of reconciling things into a Whole, in
a way whioh is valid on two ides, eventually incorporates tne
object into the subject, or vice versa; the antithesis of 1 and
It is synthesized, ; irice essentially they are not only co-rela¬
ted and seen as belonging to each otner but also are seen as
identical. This is how Schleiermacher victoriously secures re¬
ligion's inuepenuence from philosophy and ethics. The latter
two depend on a wording antithesis of subject and object; whereas,
for Schleiermacher, the effect of religion is essentially but a
process of reconciling (or approximating) these areas, starting
from that feeling which is caused by the operation of tne Uni¬
verse and transmitted to the corporate Whole. To support this
theory of reconciliation or approximation, Munro remarks,
Schleiermacher even spiritualizes the material world: "'ieason is
originally present in things not less than in us, in the material
not less than in the spiritual. 'There is a process of ethic*
Speeches, pp.71, 136.
5. Schleiermacher says; "It is your body, you pervade,
as your own, its muscles and members and your thinking and fore¬
casting set its inmost nerves in motion." ibid.. p.45;cf. Chris¬
tian Faith. pp.236f.
6. Munro, op. cit., p.1b4.
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(Versittlichung) in the whole earthly nature, in time and space,
7
which is never given as the wor& of numan reason." Thus
Schleiermacher involves a third element of the religious under¬
standing of the world here to introduce a mysterious so-called
"process of etnic" which extends over and oeyona our reasoning.
According to him, reason has its limits, but the excitation of
cy
emotion (Krregung) is flexible. When one's feeling is excited
or sense awakened, one feels immediately united or belonging to
the greater One, or to humanity (i.e., one in tne One). When
this theory is further developed, numanity as it exists in na¬
ture as a whole, is called world; ana tnis world, while finite,
a
is in Infinity. Cross sums up at this point: "Tne highest de¬
velopment of the self-consciousness involves a consciousness of
our being a part of the articulated world-whole, and this again
is a condition of tne highest development of tne God-
10
consciousness."
4* God and feeling.
To discuss the term "God" one must appxy Schleiermaoher's
key to religion, i.e., feeling. "A feeling of freedom in rela¬
tion to the world" won for Sohieiermacher, the independence of
religion from an ambiguous admixture with the Knowledge and ac¬
tivity of mankind. And yet, to explain Schleiermacher*s concept
of God, this feeling is also ooth a feeling of freedom in rela¬
tion to the world and a feeling of absolute dependence in rela¬
tion to the term "God". According to Schleiermacher, religion
Ibid., pp.292f.
8. Speeches, p.42.
9. Oman says; chieioriaacher' s speculation was to find
reality for the individual as a whole within a whole." Ibia.,
p.xxix.
10. Tne Theology of Schleiermacher, p.158.
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is both individual experience ana mystical concept. It is only
through subjective experience that we can contemplate this mys¬
tical or transcendental idea of "God". we possess no real ob¬
jective Knowledge of God; Knowledge essentially belongs to man
so he might understand or determine himself; but so far as God
is concerned, man's knowledge goes out of the picture.^ But
Schleiermacher says:
If, however, word and idea are always originally one, and
the term 'God' therefore presupposes an idea, then we shall
simply say that this idea, which is nothing more than the
expression of the feeling of absolute dependence, is the
most direct reflection upon it and the most original idea
with which we are here concerned, and is quite independent
of that original knowledge (properly so called), and con¬
ditioned only by our feeling of absolute dependence.12
This feeling of absolute dependence or as Otto suggested "crea-
15
ture feeling" can be explained as "an awareness of the exis-
■j J
tence of God, as the absolute undivided unity." "The realiza¬
tion of one;elf as absolutely dependent is the only way in
15
which God and the ego can co-exist in self-consciousness."
But this awareness of the existence of God that is to say,
this God-consciousness must be connected with other deter¬
minations of the self-consciousness so as t> make them sudor-
1
dinate to this one; for even tnese determinations of the self-
consciousness are capable of exciting the religious conscious¬
ness through the contemplation of the Universe. Otherwise, the
God-consciousness would be out an empty proposition.
Sohleiermacher's approach to the concept of God is funda¬
mentally Christian. He does not arrive at this on the b- :is of
11. Christian Faith, p.74d.
12* ibid., p.17- cf. p.lo.
15- Otto, op. oit.. pp.20f.
14• Christian Faith, p.152.
15. Ibid., p.155.
16. Ibid., pp.17, 47.
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his philosophy of religion as he did. in the Speeches, where one
finds these terms in an undeveloped state of his concept of God:
Eternal, universe, Infinity, Indeterminate, etc. In the Speeches
Schleiermacher had emphasized that piety may even exist without
any idea of God whatsoever; out in the Christian Faith, apparently
moving a step further, he lays down the idea that God means "the
17
whence of our receptive and active existence." God, to him,
is an absolute universal causality; and our feeling of absolute
dependence is a real and oirect reflection of the dominant and
"binding principle behind all p enomena ana tne true Source of
our life in our ; elf-consciousness. Man, in order to have true
freedom in ail other worldly relations, must realize himself as
being absolutely dependent on God ana must passively surrender
to this Being of beings, this Reality of realities. Schleier¬
macher adds that:
The feeling of aosolute dependence becomes a clear self-
con ciousness o uy as this idea comes simultaneously into
being. In this sense it can inaeed be said tnat God is
given to us in feeling in an original way; and if we speak
of an original revelation of God to man or in man, trie
meaning will always be just this, that, along with the ao¬
solute dependence which characterizes not only man but all
temporal existence, there is given to man also the imme¬
diate self-consciousness of it, which becomes a conscious¬
ness of God.18
1*7. Ibid. , p.16; of. Mackintosh, op. cit., p.64.
18. Christian Palth, pp.l7f; cf. Munro, 'It is immediate
in the sense that consciousness of God is not formed in us, like
the concept or the judgment, through the intervention of an ob¬
ject, or th medium of reflection. In feeling, the contrasts
upon which thought rests are suppressed. What we feel is not
something external or finite, not the totality of being or the
highest power: what we feel is our own individual self-consci¬
ousness as essentially related to God. Peeling is the form of
subjective knowledge corresponding to the Absolute. It is not
wrought in us: it is the immediate relation of tne soul to the
transcendental Unity appearing and revealing itself in finite
things, and it simply comes to existence in the individual con¬
sciousness." op. cit., pp.!96f.
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Schieiermacher would, seem to say that tnis Kind of divine exis¬
tence in the individual or in otn r temporal beings must in
turn presuppose that the existence of God pervades throughout
19the world; for since God is an absolute undivided unity, any
attempt to present a pure and true conception of Goa tends to
imply division in Him. Scnleiermacher is very cautious not to
give rise to any objective consciousness of God's existence,
for to do so would not be true to his interpretation of the na¬
ture of religion.^
Schieiermacher hates to accept any concept of God which
is derived solely from either intellectual speculation or sen¬
suous satisfaction, because it would not be true either to human
experience or to tne nature of human Knowledge. Schieiermacher
completely refuses to develop the concept of God along these
lines: there would be absolutely no place for such a concept of
21
Goa in his dogmatic system. At this point Selbie concludes
that, in Schieiermacher*s system, the aoctrine of God is inade¬
quate:
in his strong reaction against Deism he tended to adopt
pantheistic forms of expression and to emphasize the divine
immanence at the expense of His transcendence. He was not
concerned to prove tne objective reality of the Being of
God, but was deeply interested in asking what God was to
the individual.22
Thus, according to Schieiermacher: God is originally unknown to
man, yet in the meantime, He is not far away from us. chleier-
macher's concept of God is unknown only apart from the religious
19* mackintosh, op. cit., p.o4.
20. According to Schleiormacner, religion is a matter of
"everyone's own": if any proof of God is possible, and if any
objective Knowledge of God is to be derived, religion eventually
becomes a derived datum totally foreign to that religious consci¬
ousness which is an ori. inai endowment to the nature of man.
21. Christian Faith, pp.l36f.
22. Bchleiermaoher, p.234.
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realm, viz., in the feeling of absolute dependence and man's
2~*>
sensation of being immediately united with Him. Schleier-
macher preached: "How can we nave living trust in uoc! if He is
not near and present in our soul; i.e., if we do not in the
depth of our hearts see His divine nature as that of tne strong
and beneficent God? But God is love, and tnerefore we can only
be near Him in the living strength of love."^4 This does not
imply to prove God in the living strength of love, for any at¬
tempts to prove God are not only unnecessary but frankly impos¬
sible. And Schleierxn&cher in fact affirms:
We cannot form any real conception of the highest Being;
but that philosophy {*i -eomorphism>l properly consists in
the perception that this inexpressible reality of tne highest
Being underlies all our thinking and all our feeling; and
the development of this Knowledge is, according to my con¬
viction, what lato understood by dialectics. But further
than this, i believe, we cannot get.25
And, in another paaaag- from the Christian Paith, Schleiermacher
pL
says that a God that "could be proved, must not itself be God."
Because God is transcendent, we cannot adequately or scientifi¬
cally describe Him, since every description is a limitation
27
which is irreconcilable with His essence. Therefore, "His na¬
ture is such that in no sense could we react upon Him. Were such
reaction possible, the sense of utter and unreserved dependence
would promptly vanish, and our attitude could no longer be des-
28
cribed as specifically religious in character.""'
23* Christoph Cenft, wahrhaxtigKeit una *>ahrheit. (Ttlbingen:
J.C.B. ohr (Paul Siebeck), 1956)* "Schleieraacher, philosophisch
ein Brbe des 18. Janrhunderts und ein Rornantiker, hat kein Ver-
stSndnis ftir ein solches GegenGber von Gott und Censch; es ist
ihm selbstverstMndlich, dass das GtJttliche im ilenschen selbst
liegt." p.7.
24. Selected Sermons of Schleiermacher, (edited by 41.
Robertson Nicoii, London: Hodder x Stoughton, 1890), pp.400f.
25. Rowan, op. cit.. 11. p.283.
26. Christian Faith, p.136.
27. Lichtenberger, op. cit.. p.142.
28. Mackintosh, op. cit.. p.64.
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Schleiermacher hesitated to adopt or assert the idea of
29
a personal God. In his letier to Jacobi he says: "The foun¬
dation of your philosophy was the idea of a personal God, which
30
1 denied." Thus, while Schleieraiaeher' s God is as true and
near to his heart as he is to himself, he does not allow any
concept of the objective reality of Goa to be formed. Actually,
51
this is what he reaiiy means by absolute dependence. Absolute
dependence to the indeterminate! That is why leg: 1 sarcastically
mocked his typical phrase, "feeling of absolute dependence,"
saying that Schleiermacher* s dog would even be snore faithful
32
and pious than its master. It is because this speculative
champion can only see that this is a Kind of half-way Knowledge
that he must reject its indeterminate character. Pfleiderer
points out:
How Schleiermacher came to give such a meagre account of
religious feeling, emphasizing what may be called tne phy¬
sical side of dependence on an infinite cause, to the ne¬
glect of the moral side, represented in the xeeling of al¬
liance witn a voluntary power related spiritually to our¬
selves. .ve can hardly be wrong in tracing the origin of
this defect to the influence of tne :nilosophy of Spinoza,
whose cognitio Dei intuitiva is nothing else than the re¬
ference of all finite phenomena to tne necessary causality
of God, that is, the feeling of our dependence upon
it. This supposition is confirmed by Schleiermacher*s doc¬
trine of God, which is connected with nis imperfect theory
of tne nature of religion.33
29» in tne Speeches, Schleiermacher sees that piety may
exist without any idea of God 'whatsoever even though, in a more
mature viewpoint, a religion without a personal God might t>e
better than one with a personal God.
30. Rowan, op. clt., II. p.263.
31• Christian Faith, p. 14.
32. jfric S. .Vaterhouse, odern Theories of Religion,
(London: Charles U Kelly, 1910), p.37*
33. development of Theology. p.lOo.
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As to Schleiermacher*s view of the relation of God to the
■54
world, the religious feeling is the result of God's operation
3 3
in us by means of the operation of the world. As Wendland
puts it: "There is no isolated intuition of Godhead, but we see
it only at, in or with the whole system of intuition, Our Know-
It
ledge of God is, therefore, only completed in the world-view."
God and world are not identical, but correlative, ii&e "right"
37
and "left". But God underlies all our being, tninking, and
feeling; He is the presupposition of ail valid Knowledge
and yet, 'God is never apprehended as it were naxedly, but al¬
ways in conjunction with, or mediated by, some finite element
of the world."58
2. Universe and man.
f>e will deal with the heading of Universe and man more
from the material side than we did in our approach to the head-
ing God and f eling which we have discussed above. As dacKintosh
points out:
It is Schleiermacher* s contention that the fundamental
Unity may be designated either God or world. These two
ideas are given only in ana with each other. ThinK the
world without God, and it has no bond of union; thirst God
without the world, and the object of our thought is devoid
of content, "fet the one is in no sense identical with the
other. The world is the supreme Unity including all anti¬
theses; God is the supreme Unity excluding all antitheses.39
34. fore about the world will be treated in tne following
section. Here we are concerned only with God ia(relation to the
world.
35. In order to apprehend tne operation of God, the world-
impression i. our necessary source for the content of the object
of our thought.
36. "Ks gibt *eine iaolierte Anscrmuung der Gottneit, son-
dern wir schauen sie nur an, in una mit aem gesamt n System uer
Anschauung.' 'Unser ftissea um Gott ist also erst voiiendet mit
oer Weltanschauung.'" (quoted by him) op. eit.. p.l9o.
37. Mackintosh, o.♦ cit., p.GO.
3d . J 0X U ., p^ . <»uf.
39« ibid.. pp.39f.
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According to Schleiermacher, man possesses a possible concep¬
tion of God in the religious consciousness, but only via the
contemplation of the universe. Suppose that this cause as the
result of God's operation upon us through the operation of the
world.^ In that case the world is a medium of the divine,
both as the sphere of divine activity and in the self-conscious¬
ness of human existence. If Schleiermacher had only discussed
the God-consciousness and human feelings without relating or
referring them to the world and to man, we should have a quite
empty and abstract discussion which, perhaps, only spiritual
beings could conduct convincingly.
In the feeling of absolute dependence, the God-conscious¬
ness and world-consciousness should be distinguished from each
other, though without obscuring their close relationship and co-
41
existence. The world supplies us with the expression of the
divine causality and with a reflection of the content of the
God-consciousness. Cross writes that the variou. modifications
of religious feeling arise "from our relation to tne universally
interrelated totality of Mature in which we are." He continues:
"'ihe range of ourexperience (or of the consciousness of our re¬
lations) is limited to this world, and hence the feeling of ab¬
solute dependence is experienced only within the world-whole
(world-order) and through it. That is to say, for us the abso¬
lute divine causality finds its full expression in the totality
of the forces of Mature.Thus ensues quite a process of
analysing Schleiermacher's theory of the development of religion!
Schleiermacher sees everyone as possessing feeling, which is the
elementary capacity for religion. ..hen once awaxenea or excited,
40. Speeches. p.45*
41. Christian Faith, pp.lid, 233*
42. The Theology of Schleiermacher. pp.lobf.
43« '. ince in. religious self-consciousness can only fill a
moment when combined with an excitation of tne sensuous self-cons
ciousness, and every sued excitation is an impression of tne
world." Christian Faith, p.233.
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this feeling stretches out to the plurality of beings of finite
existence (i.e., the world). "we taxe up the world into our
self-consciousness and expand the latter into a general cons¬
ciousness of finitude, we are conscious of ourselves as abso¬
lutely dependent." eanwhile, Schleiermacher also points out
that "we are constituent parts of the world."44 Does this mean
that our absolute dependence stems from the nature of tne world,
as we see it, as a composition of constituent parts, each of
which is absolutely dependent upon the other? Does this situa¬
tion reflect our human situation? Is tne concept of Unity of
the world simply identical with God? Otherwise, where aoes
Schleiermacher maxe place for the c mcept of the Unity of tne
45
world? Or viewed from anotner aspect, the Unity of the world
may depend on the absolute supreme force of unification, i.e.,
God. If God is originally presented in the religious self-
consciousness of man, then either we have the human mind actually
perceiving this world of infinite multiplicity as a unity, or we
see God as an unknown datum4° binding this world of infinite mul¬
tiplicity together as a Unity, l'he concept of God as the Uupreme
Unity behind all and binding all is more maturely presented in
the Christian Faith than in the Speeches, in which it i said
that the pantheistic trend is undeniable.<r ^ In the strict sense
of the word Schleiermacher actually was not, then or later a
pantheist, although a part of his work probably is undergirded
44. Ibid., p.55.
45* Here Oman has pointed out that "the Universe, in ac¬
cordance with the new philosophy, was conceived as infinitely
active. In this part of Schleieraacher* doctrine there are dis¬
tinct traces of Sohelling. This activity divides itself, but di¬
vision is not separation, but parallelism and interaction. This
division that is not separation, is found throughout the
Universe." Speeches, p.xxix.
46. That is, either God is xnown in the feeling of absolute
dependence as God-consciousness, or tie is unknown in the sense
of personality.
47. Cross, oo. oit., p.IOB.
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Art
with a Spinozist structure. Mackintosh rightly apprehends
Schleiermacher at this point, saying that "he makes it clear
that for him the feeling of absolute dependence points beyond
the sum-total of finite beings. 'This (Whence) . .concerning
iq
the Source of all, 'is not the world.*" 3
Another conspicuous aspect concerning the world mu3t be
discussed. "The Universe is in unbroken activity, and reveals
itself to us at every moment. Every form, every creature,
every occurrence is an action of trie Universe upon us, and re¬
ligion is just the acceptance of each separate tning as a part
of the Whole, of each limited thing as an exhibition of the
50
Infinite." ..<chieiermacner continues along these lines:
The more everyone approaches the Universe ana the more tney
communicate to one another, the more perfectly they all be¬
come one. No one has a consciousness for himself, each has
also that of his neighbour. They are no longer men, but man¬
kind also. Going out of themselves and triumphing over them¬
selves, tney are on the way to true immortality ana
eternity.31
Thus through a religious process, humanity is destined to melt
52
down into one fellowship. Schleiermacher means this to be
48. Pfleiderer writes: "The relation of Goa to the world
(which forms the basis of his entire theology), according to
which both God and world are conceived as equal magnituaes, only
that the former is the absolute and undivided unity, which the
latter is the unity from the relation of the natura naturans to
the natura naturata of Spinoza." op. cit., p.110. As for pan¬
theism, he does not regard this as "a special form of religion,
but as a speculative theory, quite reconciiaole with true reli¬
gious feeling, as long as we do not understand by it a masked
materialism." Ibid., p.33.
49. Types of Modern Theology, p.79.
50. Speeches. po.278f.
51. Ibid.. p.180.
32. Schleiermacher*s basic Christian belief relates to
his doctrine of the original perfection of the world, in the
sense that the process of this perfection is identical with the
activity of the expansion of Christianity in the world. He op¬
timistically believes that ultimately this specific religious
community will pervade all peoples. As Cross puts it: "original
44
related to the ori0inai perfection of the world, as the ulti¬
mate goal to be reached. He postulates that the original per¬
fection, but of a developed one, does not refer to "any defi¬
nite condition of the world or of men nor of the God-conscious¬
ness in men." Rather,
such perfection is affirmed in the above sense, i.e. it is
laid down that all finite being, so far as it co-determines
our self-consciousness, is traceable pack to the eternal
omnipotent causality, and all the impressions of the world
we receive, as well as the particular way (consequent on
human nature) in wnich the predisposition towards God-cons¬
ciousness becomes realised, include the possibility that
the God-consciousness should combine with each impression
of the world in the unity of a moment.!?3
Here Schleiermacher draws attention to what rte calls the "eter¬
nal omnipotent causality". It is the working force for appro¬
ximating the world-impression to the God-consciousness in the
religious self-consciousness. One might say that Schieiermacner•s
"eternal omnipotent causality" is the projector throwing pic¬
tures on the screen, i.e., his concept of the world. The screen
54
can show off only what is already in the projector. it con¬
tinuously develops a running situation, one picture after an-
55
other, rather tnan freely developing something ad lib. "The
question," Schleiermacher avers, "is ratner of self-identical
perfection prior to all temporal development and based on the
inner relations of relevant finite existence." That is to
perfection pertains to human nature, in that man possesses tne
original capacity of connecting ail nis experiences witn God,
that he is capable of propagating that same religious attitude
to all men, and that all men are consequently capable of recei¬
ving it." op. cit., p.174. We shall discuss this in greater
detail when treating Schleiermacher's doctrine of the Church.
53. Christian f'aitn, p.234.
54. cf. Brunner, fan in Revolt, (Loudon: Lutterworth
Press, 1939), p.458.
55. Just as in the relation of the television set to the
station, the TV set is absolutely dependent upon what tne sta¬
tion televises.
56. Christian Faith, p.234.
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say, we are dealing with "those relationships which uniformly
underlie the whole temporal development and throughout it re-
57
main the sarae."^ Thus, the continuous unfolding of the world
has a definite purpose of developing, or of attaining to, some¬
thing. Revelation means to discover this purpose, or to under-
58
stand this unfolding of the world. Schleiermacher clarifies
this:
In oelief in tne eternal omnipotence it is implied that
the world is the complete revelation of it, so in belief
in the original perfection of the world it is implied that
through the feeling of absolute dependence the divine om¬
nipotence in all its livingness reveals itself everywhere
in the world, aa eternally omnipresent and omniscient,
without any distinction of more or less, without even a
contrast in respect of dependence between one part ana
another.59
Here it must be pointed out tiiat the expression of the content
f.n
of revelation is but an expression of human nature. ' t»hy?
Because the world is the complete revelation of the eternal om¬
nipotence, and "man himself, with his cinstitution, is an inte-
gral part of the world." The revelation which is understood
as the original communication of the world to man must there¬
fore, be human expression. That is what 'chleiermacher means
by saying that the original perfection of the world includes
62
the original perfection of man. "The relations between man
and the world are twofold each acts upon, and is acted upon
by, the other," ana the influence of their activity is reci¬
procal. In Schleiermacher's own words. "This explanation would
57. ibid., p.235.
58. According to Scnleiermacher, religion implies an ap¬
prehension of the communication of the Universe to man. As
Otto says: "The presentiment goes out to meet the 'revelation'
to which i; belongs." op. cit♦, p.164.
59* Christian Faith p.234.
60. Because the finite being:: could be utilized as ins¬
trument or means of expression, cf. Christian Faith, p.238.
61« Ibid.. p.236.
62. Loc. cit.
63. Cross, op. cit.. p.171.
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not be hard to give, for, assuming an organic construction of
trie whole, all is just as much for each as each for all."04 He
actually means that the religious self-consciousness has two
states, passive and active, both of which are necessary in the
development of tne Coo-consciousness. Its process is this:
Passive states, however, can only arise through operative
influences, and hence the original perfection of the world
in relation to men consists primarily in this, that in it
is temporally grounded tne excitation of passive states
which are to pass into active states (these we name incen¬
tives), or, in other words, that they sufficiently determine
the receptivity of man to the awakening and shaping of his
self-activity.65
Man is actually in the world; his relation to the world is tne
same as his feeling of absolute dependence to his body, his phy¬
sical organism, all of his elements being articulated into this
great whole and all exercising influence upon the others.
Schleiermacher goes even further in this respect, saying that
not only could finite beings or things of the world serve merely
the revelation of the Eternal, but that originally also "there
66
xs a divine element in things." He preached that the entire
human being and all of nature have been endowed with "manifold
but variously diversified gifts" by the Spirit, manifesting
themselves "in different ways according to differences of time
A r7
and situation."0 They are all interdependent: they co-exist
68
in a closed organic connection. it may be imagined that
Schleiermacher actually infers the activity of tne great whole
from the activity of tne human physical organism, i.e., the boay.
64. Christian Faith. p.237.
65- Ibid., p.238.
66. As Mackintosh puts it, according to Schieiermach r:
"Have you opened your mind to its reality ana answered its ap¬
peal? A sublime and eternal meaning pervades the world, which
no human conceptions can ever compass or exhaust: has your soul
bowed before it in reverence?" op. clt., p.53.
67. Nicoll, Selected Sermons of Sohleicrmacaer, pp.219f«
68. ibid., p.439»
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The body is composed of many different organs, all of which
work harmoniously together, each of which supports and is sup¬
ported by the others, yet each of which immediately remains
o 9
relatively free and yet also relatively dependent. in this
respect the world, too, is a harmonious cosmos: "The world is
a harmonious cosmos or is meant to become this more and more.
The ethical ("process]! has already begun to penetrate nature and
progresses more and more in this."^ As Schieiermacher himself
wrote:
For we have a feeling of freedom (though, indeed, a limited
one) in relation to the world, since we are complementary
parts of it, and also since we are continually exercising
an influence on its individual parts; and, moreover, tnere
is the possibility of our exercising influence on ail its
parts; ana while this does permit a limited feeling of de¬
pendence, it excludes the absolute feeling.71
In forming his concept of the Unity of the Universe (the world-
whole), he thereby spiritualizes Nature at the expence of mate-
72
rializing the value of man. an, together with finite exis¬
tence, has the same standing in the Universe wnich is the eter¬
nal behind which the Eternal stand.^ "Every finite tning,
however," Schleiermacner says, "is a sign of the infinite, and
so these various expressions declare the immediate relation of
74
a phenomenon to the infinite and tne »vnoie." irobably the so-
called "Infinite" (Unendlicne) ana "the Whole" (danze), as in
the passage just quoted, nay signify an "eternal" which does
69. The present writer feels that Schieiermacher actually
illustrates the unity of the activity of a human body to form
his concept of the unity of the activity of the world'.
70. '-endland, ! ie ffelt i; t ein harmoniecher Kosmos Oder
soli es immer mehr werdea. Das Sittliche hat bereits begonnen,
xie Natur zu aurchdringen und scnreitet iouner weiter hierin
fort." op* cit.. p. 110.
71. Christian faith, pp.i6f.
72. As Monro points out in his Aesthetik, Schieiermacher
has a remarkable discussion on man's place in Nature (Aestnetik,
pp.1 1-106). "In your bodily organization we iave a sense that
is open to tne manifoldness of the world and its appearances."
Schieiermacher, p.294»
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not correspond to the "Sternal". In such a case the bternai
would only stand behind the eternal. Some more explanations
are given by ::uaro when, at the end of his book, he discusses
the notion of the highest force in the world of experience, a
force which is the ground of ail appearances but whicn does
not transcend the sphere of that which is contrasted, since
'every force is measured by the totality of its appearance,
and is, therefore, necessarily of a definite or determina¬
ted extent.' Besides, 'the highest force only so condi¬
tions all that it becomes itself conditioned by all.' The
highest force t&xen along with its inseparable appearance,
or the system of the reciprocal action of things upon each
other, can give us only 'the idea of the world the sys¬
tem of forces, the abiding forms of beings,as identical
with the system of cause of effect.* This, it is true, is
the limit of our knowledge the terminus ad quern, but it
is not the terminus a quo, the • «hence' of our knowledge.
The real Absolute can never be identical with the totality
of knowing and being, since it is the transcendent ground
of all knowing and being, tne Jbrue Unconditioned condition¬
ing all things.75
No doubt, Sehleiermacher meant that in nature all is completely
interdependent via a higher unifying force. All tnis is signi¬
ficant^ in tne sense that more or less, we see constituent
75* acxintosh, op. cit., p.55.
74« Speeches, p.88.
75. Schleiermaoner, p.292i cf. "God and world are not to
be identified, but 'neither can we think of one without the
other'; they are correlatives. Both are transcendent; the world
transcends all actual thought as a terminus ad ,uera toward which
the process of discovery approaches; God transcends thought abso¬
lutely as a terminus a quo, in which thinking is grounded, but
which it cannot approach.' (Werke, III v.4,2 pp.154-172),
quoted by JKriess, op. cit., p. 137.
76. chleiermacher affirms that notning, not even the
smallest "should be excluded from the relation of absolute
dependence" as a stimulating object of the religious conscious¬
ness. See Christian Faith, p.172.
parti' manifesting themselves in the whole. Of course we know
that in all these ideas Schleieraacher owes a great ijheal to
the contemporary thought of hi© age. At this point he clari-
- (jf*
fies himself so as not to be tagged 'wiih a pantheistic point of
view. He said:
tie ought to observe more car fully the difference between
a universal and an individual cause. For in the totality
of finite being only a particular and partial causality is
given to each individual, since each is dependent not on
one other but on all the others; the universal causality
attaches only to that on whicn the totality of this partial
causality is itself depenaent.77
Finally, with regard to the world and its origin and de¬
velopment, the term 'historical whole" is introduced. Schleier-
macher says: "Every historical whole is capable of a continued
existence only by means of the same energies through which is
7R
originated." His view is that one has no consciousness of a
70
beginning of existence, but only of a continuous existence.
Schleierraacher warned that 'all attempts to form a historical
picture of the first beginnings of human existence are bound to
fail, because, as we have no experience of an absolute beginning,
we have no analogy by which we could make the absolute beginning
of rational consciousness intelligible." But "if the narrative
i regarded not as history but simply as an ancient attempt to
make good the lac* of an historical account of the beginnings of
the human race, the particular points in it will have inner
trutn for us in eo far as they agree with the conception which
77. Ibid.. pp.l74f.
76. Brief Outline of the Otuay of Theology, p. -06.
79. In other word, not "the origin of the world but its
co-existence with God and its reiatednese- to God." Christian
Faith, pp.174, 748; cf. Bailiie: According to Schleiermacher,
"faith has no concern at all with the manner of creation, but
only with tne assurance that behind ail creation there is,
somehow, God.' op. cit., p.34.
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we have laid down." Scnleiermacher here ri, ntiy challenges
the consciousness of modern scientific knowledge in a negative
way. tor in going back in thought, we have reached the end of
it, farther than which we cannot go.ol
One more aspect has to be discussed before concluding
this chapter. It is this: the fact that every individual has
his own significance within humanity. "1 saw clearly,
fchleiermacher says, "that each man is meant to represent hu¬
manity in his own way, combining its elements uni uely, so that
it may reveal itself in every mode, ana all that can issue from
its womb be made actual in the fullness of unending space arm
3?
time." He sets forth the claims of the importance of the
individual:
Everyone knows that he is both a part and a work of the
Universe, in him also its divine life and working being
revealed, we, therefore, regards himself as an object
worthy of the attention of others. <«ith sacred reserve,
yet with a ready opennes; that ali may enter and behoid,
he lays bare everything of the relations of the Universe
of which he is conscious ana what of the elements of hu¬
manity takes individual shape in him. vVhy should they
hide anything from one another? Ali that is human is
holy, for all is divine.85
As uichtenberger explains it, Schleiermacher sees that 'man
carries in himself the consciousness of the eternal and the
infinite; he coes not receive it from without; it constitutes
i ,j
trie foundation of his being." '4
Thus, Schleiermacher truly apprehends the human
80. Christian Faith, p.250.
81. as Oman puts it: "This is the source ana the type of
all experience. Perception therefore rests not on reasoned
knowledge but on belief; it is a transaction witn tae Universe
and therefore a religious act." Speeches, pp.xxixf.
82. ifriess, op. clt., p.31.
83. Speeches, p.180.
84. Hi-- tor.y of German Theology in the 11th Century, p.67•
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fellowship, the importance of the individual within humanity,"
the reality of the Universe, and the religious life which seeKs
the full manifestations of the Universe as a marvelous, infi-
a/r
nitely active Whole.
85- Friess, "Each human being has his own unique place
within the sphere of humanity, and it is only by his approach¬
ing this that he can exercise his influence in the spiritual
community." op. cit., p.xliii.
86. As R. Otto understands it, 'Ihe vast, living totality
and reality of things as it is in nature and history." op. cit.,
p.150.
CHAPTER III.
THE DOCTRINE OF 3IN
Schleiermacher has an original and remarkable interpre¬
tation. of sin. riis viewpoint is . uite independent of both the
traditional description of it and the criptural narrative of
it. He worka out the doctrine of sin in accordance with, his
policy of organizing hi;: theological thought as one organic
whole.
He call!- one's attention to a re-examination of tne whole
concept of sin, which is worth discussing or emphasizing"only as
1
it is related to other issues of theological notion . He re¬
fuses to concretize the concept of £ in as a reality of sin-in-
itself,' or to imagine it to be a really existent external enemy
of mankind or as an antagonist to God's will. If it were the
former, the concept of a great harmonious whole, or the unity
of the world-whole woul . be invalidated, or else would be con¬
tradictory to itself; if it were the latter, the concept of the
absolute dependence or' the world-whole to the Eternal would be
over spiritualizes or "evaporated". Another possibility is in¬
volved; that there would be a third kind of existence introduced
into his system of thought; but ochieiermacher himself would
1. "In the sinful nature, the bad £Bflse"| exists only cor-
reiatively with the good, and no moment is occupied exclusively
by sin; for sin actually presupposes the God-coneciousnees, so
tnat the sinful nature always retains the presence of God as
something imparted, though only in the most limitea degree."
"The limitation of the God-consciousness, as well as its impar-
tation, may be grounded in one and tne same divine will."
Christian Faith, p. Vt>2.
2. "We must rather insist upon the fact that sin in gene¬
ral exists only in so far as there is a consciousness of it; and
this again is always conditioned by a good which must have pre¬




never give way to such confusion. Thus, so far as the positive
reality of sin is concerned, there is no place for it in his
system of thought. Schleiermacher is very sure that he cannot
assign any unique or c.ertain characteristics to the fragmentai
frV
notions of sin, by way of delineating its original nature. He
only recognizes the doctrine of sin as having negative value in
the whole drama of salvation; it can only be utilized at every
stage of the development of the religious consciousness. it
serves to reflect the good. In Schleiermacher'a optimistic
thought which believes that Christianity shall expand to embrace
all humanity, we find that sin actually serves to stimulate the
realization of the need for redemption. As Christianity ex-
pands, sin shrinks and ultimately disappears.
Schleiermacher says: "In Christianity these two, sin and
grace, are valid ideas only on the basis of redemption and on
the assumption that it has been appropriated."^ He means that
both ideas, sin and grace, exist side by side; and he assumes
that "everywhere human evil exists onxy as attached to good, and
8
sin only as attached to grace." According to him, sin is rxeces-
9
sary for working out the process of redemption; for he preaches:
5. Ibid., pp.16jf.
4. Kegarding "sin ae a state of man, he insists that it
must always be considered from the standpoint of the personal
consciousness. He identifies sin and the consciousness of sin.
It exists in ail stages of human development ana expresses it¬
self as a strife between lower and higher impulses, between the
flesh and spirit"; "a consciousness of struggle between differ¬
ent powers of the nature, and this consciousness constitutes
sin." Selbie, op. cit., pp.!46f.
5. ""in does not belong to the essence of humanity, but
is a contradiction of man's native God-consciousness." Ibid.,
p.118.
6. It is God's will that "sin should gradually be bani¬
shed through grace, but this is to say that it is God's will
that sin should exist (for us, not for Him), else the redemp¬
tion could not occur." Cross, op. cit., p.lb9«
7* Christian fr'aith, p.264.
8- Ibid.. p.527.
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very great Historical event is a judgment on some evil
that has gained the mastery, and it thus becomes in one
aspect or another the germ of a new life; and only where
we find and recognize a great phenomenon. And the same
is true as to individuals; sin must have somewhere gained
the upper hand, the flesh must have been active and ru¬
ling, that grace may have the mastery when the spirit at¬
tains to life; every one must first have tasted the life
of corruption, and then, by the second act of divine om¬
nipotence and love, he is born of the Spirit and becomes
spirit.10
vV end land wrote: "Every evil was to him a transit ionai-point for
aiming at perfection in God. This transition was necessary,
11
was willed by God." Thus, evil is not only closely related
to but also conditioned by good. Schleiermacher persistently
emphasized the negative significance of the fact that sin exists
only in the world of religious experience. Seibie reminds us
that to understand Schleiermacher's doctrine of sin, the idea
of "sin itself is an antithesis of the religious aelf-conscious-
1?
ness," and must therefore be Kept in mind. " Selbie's reminder
is not without its point when one looks back to Schieiermacher's
earlier concept of sin, expressed in nis Speeches: "Religion
has no other opposite than just the absence of religious purpose."
Here it seems that "cold" is nothing else than just the absence
of "heat". As he says: "Every interruption of religion is irre-
iigion. If the mind is for a moment without intuition and feel¬
ing of the Infinite, it at once becomes conscious of hostility
9» Schleic-rmacher writes: "I understand human nature to
be a necessary stage of spiritual life, and viewed from this
side no human being is insignificant who has in him something
peculiar, which represents human nature from a new side." Rowan,
op. cit ♦, I. p. "568.
10. Nicoli, Selected Sermons of Schleiermacher, p.90.
11. "Alles Bdse war inm ein Durchgangepunict zu dem Oiele
der Vollendung in Gott. Dieser Durchgang durch das Bdse war




and remoteness. Christianity then demands as first and essen-
tial that piety as a constant state." Although Schleierma-
cher views Christianity as a continuous progressive advancement,
yet the course of development is not strictly a smooth line. It
is a struggle,"^ a social one as well as an individual one.
Besides the passage quoted above from his preaching, here it
may also be seen why mackintosh has added:
In every moment of consciousness, he argues, it is possible
to distinguish between tow elements or factors: a sense of
freedom and a sense of constraint, of self-determination
and of being determined by things around us. Our human life
is an alternating and continuous succession of these two
kinds of feeling; we are never wholly subject to our envi¬
ronment, but also we are never wnoliy masters of it. Yet a
region or zone of experience does exist in which we have
the sense of being dependent and nothing else. That zone
is religion.15
To quote one more passage from his preaching:
Undeniably one of the strangest phenomena of the human soul
is the conflict between two feeiings, both lying deep in
the noblest part of our nature, and yet constantly opposed
to each other: our love to our fellows on the one side, and
our pure sense of right and wrong, of good and evil, on the
other.16
This is his own description of the state of the human soul, it
is a strenuous state of transition, a process of constantly be¬
coming better.Other than noticing a feeiing of absolute de¬
pendence, we see in all this a helping force for keeping this
15. Speeches, p.245.
14. friess, "«Ve are here waging a great battle around the
sacred standard of humanity, which we, men of the future, must
maintain i'or the coming generations, it is a decisive battle,
but also a certain victory, to be won, independent of chance or
fortune, by spiritual strengtn and genuine art." op. cit., p.t>5«
15. Types of Modern Theology, p.65.
16. Nicoil, Selected sermons of Schl iermacher, pp.286f.
17. Schleiermacher wrote: "If human beings nave the power
of conquering their lower instincts when they become conscious
of them, why should they not also be aole to conquer their Hi¬
gher ones and to supplant them by something higher still."
Rowan, op. cit.. I. p.525.
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state of transition fluid. This is what he means: "Bo iat das
Christenthua zueret und wesentlich die Porderung gemacht, dass
18
die Prdaimigkeit ein beharrlicher Zuatand sein soil im menschen."
He goes on to emphasize that tnis is original and native to man,
that only thus is man worthy of being distinguished from the
animals. This possibility of spiritual contradiction is vouch¬
safed by God. At first, however, Schleiermacher may have seen
all thi3 as but an auxiliary element, something attached to
man's native religious consciousness. Notice how he preaches:
Every man, they say, is at the same time flesh and spirit;
thus has God in a similar way endowed all; only in some,
through that progress which they make, th> spirit gains
more and more command over tne flesh, and tnose are the
good; with others, on the contrary, the spirit is long kept
under, is only rarely seen in its beauty and strength; and
tne greater part of their life is devoted to various mani¬
festations of carnality, in violent secret or open con¬
flict with the spirit, and tnose are the wicked; but the
great majority of men are those whose lives pass away in
continual vacillations, without a decisive preponderance
on the one side or the other. But still the spirit is pre¬
sent and at work in all; for otherwise they could not be
men, but would be beasts.19
It will be seen tnat Schleiermacher contradicts himself:
he is illogical, at least, in delineating his concept of sin
while at the same time emphasizing this spiritual contradiction
DA
of the human soul.How could God enuow man with the evil
element embodied in the flesh, as tne previous passage represents,
18. leden Ueber die Religion an die Gebildeten unter ihren
Veraohtern, Mit Einleitung herausgegeben von Dr. Schwarz, (Leipzig:
F. A. Brockhaus, 1868;, p.227«
19. Nicoli, Belocted Sermons of Schleiermacher, p.92.
20. It is said that Schleiermacher could never have written
his sermons before he preached (Ibid., pp.26f.). This has been
pointed out that his preaching is sometimes different from the
thought of the elaborately architectural work of the Christian
Faith or even that of the Speeches.
57
when the discussion up to now nas alleged tnat sin or evil is
hut an attached element to grace or good? If sin or evil nas
any existence at all, it must be conditioned by or be dependent
on grace or good.
Schleiermacher applies, however, an acute dialectical
process in unfolding his concept of sin. All different possi-
21
bilities are sought, but the conclusion in that the existence
of evil owes to its relation to good. According to him, sin
could also be an element native to man, particularly prominent
in man's earliest development but present throughout the whole
unfolding of the religious consciousness. As he writes: "Sin
is anterior to grace being simply the expression of the human
race's need for redemption ana of its relation to Christ."
One could not help thinking that Schleiermacher's concept might,
25from this viewpoint, be too mechanical, particularly wnen one
thinks of his theory of prophetic analysis: i.e., that the whole
human situation works itself out automatically, sooner or later,
perhaps rapidly in some lives and slowly in others. He has so
21. If it were considered ae the act of man, "it would be
in contradiction with the disposition to the God-consciousness
which is present in man ae a vital impulse." If it were an ac¬
tual existence, as man in the state of sin exists within the na¬
tural order (or, as it were, "oB-extensive" with the divine
causality), then the unity of the worid-whole is destroyed. If
there are divine attributes related to sin, then the unity of the
divine causality is torn, finally, "if it develops in man in
conse uence of impressions received from the totality of finite
existence," then the perfection of the world in relation to man
has vanished. Christian Faith, p.26).
2.< • Ibid., p. 66.
23. It is the divine immutable law that 'each definite
tning can only be made up by melting together two opposite acti¬
vities." "wherefore the spirit also, in ho far as it manifests
itself in a finite life, must be subject to the same law. The
human soul, as is shown both by its passing actions and its in¬
ward characteristics, has its existence chiefly in two opposing
impulses, following the one impulse, it strives to establish
it. elf as an individual. For increase, no less tnan sustenance,
it draws what surrounds it to itself, weaving it into its life,
5<3
far been consistent with his presupposition that Christianity
is of an evolutionary nature in wording out nis doctrine of sin.
In fact, he actually utilizes the concept of sin to modify tne
otherwise rather monotonous continuity of his evolutionary
theory, decorating and enriching it with more interesting though
PA
unwelcomed content.'" The basic principles which he laid down
have not been changed. Oman comments that:
Schleiermacher even cornea within sight of the Dar»vinian
idea and, in one important respect, goes beyond it. All
that is in man, he says, is a strife which avails for
progress, because he has his place in an ordered whole
the significance of an ordered whole for the struggle of
evolution being apt to be ignored. This conception of
restless struggle and a growing individuality in the bo¬
som of a Universe that rejoices in the unfolding of ail
its variety, is the Keynote of the new age.25
Why does Schleierraacher insist that the consciousness of
sin is and always must be determined by the consciousneas of
grace? First, because "the consciousness of sin can be present
only simultaneously with and as related to the God-conscious¬
ness." He means that we become conscious of sin when the God-
consciousness already develops in us; otherwise there would be
no resistance to it, and so no consciousness of sin at all, but
"merely an independent activity of the flesh which, thougn in
time it will quite naturally come to act as a resistance to the
and absorbing it into its own being. The other impulse, again,
is the dread fear to stand alone over against the whole, tiie
longing to surrender oneself and be absorbed in a greater, to
be taken hold of and determined." Speeches, pp.3f.
24. "The state of sin over its entire range actually pre¬
supposes the original perfection of man, and is indeed dependent
upon it; and, accordingly, just as the latter conception expres¬
ses the unity of our development, so sin in turn represents its
intermittent and disjointed character, though without in any
way abrogating the unity itself." Christian Faitn, p.273.
25* The Problem of Faith & Freedom, p.1^9-
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spirit, cannot at that stage be regarded as sin in the proper
sense."" It is clearly seen here that if the God-conscious¬
ness grows or is gradually awakened and realized, the conscious'
ness of sin is intensified as a necessary condition for the re¬
ceptivity of a redemptive-consciousness.4^ He argues:
It is of course true that the consciousness of sin comes
from the law (Rom.7:24; 6:2), but as the law in the very
multitude of its precepts ie but an imperfect representa¬
tion of the good, and even in the unity of an all-embra¬
cing maxim does not show how it can be obeyed, the Know¬
ledge of sin that arises out of it is ever in some res¬
pects incomplete and in some uncertain; and it is only
from the absolute sinlessness and the perfect spiritual
power of the Redeemer that we gain the full Knowledge of
sin.28
Schleiermacher does agree that the law reflects man's incapa¬
city for action, but he also asks whether law itself is an ade¬
quate representation of tne good, it yet does not show man how
it is to be obeyed. It is evident that if the law itself func¬
tions as Knowledge while attempting to awaiten one's religion,
Schleierrnaeher shows in the very beginning that his basic con¬
cept of religion is not dependent on knowledge. No doubt he
will, in this aspect, deny that law is valid for giving man a
full Knowledge of sin in relation to redemption, simply because
29
here law is viewed as something objective. In addition, sin
itself is not of a substantial character. It always appears
26. Christian Faith, p.273.
27. Selbie: "The consciousness of sin is the conscious¬
ness of an antithesis to the divine will, an antithesis which
is to be removed by redemption. God has, in other words, or¬
dained sin in order to salvation. As the God-consciousness grows
in us the apprehension of fin becomes more vivid, arid sin consists
in the defects in tht reign of the divine in us over the flesh,
defects which, in their turn, produce in us the sense of the
need of redemption." op. cit., p.100.
26• Christian Faith, p.279•
29. According to Schleiermacher, God-consciousness and
sin-consciousness botn are subjective; an religion is one's
very own, therefore, it must be subjective experience.
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as something inefficient, incapable, in the augmentation of the
Christian consciousness. As wendland understands it, "sin, ob¬
viously appears as a remaining-behind of the highest goal, as a
not-yet, as a transitional-point for a higher perfection, not
as a guilty perversion or contradiction against the final-goal
30
imposed by the divine." Thus its existence is always related
to something of positive character: sin itself is but something
imperfect of negative nature, something which bespeaks inability
in the context of total ability. It is but an inharmonious
force in the process of the approximation of the great fthole.
Its existence depends completely upon its opposite. If its op¬
posite is in an undeveloped state, it will only exist as 'the
germ of sin," and will not be regarded as sin in the proper
31
sense. At this stage of its embryonic existence, this does
not mean that man is not in a state of sin, but that the sin-
consciousness nas not yet been aroused. In this case it means
that sin does exist, insofar as one can be conscious of it."^
As Cross put it: "Sin and the consciousness of sin are
not to be separated. It is an experience of the God-cons cious-
ness being hindered by sensuousness from controlling tne acti¬
vities of life and it is expressed in a feeling of pain, dis-
33
satisfaction." And this situation is related to the origin
of evils: "The experience of a repression of the God-conscious¬
ness is connected witn external events in such a way tnat they
become evils, i.e., punishment of our sins, which is the
30. "Die Stlnde erscheint hier offenbar als ein Ztiruchblei-
ben hinter dera hdchsten Ziei, als ein Noch nicht, als Durchgangs-
punkt zu hdherer Vollendung, nicht ais schuldvolle Verkehrung
und Widerspruch gegen das gdttlich gesetzte Endziel." Die Religi¬
ose Entwicklung Schleiermachers, p.2?3.
31. Christian Faith, p.273.
32. "If in any particular moment under examination God has
formed part of our self-consciousness, but this God-conscious¬
ness lias not been able to permeate the other active elements
therein, thus determining the moment, tnen sin and the conscious¬
ness of sin are simultaneous, and the sensuous self-consciousness
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experience of unbieseedness. "^ whenever the i'iesh prevails
over the spirit, obstructions are present vvhicn oppose the ori¬
ginal harmony of human development; and these obstructions be¬
come evils. "in and evil are relate i to each other as cause
and effect.
Mackintosh explains at this point tnat along with tills
more superficial view in Sohleiermacher, there goes another
profounder view hard to reconcile with it: "sin is a profound
disturbance of 'human nature,' a complete incapacity for doing
good which can only be cured by redemption, an abnormality and
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deformation on which all evil follows as its penalty." There
are, he says, two Kinds of evil: "anything that gives rise to
obstructions in human life so far as it is independent of human
action, we call natural evil," and "what in bringing about
such obstructions is really due to human action, we call 'social
evil.' The term is preferable to 'moral' evil; for if we say
'moral' we suggest that the bad also as such (das BiJse) is sub¬
sumed under the concept of evii." Again: "It is true that
social evils too presuppose sin; what in one person issues from
sin becomes an evil for another, and probably for himself as
well"; for social evii is caused by the sin of one individual
which produces evil consequences for others, owing to men's re-
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lation to one another. But Schleiermacher prefers to use
by reason of its having been gratified is affected with plea¬
sure, but the higher, owing to the impotence of the God-conscious¬
ness, with pain." Ibid., p.271.
33 • Gross, op. cit., p.173.
34. Ibid., p.221.
35• Types of Modern Theology, p.84.
36. He explains: "Natural evils,... objectively considered,
do not rise from sin; but as man, were he without sin, would not
feel what are merely hindrances of sensuous functions as evils,
the very fact that he does so feel them is due to sin, and hence
that type of evil, subjectively considered, is a penalty of sin.''
Christian Faith, pp.316, 319.
37. Ibid.. pp.316f.
different, more restricted terras in referring to particular
caee3. 'But precisely on that account," he continues, "it seems
the more necessary to insist, even by our use of terms, on the
essential difference in the reference involved in the two."
After developing this point that evil is an effect, we
see that according to his theory of the great harmonious Whole,
the world as a unity of all natural forces, ana God as the ab¬
solute 'Supreme Being behind this world-whole, it becomes evident
that evil cannot be referred to any other than God, the absolute
39
divine causality. This is based on the theory that ail natu¬
ral forces are interdependent and appear as a unity of a world-
whole which is absolutely dependent on this absolute Unity.
Schleiermacher, after dividing evil into two xinas: natural and
social, combines them. He writes:
(We maintain) evil and good are alike rooted in universal
dependence on God, from this point of view there is no dif¬
ference between these two types or classes of evil. To the
one belong those conditions which we call natural evil, in
which numan existence is partially negated. To the other,
which we name social evil, belong those conditions in which
human activity is in conflict with anotner activity and is
partially overcome and depressed; and here the influence
of moral evil specially comes in. But clearly these two
kinds of evil not only give rise to eacn other,...but they
also overlap in thought, for the being of man consists
only in the totality of nis activities, and vice versa.
The difference consists then principally in this, that the
one is much more determined by the total forces of nature,
and the other by tne collective conditions of human
activity.40
58. Ibid., p.316.
39. Schlei rmacher says: "As regards sin in its relation
to redemption, we must if this section is to nave any subject
matter at all be able somehow to show that sin does actually
exist in virtue of certain special divine activities; and what
is more, we must do so, keeping is mind the fact that we have
already ruled out as inadmissible any distinction in the Jivine
causality betwo n causing and permitting, or between creating
and preserving." Ibid., pp.325f.
40. Ibid.. p.I ho.
65
One step further Schleiermacher unuertaK.es, notice tne opening
sentence in the passage quoted, above: "evil and good are alixe
rooted in universal dependence on Uod." lie is not only going
to combine these two kinds of evil, but here even combines evil
and good together, because they all have the same root in the
universal dependence on God. i'neir differences do not essen¬
tially occupy two separate spheres, their magnitudes depend on
the viewer, his viewpoint from afar or near, the way of looking
at them. It just depends how one views them, evil actually
could be goou, good actually evil, or evil could be a cause of
good, or good, a cause of evil. Up to this point, historically,
it is very true, that in time the same activity appears as good
and evil alternatively at certain different periods of time. As
regards this, let Schleiermacher*s own words be quoted on the
suggestion:
... the world could exist apart from evil. The fact is
rather that the very same activity or condition of a thing
by which it enters on tne one hand into human life as an
evil, on the other hand is a cause of good, so that if we
could remove the source of life's difficulties th: condi¬
tions of life'8 progress too would disappear. This is true
even of moral evil wnich only functions as evil in so far
as it appears in external action: and it holds good not
only accidentally because sin produces good effects some¬
times in individuals and sometimes as a great Historical
lever, but as a general truth since sin only comes to be
done by reason of fiat capacity of man to express his in¬
ner nature outwardly which is the source of all good.41
He affirms the alternate concept of evil and concludes at this
point with another passage:
Now if sad experiences only occurred separately, although
frequently, and were such tnat we could trace no connec¬
tion between them, then they would hardly have been able
to produce such an effect; but it is dependent on the fact
that there are conditions wnich bring a persistent and
41. Ibid., p.187.
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regularly renewed consciousness of life's oostacles. These,
then are what we usually characterize by the term 'evil':
it is to be maintained that all evil, in the full meaning
of that word, is just as much wholly dependent upon God as
that which is in opposition to it, i.e. good.42
Schleiermacher's concept is of a good and an evil which are cor¬
relative and co-operative, warning out for tne betterment of hu¬
man development. Therefore, evil is potentially good; though
their external functions for a time may appear to man as evil
43
or good, yet they are all grounded in the universal divine
causality. Thus evil and sin are strictly related to good and
44
grace. They are both ordained by God for the worxing out of
this betterment as tne necessary process of redemption.
Schleiermacher's basic concept of tin is not restricted
to one immutable theory. Since he views sin itseif as having
no definite character, he is merely searching for aii the exis¬
tent possibilities from aii different viewpoints, whether one
considers Schieiermacher close to biaspnemy or whether, on the
basis of his theory previously discussed, one sees him as merely
one step further along in his logic, one cannot help but con¬
clude that God ultimately is at once both the author of the pos¬
sibilities of sin and not the author of sin. In the leading
statement, he says:
As in our self-consciousness sin and grace are opposed to
each other, God cannot be thought of as the Author of sin
in the same sense as that in which He is the Author of
42. Ibid., pp.l84f.
43. Schleiermacher writes: "I can only say that in human
affairs there is no more absolute distinction between the true
and the false than there is between tne natural and the super¬
natural. There is no error, even of the most pernicious Kind,
which has not an admixture of truth or which is not connected
with some truth, and there is no truth that does not include
the possibility of error." Rowan, op. cit., II. p.261.
44. It is supposed that everything depends on the spiritual
struggle, flesh vs. spirit, "for aii activities of the flesh are
good when subservient to tne spirit, ana ail are «vil when seve¬
red from it." Christian Faith, p.307.
o5
redemption. But as we never have a consciousness of grace
without a consciousness of sin, we must aiso assert that
the existence of sin alongside of grace is ordained for
us by God.45
Of course ail these possibilities, as referring to God, are them¬
selves ouite scientific. On the one hand, God is the absolute
causal unity of tola antinomy of the consciousness of sin and
the consciousness of grace; while on the other hand the conscious¬
ness of sin, or just sin itself, is the indefinite cause, or the
supplementary element which is to be applied wherever it is
deemed necessary. Surprisingly enough, Schleiermacher•a method
of interpreting the Christian faith is always to organize his
theological thoughts with a view toward reconciling everything
to a sound unity. For the first time hie theology is said to
appear as an organic whole; but in his doctrine of sin he yet
tears it up into fragments.^0
Schleiermacher see; sin and evil as thus ultimately
grounded in the divine absolute causality, but only on the ba¬
sis of their reference to redemption, since ail experience in
the religious consciousness is referred to this causality, un
any other basis it must be denied, because sin is a contradic¬
tion to God's will; and as such it cannot refer back to trie
45. Ibio.. p. 326. >»e see how Schleiermacher, with this
shifting theory, skilfully avoids departing from his doctrine
of sin at this point and toward the verge of Manichaeism or of
Feiagianism; especially the latter, which "sacrifices toe prac¬
tical religious interest to the theoretical which demands that
every vital activity shall have the same relation to the divine
causality," thereby "minimizing and by degrees annulling the
antithesis of sin and grace." Ibid., pp.330, 335. The former
heresy surrenders "the theoretical religious interest in the
reality of tne divine omnipotence, in favour o the practical
interest attaching to the idea that evil is real in the most
unqualified sense, so as all the more to bring out the neces¬
sity that the perfect good should counteract it redemptively."
Ibid.. p.330.
46."we are conscious of the spirit as one, while the
flesh is a manifold, and a manifold composed of diverse elements,
so that the spirit cannot stand in a uniform relation to it."
Ibid.. p.275.
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divine causality, for it would seem to delineate God as the
47
ource of evil. The sources of evil are in man's sin. So far
as his relation to the world is concerned, man is free; tout his
freedom is eventually unite limited, and this limitation appears
as a hindrance to his life ana is apprehended as evil. On
this basis man is free to sin; yet he must pay the price for
committing it. The limitation of this freedom must sooner or
later indicate to him tnat he has breached the original harmony
of the world-whole. As Schleiermacner says: "The spirit's de¬
mand is Iways the same, the spirit itself, wherever it is less
able to worir effectively, appears as a toafflea and defeated
, ,, 4 Q
lorce, ana the subject therefore as in a state of sin."
Where actually do these forces of nindr&nces to human
life come from? what is the representation of these sources of
disturbance? Schleiermacher raises several difficulties for
our acceptance of any attempted doctrinal representation of the
dangerous spiritual beings as a Kingdom and with their chief,
calieu the devil. Would God allow this Kind of existence? And
why after they fall, are they so dangerous? Is the devil ins-
50
trumental and active in the punishment of sin? These are ty¬
pical of the problems that now arise; and they are all full of
contradiction. To quote his own words: "The fairly frequent
idea that the devil is the instrument of God in the punishment
of the wiciced, is inconsistent with his antagonism to the
61
divine purpose."
whatever may be the purpose of forming the idea of a de¬







or negative ideas to validate its existence, and fundamentally
contradict Schleiermacher's rejection of any objective knowledge
52
of either a positive or a negative stimulating force. To al¬
low such an existence means to destroy his whole system of
theology. Belief in the existence of a devil or fallen angels
is not part of religious experience, according to Schieiermacher,
because these cannot be an expression of Christian consciousness.
In order to avoid inconsistency, no modifications of the concept
of the existence of a devil or fallen angels will be valid. He
argues that even though certain passages in Scripture refer to
the devii, "there is stiii no reason for our accepting this no¬
tion as a permanent element in Christian doctrine and defining
it accordingly so accurately that everytniag attributed to the
devil could be conceived as a consistent whole.Finally,
Schleiermacher points out that:
Those who actually go so far as to maintain that living
faith in Christ is in some way conditioned by belief in
the devil ought to be on their guard lest, by so doing,
they depreciate Christ and unduly exalt themselves. ifor
the ultimate meaning is that salvation by Christ would be
les3 necessary if there were no devil; and so, on the one
hand, salvation appears to be only a help against an ex¬
ternal enemy, while, on the other hand, man would be well
able to help himself if there were no devil and evil had
its seat solely in human nature.54
Another thing to be discussed is the proposition that
sin, guilt, and evil belong, in th ir totality, to the human
race. Scnleiermacher writes: "Just as the human race is the
proper sphere of sin, and sin the corporate act of the race, so
52. The writer feels that ; ehleierrnacher even hesitates
to affirm God's personality in relation to us except through trie
"world-impression," i.e., we gain our knowledge of Him from our
own consciousness. Tne devil, according to Sohleiermacher, is
the acme of notningness.
55. Christian Faith, p.167.
54. Ibid., p.169.
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the whole world in its relation to nan is the proper sphere of
55
evil, and evil the corporate suffering of the race." As we
nave pointed out earlier, man does not exist alone, out in re¬
lation to humanity, i.e., as a constituent part of the whole of
mankind. The significance of the individual lies in trie corpo¬
rate life of humanity. Pchleiermacher not only adopts this
theory to delineate that which works out for good in the course
of human development (cf. Chapter V), but also applies the same
theory to explain the bad influences which come via the total
operation of human activity. Because the unity of the race is
grounded in a common consciousness of sin exists for the indi¬
vidual in both the self- and the race-consciousness, in fact,
sin is properly understood only in the context of the universal
collective life of mankind. As Schieiormacher wrote:
If sin as an organic whole can be rightly understood only
as the corporate action of the human race, its causal ac¬
tion relatively to evil can only be understood from the
same point of view. In fact, the most definite expression
of this conviction lies...in a general statement that
throughout the human race as a whole.56
There is also actual sin and original sin, Schleiermacher under¬
stands them in the same way. As to their relationship to each
other, Schleiermacher adds:
It is to be understood rather as implying that in the indi¬
vidual original sin is the sufficient ground of all actual
sins, so that only something else outside of him, and not
anything new within him, is needed for the generation of
actual sin. Original sin is purely a thing received only in
the degree in which the individual is not yet spontaneously
active, and it ceases to be such in the uegree in which
that activity is developed.57






flesh and spirit, as a Hindrance to life in the development
of the religious consciousness. It is, therefore, an inevita¬
ble outcome of human nature as such, and not an external in¬
heritance from Adam. Gross concludes that "sin being the joint
5a
guilt of the race, evil is its joint punishment"; and, "sin
is a historical phenomenon in human consciousness and pertains
to all peoples and ages."*3^ Macxintoeh adds that sinful soli¬
darity links the generations, ana that "sin is stored or found-
£% 1
ed in humanity, and Kept in circulation by social influence."
Finally this concept is summed up with a comprehensive statement
by Gross:
Evil is thus produced by human freedom, but is grounded
ultimately in the divine causality. But evil is not in-
and-for itself, but only in reference to sin, as sin also
is only in reference to the redemption. Consequently evil
becomes a source of stimulus to tne consciousness of the
need of redemption. Otherwise evil would seem to be joined
to sin by arbitrary divine determination.62
b8. Ibid.. p.31b.
69* The Theology of Schleiermacher, p.191.
60- Ibid.. p.179.
61• Types of Modern Theology, p.Ob•
62. The Theology of Schleiermacher, p.191.
CHAPTER IV
CHRISTOLOGY
Schlelermaoher's doctrine of Christ is, on the whole,
elaborated in his own speculative imagination and valves from
his pious love for the Redeemer. We have seen that he never
got away from the influence of the Moravians.^ He affirms that
the Redeemer possesses His distinctive worth (eigenthttmliche
2 3
in'lrde) and uni ue originality as One over against all others,
so exclusive of other men that no analogy^ adequately describes
His person and absolute dignity. He enters into human existence
appearing, for the first time in history, as a person of essen¬
tial sinlessness and absolute perfection. His appearance and
the inner character of His personality are of an archetypal
form entirely rooted in the original creative act of God; and
in Him is a perfect union of the human and the divine. This
1. Mackintosh points out that the Moravian heritage ne¬
ver quite disappeared: "In his warm love for Jesus, Scnieier-
macher never ceased to be a Moravian. But, as may be seen from
his Life of Jesus, his conceptions of our Lord are often more
imaginative than historical." Types of Moaern Theology, p.8b;
of* The Person of Jesus Christ, (Edinburgh; T.x.T. Clark, 1912),
p. 2i>0.
2. Schleiermacher, Per Christllche Glaube, (Berlin: Ver-
lag von Georg Reimer, 1884), II. p.28; cf. Christian Faith,
p.377.
3. Mackintosh: "Christ...'is distinguished fro i ail
others ae Redeemer alone and for all,' nor did He ever need re¬
demption Himself. Thus in opposition to the cosmopolitan enli¬
ghtenment of the time Schleiermacher insists steadily on the
uni ueness of Christ." He is "the heart of Christianity." Types
of Modern Theology, p.69.
4. ^chleiermacher explained: "It might be argued, this is
the fundamental exaggeration into wnich believers falx when they
regard Christ in the mirror of their own imperfection; and tnis
exaggeration continually perpetuates itself in the same manner,
since believers in ail ages read into Jesus whatever they are
able to conceive as ideal in this sphere." Chr1stian Faith.p.3761
cf. Mackintosh; "No one can doubt that when he speaxi openly as
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union, in terms of dignity, is at once exemplary (Vorbildliche)
5
and ideal (Urbildlichkeit). Strangely enough, Scnleierm&cher,
in hi© theological system, does not usually follow the patn of
supernaturalism at all, until he comes to the doctrine of
Christ.6
One sees Schleiermacner circling around an area, actually
7
confronting something that cannot satisfactorily be explained
by his all-validating Key to religion, i.e., tne feeling of ab¬
solute dependence. till, at certain points, he does correlate
his ideas intelligibly, at the risx of contradicting tne remain-
Q
der of his theological system. This is so because Schleierma-
cher too seriously attributes worth to the religious self-con¬
sciousness. Bridging the entire gap between the human ana the
divine, Schleiermacher consistently propounds a "tneology of re¬
conciliation" and a "continuity of evolutionism". This, in
turn, means that even apart from nis Christology, his soterio-
logy lacks nothing: he sees the divine in the human, and the
a believer the Ierson of Christ taxes on absolute dimensions;
there is no analogy for Jesus, he writes, and tnere dwelt in Him
a spiritual power suca as no human calculus can reckon." Types
of .,'odern Theology, pp.72f.
t>. Scbleiermacher, Der Christiiohe Glaube, II. p. 29*
6. Lichtenberger writes: "All tnat Christ has been, He
has become by a primitive communication of Cod owing to wnich
He was freed from the influence of sin. On this point, Schleier-
macher has remained faithful to the supernaturalistic point of
view of the traditional theology." op. cit., pp.lb3f.
7. Schleiermacher writes: "My Christian feeling is con¬
scious of a divine spirit indwelling in me, which is distinct
from my reason, I will never give up seexing for this spirit in
the deepest depths of the soul's nature; and when my Christian
feeling becomes conscious of a son of God, who differs from us
in another way than merely being better tnan the best of us, I
will never cease to search for the genesis of this Son of God
in the ueepest deptns of nature, and to say to myself, that I
shall most lively learn to understand the second Adam just as
soon as tne first Adam, or Adams, whose coming into existence 1
must also admit without being able to understand." Rowan, op.
cit., II. p.281.
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human within that great whole which is absolutely dependent on
the Supreme Unity, God. The process of redemption is a gradual
approximation, ever progressive, of feeling, becoming, and
doing. But Schleiermacher*s theory of salvation could concei-
Q
vably ao away-7 with the Supreme Figure of Jesus. Schieiermacher,
being aware that his doctrine of Christ win be virtually an abs¬
tract superfluity in relation to the re; t of his system,"^needa
only to affirm a peculiar doctrine twice as untenable as what
he had without knowing precisely how he uerives it, whether
on Scriptural (biblische) or traditional (kirchliche) grounds.^
All of which indicates that he derived it from his own specuia-
12 13
tive imagination. Of course he would deny that Christ is
8. mackintosh points out that 'while Schlelermacher as¬
serts no one more emphatically the central and redeeming
place of Christ, it is doubtful whether his Speculative presup¬
positions permit him to hold such a person as either real or
possible." The Person of Jesur Christ, pp.254f* cf. Lichtenber-
ger: "What is tnis ideal type of man which Jesus is said to
have realized? Is it not a pure abstraction, or rather a con¬
tradiction in terms; for can a single individual realize trie
type of the whole of humanity?" op. cit., p.154.
9. Mackintosh writes: "He himself gained less than might
have been hoped from the new point of view, ana failed to satis¬
fy some deep Christian instincts, this was owing to defects in¬
herent in his theoretic notion of what salvation is. Its rela¬
tion to the world too much predominates. Kedeemed men are men
liberated from the oppression of finite causes, and dependent
solely on the Absolute Causality, rather than forgiven sinners,
living in fellowship witn God the Father." The Person of Jesus
Christ. p.254.
10. Mackintosh has pointed out that "in his Christology
more clearly perhaps tnan elsewhere we see how persistently
ochleiermacher strove to escape from tne region of abstract
ideas into that of veritable fact." Types of ,'odern Theology,
p.85.
11. Carl Clemen, Schleiermachers Glaubenslehre, (Gieszen:
<j. Richer* ache Verlagbuchhandlung, 1905), p. 90.
12. mackintosh: "This is to make an imaginary Cnrist, in
a vain effort to be wiser than the New Testament." Types of o-
dern Theology, p. 90.
13. As a matter of fact, his Christology is constantly
affirmed as vitally important to redemption; yet, when related
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superfluous to his system; but to offset this suspicion he must
accentuate the Redeemer's position within. Even negatively,
this is important, whether or not we are actually to pronounce
his theological system superfluous. If superfluity is actually
an issue here, then either Christ as presented in Schleierma-
cher's system is superfluous to tne rest of tne system, or his
elaboration of this phase of theology is superfluous specifi¬
cally to his Christology.'1'4 Yet Scnleiermacher seemingly
founded for us difficulty with this challenge; we have seen how
he is an old hand at reconciling apparent opposites and iacon-
1*5
sistencies. with some sort of speculation and imagination,
somewhat along the lines of the Johannine Gospel,ne does ela¬
borate a Christology of his own, and in certain aspects actually
17
does reconcile it with his theological system. Just as the
dignity and activity of the Redeemer are "intimately related
1 ft
and mutually determined," so also the person of Christ and the
work of Christ are inseparable and "each finds in the other its
full expression." Nevertheless, in accordance with current
to his theological thought, particularly at a comparably earlier
stage, it does not seem as important as we have been led to
believe.
14. It seems that -chieiermacher possesses two soteriolo-
gies, the one being his Christology and the other his whole theo¬
logy, excluding his Chrietology.
lb. Schleiermacher affirms; "But the truly divine element
is the glorious clearness to which the great idea He fJesusJ
came to exhibit attained in His soul. This idea was, that all
that if finite requires a higher mediation to be in accord with
the Deity, and that for man under the power of the finite and
particular, and too ready to imagine the divine itself in this
form, salvation is only to be found in redemption." speeches,
p.246.
16. Wendland: "Schleiermacher ist nicnt pauiinischer, son-
dern johanneischer Theologie. Nicht der tod Jesu ist ihm die
TIauptsache, sondern das Leben Jesu und die von diesem ausgehende
anziehende und gewinnende Kraft." op. cit., p.181.
I?• Christian Faith, p.476.
18' Ibid., p.37b.
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theological practice, we may deal with the person and work of
Christ separately.
1. The Person of Christ.
The secret of Christ's energetic personality lies in
His possession of the potency of the God-consciousness in the
full sway of ail the activities of His life. The essential
difference between Christ and other men is that only Christ
19
ever attained the highest point of human development, and
only in Him has the creation of humanity b* en first perfected.
20
This is so because His human nature is completely exhausted
by His "absolutely powerful God-consciousness," i.e., "the exis-
21
tence of God in Him." In Him all actual sin, together with
all possibilities of it, are excluded. Yet His freedom from
22
sin does not conflict with His identity with human nature.
As Cross put it: His human nature becomes a "perfect organ for
the reception and presentation of the divine," and therefore
we may say of Him: "In the Redeemer God became man." Schleier-
macher asserted that it was Christ who alone could be destined
gradually "to quicken the whole human race into higher life."
Anyone not accepting Christ in this universal way as the divine
revelation cannot desire that Cnristianity should be an enduring
19» "There is no reason why we should not believe that the
appearing of such a life is the result of the power of develop¬
ment which resides in our human nature." ibid., p.63»
20. Diltney: "In Christus ist das Ideal der menschlichen
Vollkommenheit, als Erscneinung una Abglanz des moraiischen we-
aens der Gottheit selber, daher als in Gott enthalten und aus
ihm hervorgegangen, in einem religidsen Symbol von bleibender
Gtlltigkeit ausgedrUckt. " op. cit.. p.156.
21. Christian Faith, p.387.
22. "The Redeemer, then is liklfe all men in virtue of the
identity of human nature, but distinguished from them all by
the constant potency of His God-consciousness, which was a veri¬
table existence of God in Him." Ibid., p.365.
23. Cross, op. cit., p.208; same passage found in Selbie,
op. cit.. p.120.
7t>
phenomenon. Notwithstanding ail this, however, even the most
rigorous view of Christ's superiority over ail other men doe3
not hinder us from regarding his appearing, or even His incar¬
nation as the Son of God, as a natural fact.^ Christ is the
2*5
subject of the God-consciousness, historically realized. Ilis
existence should be accepted universally as divine revelation,
and all consciousness of redemption must be referred bacx to
Him. "All Christian piety rests upon the appearing of the Re¬
deemer," Pchleiermacher writes. "The same thing is true of Him,
too, namely, that nothing concerning Him can be set up as real
doctrine unless it is connected with His redeeming causality
Pfl
and can be traced to tne original impression made by His
27
existence." Redemption signifies essentially this: that how¬
ever weak and suppressed the God-consciousness may be in human
nature, it still is aroused by the incoming power of Christ and
strengthened by flis abiding influence?*^ and, on the other hand,
wnat "chleiermacher calls the Redeemer's original purpose to
present Himself to man so that man can first see the revelation
of God in Him must also be included in the total picture. He
2Q
argues that "Christ himself seeks above ail to impress upon
24. Christian Faith, pp.63f.
25. Dilthey: "Sp&ter ist Christus dis spezifische Vollea-
dung der Menschennatur, sonach nicht Vorbild, soadern Urbild,
nicht eine Kraft, die das in uns Liegende zu aligemeiner >»irkung
bringt, sondern eine solche, die durch die Macht der erscheinenden
Vollendung uns zu sich hinanzieht." op. cit., p.160.
26. "The individual even to-day receives from the picture
of Christ, which exists in the community as at once a corporate
act and a corporate possession, the impression of the sinless
perfection of Jesus, which becomes for him at the saiae time the
perfect consciousness of sin and the removal of tne misery." And,
"all those aberrations of the Christian Church, however much they
may resemble the sinful corporate life, there is still a tendency
which in every manifestation. nay, constantly even in the set¬
ting up of the concepts of trutn and goodness fails more or
less a prey to non-existence, but which...corresponds to its ori¬
gin, and consequently, in spite of ail reactions, will also in¬
creasingly make itself manifest." Christian Faith, pp.3o4f.
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us that through him we come to the Father, and that the Father
abides in us." what kind of a presentation of the Person of
Christ does Schleiermacher give us? An Absolute Figure presented
31 32
in a relative sense. He is at once both a mediating example
who can successfully control and govern His religious self-con-
"Z Z
sciousness, and an exemplary ideality who possesses absolute
perfection based on the presence of the God-consciousness in
Him as His own personal being; in short, He is an historical in¬
dividual as well as an ideal Person.^ In Schleiermacher's book
The Christmas Eve (weihnachtsfeier), Hdward speaks:''
He Referring to the individual;] finds his redemption only
in Man as such, Man in himself £*the man behind the man, der
Mensch-an-sichjU Therein he finas in fact that very oneness -
of the eternal being and becoming of the spirit which can
manifest itself upon this planet, and rise in every one
only be every one contemplating and loving all that becomes,
including himself, in the eternal Being alone. And in so
far as he appears as in the process of becoming, he wills
to be nothing else than a thought of the eternal Being; nor
will he be grounded in any other eternal Being than in that
which is one and the same with the ever changing and return¬
ing process. Hence the oneness of being ana becoming thus
indicated, and is found eternally in humanity, because hu¬




29. In a letter to his wife.
30. Rowan, op. cit., II. p.326.
31. Mackintosh: "It has been maintained tnat for chleier-
macher the being of our juord is supernatural only in a relative
sense." The Person of Jesus Christ, pp.253f«
32. Selbie: "It is in Christ that the love of God is mani¬
fested and through Christ that the love of man for God is awakened."
op. cit., p.104.
33. Christian Faith, p.378.
34. Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology, p.72; ef. Chris¬
tian Faith, p.392.
35f. At the end of The Christmas Eve we find this statement
(in the appendix by Dr. Carl Schwarz): "The speeches which thus
follow, form the kernel of the whole production; and they contain
in germ, and in the most graceful and accessible form, the
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What Edward tries to explain is tnat the eternal Being, in the
process of becoming, is identified both with temporal humanity
and with eternity. "Man-in-hirnself," or the "God-man," must
display human self-cognition and be, from the very beginning,
the Light of man. And we, in our turn are born again through
the Fpirit, in and of the Church. The Spirit itself only pro¬
ceeds from the Son, who being born originaliiy of God, requires
no new Dirth and hence can be absolutely the Son of Man. All
that preceded Hira was a prefiguration of, and related to Him;
in fact, only through such a relation to Him could anything be
37
divine or even truly good. Schleiermacher sees Christ as the
Eternal Figure who once appeared absolutely miraculous and per¬
fect, and at the same time natural in the sphere of human life.
"2 vj
Christ is "the integrating factor in Christianity." Oman wrote
that Christ as seen by Schleiermacher is "the originator of the
Christian intuition of the world"; "He is the centre of all
mediation and to have the Christian view is to be in a position
39
to recognize His place when He is onown to us."
The appearance of this Absolute Figure is not absolutely
supernatural: it also accords with the laws of human nature.
Schleiermacher freely admits that a Rede mer who could not Him¬
self belong to what Schleiermacher calls "the corporate life of
sinfulness" could therefore hardly be brought into being via na¬
tural procreation. Furthermore, by the same token, the repro¬
ductive power of the human species could hardly suffice to bring
fundamental thoughts of Schleiermacher*s Christology, and even
of his whole theology. The various sides of Schielermacner's
nature, and the spiritual tendencies which so wonderfully met
in him, are assigned to several speakers." (Transl. by a. Hastie,
Edinburgh: T.&.T. Clark, 1890), p.77.
36. Ibid., p.70.
37. Ibid., pp.71f.
38. Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology, p.86.
39• Speeches, p.xl.
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forth One through whom something never before existent in tne
species is to be introduced.^ But Schieiermacher, feeling that
even these assertions represent rather an inadequate expression
of things, goes on to say that even
the more precise definition of this supernatural concep¬
tion as one in which there was no male activity has no
connexion of any xind with the essential elements in the
peculiar dignity of the Redeemer; and hence, in and by
itself, is no constituent part of Christian doctrine.
Whoever accepts this definition, therefore, accepts it
only on the ground of the narratives involving it contain¬
ed in the New Testament writings; hence belief in it, lixe
belief in many matters of fact which have just as little
necessary connexion witn the dignity and the work of the
Redeemer, belongs solely to the doctrine of Scripture.41
Schieiermacher will not follow along the patn of an abso¬
lute supernatural conception with such a so-called precise defi¬
nition; yet, on the other hand, he asserts that alongside this
reproductive power one must postulate a creative activity com¬
bined with human activity, if one would seek to nullify the sex¬
ual aspect of procreation "an influence wnich would involve
participation in the universal sinfulness.^ Schieiermacher
consequently concluded that "everything rests upon the higher
influence which, as a creative divine activity, could alter both
the paternal and the maternal influence in sucn a way tnat all
ground for sinfulness was removed.iroereation might be per¬
fectly natural: certainly such creative divine activity could
alone suffice to complete the natural imperfection of the begot¬
ten child. Yet the general notion of a supernatural conception
must be seen as indispensable if we are not to allow the Redee- •
mer's own pre-eminence to be minimized.^ Scaleierraacher goes






on to affirm the Redeemer's unique personality with reference
to the very attempt of analyzing or even describing His real
character which easily leads to confusion. "When the expres¬
sion 'Jesus Christ' is used," Schleiermacher asserts, it is
done "to indicate not only tne subject of the union of the two
natures,... but also the divine nature of the Redeemer from all
eternity before its union with the human nature; so that this
union no longer appears as an element that goes to constitute
the person, Jesus Christ, but rather as an act of this person
4b
Himself." True, the New Testament says nothing of this,
using even the term "Son of God" "only of the subject of this
46
union, and not of the divine element in it before the union."
Schieiermacher even opposes the use of the term "nature" to re¬
fer to both the divine and the human,arguing taat if in Jesus
Christ the divine nature and human nature are combined into one
Person, there can hardly be that sort of constant unity of life
in Christ, and he Questions: "how can the unity of life coexist
with the duality of natures, unless the one gives way to the
other, if the one exhibits a larger and other a narrower range,
or unless they melt into each other, both systems of ways of ac-
tion and laws really becoming one in the one life?" Schleier¬
macher' s intention is to show that all these analyses of the
Redeemer's unique character are confusing and can but beget un¬
thinkable erroneous expressions.
Schleiermacher believes that to combine these two natures
45- ibid.. pp.391f.
46. ibid.. p.592.
47. He says: "But tne word 'nature' is particularly ill-
adapted for such a common use," and he explains: '.for in one
sense we actually oppose Cod and nature to one anotner, and hence
in this sense cannot attribute a nature to God. Nature in this
sense is for us the summary of ail finite existence." uoc. cit.
48. ibid.. p.595«
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into one Person is ridiculous, all attempts to do so being un¬
convincing at the point of producing a Christ who could be
truly alive arid credible. The very expression, "two natures
in one Person, 1 has always vacillated so Schieiermasher says
between the opposite errors of (a) mixing tne two natures
to form a third which would be neither divine nor human, or
of (b) keeping the two natures separate but neglecting the
unity of the arson for the saxe of more distinctly separating
or, in order to keep the unity of the Person inviolate, dis¬
turbing the necessary balance by subordinating and thereby
4 4
limiting one nature to tne other. The credai formulation re-
50
garding Christ is denounced for its improper and speculative
expression of him. Also denounced are U) tne Docetic heresy
of linking with God so tightly as to obscure the genuineness
of His humanity, and (b) tie Sbionite heresy of excluding "any
essential distinction between Christ and an exceptional man,"
51
both being very un-Christian misrepresentations.
The Redeemer's unique origin is a miraculous manifesta¬
tion which may be traced back only to the creative act of God.
In the event of such a life and an exclusive personality, the
divine side of reality is externalised. svith this abiding exam¬
ple, the God-consciousness of which is self-communicative, all
humanity is quickened for the divine dimension. Christ is the
living Awakener of the living religious seif-consoiousness. Of
course, Schleieraacher says, the God-consciousness must be seen
as having a supernatural origin, even as we see that the entire
human race is included in a sinful corporate life. But when re¬
lated to the Redeemer, the new corporate life seems miraculous





becoming natural, since every exceptional force attracts mass
K p
to itself and holds it fast." Scnleiermacher thus depicts
the Redeemer somewhat like the ferment in flour, saying that
in like manner His activity has penetrated the total human
sphere. He is the unfolding fountainhead of universal spirit¬
ual life (allgemeinen geistigen Lebens). All tnat He has in¬
troduced into human life is presented as "a new creation."
Schleiermacher therefore does not hesitate to call Christ "tne
Second Adam, the beginner or originator of tnis more perfect
A
human life, or the completion of the creation of man."
But Schleiermacher does not view the Redeemer's appear¬
ance as absolutely supra-rational: "Christ could not in any
way be distinguished as Redeemer from the totality of mankind
if those phases of nis life by wnicn He accomplishes redemption
were explicable by means of the reason which dwells equally in
nrv
all other men. For them those conditions would also be found in
54
others, and they also could work redemption." Schleiermacher
then admits that the dimension of "the supra-rational certainly
has a place in the Redeemer and the redeemedbut "the highest
goal that is set for these wordings of redemption is always a
human state which not only would obtain the fullest recognition
from the common human reason," but in which also no one could
ever distinguish that which the divine spirit effects from that
which human reason effects, even within, the selfsame individual,
inasmucn, tnen, as human reason would be completely one with
the divine 'pirit, the latter might in turn be regarded as rea¬
son's "highest enhancement...so that the difference between the
55
two is made to disappear."
5< • Ibid., p.3b5»




Again: "Any distinction between the natural and the superna¬
tural, between the comprehensible and the incomprehensible, 1
do not, upon the whole, recognize. Everything is in one sense
natural, and in another supernatural. -ven that the Son of
God was rna^e nan must, in a nigher sense, be natural. ' Thus,
Christ is presented as a .model man, archetypal and uni.ue,
historical and ideal, with both the divine and the human dimen¬
sion identified in Him; lie is fully der Menscn an sicn.
The flork of Christ.
Christ is treated as Redeemer because it is witn regard
to His worn of imparting tne Cod-consciousness to us, thereby
augmenting our human development, that we are conscious of our
need of a higner life. Christ gives to man that incentive
whicn is the original strength for human advancement. Kaitn
arises only through what Schleiermacher calls the agency or ef¬
ficacy (Wirksamkeit) of Christ, not from any natural constitu¬
tion (Beschaffenheit) of man. Nothing building up independently
in him of the whole series of Christ's gracious and mediated
workings can alter his relation to God or effects his justifica-
57
tion. At this point merit is altogether powerless. Trie im¬
portance of the Redeemer's activity in tne Christian's conscious¬
ness of grace is clearly seen in ail of this. The act of tne
redeemed is really the act of tne Redeemer: the union or iden¬
tity of two acts, (a) tne -Redeemer's activity and (b) the re-
56
deemed's receptivity, is here involved. ¥aitu in Christ im¬
plies recognizing Hi® as tne agency, within the Christian's own
consciousness, of our blessed relation to God. Christ Himself
holds and performs an agency toward mankind that no other being
5o. Rowan, op. cit., ii. pp.2o0f.
57. Christian Faith, p.504.
58. Ibid.. p.426.
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could effect, since His relation to uod is sucn that the abso¬
lutely powerful (iod-coasciousness is His whole personal cons¬
ciousness, i.e., the existence of God in Him.^^ He is the only
Person or Pattern in human existence who can originate the Hi-
PA
vine world-forming (weitbildend) movement. The revelation
caused by His life means that the seif-cotamunicativeness of His
powerful God-consciousness is imparted to us in such manner that
we may participate in His redeeming activity, in the divine
creative activity which is rendered possible by tne original
perfection of man and of the world, and which is even now pro¬
pagated in the totality of human nature. Thus Senleiermacher
actually includes the redemption in the creation.0"^ Redemption
is to be understood as a process of creation. God's revelation
in the world, when referred bacx to tne idea of human develop¬
ment, is mediated only by the influences of His possession of
this self-communicating and absolutely powerful God-conscious¬
ness. Schleiermacher quotes Jesus' saying: "Ho man knoweth the
Father but the Son, and He to whom the Son shall reveal Him."
"This consciousness of tne singularity of His knowledge of God
and of His existence in God, of the original way in which this
knowledge was in Him, and of the power thereof to communicate
59 • Ibid., pp.387, 426f.
60. In Schleiermacher*e own words: "The activity of the
Redeemer is world-forming, and its object is human nature, in
the totality of which the powerful God-consciousness is to be
implanted as a new vital principle. He takes possession of the
individuals relatively to tne whole, wherever He finds those in
whom His activity does not merely remain, but from when, moving
on, it can work upon others through the revelation of His life."
ibid.. p.427.
61. Wendland writes: "Schleiermacher wendet eacniica gegen
die Rationalisten ein, dass sie fiir das Spezifische des Christen-
tums, fdr den Glauben an die ErlfJsung und »• iedergeburt kein Ver-
stMndnis haben. Sie reden nur von einen allmfihlichen Fortschrei-
ten auf Grand der natdrlichen Anlagen und Kr&fte, die Gott dem
Menschen gegeben hat. Man kann sagen, dass Schleiermacher inao-
fern mit ihnen ging, als atch er Schdpfung und aridsung in einen
einzigen gdttlichen Ratschlues Zueammenfasate und die Krldsung
echon in der Schdpfung einbegriffen sein liess." op. oit.,p.230.
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itself and awake religion, was at once the consciousness of His
o 2
office as mediator and of His divinity." He asserts this
even more intensively in the Christian yaith:
It is only through Him that the human God-consciousness
becomes an existence of God in human nature, and only
tnrough tne rational nature that the totality of finite
powers can become an existence of God in the world, that
in truth He alone mediates all existence of God in tne
world and ail revelation of God through the world, in so
far as He bears within Himself the whole new creation
which contains and develops the potency of the God-
consciousness .65
Thus, Schleiermacher is seen as affirming the exclusive
worth of Christ as the only mediator for all. At the same time,
this affirmation is hard to square with a system which is unde¬
niably predominated by a pantheistic world view. Schleiermacher
means that communion with God, or the Christian consciousness
of grace, comes only through the act of the Redeemer. There is
no spiritual life whicn is not referred to the activity of His
redeeming causality; there is no Christian consciousness which
is not referred to the relation to Christ. As he says:
The view that in every Christian affection there must be a
relation to Christ does not in the least contradict our
proposition. Much more i this the case when the pious
feeling comes to expression as an actual moment in the form
62. speeches, p.247.
63. Christian Faith, p.588. One may quote Schleiermacher*s
earlier viewpoint in this regard, in the Speeches: "He ("Christ}
never maintained He was the only mediator, the only one in whom
His idea actualized itself. Ail who attach themselves to Him and
form His Church should also be mediators with Him and through
Him." p.248. ifleiderer points out that the view of "the possi¬
bility of a more perfect religion than Chri: tianity ochleierma-
cher afterwards limited to a continuous development within Chris¬
tianity itself, just as in his later Glaubenslshre he 10 longer
regarded Christ as one mediator among several, but as the only
one whose consciousness of God was perfect ami of unceasing ef¬
ficacy for the whole race." op. cit., p. 54; cf. end land, op.
cit., p.151.
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of pleasure or pain, for th Christian faith, however, the
incapacity implied in religious pain must be ascribed to
lack of fellowship with tne Redeemer, while, on the other
hand, the ease in evoKing pious feeling which goes along
with religious pleasure is regarded as a possession wnicn
comes to us from this fellowship, thus it is evident that,
within the Christian communion, there can be no religious
experience which does not involve a relation to Christ.64
what tcina of a relation to Christ causes pleasure or pain in
one's spiritual experience? what Schleiermaeher says in another
passage of the union with Christ may throw some light in this
aspects "Tne state of union is tne real possession of blessed¬
ness in the consciousness that Christ in us is the center of our
life, and this in such a way that this possession exists solely
as His gift, which, since we receive it simply by Hie will that
K
we should have it, is nis blessing and His peace."
Thus, if our relationship to Christ is understood as tnat
union with Christ which is the source of blessedness and peace,
and if it is truly in accord with the original destiny of human¬
ity, then, as this state of union with Christ is more strongly
established, the disturbance of life called "evil" (the effect
ft ft
of its cause, "sin") will gradually disappear. ' JSvil is trans¬
muted from a force of limitation to one's religious life into a
service for one's religious guidance ana progress. In dchleier-
macher's theory of salvation, Christ is the mediator in the sense
of being "the Starter" in control of the religious self-consci¬
ousness, which, after being awakened or guided, will participate
in the redeeming process of world-forming. The result of this
religious control, which brings things back into their original
harmony, is understood as reconciliation and eventually means





that Christ has brought men into the fellowship of His bless¬
edness, freeing them gradually from all hindrances of life.
Mackintosh points out that "an odd feature in terminoloy" is
involved here, because "the word 'Reconciliation* is used not
Cas in the New (Testament) for something done by God, but for a
process in the human soul." Pfleiderer sums up at this point
in more detail:
Schleiermacher rejects the idea of a transcendental recon¬
ciliation through tne atoning sufferings of Christ as the
representative of mankind before God, and puts ixi its place
the historical view of the matter, according to wnich
Christ by the toal impression of nis personality had such a
strengthening and beautifying influence on men's religious
consciousness that tney felt them elves saved and reconciled,
that is, delivered, or gradually being delivered, from tne
hindering and miserable contradiction between the higher
and lower self-consciousness.69
Schieiermacher's interpretation of Christ's suffering is
opaque because it evidently involves his concept of sin. Basi¬
cally, he disagrees witn what is sometimes called "wounds-
theology," which did not view the totality of Christ's suffering
but had rather aliegoricaily trivialized the wnole into a 3ensu-
70
ous, fragmentary interpretation of an artificial construction.
He pointed out that what is most significant is Christ's sympa-
71
thy with sin, or His attitude of submitting to the suffering
and describes this as "The real meaning of the statements that
67. Selbie writes: "New relation to God" is called "Justi¬
fication," "Conversion" is described as "new life," both are in-
voled "in the participation in Christ's blessedness and they are
not to be separated." op. oit.. p.l94«
68. Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology, p.91- Seibie
says that Schleiermacher develops his doctrine of reconciliation
altogether "from the subjective standpoint, and in so doing de¬
parts from the Church tradition which assigns an objective valid¬
ity to the death and suffering of Christ as a means of reconci¬
liation between God and man." op. clt., p.171.
69• Development of Theology, p.117.
70. Christian i'aith , p. 459•
71. Ibid.. p.458.
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Cnrist by Hie willing surren er of Himself to suffering and
death satisfied the divine justice, as that which had ordained
the connexion between sin and evil, and thus set us free from
7?
the punishment of sin," or as he calls it the "passive
7 it
obedience" of Christ, springing out of His self-denying love.
It is to be understood here that what Schleiermacher asserts is
not that suffering per se is of value, or that it carries "vi¬
carious satisfaction,"^ but that the intention to which Cnrist
firmly held until the end is worthy to be called to our atten-
7 b
tion. His suffering for us is not for the punishment of sin,
but to set us free from it, i.e., from our liability to punish¬
ment. ^ According to this viewpoint, should Christ be punished
for any so-called "hindrances of life," i.e., "sin"? To Him, or
to the absolutely powerful God-consciousness in His life, sin
and evil are no nothing; and, on the other hand, the gradual re¬
moval of guilt comes not by His substitution in our place (as
in suffering;, but by our union with the One who has set up for
us the new principle of life.
72. ibid.. pp.458, 4o?.
73. Schleiermacher writes: "If we begin by dividing the
obedience of Christ into the active and passive, we are by no
ipeans to imagine that these two are so divided that they occu¬
pied different parts of His life, as is commonly supposed—that
Lne passive obedience began only with His arrest, while the ac¬
tive had expressed itself from tne beginning of His public life
up to that point." But w.oen looked at more closely, then, "ac¬
tive and passive obedience were bound up with each other at
every moment." lbin.. pp.452f.
74. Cross: "The doctrine of vicarious satisfaction wrongly
makes God the arbitrary author of Christ's sufferings, removes
punishment from its natural connection with trie r.orally bad, and
so ignores the unity of nature. " op. cit., p.223; of. CnristIan
Faith, p.460.
75. As Schleiermacher puts it: "For in His suffering unto
death, occationed by His steadfastness, there is manifested to
us an absolutely self-denying love; and in this there is repre¬
sented to us with perfect vividness the way in which God wae in
Him to reconcile the world to Himself, just as it is in His suf¬
fering that we feel most prefectly how imperturbable was His
68
How, turning to what Schleiermacher caiis the 'active
obedience" of Christ, we come to und rstand and view His living
relationship with us as His nigh-priestly office. "It is His
action alone," Schieierm&cher says, 'which completely corres¬
ponds to the divine will, and gives pure and full expression to
the domi^on of the God-consciousness in human nature this is
the basis of our relationship to as to His priestly of¬
fice, it is Cross whien points oat tnat "Cnrist is tne climax
of all priesthood because he exhausts its significance, and he
is the end of ail priesthood because he is the perfect mediator
•7Q
between God and the human race for all time.' Yet His wnole
redeeming activity is manifested in the entire communion of be¬
lievers in such e way that His priesthood passes over to them,
and they in turn are to tne rest of mankind as the Jewish priest¬
hood was toward its people.
The origin of this living union with Christ lies in
Christ's prophetic office. Christ is the climax and end of all
prophecy as well as all priesthood: this fact in turn ieads to
something of tne complete adequacy and the utter inexhaustibility
of the original divine revelation. ocnleiermacher shows that
"no presentation of our relationship to God can arise outside
the sphere in which Christ is recognized, which would not fall
blessedness." He goes on: "Hence it may be said that tne convic¬
tion both of His holiness and of His blessedness always comes to
us primarily as we lose ourselves in the thought of His suffer¬
ing." Christian Faith, pp.458f.
76. Since there is 'a natural connexion of punishment with
moral evil." Ibid.., pp.45off.
77. Christian Faith, p.454- This relationship with Christ,
or this "union with Him, accordingly, although it never attains
more than relative manifestation, is yet recognized by God as
absolute and eternal, and is affirmed as such in our faith."
Ibid., p.465- Thus this union is ever incomplete from our view¬
point, for he says that "in living fellowship with Christ no one
wishes to be anything. Bach one wishes to appear only as anima¬
ted by Christ, and as a part of His work which is still in pro¬
cess of development." Ibid.. p.454.




short of that revelation." The revelation of God in Christ
is actually His "proclamation as well as His "self-presentation,"
both together being addressed to men "in view of their opposi¬
tion to Christ, in order to inane them susceptible of union with
OA
Hirn." fie may note from ail this that Schleieranacher's doctri¬
nal sources are quite independent of the old Jewish law. From
this point of view the prediction of Messianic prophecy is un¬
certain: "But its essence consists in this, that it spoxe of
the future of God's true messenger. The idea of that messenger
could be grasped by individual only in limited fashion, by each
in his own way; but rightly understood it always involved the
Q]
end of those two Jewish conceptions of retribution and election."
The performance of Christ's miracles Is superfluous to
our faith, since their characteristically immediate impressive-
82
ness is lost in time and space. In reality, Christ Himself
is the "total spiritual miracle"; it is Christ wno completes tne
possibility of the wotk of redemption and who is, once again,
Q2
trie climax and ena of the miraculous activity. Since all re¬
ligious or redemptive activities are referred bacx to him who i3
at once the climax and tne end of them ail, He is representing
the highest point of realisation of all things and the acme of
their true significance. He is their width and their depth,
their real value and the true significance of their development.
who is He then? Schleiermacher here is not nesitant to
84
testify to His lordship over the religious community He founded
79. Christian faith, p.44b.
80. Ibid., p.455; cf. Pfieiderer, op. cit., p.116, and
Lichtenberger, op. cit., p.85.
81* Christian faith, p.44b.
82. Ibid., pp.44 if.
83. hoc, cit.
84. Schleiermacher writes: "The evangelical Church, which
is guided and governed by its founder, Jesus Christ the eternal
Son of God. He is the quickening centre of tne Church; from nim
comes all, to Him ail returns: He is Beginning and Ena; in Him
we believe, and through Him aione we are blessed." Kowan, op.
cit.. II. p.207-
90
for, since "no one enterr this community except by submitting
himself to Christ's lordship, it follows that Christ Himself
initiated this Kingdom, and is thus without any predecessor in
85 86
Wis Kingly dignity." True ana real lordship" is found only
in Him: He is the only Source of spiritual power and grace,
all other leaders and sovereigns (including reiigious and poli¬
tical authorities) being but Wis inferior snadows or imita-
87
tions, Therefore, Christianity has a very distinctive spirit¬
ual determination and snould be altogether independent of all
extrinsic influence or colouring which would tend to channel its
development into alien determinative structures. For example,
Christianity cannot and must not become a theocracy or a polit-
QQ
ical tool.~ The healthy existence of such a reiigious commu¬
nion depends solely upon the redemptive causality, i.e., the
absolutely powerful God-consciousness of the Founder of this
communion; and all human elements which attempt to usurp His
lordship must be excluded.
Finally, Schleiermacher discusses Christ's resurrection,
ascension, and return to judgment. His attitude in tnis regard
is revolutionary in relation to the intenaed meanings of the
Scriptural presentation. One must oe reminded that since
Schleiermacher holds redemption to be a continuation of human
85« Christian Faith, p.467; cf. p.466.
86. "The lordsnip of Christ is as unlimited as tnat of the
animating principle always is when it is neither outwardly hin¬
dered not inwardly weakened." Ibid., p.466.
87. Ibid.. p.47?.
88. hoc, cit., cf. That is why Christianity is neither a
political religion nor a reiigious state nor a theocracy." He
goes on and affirms this: "To both, then, political religions
as well as theocracies, Christ puts an end through tne purely
spiritual lordship of nif- God-consciousness; and tne stronger
and the more extensive His Kingdom becomes, tne more definite
becomes the severance between Church and State, so that in the
proper outward separation which, of course, may take very dif¬
ferent forms their agreement is ever more perfectly worked
out." ibid., p.473.
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development, and that since he now comes to uiocuss certain mat¬
ters which do not fit into his theory and therefore are immediate¬
ly recognizable as alien to his system, we now face what amounts
to a real breach in any uniform historical development, ochleier-
macher sees the tnree tnernea referred to above as fantastic, very
litcely fictitious, and subject to a pletnora of suggestive and
erroneous misrepresentations. Still, he does concede tnat the
resurrection, ascension and judgment are accepted only "because
QQ
they are found in tne Scriptures; and ail that can be required
of any "roteetant Cnristian is that he shall believe them in so
90
far as they seem to him to be adequately attested." The resur¬
rection and ascension serve to exalt the "incomparable dignity
91
of Christ," and "the promise of return is only an accidental
form for the satisfaction of the longing to be united with
9?
Christ."^" However, the miraculous dimension in Christ's Return
cannot be made out to depend on His divinity, any more tnan that
which is incomprehensible and miraculous in tne ascension can
be made dependent on it. Yet the dimension reveals itself as
the impulse to all Christ's free actions (althougn trie ascension
93
is nowhere presented as precisely His act).
Schleiermacher'a viewpoint concerning tnese issues closely
parallels what he has to say in counteracting the old sensuous,
fragmentary interpretation of the vvundentheola^ie. «e are re¬
minded that faith in Jesus as Redeemer does not rest on details,
89. As to his attitude toward Scripture, in regarding to
Christ, Schleiermacher writes: "The Holy Scriptures are the per¬
manent reflection of ais prophetic activity, inasmuch as in
their composition and preservation, regarded as the wont of the







bat rather evolves from a total impression "from which it fol¬
lows only that there are no details in existence which could
04
have prevented that impression." Yet the Christian proclama¬
tion strikes out from the activities of Christ's total histori¬
cal career; it is not merely a matter of externalizing one's
J S
own sensuous experience, even though the significance of
96
Christ's life lies in the impression He made and tne influence
97
he had upon those who believed in Him.
Thus, Christ is the center of Christendom. He is the
originator of the Christian consciousness and the Pounder of the
Christian communion. If we view the whole matter from a rela¬
tive standpoint, as Schleiermacher did, Christ actually appears
as an exalted Figure. If, on the other hand, we see tnings
from the vantage point of faith or revelation, ochleiermacher
has in reality downgraded Christ; for His living wholly divine
personality is absent from Scnleiermacher's total presentation.
His chief mistake throughout is tnat he foes not make adequate
94. Ibid.. p.423.
95. He preaches: "Tn.e resurrection life of our Lord, as
the apostle presents it to us, is a glorious, though it may be
unattainable, model of the new life in which we are all to walk
through Him." Nicoll, Selected Jermon3 of Schleiermacher. p.2o7.
Again; the coming back of the Saviour to judgment, "already in
course of being fulfilled; but it will be only tne smallest num¬
ber of you who will be readily inclined to do so. It always
seems to us as if tne Lord had not yet set up His judgment-reat;
and although we distinctly know tnat the kindom of God comes
not with outward show, yet as respects trie judgment of God we
are accustomed to expect that it will so come. ' Ibia., p.432.
96. Christ's influence is just this: The communication,
provided only that "they trace every approximation to blessed¬
ness back to Christ, and seek to find it in a fellowship which
makes it a principle that, for redemption, nothing need be sou-
ght beyond His influence, and also that nothing in that influence
is to be neglected." Christian Faith, p.361.
97. fleiderer summarises tne whole discussion: "Schleier¬
macher thus makes evidently the well-known distinction between
the ideal principle which was revealed in Jesus £nd the form trie
principle takes as a historical phenomenon. In the communication
93
allowance for the concept of revelation. Instead, it is per¬
meated and coloured by the background of tne modern movement
which has been furnished by "the uninspired Nationalism of the
On
Aufki&rung." fet, we see also how ochieiermacher entangles
himself and his system in contradictions when he comes to for¬
mulate his thinking about the living Redeemer. Selbie charges
his Christoiogy with being "largely a priori and determined by
qq
his general interpretation of Cnristianity," without always
being wholly consist exit with the remainder of his theology. It
is the usual practice to charge Schieiermacher thus,
because his doctrine of the Person of Christ cannot be
said to square with the presuppositions of his philoso¬
phical theology. But the truth rather is that while some
parts of his system are almost too exclusively dominated
by his experimental doctrine to its logical conclusions.
100.
Finally, despite all these defects in Schieiermacher's presen¬
tation of Christ, Selbie assures us that: "it is stiil true to
say of Schieiermacher that 'he was the first modern theologian
to write a definition of Christianity in which the name of its
101
Founder occupies the central place.'"
of the principle itself consists the work of Christ: His work
as Saviour is that of imparting to others the strength of his
consciousness of God; his work as Reconciler is tne communica¬
tion of the happiness of this cunsciousness; effects which were
at first the immediate work of Christ, but subsequently could
only be produced by the continued operation of his spirit and
example in the mind of believers." op. cit., p.i!7.







In beginning this chapter it is important to point out
that, according to Bchleierraaefter, fellowship essentially be¬
long: to human nature:
Fellowship...i demanded by tae 'consciousness of Kind'
iGattungsbewusrts:einj which dwells in every man, and which
finds its satisfaction only when he steps forth beyond the
limits of hie own personality and taices up the facts of
other personalities into his own. It is accomplished
through the fact that everything inward becomes, at a cer¬
tain point of its strength or maturity, an outward too,
and, as such perceptible to others.1
The internal religious self-consciousness is that original en¬
dowment which, arising from the original perfection demands ex¬
ternal expression.^ The foundation of the religious fellowship
is implicitly grounded upon one's broadening from a personal
self-consciousness (persdniiches Selbstbewusstsein) into a race-
consciousness (Gattungsbewusstseinj. This is to say that there
is an impulse to communicate to otners the same religious cons¬
ciousness. Fellowship is also vitally important for the seif-
recognition of every individual; it truxy reflects trie existence
of the individual himself. Human communication evoxes trie true
apprehension of human nature. Schleiermachor wrote:
'The dawning of an archetypal idea' in an individual soui,
evtn if it cannot be explained by the previous states of
that very soul, can certainly be explained by the total
state of the society to which the individual belongs: so
even the men who are credited with divine descent always
appear as determined by the character of their people,
and tnus it is from the total energy of the people that
their existence is to be explained or comprehended.3
1. Christian faita, p.27•
2. Ibid., p.24b.
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According to him, every individual i rooted in certain
common religious characteristics; ana the experience of each
individual is found, more or less, to show tne same direction
of religious development, not only having identical standing
in the universe but also advancing toward the same goal, xhe
religious communion is formed on the basis of the religion
which all possess.4 In other words, religion naturally produ¬
ces religious communion. If we trace back, uchleiermaeher* s
earlier thought in this respect, we find that he wrote: "If
tnere is religion at all, it must be social, for that is the
nature of man, and it is quite peculiarly tne nature of
religion." As Oman points out tnat when a religious man is
in touch with the infinite, he feels deeply the need of a con¬
federate fellowship with others: "Man is not free merely as he
is self-contained, sie reaches the freedom of a large individu-
fl
ality only in relation to humanity and the Infinite." Or, as
Mackintosh understands it: "Schleiermacher struck the note
5. Ibid., p.51- of. i?'ries3, '«vnat etnics seeks to por¬
tray should 'be regarded as a complete whole, the parts of
which can be understood only in and through the whole.'" op.
cit., p. 1*32.
4. Schieiermacher says: "Everybody must in his own ex¬
perience be conscious of this process from both its sides, the
expressing and the perceiving, and must thus confess that he
always finds himself, with the concurrence of his conscience,
involved in a multifarious communion of feeling, as a condition
vjuite in conformity with hie nature, and therefore that he
would have co-operated in the founding of such a communion if
it had not been there already." Christian Jfaitn, p.21.
5« Speeches, p.14 5. He also says: "You must confess
tnat when an individual has produced and wrought out something
in his own mind, it i morbid and in the highest degree unna¬
tural to wish to reserve it to himself. He should express it
in the indispensable fellowship and mutual dependence of action.
And there is also a spiritual nature whicn he has in common
with the rest of hi; species which demands tnat he express and
communicate all that ia in him. The more violently he is moved
and the more deeply he is impressed, the stronger tnat social
impulse works." hoc, cit.
6• i'he Problem of raith Freedom, p.21; .
JO
firmly tnat to be a Christian is to be a member of a living or¬
ganism, whose life derives from Christ, Trie mutual giving and
receiving of the brethren makes religion, ae lived at the
7
Christian level, what it is. ' Thus, owing to the living ex¬
perience of the religious individual, religion is essentially
active or communicative, according to Schleiermacher*n own
words: "We commence with religion ae a kind of activity. Acti¬
vity is twofold, having to do with life and with art. ,c! Oman
also comments at this point tnat it was his high merit to have
maintained the social nature or religion and the knowledge of
divine things in life and not apart from it.
Thus far, considering what nas be n discussed, Scnleier-
macher too easily works out his theory of religious communion.
Human nature is fundamentally religious; religion is fundamen¬
tally social; and sociability essentially belongs to human na¬
ture. Schleiermacher is conscious that truth constantly reiaains
the same and that it is easily always identified. in what fol¬
lows we shall see how he applies this already established theory
of the social spirit of the religious communion^ to an interpre¬
tation of the common spirit of the Christian Church.^
.Vhat is this religious communion? ICelbie points out tnat
"this communion is tne Church, the new organism which Christ has
formed for Himself. It is in and through the Church that men
have experience not merely of the historical image of Christ,
7. Types of ern fiteology, p.75»
Speeches, pp.27f.
9. Ibid., p.xiv.
10. Haiiiie, ince religion is also for Ocnieiermacher
an essentially social phenomenon, this feeling is always concei¬
ved by him as being socially determined." op. cit., p.55*
11. Church means 'tne totality of the religious affections
which form the foundation of r-uch a communion ana are recognised
to be identical in the various members, in its peculiar content
as set forth by contemplation and reflection upon the religious
emotions. ' Christian Faith, pp.29f.
n
but of His redeeming power. There ia a new life in tne Church
which spreads among all those who enter into touch with it, and
12
tne source oi this new life is Christ." As to trie relation¬
ship of the Church to Christ, he says that 'the Church is call¬
ed tne body of Christ, ruled by the Head fcSph. 1*22-23} Ool.l:
1:'>—19J and tne more it becomes externally complete and inwardly
perfect, tne more it is also said to become the image of
13
Christ." Therefore, judging from the passage quoted, it is
■J A
the aim of the Church to approximate it;elf to tne image of
Christ. Christ is the abiding example of the believers: tne
Christian communion"*"* owes its existence to tne appearance
of Christ, who is of supernatural origin, manifested in that
wnich is natural. Cross points out here that "in relation to
the Kedeemer Him: elf the existence of this new collective life
is no miracle out the normal working of that supernatural power
in its assumption of natural ethical forms and in its appropria-
16
tion to itself of the material surrounding it." And again:
..e perceive, tien, that the law of self-organization, as
it appears in tne naturalization of the supernatural in
Christ, finds its parallel in the communion founded oy
Him. ror tne incarnation of Christ in relation to human
nature in general corresponds to th- regeneration of the
the individual in relation to the whole nature of tne in¬
dividual; so also to sanctification, as tne progressive
12. oelbie, op♦ clt., p.169.
13• Christian Faith, p.580•
14. "The self-Identity of the Christian Church, however,
can cover no more than the fact that tne mode in which the
divine exists in the human ever remains the same, and that the
goal also remains the same to which the Church throughout all
its movements is seeking to approximate. In Christ also the
union of the divine with the human was ever the same." Ibia..
p.5B3.
15« "The Church exists wherever there ia faith, because
faith is the complete appropriation of Christ and is, in addi¬
tion, of an essentially fellowship-forming character. " ibid.,
p.694.
16. The Theology of Schleiermacher, p.198.
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appropriation by Christ of individual functions, corres¬
ponds the work of the Christian communion as an organic
body which progressively organizes itself and appropria¬
tes to itself the mass (i.e., the world) whicn lies over
against it.17
According to Sohleiermacher, tne woric of Christ is but an un-
1 H
finished task; " and the Church was founded by Him to witness
19
to Him in the world and to continue His activities, so that
His redemptive worx of world-forming will gradually and pro¬
gressively be actualized through the agency of the Church, ac¬
ting for Him in tne world.'therefore, faith in Christ means
to live for Christ. "To believe in Christ and to have Christ
21
living in one are the same thing." Since Christian piety is
teleological, faitn means to be receptive of Christ as present
ed by the Churcn on the one hand, and to be active in human
life as manifested in the world on the other. He explained
that:
when Christ was with them (Christians), anu just because
they were taken up into living fellowship with Him, they
had the principle of the new life, and had it not merely
as susceptibility but also as spontaneous activity; al¬
though as long as Cnrist was with them it took the form
exclusively of a continuous desire to receive from Him,
and therefore only afterwards could become truly common
and manifest itself as Holy Spirit.22
He continues: "it may be said on the one hand that tne Holy
17. Ibid., pp.238ft cf. Christian Faith, p.526.
Id. Schieiermacher preached on Good Friday: "On, that we
might all die with the same sorrow over unaccomplished deeds,
which was so plainly revealed in tne Saviour's sorrowful cry,
'My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?'" He continues: "He
loves His duty with His whole heart; the thought of tne great
work to which He had devoted His life still filled His soul.
And when He reflected how far that work still was from comple¬
tion." Hicoll, op. cit., pp.54f.
19. Christian Faith, pp.586, 588.




bpirit produces faith, ana on the other hand tnat the Holy
23
Spirit comes through faith." According to him, the common
spirit of the Christian fellowship is the Holy Spirit;*^ the
Spirit of God belongs to tne original nature of man,^y and it
is first seen in Christ.2** Scnleiermacher also means that




of a common spirit among them is effected. it is this spirit
which furnishes a truly unitary life; it is a moral I era on.
He says: "This comon spirit is also one, because in all derived
29
from one and the same source, namely Christ." In other words,
30
the reciprocal influence of Christian believers is only a pro¬
cess whereby this spirit originally derived from Christ is
realized. Yet one will not easily ignore the fact that fchleier-
macher is actually applying here the same old theory of his
23. Ibid., p.577.
4. He stated that 'the expression 'Holy Spirit* must be
understood to mean the vital unity of tne Christian fellowship
as a moral personality; and this, since everything strictly
legal has already been excluded, we might denote by the phrase,
its common spirit." Ibid., p.535.
25. He preached tnat the Spirit of God belongs to "tne
original nature of man, who was created in the image of God."
dieoil, op. clt., p.100.
2b. ifleiderer traced bacx that it is the "stronger (hi¬
gher} consciousness of God, proceeding from Christ, whicn, as
the con. ciousness of the Christian community, is the *noly
spirit.' As the God-consciousness of Christ is the divine in
Him, so the noly Spirit 'is the union of .divine Being with hu¬
man nature in the form of the common spirit of the community,
as animating the collective life of believer.'.* Tne holy bpirit,
therefore, is the same saving principle in the community tnat
primarily appeared in the person of desus in the form of an in¬
dividual life; and the saving work of this principle is the
production, in those individuals who open themselves receptively
to it, of a life of invigorated and felicitated God-conscious¬
ness similar to that which was typically present .in Jesus."
op. cit., pp.HYf.
27. Christian Faith, pp. 560f"f.
28. Ibid., pp.95» 562.
29. Ibid.. p.563.
30. cf. Nicoll, op. cit.. pp.241f«; Kriees, op. cit..p.5b.
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racial conscioueness which is dev loped from a self-conecious-
31
nese. According to him, the self-consciousness of a single
individual, in the fullest sense of the word, is to be under¬
stood as a widened form of this race-consciousness. As ;»1acKin-
tosh explained: "The consciousness of man, within Christianity
as without, includes a communal element. It is a consciousness
in which we know ourselves one with others." And ne pointed
out: "This emphasis on the corporate nature of the Christian
32
life is one of hie best contributions. " One will, then ven¬
ture to ask in this respect: what is the difference between the
self-consciousness and the Cod-consciousness? Or between the
race-consciousness and the common spirit herein discussed? fet
fchleiermacher aware of this, identifies them: "The race is one
in the same sense as the Church is one, ana as these cannot be
two living unities for toe same whole, what we wish to denote
by the expression 'Holy Spirit* would be exactly tne same thing
33
as the racial consciousness." But the difficulty still exists,
in spite of his mediating these two ideas by identifying them.
It is the appearing of Christ which once again would seem super¬
fluous in this respect, if the self-consciousness can work out
into a race-consciousness; and again, as he says, trie Holy Spirit
would be the same as the race-consciousness. fni3 immediately
means that one's self-consciousness can work out the Holy Spirit.
However, -chleiermacher is aware of this difficulty, affirming
that:
Of course it was first through Christ...that the racial
consciousness, along with the God-consciousness and with
the same object in view, has become a powerful practical
motive. But just for this reason, this power is no mere
31. Edward (speaking for Schieiermacher); "In Christ,
then, we see the -Spirit, according to the kind and manner of
our earth, priraordially take the form of self-consciousness in
the individual." Christmas Eve, p.61.
52. Types of lodern Theology, p.61.
33. Christian Faith, p.564.
iOl
natural principle that would have developed of itself
out of human nature as human nature would have remained
without Christ.34
Christ being the author of all Christian experience, the Chris¬
tian communion is a divine operation. Its common spirit is the
Spirit of Christ which constitutes the will of the Kingdom of
35
God. Schleiermacher stated that:
To regard our corporate iife as divinely-created, and to
derive it from Christ as a divinelv-given One, are the
same thing; just so, at that time, to believe that desus
was the Christ, and to believe that the Kingdom of God
(that is, the new corporate life which was to be created
by God) had come, were the same thing. Consequently, all
developing blessedness had its ground in this corporate
life.36
The Church is the divine government of the world: it is
not only the communion of the Christian believers but al30 a
locus of the communication between the human and the divine.^
This is known as the work of redemption, for he writes: "Redemp¬
tion is possible only in the form of a common life, and sin has
its basis, strictly spe&King, not in this common life, but only
in the individual, in so far as he still has some thing in him
38
of the old common life of sin." Thus human fellowship is a
necessary process for redemption, and the true force of unifica¬
tion is the Holy Spirit, which is apprehended (as in the form
of the common life with Christ) that they may advance harmonious¬
ly in the course of development, that the true unity of the
34. Ibid., pp.564f.
35. Schleieraacher preached: "The Kingdom of God, in this
narrower sense, i3 only in those who are actuated by a spirit
common to them ail, making known the will of God in their hearts.
Those manifold gifts, which always work in harmony towards the
same end, because they proceed from the same Spirit." Hicoll,
Q p » c11., p. 3o.
36. Christian .raitn, p.360.
37. 'elbie, op. cit., p. 207.
33• Christian Faith, p.315•
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human race may eventually be accomplished through the communi¬
ty
cation of tne Holy Spirit, and that their faith in Christ may
be mutually established through the reciprocal influence of
their spiritual experience. This is rooted in their common in¬
ner impulse felt by ail the members of the communion to realize
their God-consciousness. At this point, Selbie also points out
that "union with God in Christ is characteristic of all those
who are in the condition of sanctification. The sphere of this
union is the Church, and the indwelling of the divine in the
40
Church is conditioned by the indwelling of the divine in Christ."
Schleiermacher gradually realizes the importance of the
existence of the Church, but he asserts its extraordinary signi¬
ficance or peculiar worth at the expense of nearly abandoning
his affirmation of the abiding virture of the human race-cons¬
ciousness, to the extent tnat the operations of the Holy Spirit
are only to be found in the Christian Church.41 with regard to
the Christian life, here is his interpretation of prayer:
"Prayer is the sense of need put in relation to our conscious-
A O
ness of God and directed towards the future." True prayer al¬
ways relates to an interest in the Kingdom of God, and it origi¬
nates from the common consciousness of the imperfection of the
A '2
Church. As he puts it: "prayer, i.e. the inner combination
39* Schleiermacher says: "Owing to the identity of the
Spirit in all, everything that happened would show a spontaneous
consistency; there would exist no difference between tne general
will and that of individuals." Ibid., p.660.
40. Schleierraacher, p.205.
41. He says: "First, these powers are not to be found out¬
side of the Christian Church, and hence they neither arise from
the general constitution of human nature (which would make
Christ superfluous) nor from any other divine arrangement. Se¬
cond, this Spirit is not something supernatural and mysterious
though not immediately divine, a higher yet created essence put¬
ting itself in secret ways into relation with men." Christian
raith. pp.570f.
42. Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology, p.92.
43. Christian Faitn, pp.68f.
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with the God-consciousness of a wish for full success,This
involves only two Kinds of attitudes: tnankfulness ana resig-
nation. Mackintosh pointed out that "nothing betrays a man's
genuine standpoint in theology more unerringly than his view
46
of prayer." Baptism is the act of receiving the individual
into the fellowship of believers; the Lord's Supper is an act
whereby "the communion of life with Christ is preserved in a
A "7
particularly energetic manner."
Schleiermacher goes on to discuss the Church Visible and
the Church Invisible. It is because the pure appears in impure
expression that he proposes the ideas of the Visible and the In¬
visible. As he puts it: "The invisible Church is the totality
of the effects of the Spirit as a connected whole; but these ef¬
fects, as connected with those lingering influences of the col¬
lective life that has been taken possession of by the divine
Spirit, constitute th visible Church." This separation into
Visible and Invisible is inevitable because of the antithesis' be¬
tween the Church and the world; yet they are not spatial or ex¬
ternally separate, and this antithesis has been relegated to,
or developed into, an antithesis between the Visible and tne In-
40
visible Church. As he wrote: "Every existing church is only
50
a visible appendage of the true church." By tne true Church,
he means the invisible one, which is an undivided unity and in-
51
fallible in action. On the other hand, the visible church is
52
imperfect and subject to division, although tnis does not des¬
troy its living fellowship. In fact, this is how he states it:
44. Ibid., p.669.
45* Loc. cit.
46. Types of Modern Theology, p.92.
47. Lichtenberger, op. cit.. p.157.
48. Christian Faith, p.677.
49. Ibid.. p.676.
50* speeches, p.205*
51. Christian kaith, p.678.
104
"All action within the fellowship is productive of fellowship,
which can only continue to exist through actions bearing upon
it; thus whatever disturbs such action must carry with it
53
division." On the other hand, Schleiermacher has already
affirmed in the Speeches; "But religion, exactly by its multi¬
plicity, assumes the utmost unity of the church. The muitipli-
.54
city is necessary for the complete manifestation of religion.
He concluded that it was because "the religion of religions
cannot collect material enough for its pure interest in all
55
things human.The Christian Church, like every historical
phenomenon, is a thing subject to the law of development, and
therefore it presents variations; and he continues; "It must...
be shown how the unity of its essence is, nevertheless, not en-
dangered by these mutations." At this point, Seibie wrote;
"Schleiermacher sees clearly that uniformity is not unity. The
true Church is a fellowship, and fellowship is a fellowship of
differences, but underlying them ail is that oneness of aim
and spirit which will always characterize those who are truly
57
Christian in their outlook." In this aspect, his words take
on a severe tone; "As nothing is more irreligious than to de¬
mand general uniformity in mankind, so nothing is more unchris-*
58
tian than to seek uniformity in religion."
Thus Schleiermacher, with this view, sees Christian fel¬
lowship as being manifested in one spirit which is common to
52. "The church can never in actuality be completely and
uniformly one. Tne only reason, however, is that every society
existing in space ana time is thereby limited and losing in
depth what it gains in breadth, falls to pieces." Speeches,p.213.
53. Christian Faith, p.681.
54. Speecnes, p.213.
55. Ibid., p.252.




all its members as a principle of unity, and whicn is meanwhile
expressed in the differences of that multiplicity which is na¬
tive to all worldly elements (though not as a necessary evil,
but as an essential manifestation). He goes on to state that
this Christian fellowship, through combined effort and with an
impulse of mission,has a goal to pursue: i.e., to regenerate
the human race, xhie means tnat the Kingdom of God must be ex¬
tended among those who are not yet consciously within it.*3^" To
quote him: "If a religious view become clear to him, or a pious
feeling stir his soul, it is ratner his first endeavour to di¬
rect others to the same subject and if possible transmit the
62
impulse." " But it if of the utmost importance that the first
awakening of the innate religious capacity be realised, for
this capacity depends on others to help quicken it.^
Although Schleiermacher, at a later period in his theo¬
logical thought, appeared to have more of an objective approach,
he continued to emphasize the significance of the common cons¬
ciousness of Christian believers, with regard to the work of
regeneration or the process of propagation, nowever, his Dasic
viewpoint from the beginning was that religion must be one's
very own; and his emphasis upon the subjective indiviaual expe¬
rience was never diminished. Schleiermacher insists that the
59. Schleiersacher dialectically states: "if the fellow¬
ship of believers, as an historical body within the human race,
is to exist and persist in continuous activity, it must unite
in itself two things a self-identical element, whereby it re¬
mains the same amid change, and a mutable element, in which the
identity finds expression." Christian jf'altn. p.532.
60. 'fellowship with Him ["ChristJ is always a fellowship
with His mission to the world." ibid., p.517.
61. He says: "You see that this is not a case of endea¬
vouring to make others lite ourselves, not of believing that
what is in one man is indispensable for ail. it is only the
endeavour to become conscious of and to exhibit the true rela¬
tion of our own life to the common nature of man." Speeches,
p.149.
62. hoc. cit.
63. Oman, The iroblem of Faith & Freedom, p.224.
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experience must be that of the individual. Fir-t, concerning
the work of regeneration, he speaks of "the regeneration of the
human race, wnien to be sure only actually cornea to pass in tne
form of regeneration of individuals." Then, concerning the
process of propagation in Christian preaching: "Such preacning
must always take the form of testimony; testimony as to one's
own experience, which si all arouse in others the desire to have
o b
the same experience." Thus, Schleiermacher strikes a balance
by seeing tne importance of tne subjective individual experience
in religion, as active on both the receptive side and the im¬
parting side, and at the same time seeing tne significance of
the objective communal spirit which is essentially common to all
who have been received into the living fellowship with Christ
as "co-operative ana interactive" (zusammenwirkende una aufein-
anderwirkende). 'inerefore the regeneration is for the individ¬
ual and the sanctification is mostly communal.00 In the redemp¬
tive work of furthering the whole, regeneration is for the ori¬
ginating stage and sanctification is for its continuation.
Through tnese two forms taken up into the system of redemption,
the Christian fellowship is truly on its way to the goal of
world-forming. And tne world stands in an antithetical relation
to it as the locus in which the missionary work of tnis fellow¬
ship is to be done. As be says: "Tne world of nature is not to
64. Christian Faitn, p.477.
65* ibid., p.69»
66. He explained: "For the incarnation of Christ means
for human nature in general what regeneration is for the indi¬
vidual fSinzeinenJl. And just as sanctification is the progress¬
ive dominion of the various [einselneu]} functions, coming with
time to consist less and less of fragmentary details and more
and more to be a whole, with all its parts integrally connected
and lending mutual support, so too the fellowship organizes it¬
self here also out of tne separate feinzelnenj redemptive acti¬
vities and becomes more and more co-operative and interactive."
Ibid., p.628.
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be considered as going its own way ori the strengtn of the di¬
vine preservation, the divine government only exerting influ¬
ence on it through special isolated acts, so as to oriog it in-
to harmony with the Kingdom of grace. " The world serves as
preparatory ground for the development of the Church: its co¬
existence with the Church is only temporary and contingent.
As Schleiermacner puts it: "In toe doctrine of tne Church in
its co-existence with the world, we can only state first those
chief activities through the continuous exercise of which the
temporal development of this wnole really becomes the develop¬
ment of the Christian Church, and which thus form its essential
AR
and invariable features. ' And yet, he says, "the world might
persist alongside of the Church, opposing the Church's action
and throw it back upon itself. But yet the church, as actually
existing, would none the less be without any worldly admixture;
the two would be entirely separate ana mutually exclusive eoci-
69
eties." In describing the existence of this antithesis be¬
tween the Church and the world with relation to the mission of
the Church, the world is but a "nullity and a purely negative
thing" (Nichtigkeit und das bloss Verneinende) except for its
70
feeling of a need for help; and this antithesis is destined to
71
disappear through tne absorption of the ultimate world-forming
67. Ibid., p.723.
68. ibid.. p.585. cf. i'riess, "He was convinced taat a
general survey of human history at a whole is indispensable to
the Kirchenfdrst, since the development of churches and reli¬
gions can be understood only in connection with the development
of all manxind." op. cit., p.158; cf. p.7o.
69. Christian Faith, p.6/6.
70* Ibid., p.582. cf. "The world can be viewed as a per¬
fect revelation of divine wisdom only in proportion at the Holy
Spirit makes itself felt through the Christian Church a• the
ultimate world-shaping power." Ibid., p.737.
71. Ibid., pp.583f»
108
power of the Christian Church. This means, also tnat alx other
religious or obscured human fellowships are destined to pass.^
73
The only true fellowship is in the essence of Christianity,
which Sohleiermacher believers is the only genuine union of tne
human race. "All other religious fellowships are destined to
lose themselves in Christianity, and hence all nations are des¬
tined to pass over into the Christian fellowship, tne common
spirit of the Christian Church would then be the common spirit
of the human race."^ but here a serious dilemma is involved.
As Gelbie points out: "For it must be remembered that there is
an aptitude for religion in all men, and this justifies the
otherwise apparently fruitless efforts of the Churcn. but it
means also that the Church becomes less useful to men the fur-
7b
ther they advance in the religious life." His only effective
means of bypassing this difficulty i3 to affirm that the reli¬
gious condition in the Christian Church is never absolutely
perfect, but is ever involved in the conflict with tne world;
so that, realistically speaking, the Church militant is the
Church of which Scnleiermacher actually speaks: tne Church tri¬
umphant is but imaginary. Scnleiermacher fails into a dilemma
only if this is viewed singularly from the iaeaiistic side of it.
«»hat about the comsummation of the Church? As to his
concept of immortality, Schleiermacher reminds us that it surely
involves difficulties in thought ana that here, once again, his
72. Nicoll, op. cit.. pp.29l» 323f.
73. cf. His prayer: "Let the Spirit of order and of peace
rule everywhere in the Christian Church! To this end grant Thy
blessing on the bona of love and fellowship which unites Thy
people." Nicoll, op. cit., p.233.
74. Christian Faitn, p.563.
bchleiermacner, p.o2; cf. A.C. McGiffert, "It was in¬
evitable that when religion was regarded ae a mere means to mo¬
rality the more the principle of human ability was emphasized
tne less need there must seen of religion." The Rise of ooera
Religious Ideas, (Hew York: Tne ,<acfillan company, 1929), p.22.
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viewpoint circles back; to his concept of tne origin of the
world. He admits that since one has only analogy by which to
work out tne expression of a future life, all attempts to de¬
velop the ideas of such a life must turn to myths and visions.^
As he says: "These were everywhere the forms of prophetic
thought, which in its higher import makes no claim to furnish
Knowledge in the strict sense, but is meant only to give stimu¬
lating expression to principles already known. Thus Schleier-
7f\
raacher is only conscious of the present life, which truly sup¬
plies one with an expression or Knowledge of faith. He does
7 9
not admit of the fantastic notions which arise from one's own
80
sensuousness to form any ideas of the future life which is,
76. He warns: "if we seek, by means of the idea of tne fu¬
ture life, to assign a place to the consummated Church where it
will no longer be a productive factor but a product only, again
we fail. The one point of view will always tend to merge in
what is mythical, i.e. in the historical presentation of what
is supra-historical; the other point of view will always appro¬
ximates what is visionary, i.e. the earthly presentation of wnat
is more than earthly." Christian Faith, p.722.
77. Loc. cit.
78. .endiand, "Scnon das irdische Leben ist eine voile Of-
fenbarung der Herrlichkeit Gottes. Das ktlnftige Leben also nichts
prinzipieii Meues mehr geben." op. cit., p.213; cf. pp.21bf.
79« In Schleiennacher* s letter to Henriette von .»illich,
what he says about the life hereafter throws some light upon his
viewpoint of the problem of immortality: "But if you picture to
yourselves a phenomenal life like the present, ana conceive that
you may, under such circumstances, be distant from your beloved,
and that others may be nearer to him dear daughter, that is an
empty phantom, that you must try to get rid of." Rowan, op. oit.,
IX. p.81.
80. He says: "In the religious life then we may well say
we have already offered up ana disposed of all that is mortal,
and that we actually are enjoying immortality. But the immortal¬
ity tnat most men imagine and their longing for it, seem to me
irreligious, nay quite opposed to spirit of piety. Dislike to
the very aim of religion is the ground of their wish to be im¬
mortal." tie then continues: "They are concerned as to how they
are to carry it with them beyond this life, and their utmost en¬
deavour is for longer eight and better limbs. ' Speeches, p.100.
110
in reality, beyond one's grasp. ^(Man, after ail, is merely a
historical being and can only know, historically, what is in¬
telligible to him.)
Before conciuaing this chapter it in important to point
out that nchleiermacher emphasizes throughout the presence of
A?
a living fellowship and an ethical religion " among the belie¬
vers who are aniraatecl by one Spirit in the Christian Church,
ail of which is in turn cue to a true relationship to its
Pounder, the Lord Jesus Christ. Thus the Christian Cnurch is
"in the world though not of it, and develops itself historically
in pursuance of the aims of its Pounder." As Lucke commented
on his work: "its greatest merit is to oe sought in its contents;
in this, namely, that Schleiermacher, from first to last, gives
so decided a prominence to the positive character of the Chris¬
tian system of belief, to its most inward significance and con-
84
nexion in the life of the Church."
81. He writes: "Certainty beyond this life is not given to
us. Do not misunderstand me. 1 mean certainty for phantasy, wnich
desires to 3ee everything in distinct images; but, otherwise,
there is the greatest certainty and nothing would be certain if
it were not so that for the soul there is no such thing as death,
no annihilation. But personal life is not the essence of spiritual
being; it is but an outward presentment thereof, now tnis is re¬
peated we know not we can form no conception of it; we can only
form poetic virions." Rowan, op. cit., II. p.80.
32. (Vendland, "Diese Oeftthle una Betrachtungen begleiteten
auch nicht nur wie neilige muaik sein tfitiges Leben, sondern ga-
ben dem H ndeln die st&rksten Impulse." op. cit., p.62.
Also, Schleiermacher preaches: "Faith which is not active
by works is no true faith, but dead, and the works that do not
come from faith are only dead works." Nicoll, op. cit., p.210.
Dilthey, "Die Kirche 1st nichts anderes als die Gemeinschaft
der yenschheit, welche in sich die Idee und Aufgabe der Menachheit
vermdge des sittlichen froze see realisiert." op. cit.. p.793.
83. Belbie, op. cit«, p.220; cf. Christian faith, pp.333f.
84. Schleierraacher, Brief Outline of the Study of Theology,
(to which are prefixed Reminiscences of Scnleiermacher by Frie-
drich Ltlcke). p.40.
PART II.
THE CRITIQUE OF SCHLSIREACHES'S THEOLOGY
BY EM1L BRUME ER AND KARL BARTH
INTRODUCTORY
Schleierraacher' s theology is regarded as modera theology
Should this term "modern" be attached a© epithet to the word
"theology" and applied to Schleiermacher*s theology, then "mo¬
dern theology" in the strictest or the moot regular usage of
the term, should not only be assigned to Schleiermacher, but
Brunner and Barth should equally be defined a© modern theolo-
1
gians, The reason for pointing this out is that even Brunner
and Barth themselves constantly spoke of "modern Protestantism"
a© if this term axiomatically referred to a special kind of
Christian faith whic s is, though taken to a large extent for
granted, different from their own. ince being a modern man is
what the three have in common, a© Barth says: "Shall we ask our
r-elves, how it came, thut chleiermacher could become so much
the man of our own perhaps really still our own destiny..."
It is worth while taking notice of this. It is SSiegge who does
not fail to take it into consideration, and in tn? first ins¬
tance, describing this seemingly confused situation, he says:
It is a situation that we may enjoy when, althougn in the
realm of rotestantism Barthians and Liberals have for a
quarter of a century been exchanging fierce blows in a dual
1. Packintosh*s book is named 'Types of Modern Toeology,
ana Bartn's name is therein included.
2. Barth: "Fragen wir uns, wie es team, dass Settleierma-
cner so eehr der .ann unseres — vieileicht wirklich auch immer
noch unseres Bchieksale wera en konnte... Die Irotestantisoae
'Ideologic ia 19. Jahrhundert. (ihre Vorgeschichte and ihre ue-
scnicnte). sweite, verbesserte Auflage. (Evangeliacher Verlag
AG. ZolliKon/Zflrioh, 1952;, p.5-0. This Book is referred to as
"r'>ie i rotestantische Theologie,- unless otherwise indicated.
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which each imagines to be to the death, a sensitive and
cultured theologian can come from the other side with a
smile of kindly irony and say: 'And yet at root, you are
very much alike: you are ail moderns.* 3
In spite of C. Van Til's hasty, superficial and in many
respects, erroneous and opprobrious appraisal of Brunner and
Earth, the title of his book ''The New yoderni-.m," taking it by
itself, seems correct. It is important not to neglect this: we
must realize that they are all modern men. Berkouwer does not
adequately realize that, but partly because he does not, even
he is forced to admit a difficulty in the appraisal of Barth's
polemic against modern Protestantism. He writes: "It is very
difficult, however, adequately to circumscribe Barth*s polemic
against modern Frotestantism because of the undeniable varia¬
tions within this area."^ The writer would like to ask Berkou¬
wer why, if there are so many triumphs of Barth's theology as
he claims, there is no triumph over modern Protestantism:
Actually the characteristics of a modern man are: self-
consciousness and also consciousness of his contemporaneousness.
Again, what he has in common with other modern men is that they
all belong to the so-called "modern age," i.e., their own age.
Naturally they all confess that when they speak, they can only
speak for, or take the responsibility for, their own age. Since
he is a modern man, even if he were "the captain of his soul"
he could not escape the fact that he is also "the child of his
age" whether he is conscious of it or not. As Brunner says,
not unjustly: ' Schleiermaoher is simply the son of the
3. A Roman Catholic interpretation of Karl Bartn, Scot¬
tish Journal of Theology, edited by T.K. Torraace and d.k.3.
Reid, VII. 1. ..arch 1954. (Edinburgh and London: Oliver and
Boyd Ltd), p.39; of. p.60.
4. Berkouwer, The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of
Karl Barth, (London: The Paternoster Press, 1936), p.168.
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Enlightenment, of its antnropoiogism!" Similarly Barth points
out that the influence of Schleiermacher*s time on Schlelerma-
cher was absorbingly great: "He participated in the cultural
consciousness of his time..-but not only as a passive partici¬
pant, as one wno is being edicated, but (as an active partici¬
pant, as] one who himself is educator, as tne bearer of this
cultural consciouanese." Actually one can see that Brunner
and Barth are ail perfectly aware of this "given" situation of
our human existence.
It is rather surprising that about thirty years ago Brun-
7
ner and Barth directed themselves seriously and critically to
judging Sehleiermaoher in quite a severe tone, iarticularly it
must be pointed out that they did not like Schleiermacher as a
Q
'Christian" theologian. This is evident especially in Brunner
from tne mood of his dook Pie Mystik und das Wort, wnere his
slashing, sweeping criticism of Schleiermacher is "most forai-
dable."^ Even Barth, in the foreword of the first part of the
first volume of his Do/nnatlk, clearly declared the opposition
b. Brunner: "Darin ist Schleiermacher einfach der Sohn
der Aufkl^rung, ihres Anthropologismus!" Pie ystik and das
»ort. (Der ^egensatz zwischen moaerner Keligionsauffassung und
christiichem Glauben dargestellt an der Theologie Sciileierma-
chers). Zweite, stark ver&nderte Auflage. (Veriag von J.C.B.
.YiOhr Taul Siebeck' ) Tubingen, 1928), p.51; of. p.52. This
book is referred to as " ystik," unless otherwise indicated.
6. Barth: "Ih® ist seine Teilnahme an dem Kuiturbewusst-
sein seiner Zeit...Aber nicnt nur seine passive Teilnahme als
Gebildeter, sondern seine Teiinahme ale selbst Biidender, als
Trftger dieses Kurturbewussteeins." Die lrotestantlsche TheoloMie,
p.386.
7. Bartn says: *1 cannot consider Schleiermacher a good
teacher in the realm of theology because, so far as I can see,
he is disastrously dim-signted in regard to the fact that man
as man is not only in need but beyond all nope of saving him¬
self; that the wnole of so-calied religion, and not least the
Christian reiigion, shares in this need: and that one cannot
speak of God simpi.y by speaking of man in a loud voice." The
rtord of God and the >vord of man, transl. by Douglas Horton.
(.bondon: dodder and Stoughton, 1928), pp.ljpf.
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between himself and the line of liberalistic Neo-frotestantism.
He says:
In the former undertaking I can only see a readoption of
the line Schleiermaeher-Ritschl-nerrmann, and because in
any thinkable continuation of this line I can only see the
plain destruction of Protestant theology and the Protes¬
tant Church...fas it exist} self-nourished at its own
source, standing upon its own feet, and finally liberated
from such secular misery, I can therefore only say No
here. 10
Although both Brunner and Bartn depicted themselves as
in diametrical opposition to Scnleiermacher, yet tney seem to
have been aware of their exaggerated attitude towards him and
n -»
to have modified it to a certain extent. This modification
was only fair, for after all, they had studied and learned very
much from him and were abundantly inspired by him.^ It did
not mean a shifting of tneir tneological orientation; rather,
they had recognized tneir unnecessary bias against nira. Natu¬
rally, Barth quoted Schleiermacner to the effect that "he
13
founded not a school, but an era." Barth's modified attitude
8. In Barth's case, he criticized Gchleiermacher not only
as a "non-Christian" theologian but botn as "Christian" and as
'non-Christian."
9. Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology, p.31.
10. Barth, The Doctrine of the <*ord of God, transi. by (*.
T. Thomson, (Edinburgh: T.&.T. Clark, 1936), p.x. This book is
referred to as CD i/l.
11. Barth: "Schleierraacher ist, in seiner Glaubenslehre
ftlr die Dogmatik vor aliem, aber auch in seiner Kurzen Daratel-
lung ftir die Theologie itberhaupt und in seinen philosophischen
Werken schliesslich f-lr die ganze Aissenschaft geiungen, was
vor ihm einem August in, einem Thomas, einem Melanchthon, Zwingli,
Calvin in ihrem entsprechenden •'erken aiit ihrea 'Xapiteln, Arti-
keln Oder Loci nicht geiungen ist, eine einfach bewunderungswilrdig
durchgefdhrte Zusammenscnau der disjecta membra des historisch-
christlichen Glaubens." Die Theologie und die Kircne, p.16b-
12. v. Balthasar, Karl Barth Barstellung und Deutung sei¬
ner Theologie, (Verlag Jakob Hegner in Kflln, iViCMLl), pp.210f.
13. Barth: "Nicht eine Schule stiftet er, sondern ein Zeit-
alter." Die Protestantische Theologie, p.379-
115
towards Schleiermacher is even more evident where he writes:
sh¬
allowever grave the Question one would therefore have to aek,
one has unreservedly to take into account that Schleieraiacher
was yet a Christian theologian."14 And he added: "He wants to
be, under all circumstances, as well an a Christian theologian,
a modern man, we should not wish to decide wnether (it is) with
the same or even with a greater (earnestness), but in any case
15
(it is) with a similar earnestness." In this respect, Brun¬
ner, in his book, does not deny that Schleiermacher is really
1
the only great tneologian of the century. He acknowledges
that Schleiermacher's influence since then has been great; he
writes:
The most significant achievement of Schleiennacher is the
combination of idealism and humanism with Christian thou¬
ght; as the pioneer of Christian humanism, he was, above
all, influential in the theology of the 19th and 20th cen¬
turies. As the only imposing, spiritually powerful repre¬
sentative of that idea, he became the modern theologian,
under whose protection and leadership all trie others
sheltered. 17
Brunner and Barth first appeared as "corrective" theolo-
18
gians, and are known as belonging to the school of "Theology
14. Barth: "Man muss, wie schwiegende Fragen man auch zu
stellen habe, ohne Vorbehalt darnit rechnen, dass Schleiermacher
jedenfalls auch christlicher Theologe gewesen ist." Ibid.. p.582.
15. Barth: "Er will unter alien Umst&nden — wir adrfen
nicht entscheiden wollen, ob rait gieiche® oder gar rait grdsserera,
aber jedenxalls rait ahnlichem Ernst wie christlicher Theologe,
so auch moderner Mensch sein." Ibid., p.386.
16. Brunner: "Er, der einzige wirklich grosse Theologe des
oahrhunderts." Mystik, pp.6, 8. U
17. Brunner: Das Bedeutsamste an Schleiermachers leistung
ist die Verbindung jenee Idealismua und Humaniemus ait dear christ-
lichen uedankerikreis; als der nahnbrecher eines christlichen Hu-
manismus isx er vor allem in der xheologie des 19. und 20. sahr-
hunderts wirksaa gewesen. Als eiriziger imposanter, geistesmSchti-
ger Darsteller jener Idee ist er der moderne Theologe geworden,
unter dessen Schutz und Fdhrung sich die anderen alle stellten. '
Ibla., p.Q.
lib
of Crisis." They engaged themselves polemically against Schlei-
ermacher, in various and numerous places in tneir writings,
sometimes mentioning his name, sometimes not"when obviously
they are writing with him in view. This task constituted an
essential part of their polemic activities and operated through
most of their theological labours. They reacted to Schleier-
macher's theology as if the task of criticizing it seemed to
them a life-and-death struggle. Barth believes that we face
"the fact of pietiatic-rationalistic modernism," rooted rather
deeply not only in the humanist Renaissance but also in medie¬
val mysticism. Barth speaks of to-day's so-called "denial of
revelation" as being very irrelevant in light of the fact that,
as he sees it, evangelical Christianity opposes Protestant mo¬
dernism at this and other points only to find itself in conflict
with itself.^
Barth goes on to say that it is not a sort of irrelevant
paganism: that, at least, is not its intention; but it meets us,
if we take it as it presents itself, as a possibility of faith.
By listening to it we do not recognize faith in so full a sense
as to decide whether this possibility is not a possibility of
or)
simple unbelief.
But, when the battle was over, the decisive issue was
past, and the tine came when they settled down to elaborate
their own theology, they could not evade the predicament of
finding themselves travelling the same road as Schleiermacher,
although in a different direction. As .. iegge says: 'Against
neo-Protestantism Barth makes a fundamental objection concern¬
ing content: namely concerning its resolution of Christianity
18. mackintosh: "It is because a widely influential do-
demist theology had become indifferent to the word of God, re¬
placing it by the word of man, that Barth resolved to speak out,
to utter his 'warning cry,' to suggest his 'corrective,' to
make his 'marginal observation.'" Types of Modern Theology,p.269•
19. CD 1/1. p.56.
20. Loc. cit.
117
iato anthropology, against which he ta ices his own •Copernican
revolution* which replaces an anthropocentric theology by a
theocentric one. It seems very lively tnat they are devel¬
oping their own thou, ht in contrast to that which is originally
22Schleiermacher's except that the position hat been inverted.
One notioes with great interest, in this context, von Balthasar*s
comment that Barth has arrived at much of his own genuinely
evangel\ical content and Weltanschauung by borrowing Schleier-
macher's own framework of reference ("The history of theology
23
supplies no other principle of form"). 3y speaking of the
thought-form held in common, von Balthasar means the same as
that which this present writer d< scribes as the one road which
O A
all three travelled on. Their different directions of travel
are, von Balthasar says, indicative of a difference in thougnt-
content.
if it is really the case, as Barth emphasizes in his
view, that Schleiermacher wrote his theology with an apologetic
21* A Roman Catnolic Interpretation of Karl Barth, Scot¬
tish Journal of Theology, VII. X- arch 1 -JS4, p.oi. cf. Torrance:
"Barth has learned from...the scientific purpose of Schleierma¬
cher, but instead of binding theology to tne philosophy of one
age he has sought to give theology such an expression in our
thought that the living Truth becomes the master of our thinking
and not thinking the master of tne Truth." Karl Barth, The ex¬
pository Times, edited by A.."/. Hastings and B. Hastings. LXVI.
Oct. 1954—Sept. 1935 (Edinburgh: T.n.T. Clark), p.208.
22. Barth himself admits that the situation to oppose or
criticize Schleiermacher is bound to be difficult: "und es ist
wahrlich auch ein Keichen des ausaergewflhnlichen Ausmaasea seiner
wirkung, dass erst 1924 von E. Srunner von wirklich anderen,
Schleiermacher-freien (wenn auch vielleicht erst relativ Schleier-
macher-freien!) Voraussetzungen aus gegen Schleiermacher geechrie-
ben worden ist. Vorher immer nur aus einer solchen sachiicn 2<&he
zu ihm, von der aus eine virksame Antithese unmfJgiich war. kein
Mensch kann heute sagen, ob wir ihn v. irklich scnon Uberwunden
haben, oder ob wir nicht bei allem xiun allerdings iaut und grund-
s&tzlich gewordenen Irotest gegen ihn noch immer im Tiefsten
binder seines janrhunderts sind." Die irotestantische Theologje,
p. 3 0.
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purpose and was busily struggling ail the time witn the ideal-
25
ist group of his contemporaries, then one question must be
raised: had urunner and 3arth lived in Scnleiermacher*s time,
would they have had written a Schieiermacherian-type of theology
and would Schleieroiacher, if he had lived in our time, have
written a Brunnerian or Barthian-type of theology? Can this
question be answered absolutely in the negative?
That a theologian should be enmeshed in tne movements of
his age is almost inescapable, when he sets up doctrines in an
attempt at theological reconstruction. Bartn had virtually no
hesitation in acknowledging chleiermacher to have executed tne
or
best theological performance for his age.~° So far as Schleier-
roacher's historical position is concerned, it can be seen from
Earth's article on him in his book Pie 1rotestantische Theolog;ie
ira 19. Jahrhundert that Barth has quite thoroughly sympathized
with Schleiermecher for having lived in such an age of intellec¬
tual difficulty, and for being surrounded by tne group of
idealists.
Bchleiormacher'e theology appears consistently anthropo-
centric. Be had early himself written that man is subject,'""
25. von Balthasar: "Und da die 'Jfheologiegeschichte kein
anderes t'ormprinzip iiefert, entiehnt Barth den Rahrnen, die
Penkforra Bchleierraachere, ura oie ait -inem anderen, dem genuin
evangelisehen Inhalt zu ftlllen." op. cit., pp.211f.
24. e.g., what Schleiermacher views religion as indepen¬
dent of human knowledge and will is equivalent to Brunner and
Barth view theology as an Independent science; or tne three all
hold that.God is transcendent, and so on.
25• Die iroteetantische 1'heologie, pp.386f; cf. p.397.
26. Ibid., p.381.
27. Barth: "Ihm war, wie es sich nun herausgestelit hat,
der -'ensch, das menechliche Seibstbewusstsein, nfimlich in seiner
Bestimmtheit als frornmes Seibstbewusstsein fragioe der zentrale
uegenstand seines theologischen Penmens." Ibid., p.410.
28. Ibid. . p.4 24.
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w(10 plays trie most important and powerful role in the Universe;
man's feeiing is the presupposition and ground of ail realities
pq
in this theology of consciousness. Barth s tneology is Chris-
30
tocentric. As ne says: "^here are strictly speaking no Chris¬
tian themes independent of Christology, and the Church must in-
51
sist on this in its message to the world." therefore, Christ
i; the revelation of Cod, who it subject, in the whole drama of
salv. tiori, and Christ ii the core of Christian faith, the cen¬
tre and content of theological thinning. These opposite empha¬
sis in Schleiermaoher's and Bartn's thought are everywnere ob¬
servable in their writings, but Brunner tends to do a lit tie
more justice to human reason even at trie expense of adopting a
wider basis, "Even in the matter of the conversion of Cnristians
32Christ has not succeeded," he argues; and he believes that no
Christian may be said to possess absolute faith when one considers
that one cannot argue from a given state of any Christian duck
to any "absolute" cause. The theology of causality is itself in¬
evitably relativistic. If eucn thinking a;- this be carried on
empirically, as it must be ultimately, is anyone truly vmolly
converted? His theology, therefore, may lixeiy involve a greater
contradiction; and he may have to pay tne price for this scho¬
lastic bargaining.
29. Barth: "Schleieraacher hat seine Bewusstseine-theologie
nun freiiieh nicht so, sondern exklusiv subjektiv: ganz una gar
ais eine historische Darstellung bestimmter, nMmlich der christ-
lich frommen tread tszuetdnde verstanden. Sben sie ais solche aiad
ihm nun aber RealitMten." Die Kirohliche Dogma,tik, 111/3. (Evan-
gelischer Veriag AG. Zoliikon73drich. 1950), p.371. This and the
other volumes in uerman edition will be referred to as K~ plus
the volume-number and the part-number only, e.g., XD III/3*, etc.
30. von Balthasar: "Die ditte, die Barth einnimmt, ist
sachlich bestimoibar ais radikale Christozeritrik." op. cit., p.4o.
51. Barth, Church Dogmatics (B.T.), edited by u.«». Bromi-
ley and x.b'. Torrance (Edinburgh: 'i.&.T. Clark;, 11/1. p.320;
cf. p.515. 1/2. p.11. All the other volumes in .1. will be re¬
ferred to as CD plus the volume-number and the part-number only,
e.g., CD XI/1«, etc.
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Brunner opposes Bchleiermacner chiefly ia nis book Die
•iystik und da a wort, which is a massive volume especially devo¬
ted to this purpose, and in which he chooses a single point,
mysticism, as tne object of his criticism. Mysticism's chief
devastation, he says, is its destruction of the apprehension ox"
the word, and its substitution of the "music&i" revelation of
one's own intoxication with feeling f >r "tne clear, bright re-
5 5
velation of hod in the .Yard." As well as in this boox, Brun¬
ner criticized Bohleiermacher also in the Theology of Crisis,
Mediator, »ord ana world, hriebnis, urkenntnia und Glaube, etc.,
but he does not consider Schleiermacher's sermons, for he
thought that they ought not to be used for judging Schleiermacner's
theological thought.On tne other hand, we see that Barth de¬
voted two main articles, one earlier on his book Die 'dheoloKie
und lie Kircne, the other later in the Die irotestantische Theo-
lo&ie iin 19* Jahrhundert and innumerable passages in his Doppmatik
and other writings to tne criticism of Schleiermacher, in some
passages taxing account of tne sermons. for Barth thinics that
in order to gain a true insight into his theological thought,
one cannot afford to miss this remarkable clue from his pulpit
utterances. Barth believes that a sermon for Schleierraacher
32. The "ediator, (London and Redhill: Lutterworth Tress,
1942), p.504.
53. Brunner: "Die furchtbarste Verheerung die die MystiJc
anrichtet, ist die, dass sie das Verstdndnis des wortea zerctdrt,
daes aie die aus dem Gefdnisrausch geborene 'musixaliecne* Offen-
barung an die Stelie der xlaren, heiien Offenbarung Gottes im
Wort setzt." Alystik, p.6; cf. p.143-
34. Ibid., p.366.
35. Barth: "Man kann nieht ernst genug in anschlag bringen,
dass Schleiermacher keiner von jenen theologen war, die sich der
schwierigsten, der entecneidenden theologischen Situation, der
situation, in aer der Theologe in ganzer Ungesicnertneit nur als
xheologe sich bewfihrea muss, unter irgend einem Vorwand zu ent-
ziehen pflegen. Ich meine die Situation des Mannes auf der Kan-
zel." Die 1 rotestentische TheolOfie, p•363.
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is essentially tne self-communication of tne preacher.
In the critique by Brunner and Barth, tnere is a large
area which they both nold in common, but there is a difference
between tnem of approach or emphasis, ihe writer would suggest
that on the whole, Brunner•a approach is more appropriate to
the philosophical ^younger) Schleiermacher than the semi-theo-
37
logical (mature) one; Barth'a is more equally appropriate to
'38
both the younger and the mature Schleiermacher. Because of
these two periods of Schleiermacher's development, Barth's cri¬
tique, it may be as well to point out, cannot take an i iflexible
or consistently unified form. Throughout the whole article in
Die Protestantiscne Tneologie iin 19* Janrnundert, one can see
how Barth struggles with this situation as he carries on his
criticism: "the one the other:" or "the first motive...the
second motive..." etc. Certainly, as Berkouwer says, there are
"59
"undeniable variations within this area." Apart from the
36. Ibid.. p.40o.
37. See how Barth recognizes Schleiermacher as a versatile
person: "Er ist als moderner Mensch, also als uenker, also als
Ethiker, also als Religionsphiiosopn, also als philosophiecher
Theolog, also als Apologet und also endlich als Dogmatiker ent-
schloasen." Ibid., p.397.
38. in this connection, it may be as well to point out
that the younger Schleiermacher is very philosophical arid this
judgment is supported by both his romantic interpretations of
religion in the Speeches and his personal ethical views in the
^olilo.jueies. The mature Schleiermacher is theological as well
as philosophical. This can be seen in hi.: later work toe Chris¬
tian Faith, in which his theological attempt (with Christian
motive) has resulted in his Christology. However, one has to be
reminded that Schleiermacher's theology, in this respect, is
essentially equivocal; and by no means easy to discover or to
discern this difference (between the younger and tne mature
Schleiermacher) completely, robabiy, on the one hand, tne phil¬
osophical Schleierraacher reserved room for the further develop¬
ment of his interpretation of religion; on the other hand, the
semi-theological Schleiermacher seemingly intended to reconcile
his later view with his former standpoint. Thus he is seen as
an expert reconciler of oppositions or inconsistencies.
39. cf. Supra p.112.
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fact that they all are modern men, this difficulty is also due
to Schleiermacher* a possession of two aoterioiogies as well as
his position in his interpretation of theology, un the one
hand, he had both a philosophical soteriology and a serai-theo¬
logical one: while on the other hand, his position ir that he
himself is the centre of his peripheral contemplation of human
life.40
The primary purpose of the present writer is to present &
study of Brunner's and Berth'f criticism of Schleiermacher with
respect not only to "how" but also to "why" the criticism was
made. This involves the writer in a seriou- dilemma. One can
easily imagine that the writer is neither Brunner nor Barth,
and can only judge tneir criticism by their writings. 1'he dlf-
diculty is this: Suppose there were, or actually are, other
theologians whose thought is close to or, in some respects, even
the same as that of Scnieiermacher*s (e.g., 3ultmann) does
Barth write with both Bultmann and Schieiermacher in view? In
this direction, let Barth*s own words be .uoted: "The homogeneity
in method of both the Schleiermacher-De «ette and the Bultraann
conception should be clearly noted. "4^"
This part also consists of five chapters, set up to cri¬
ticize the five chapters in Part I.. Thus, Chapter I is criti¬
cized by Chapter VI, Chapter II by Chapter VII and so on. This
does not mean to suggest that both Brunner and Barth follow the
structure of Schleiermacher*s theological thought while criti¬
cizing it, as if their thought stands against his thought, their
notion against his notion, etc., but rather it is intended to
describe in this part the way thow) they criticize him, together
with the orientation of their theological thought (why).
40. fie Irotestantische 1'heolo/ie, p.405.
41. CT) 1/1. p.39. Similarly, Hegel's conception of history,
in one way or another, ie also involved, and there are many other
examplei.
CHAPTER VI
THE THEOLOGY OP REVELATION VS.
THE RELIGION OP IMMAHEHCE
1. Salvation is a movement from above
the self-movement of God.
The most central and decisive criticism of Ochleierraacher
by srunner and Barth in that his theology, in essence, i- but a
'religion of immanence. 'l'ne contemplation of a soul actually
means man himself seeding a way to God. As von Baithasar puts
it, according to Barth: "Religion as a 'human a priori' is the
original enemy of revelation." Both Brurmer and Bartn are raost
seriously concerned with and state extremely clearly and repeat-
e ily, their belief that the decisive point is that revelation of
3
salvation in its true meaning, is a movement from above. its
fundamental concern is to express God's condescension to man.^
Brunner begins by referring to the biblical speech about revela¬
tion as God's self-movement or graceful condescension m&nward,
bwt
not simply waiting for man to seek Him not, out Himself seeking
1. Br inner, The Tneoio&y of Crisis, (.Hew fork - London:
Charles cribner's sons, 1930), p.5; cf. CD 1/2. p.813.
2. von Balthaaar: "Religion als ein 'menschlicheo Apriori'
1st der Qrfeind der Offenbarung." op. oit., p.97.
3« Cl5 Il/l. pp.51, 69; cf. Brunner: "«he:i it (Salvation)
comes, comes from beyond, it comes not from but into history,
not from but into human reality, which in itself cannot proauc •
but only for it." The Ron and the World, (London: Student Chris¬
tian Movement Press, 1931), p.48.
4. C.D II/l. p. 200; cf. Torrance: "Because it is upon this
downward motion of God's grace that the very being of man is
grounded. Therefore,...a Christian doctrine of man...is grounded
upon the acknowle igment of a Revelation. " Trie <>ord of God and
the Nature of V?an, Reformation Old and New, edited by f?.w.
Camfield (London and Redhill: uutterworth press, 1947), p.121.
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out man; and this maaward orientation is, for Brunner, tne char¬
acteristic element in tne Bible and in the entire divine-human
intercourse, in which the initiative clearly rests with God.
One of Barth's favourite sentences is: "God stoops down
to us." Caafield also explains that Earth's idea of salvation
is the movement of God from above towards aan, not the self-mo¬
vement of man towards God. dan therefore must follow the posi¬
tive way of revelation by confining himself to the God-to-aan
movement as witnessed to Jesus- Christ in the Scriptures. Man
must not then deviate from the direction that tne movement i
7
"world-ward" and not o the world. Similarly, Brunner holds
revelation to be a divinely initiated action, and not the ini-
Pi
tiative of mankind.
A. 'i'he itord of God vs. religious experience.
Therefore, wit.i regard to the starting-point of theologi¬
cal method, u&rth says that Schieierancher does not start from
revelation, but from religi miam. "Schleiermacher tried to find
in religion as feeling tne essence of theology, revelation being
a definite impression which produces a definite feeling and then
Q
a definite religion." Similarly Brunner say: that Bchleierma-
cher does not proceed from the word of God,"^ and he points out
"that for Schleiermacher the question about the essence of reli¬
gion is the fundamental question of theology. Here Brunner
5. The Mediator, p. 294.
6. CD II/l". pp.527, 546.
7» ffeveiation and toe Holy Spirit, (London: Lliiot Stock,
1935), p.19; of.Reformation Old and new, p.25•
8. Revelation and Reason, (The Christian doctrine of
faitn and knowledge), transl. by Olive «yon, (London: Student
Christian Movement Press Ltd., 3.947)» p. 32; cf. The Theology of
Crisis, p.103; Tne Mediator, p.468.
9. CD 1/2. p. '90.
49. Mystlk. p.247.
11. "...dass filr °chlei'rancher die Frage nach den aeaea
der Religion die Grunafrage der Theoiogie ist." Ibi .., p.34.
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compares -chleiermacher's interpretation of religion with the
religion of the Bible, viewing Schleiermacher'e interpretation
as falsely placing man's relationship to his own mental process-
IP
es in paramount position. " 3arth also emphasizes the impor¬
tance of what God has spoken to man; he stresses the need of
man to serve that A'ord which has been revealed to us. Does the
modernist listen to the Word of God? Does Schleieraacher serve
God's Word as a revelation of mystery to us and for us? No!
Barth points out that Pchleiermacher does not speak as a res-
ponsibiie servant but like a real virtuoso as a free master of
13
these things." Barth sees modernism as not being aware of
the essential distinctiveness of the proclamation of the «ord.
?£odernis® can never really understand that God's word irremedi¬
ably opposes and contradicts all human viewpoints, and that
man's very theological language must inevitably serve an actual
divine utterance. Modernism does not see that man, in the pre¬
sence of God, has constantly to listen for that Word which is
spoken to him, and to await something of which he is not yet
aware and may in no event utter unto himself.^4
Hchleiermacher'a octrinal work is dissatisfying because
it makes no transition in emphasis from teaching to listening,
and consequently fails to make proper application of that tran¬
scendent Norm which must govern all teaching. «e have but a
teaching church and its proclamation, and the stress laid upon
these is such as to transport everything into the realm of re¬
flexion, philosophical anthropologists, and dialectical system-
atization through all of which we encounter no criticism or
regulation of the human discourse from above. To express ail
12. Ibid., p.18b.
13* ' chleiermacher redet nicht ais versantwortiioher
Diener, somem wie ein rechter Virtuose als ein freier leister
dieser Sache." Die Protestsntische Theologie, p.399•
14. CD 1/1. p.68.
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this in still other terms, Schleiermacher contents himself with
the soliloquy of a teaching church rather than with an address
IS
made to the Church as such. Such a subjective and immanent1st
viewpoint cannot provide the proper basis for an understanding
of Christian revelation; and, should revelation cease to be ta¬
ken seriously as a declaration from God, it is downgraded to a
mere spectacular discovery on human terms within the human
16
cosmos.
What, then, is Sehleiermacfrar's starting-point of theo¬
logical thought here'.' Barth criticizes him by saying that
'Schleiermacher as a theologian wished only to speak of what
was 'the inmost motive of my being,' out of 'an irresistible in¬
ner necessity of my nature' (Reden ub. d. Hel. 1799 p.9), "in
order to set up his own idea as an object for the rest' (op. cit.
17
p.182}." For Sohleiermacher took it for granted that there
is a special province in each caul which is properly endowed for
this purpose. Barth, however, is not int.rested in the possi¬
bilities of what man can do for himself. He points out that
theologians, as a result of philosophical enlightenment (with
reference particularly to the nature and the limitations of
theoretical reason) and proceeding from Schleiermacher's delin¬
eation of the special 'province" proper to religion within the
human heart, have turned with considerable interest to certain
derivative or auxilliary departments of psychology. Barth him¬
self, however, feels compelled to say "that we can really take
no special interest" in any further delineation of so-called
special centres' of either actual or potential religious
18
experience.
Brunaer here agrees with Barth that Scaleiermacher is
15. CD 1/2. p.815-
16. Ibid.. p.124.
17. aP.i/i. p.2i.
2_Q . It io.., p. 23<~ •
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speaking solely of l ie in.nor state of man. "It is that which
happens in man when he is religiously excited and he is in the
situation of being pious, ' Brunner asserts, "which constitutes
19
trie difference between the more pious men una the lesspious."
His chief objection to Lohleiermacher's theology at this point
is the latter'b universal sort of soteriology, which seems to
argue for a form of religion everywhere capable of being appre-
?0
headed and described by everyone,' so that "true" religion
merely becomes a ubiquitous and consequently meaningless entity
which satisfies no one. Such an amorphous concept can testify
only to the fact that the individual should discover, immanent
21
to his own being, the sources of immediate life.
Brunner and Barth criticize Schlelermacher for taxing a
wrong point of departure, but his emphasis here is actually not
completely wrong, if his interpretstion of religious experience
22
i determined by the ,vor i of God. ' As Torrance point; out:
"This capacity for revelation is not to be judged in terms of
the receiver, as if he could achieve it on his own, but in terms
of the Giver, the father in Heaven, who acts by His Spirit upon
man, from beneath and from within man and issuing out of man's
life a really human understanding of revelation and a really hu-
23
man obedience to it." Barth, however, explains that his • uar-
rel is not .-ith such descriptive terms as "experience" or
19. Sie ist das, was in enschen vorgeht, .verm er reii-
gids erregt, wenn er im "ustana des Jrrorumseins ist, das, was den
unterschied zwischen deal frCPameren and dem weniger froamen .ten¬
sehen ausmacht. " ..lystix, p. 30.
20. The milosopiiy of Religion, (London: Ivor Nicholson
and Watson ltd., 1937), p.4f.
21" vstiK, p.122.
2 . In fact, von Baithasar has even quoted t.ais: "in der
'Antwort' vird Barths Standort klarer. her 'reiigidse in ividu-
alismus' let die grorse 'Entdeckung Schleiermachers*" op. cit.,
p.221.
23. The lace of Chrietology in Biblical and Dogmatic
Theology, Essays in Christology for Karl Barth, edited by T.'i.L.
Parker, (uond n: Lutterworth Press, 1936;, p.17.
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"religious experience," nor even wit ; the very relevant and de¬
terminative ingress of the <vord of uod into tine reality of man.
The reason he avoids the term is the background connotation
that man generally is capable of religious experience of a sort
PA
that might assume critical and normative proportions.
In this respect, B&rth affirms that it is the Aord of uod
that must take the initiative, not religious experience; and so
the two should not be confused. If men may know the rford of God,
ne asserts, then they have some experience of it and can be what
they are, as that «ord determines. The 1it i Century term "reli¬
gious consciousness" ought not be taken to mean that "there is"
or that man "has" a religious consciousness; yet we can say that
man may have one, or tnat the Aord of God ,ay even become the
ground snd object of it. Ahat hchieiermacher called "being af¬
fected" we would describe as "b ing determined." we prefer the
concept of "experience" because nowadays it expresses something
2b
more comprehensive than Schleiermacher * s "consciousness."
Brunner holds, similarly, that in the relation of man to God,
uod is first, man second, an . that this order is irreversible:
"This relation, although two-sided, does not have equal or inter¬
changeable terms, "'ore correctly it is one-aided in that it
24. CD 1/1. p.220.
25* Ibid., pp.22of. cf. von Balthasar: "Fttr Schleiermacher
die Urerfahrung des uefdhls fttr Gott, oberhalb aller Reflexion
liegt, genau dort stent ftir 3artn der Glaube — nur eben nicht
als ein Apriori aer Vernunft Oder ale eine Setzung des Gesites,
sondern als ein Gesetzteein durch das wahre und konkrete Aort
Gottes. Von dort her 1st Vernunft wirkiiche Vernunft, ist erxenn-
tnis wahre Erkenntnis". op. cit., p.130. Also Cushman: "He(Barth)
has one thing in his favor, in theology God is a sort of first,
an ordinarily acknowledged prius. 1 suppose every Christian, and,
possibly, every Christian theologian, is prepared to affirm with
Barth that man is nothing without God." Cartesia.nism and the fu¬
ture in theology, Tne Journal of Religion, XXXVI. 4, Oct.1936.
(The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 111., p.218.)
12 3
originates with God. The initiative in this relationship is
taken by God, and only in a secondary way does man have any in-
itiative in it at all." The God-nan relationship cannot pos¬
sibly be inspired or impelled from man's side. The mystical,
pantheistic, and idealistic viewpoints assert this, and add that
God's relation to man presupposes the relation of man to God;
but the Biblical point of view affirms clearly and categorically
that God is first, "always and incontrovertibly first, man ai-
2 /
ways and incontrovertibly the second in this relation."
B. The revelation of Christian faith vs. universal humanity.
Brunner and Barth botn evidently charge Schleiermacher
with appealing to the common or normal experience of all indi-
viduals and generalizing the concept of revelation ' as if
everyone can cultivate his own capacity for religion whicn is
essentially native to his existence as a human being, according
to them, the revelation of Christian faitn must not be trans¬
formed into a general conception of religion as something open
2 3
to achievement by human effort. It is not something universal
and therefore common to human nature. barth can only warn men
not to be too confident of themselves, :ince: "what man of him-
? elf can beiieve in are gods who are not really God." r.hea
man's false confidence in his own ability to beiieve in God by
hi' own strength is shattered, the false idols of his own affec¬
tion also are shattered. God nlmighty, however, is God in that
He permits himself to be Known only on the basis of His self-re-
50
velation. Brunner agrees, stating that all that man has ever
26. The Divine-Human encounter, trans!. by Aboon,
(London: P.C.M. ires Ltd., 1944), p.33.
27• hoc, cit.
26. Brunner, The Inilosophy of Religion, p.49.
29- Brunner, Revelation and Reason, p.305.
30. Barth, Credo, trans!. by d.S. "cNab, (London; Hodder
and Stoughton, 1936;, p.14.
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done in history is but an attempt to hide his mortal nakedness
31
from God's sight an attempt forever foredoomed to futility.
In this direction Bartn even goes further, questioning
Ochleiermacher•s interpretation of religion in relation to his
concept of the feeling of absolute dependence, narth under¬
stands Schleiermacher as lumping all religion together under
the lowest common denominator of the concept of "a feeling of
absolute dependence." One might raise the question whether this
includes all non-Christian religion, also. In any event one con¬
demns religion, under such categories, to a denial of its author¬
ity and to irrelevance for human dignity and human rights, jn
such a basis, religion, if but a modification of the feeling of
absolute dependence, is inevitably opposed, denied, and rejected,
52
and scandalises tne essence of humanity.
The writer would venture to point out that Bartn is not
Muite doing justice to the distinction between these two concepts
of Schleiermacher: the concept of general religious consciousness
(feeling) and the concept of specific Christian consciousness
(f eiing of absolute dependence). This does not mean that Barth
33
does not know the difference between them. But he may not be
quite right to apply this criticism to Schleiermacher. Once
again, the writer would like to remind the reader tnat if anyone
wishes to criticize Schleiermacher he must not combine or iden-
tify his (Schleiermacher's) first soterioiogy with his second one,
otherwise, his criticism will immediately fall apart. It does
not mean that one's position of criticism is not right or one's
approach inconsistent, but one must realize tnat this difficulty
is due to Schleiermacher's own self-contradiction in putting for¬
ward two distinct and incompatible theories of salvation, uven
Barth himself, wnen tie wrote the article on chleiermacher in
51* ystik, p.237.
32. CD Ii72. p.333.
33« ibid., p.320.
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his book die Protestantische Theologie iia 19♦ Jahrnundert, had
to shift his position of criticise from time to time, critici¬
zing now the first theory, then the second and so on. The
writer wishes to suggest that Barth's unjust criticism in this
aspect essentially originated from the overemphasis of his own
tneocentric notion on Schleiermacher's humanizing interpreta¬
tion of the Christian life, as could oe attested by this other
passage from Barth: "it is curious enough that the humanism of
Schleiermacher ultimately culminates in this inhuman view of
the relationship of man to God, it being necessary in the last
resort to protest against his doctrine of religion in the name
34.
of humanity itself."
Therefore, in spite of Schieiermacher's own inconsistency
and Barth's unjust criticism of hira in this respect, it is still
true to say that Schleiermacner's conception of religion cannot
be regarded as a Christian attempt to understand religion, for
he thinks that all the other religions have the norm that gives
tnem their validity in a rudimentary form: i.e., in tneir reli¬
gious feeling.
in this connection Brunner points out that the etnlcal
dimension of human operations, in fact the entire realm of human
religion and metaphysics, has been invaded by something uaiita-
tively and fundamentally different from everything man may know
35
in and of himself. This invader is the Word of God. Brunner
comments: "Ho religion knows the concept of revelation as Chris¬
tianity holds it. In all other religions, revelation relates
itself to singulars and is therefore an aggregate of many single
revelations which may go on to the end of time. No religion
ever dared to affirm seriously th.t God became man."Nor is
34. Ibid., p.553-
35. The word and the world, p. 17; cf. M.ystik, p. 189.
36. The Theology of Crisis, p.33-
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this opi lion a mere illusion. Christian faith is not simply a
modification of general human metaphysical or religious Know¬
ledge, as modern philosophy (ever since Schleiermacher) has as-
57
sumed it to be. But Brunner also affirms tnat Christ is tin
fulfilment and the judgment upon all religions together with
their history. In His light are exposed both the truth and the
untruth of all religion (ef. John 3:18ff.). The history of
religion shows that "there is no such thing as a steady approxi¬
mation to him: for all approximation ignifies at tne same time
a growin; distance," even if one wero merely to compare between
Christianity and the perspective of pure phenomenology. And
Brunner emphasizes, with reference to this, that unless revela¬
tion. is "something other than ethics, metaphysics, or religion,
3d
something different in its source as well as in its content,"
it is not Christian faith, but merely moral activity or an ethi¬
cal system of man.
It is significant to point out that it is trie Gospel which
aiscounts all human efforts or attempts to approach God. "it
opens another way, the only way, God's way. There only tne word
40
'faith' and, therefore, the word 'God' find their true meaning."
Tracing back the original meaning of the very word "faith," one
can see how it is defined by Brunner: "Faith!is the answer to
the question: what shall I do? It is a self-integration, a self-
opening—and a going to the Father.Evidently the situation
is depicted as that in the parable of the prodigal son in the
Bible: an upheaval is impending, and even something transcenden-
. 4?tal " ia involved, and apersonal decision is demanded, not an
37 • The Word and the .vorld, pp. 17f.
38• The Philq8ophy of Religion, p.131.
39• The Word and the world, p.id.
40• The Theology of Crisis, p.61.
41. "'Glaube'! ist die Antwort auf die Frages Was soil ich
tun? Sr ist ein ichzusammennehmen, ein Sichaufmachen — und-zum-
Vater-Gehen." aystik, p.152.
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aesthetical analysis of religion wnich is everywhere possible
i 2
and is even enjoyable to have. it is significant to note
that Brunner wishes to negate Schleiermacher'o artistic approach
to religion. To hira, art, in this aspect, is even to be re¬
garded as dangerous, for its aesthetic flavour takes reflection
for reality*
Art contains an element of danger which produces a certain
hostility towards religion: the danger, namely, of taking
the reflection, for the reality, or at any rate of resting
content with it. Thus art becomes a substitute for faith,
which is sought because it does not demand decision, as
faith does, but merely the attitude of a spectator, or of
one who is swayed hither and thither by the artistic in¬
fluences around him; that is, it is not a real devotion,
it is merely aesthetic. 44
Brunner points out that the meaning of faith is different from
that expressed in Schleiermacher's interpretation of it: "Faith
is no Habitus. But that is precisely what Sohleieriaacher's
piety is. •xne conception of tne Christian pious states of
feeling' is indeed his doctrine of faith." And Bruxiner explains:
"His piety is not a dialogue, but a 'process,' a natural oocur-
rence. It deals with mixture and admixture, instead of deci¬
sions; with a relationship between forces, instead of one from
45
person to person." As a result, Barth points out that !a
doctrinal passage 'On service in the divine <>ord* is not lac ic¬
ing even in Schleiermacher'a Glaubenslehre (s.l33f). But we
42. Tne parable of tne prodigal son described in the 3ibie
seems to have involved a psychological element known as telepa¬
thy which happened in both the minds of the father and the son
when they had departed each other.
43. Myatik, p.167.
44. The Divine imperative, p.300.
45. "Glaube ist kein nabitus. Das aber ist gerade Schieier-
machersche FrtJmmigkeit. 'Auffassung der christiicnen frommen Ge-
mtits zuatdnde • ist ja seine behre vom Glauben." Myat Ik, p.155;
Also; "Seine 'PrOmmigkeit ist xein Gespr&cn, sonuern ein 'iro-
zeaa', ein Naturvorgang Gtatt um Entacheidungen handelt es sich
um .iscnungen una Bntmischungen, etatt urn ein VerhMitnis von
Person zu Person, um eines zwisc.hen Kriiften." i.ystik, p.i>9.
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are at once told that 'the divine >;,ord' i; nothing else than
'the spirit In all men,' i.e. of all who are united in the
Church (sl34,5)."4t>
Thus it is seen that in Echleiermacher's interpretation
of faith, according to Brunner's and Earth's criticism, faith
is but the spirit of a religious man. It is his piety which
denies the t«ord of God of revelation. When Earth points out
that 'tne spirit in ail men" is Schleiermacher*s interpretation
of "divine <-ord, ' Bartn means to assert on the contrary that
these are two absolutely different things. As von Baithaear
explains: "The absolute point of (Sarth'sJ system is the meet¬
ing between Word and faith: Word is the expression of the abso¬
lute Creator uod, faith is the expression of the entire crea-
tureliness of man, as it has already be n made participant in
nivine possibility; transformed, .rede taed and exalted by the
Word."4/
2• Dogmatics is a knowledge of faith
a response to the word.
When referring back to the starting-point of dogmatics,
Barth quotes his brother, saying: "That the beginning of theolo¬
gy taxes place in a determination of being, of man...is funda¬
mentally a bit of Liberalism. It might have been thought that
SA
it would have proved impracticable to undertake for one moment
/I
to speak first of man as a believer, apart from God." Accord¬
ing to uarth, the Knowledge of dogmatics cannot be formulated
outside dogmatics; therefore he says: "In that case it is held
46. CD 1/1. p.63.
47. "Der Absolutpunkt aes System ist die BerCthrung zwis-
chen wort und Glaube: Wort ist Exponent des scnlechtnin schtip-
ferischen Gottes, Glaube ist Exponent der gesamten ueschdpf-
lichxeit des . enschen, wie sie bereits vom Wort ernoben, erldst,
urngewendet, gflttlicher Y'dglichkeit teilhaft gemacht wordea ist."
Karl Bartn: Carsteiiunp und ueutung seiner xheologie, p.216.
43. CD 1/1. p.3d; "of.""KB Iil/2. p".23^ ~
133
with Schleiermacher 'that ail propositions occurring here cannot
themselves be dogmatics as well (Chr. Gl. sl.l)."^ As tfeber
explains it, Barth holds that "the norm of Christian knowledge,
the 'criterion of dogmatics,' i. not to be found...in a universal
human possibility as in modernism...On the contrary, the cri-
SO
terion of dogmatics is 'the word of God."' Brunner even empha¬
sizes the importance of the Word as absolutely essential to all
truth: "The Word is the basic fact of human existence, that
which makes it human. Not to reason, but to the Word, this
SI
first place belongs."y And he adds: "This is the irrational,
which utters 'the mystery which has been hidden before trie world,
and is now revealed,' that the eternal truth enters in time, that
the fundamental on which all fundamental rest and the truth of
all truths, through which alone the truth of man is 'called into
up
existence,' speaks to us." Therefore, Brunner explains: "But
theology is tne science, which has faith as its presupposition.
It is therefore church science, i.e., an orderly exposition in
faith comprehensible only in relation to the propositions of
faith.' And he points out that the difference between the
word of revelation and the word of mysticism:
Mysticism also speaxs of a word, but not as a factum from
outside, historical and unicue. For mysticism the word io
49- CD 1/1. p.40.
30. ><eber, K.ar.1 Barth 'a Church Dogmatics, London: nutter-
worth Press, 1933), p.23.
31. Das t*ort ist die Grundtatsache der menschiichen Kxia-
tenz, das was sie rnenschlich macut. Nicht der Vernunft, son.hern
dem Wort gehdrt diese erste Steile zu." Mysti k, p.88.
52. "Das ist das Irrationale, dass 'das Geheimnis, das ver-
borgen gewesen vor der Welt, jetzt offenbart' ist, dass die ewige
rtahrheit in der Zeit hervortritt, dass der Grund aller Grdnde una
die wahrheit ailer «ahrheiten spricnt, uns anspricht and dadurch
erst die wahrheit vom lenschen 'ins Dasein ruft.*" Ibid., p.5.
53. "Theoiogie aber ist diejenige «issenschaft, die den
Glauben zur Voraussetzung nat. Sie ist darum kirchlicne '.issen-
schaft, d.h. eine geordnete Besinnung dber den im ulauben allein
erfassbaren Zusammenhang der Glaubens tze." Ibid., p.358.
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the eternal principle and precisely the expression of un¬
broken continuity, whereas the <*ord of revelation on the
contrary expresses the event of reconciliation through
the Mediator, and is the highest expression of the abro¬
gation of continuity, of the wrath of uod, and of the
breach between Him and tne creature. 34
Thus far, judging from what nas been discussed, we see
that Brunner and Barth both hold this belief in common against
Schleierraacher: that the revelation of the Christian faith is
not grounded on any anthropological possibility, but ratner is
alien to it.
Barth raises several questions at one point. May revela¬
tion be regarded as an event on the basis of some so-called "exis¬
tential potentiality" which is to be distinguished from the ac¬
tuality of revelation? Does some "universally human" category
exist, "of which this special thing can be claimed subsequently
as tne realization? is there an existential ontologioal prius
I InfN
to this ontic existential thing?" From such challenging ues-
t
tions we can know only wnat is actual, but can also Know that
37
this is the essential characteristic of faith. Therefore, the
human possibility reaches out for the divine, seeking what is
58
ultimately only a rational possibility. Barth rejects ail
54. "Auch die :Viystik spricht vom vtort, aber nicht vom ada-
seren, geschiohtlichen, nie vom einmuligen Faxturn; sondern daa
ort isi den mystiker ewiges Prinzip and damit gerade Auearucx
der ungebrochenen Kontinuit&t, wShrend das Offenbarungswort,
das Veradhnungsgeachehert im Mittier, umgekehrt der hochvte Aus-
drucx der aufgehobenen Kontinuit&t, des Zornes Gottes, des
Hisses zwischen ihra uad der Kreatur ist." Ibid., p.584.
55. Torrance writes: "Revelation is given to ua only in
terms of what it is iot, in the humanity of those to wnom it is
given, so that from first to last we have to reoxen with an es¬
sential bi-polarity." The Place of Chrlstology in Biblical and
Dogmatic Theology, Essay:-- in Cnristol jgy for K r*. Bartn, p. 1o.
56. CD 1/1. p.40; cf. Credo, p.65.
57. Brunner: "Das Christentum stent und Milt in seiner
Besonderheit rait diesea Glauben, dass in Christus Uott selbst
rait der Mensohheit handle und zu ihr rede, und zwar nur dort:
er elb> t. Lee, dieses unerndrte, aieses exklusive, dieses
137
such emphases from a methodological standpoint, since they are
the results or propositions of some general philosophical anthro¬
pology by which, however valid or invalid of themselves, we can-
50
not allow our'elves to be influenced. Brunner understandably
adds: "The Word is more than reason, because in the Word comes
to expression the fact that man has reason not as a possession
60
in himself, but as a gift." Therefore, Christian theology
Joes not require a rational knowledge a:: its basis but revela¬
tion. Granted that theology and philosophy may stand oil common
grounds in demonstrating the intelligible connections which em¬
brace all things, this is not the logos of the natural reasoning
process (as in philosophy) but the logos of revelation. Christian
theology, then, cannot be made to present faith rationally Dy
clothing it in scientific form, but uust properly distinguish
between revelation and religion by means of clear-cut definitions
6 1
and specific concepts/ for Brunner holds "that this Word is
actually spoken, is the Gospel; this word is the truth itself,
this is faith.
Garth agrees with Brunner that Christian faith is truth in
wunder meint der Christ, wean er von Offenbarung spricht." Phi-
losophie und uffenbarung, (TUbingen: Verlag von d.C.B. Mohr 'Paul
Siebeck' 1925), p.15.
53. CD 1/1. p.232.
59. Ibid., p.233.
60. "Pas Wort ist mehr als die Vernunft, weil im .ort sum
Au-druck Komrat, dass der ..iensch die Vernunft nicnt ale Sigenbe-
sitz, sondern als Gesehenk hat." f.ystik, pp.38f.
61. The Philosophy of 8eli£ion, p.14.
62. "Pass dieses Wort tatsfichlich gesprochen sei, ist das
Svangeliua; dass dieses .»ort die Wahrheit selbst aein, das ist
der Glaube." VSyst ik. p.95. of. "Sin Wort, das ich von irgendwo-
her zu begrtlnden vermag, ist eben darum nicht uottes wort, nicht
im strengen Sinn :/<it-teilung, sondern irgendwie immanente, welt-
liche Wahrheit, nicht Offenbar ngswahrheit, eondern Vernunftwahr-
heit, nicht Gnadengeschenk, sondern Selbst meines erkennenden
Ichs." Vom ««erk des Heili^en Geistes, (Ttibingen: J.C.ii. ko&r
'Paul Siebeck' 1935), pp.!2f.
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itself and completely independent of any human norm of truth.
According to him, it ia certainly not tho case that dogmatics
first has to prove or defend itself to those outside (.i.e., in
the face of modern man's own reason). As fieher puts it, Barth
admits: "To be sure, dogmatics by its very nature will always
6 5 o/eata °f
be a Kind of apologetic. 4 Barth, in other words, dogmatics
as "the inquiry about the word of Cod in Church proclamation,"
of necessity a critical inquiry into the agreement of that pro¬
clamation with respect toiely to the revelation attested to in
Holy Scripture, and not witn regard to human norms or value jud¬
gments, or even with respect to some standard of divine truth
which may already have the sanction of eccle:iastical recogni-
f%A.
tion and proclamation. Barth therefore denounces any histor¬
ical evolution of revelation or of the God-man continuity in
religious experience. !e could not acknowledge there factors
as dogmas, because they have no "roots" in revelation (i.e., in
the Biblical attestation of it) such as dogmas must have.
According to Brunner and Barth, faith actually means to
be responsive to the word of God;°^ therefore, .faith demands
obedience. As Brunner says: "This is faith, the 'religion* of
the Old and the Mew testaments, of the Apostles and the Reform¬
ers. But thereby it radically iscloses their opposition to all
mysticisms which are alien to, and despise, and are hostile to
cn
the Word." Thus, Schleiermacher's enjoyable usage of the hy¬
phen ("-"), and the most valid and defensible word "consciousness"
which he attaches to all theological notions, are wrecked by tnis
63- Karl Berth's Church Dogmatics, p.22.
64. CD 1/1." p." 304.
• Ibid., pp. "5b6f.
66. Brunner: "lea bin angespro cnen, darura verantwortlich."
Philosophic uaa jffeabarun#, p.10.
67. "Par ist rier Glaube, die 'Religion' dee Alten und Neuen
Testamentes, der '\portel und der Reformatoren. Dauait ist aber auch
ihr (Jegensatz zu aller wortfreuden, wortverachtenden, ja wortfeind-
llchen Aystik an der rt'urssel aufgedecict." ulystIk, p.97.
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solid fact of the revelation of God in Christ, an event in truth
(for it happened by truth), 'inere would be no sexf-cherishing
of mental states here, but simply faith in this incarnate word
of God.d8
Brunner points out that: "As Schiciermacner replaces the
relationship 'Ansprucn-uehorsam* by a passive concept- of being
impressed, his religion iacxs content as well as seriousness.
word, seriousness and personality belong inseparably to one
69 i
another." Bartft adds that Scnleiermachers nisunaerstanding of
the nature of claim anu obedience at this point makes his pre¬
sentation 'so profoundly unsatisfactory." This view is, in one
sense, even non-Christian, and "intolerable" from any Christian
perspective, since it pav a the way for every possible sort of
tyranny or caprice and, consequently, for a most disobedience to
70 ^
(*od. Brunner assures us that "faitn arises from nothing other
71
the divine promise." And he speaks of "the xietist error"
which transfers its focus from the -»ord and the divine promise to
72
the subjective experience and feeling of the individu 1.
Therefore, with a play upon words, ne says: "in the region of
trie Word, to ere exists answering or contradiction. -.nswering is
73
faith: contradiction is unbelief. Brunner makes a further
68. jaarth says: "If we ask further why we must believe trie
Vord of God spoken in this event, and obey it, again and above
ail the only answer we can give is that this is God's free will,
and as such Hie o. - nipotent will. This i all absolutely above us,
and we are absolutely accountable to it ali, because it is ail
in some way God Himreif, and God is fr e to be God in thi; way
both in riira elf and therefore also for us. 1 CJJ II/1. p.561.
69. 'iadem Schleiermaeher das Verhfiltnis: Ansprucn-Gehorsam
urch ein passives Beeindrucktwerden ersetzt, fehlt seiner Reli¬
gion so wie der Inhalt auch der Rrnst. *ort, mat und I ersdn-
iichkeit genbren u.ntrennbar zusammen." dystiK, p. 159.
70. CD II/?. p.553.
71. "Glaube entsteht aus der gdttlichen Verheissung und
aus nichts anderem." "ystik, p.167.
72. The "..■Ivine Imperative, p.565.
73. In der Region aes ..ortes gent es urn -jnt-spree hen oder
Aider-spreehen. utsprechen ist Giaube, idersprecnen ist unglaube. 1
Myatik. p. 165«
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comment at this point in comparing faith, to some extent, witn
knowledge:
For faith ia nothing in itself, as little as the t-cho is
something in itself. Faith ia trie echo of God's word, hear¬
ing the ,ord, obedient to the ord, trusting in the word.
This s»ord is only the ..ord of Goa in faith, therefore there
can only be a believing theologian; without faith he is
perhaps a scholar of religion, of psychology, or of philo¬
sophy. 74
Thus, one must not c afuae knowledge with faith, i'or faith de¬
mands obedience and hat characteristics essentially different
from those of knowledge. Therefore, the tasx of theology is
fundament 11y dissimilar to that of the moral or intellectual
systems. It is seen here that drunner even rej cts the kind of
profane stu.,y which follows: "The ps.ycnology of religion ia
something completely iifferent from theology; it is a profane
science, i.e., it has faitn only as object, not as preauppoai-
75
tion. ' Barth has also taken into consideration the fact that
"Schleiermacher has attempted to prove the possibility of theo¬
logy as science, Cand with this intention} he has written...his
n c
dogmatics." One may note that Barth ,uite sympathizes with
Schleiermacher'! historical position: "Perhaps he £SchieiermacherJ
77
has after all transformed faith into knowledge." but Barth
ultimately rejects nis theological method, even considering hi3
74. "I)enn der Glaube ist an sich nichts, sowenig als das
Echo an sich etwas ist. her Glaube ist Echo aes Gotteswortes,
o'ort-hdren, «ort-gehorsamf vVort-vertrauen. Diese. wort ist nur
dem Glauben uottes .ort, darum icann nur der Gl&ubende Theoioge
sein* abgesehen vom Glauben ist einer vielleicht Religionswissen-
schafter, -. s.ycholog, -i hiiosopn. " ibid*» P* 353.
75. Nur ist diese Reiigionspsychologie etwas ganz anderes
als Theologies eie ist eine profane ..issenschaft, i.h. sie hat
Giauben nur als Objekt, nicht als Voraussetzung.' Loo, cit.
76. "Schleiermacher hat die ydglicaxeit uer Theologie als
Wissenschaft oamit zu erweisen versacht, uass or seine hogmatik
gercnrieben nat." Die Protestanti■: che TneolOjle, p.384.
77. Sr nat vielleient die tistis doch in Gnosis verwan-
delt. " Ibi.„., p. 565 •
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apologetic purpose: "He is, as an apologist, not a Christian
ja
theologian, but a moralist and a philosopher of religion.'
3. The unity of Scripture cannot be (.enled.
Concerning Holy Scripture, it is important to carry the
discussion further, since the serious mistaKe in Schieiermacner's
orientation of his theological thought lies partly in his atti¬
tude towards the Scriptures.
Brurmer and Bartn ta^e both the Ola Testament and the New
Testament to be witnesses to the revelation of God. Barth writes
that the basic assertion at thi. point is the assertion that the
Bible is a witness of the divine revelation. This assertion, in
turn, is ba. ed aimpiy on the fact that the Bible answers man's
question about the divine revelation and confronts us with the
79
lordship of the triune God. Brunner writes: "It is the testi-
3 )
rnony or witness to the revelation of God in Jesus Christ." ' In
fact, Brunner and Barth both appeal to the whole Bible as a
unity, which consists of one history and one coWenant. History
begins here, is centered in sesus Christ, and hastens tnence to
its culmination. The Church must necessarily, as always, show
the unity of the divine covenant which ties the whole together.
Botn Testaments must be read together as an affirmation of the one
work and one revelation of the one God. The Church therefore has
been, from its inception, the Cnurch of Jews and Gentiles (cf.Uai.
6:1a, "the Israel of God"; Rom.11:26, "all Israel"). Deny this
3X
unity and one denies Jesus Christ Himself. Brunner agrees,
pointing out that the Christian religion asserts not only the
unity of the divine revelation, but the exclusive unity of that
revelation as attested to in Holy Scripture. God's <*ord is tne
78. "Er ist .ma Apologet nicht chriatlicher Theologe son-
dern Ethiker und Religionsphiiosoph." Ibiu., p.396.
79. CD 1/2. p.462.
80* The Word and tne World, p.83.
81. CD IVTTTPf .670f.
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*ord of desus Christ in both Old and New Testament; it becomes
0 P
reality in desus Christ. Thus, according to Brunner and Bartn,
the Old Testament is indispensably necessary for understanding
tne revelation in the New Testament. "For a knowledge of this
continuity of the being and activity of God, of His condescen¬
sion, " says Barth, 'the Old Testament is indispensable as the
Q "Jt
presupposition of the New." Brunner points out that "the two
covenants are related to each other as preparation is related
to 'fulfilment.*Though Brunner recognizes the difficulty in
which Schleiermachor is involved, and although he also admits
that while the divine revelation in the Old Testament and the
New Testament is one, a difference between them evidently exists,
he adds that together they render a service of mutual interpre¬
tation and that only as the two are taken together can the Bibli-
cal revelation be adequately understood or even recognized.
Nor does Barth deny the reality of the temptation to reject the
Old Testament: "The expectation of revelation in Old Testament
is prophecy, not prediction to be controlled experimentally by
logic. That is why it was and is possible to look past it. That
is why it could and can be rejected."*^ Bartn criticizes
Schleiermacher for nis intention of removing the Old Testament
from the canon of the Church, saying that if desua Christ is the
object of both the Old and the New Testament witness, then his
judgment of the historical connection of these two so-called
religion (i.e., Christianity and Judaism), is erroneous and
wrongly approached. Schleiermacher sees tne Old Testament as
primarily "the most universal literary aid to the understanding
32. The Mediator, pp.172f.
83. CD IV/1. p.173.
Revelation and Reason, p.81; cf. "Tne Old Testament
revelation is the preparation for the revelation in the New
Testament." Ibid., p.134.
35. Ibid.. p.22.
86. CD 1/2. p.100.
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of the New Testament ' (Kurze Darst.. sl41), because 'Christi¬
anity" stands in a 'special historical connexion" with "Judaism"
although this does not exclude Christianity, in respect of
its nature, from standing in ju; t as neutral an attitude to Ju¬
daism as to heathendom (The Christian Faith, E.T., slJ): "that
toe Jewish codex does not contain a normal exposition of pecu¬
liar Christian statements of faith will soon be generally ac¬
knowledged" (Kurze Parst., sll5). One might not even object to
Schleiermacher's explicit wish to see the Old Testament removed
from the Christian canon if it be understood that the major con¬
cern is not "Judaism,'' "Christianity," or Old Testament or New
Testament piety, but simply Jesus Christ as the object of botn
the Old Testament and the New Testament witness. We deal, not in
historical relationship between two religions or with their "kin¬
ship" or "homogeneity," but with the u$ity of revelation which
links the two religions together.v Therefore, one cannot simply
depreciate and downgrade tne Old Testament message by generali¬
zing its particular aspect. The important point here is that
the Old Testament sharef with tne New Testament its witness to
the historical revelation in Jesus Christ.
Brunner goes even further, reminding us that from Schleier-
macher's knowledge of the Old Testament, one can juuge that his
knowledge of the New Testament is also unsound: "It has always
been noticed how little understanding Schleiermacher had of the
Old Testament. This is also the criterion for the genuineness
of his understanding of the New Testament. For without ground¬
ing in the Old Testament the relationship to God of the new Tes¬
tament not in the historical, but in the objective eternal
sense cannot be understood."'^5 Brunner explains how
87. Ibid.. p.79*
88. "Ss ist immer schon aufg fallen, wie wenig VeratUndnia
Schleiermacher fdr das Alte Testament gehabt hat. Das ist auch
das Kriterium ftUr die Echtheit seines Verst&ndaisoes f&r das
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Schleiermacher got into euch a position of rejecting the Old Tes¬
tament and inclining only to the New Testament: "In the New tes¬
tament there arises the appearance of mystical features from the
fact that here in the centre tands love, i.e., the self-commu-
nication of God to men, the reconciliation of the Creator with
the creature wnicn was separated from Him."^ JJrunner means
that the New Testament is easier to fit into the system of mys¬
ticism, but in the Old Testament "God speaks, indeed, tie speaks
as the uord. Our relationship to Him has no other base than
90
this, that He is the nord wno speaks to us,l,J In the Old Tes¬
tament, one can easily imagine that the holiness of God militates
against the mystical relationship with Him. Yet that very thing
has occurred which the Old Testament, with its concept of the
91
holiness of the manifest God, seeks to avoid. "That," says
Barth, "is why :chleiermacher is no friend of tne Old Testament;
because he sees in the concept of the law (which according to
his view is dominant there), the spearation between heaven and
9?
earth, grace nd sin."J
Thus, Brunner and Barth catch Schleiermacher sharply at
his weak point. They both explain tneir different viewpoints
Neue Testament. Den i ohne die Grundlegung im Alten Testament ist
das GottesverhMltnis des Meuen — nicht etwa im nistoriscnen,
sondern im sachiich-ewigen Sinne — nicht zu verstehen." MyatIk.
p.1oO.
89. "Im Neuen Testament entsteht uer Schein mystischer
ZUge dadurch, dass hier die Liebe, d.h. die Selbstmitteilung
Gottes an den fitenechen, die Versdhnung des Schdpfers mit der
von ihm getrennten Kreatur, im Mittelpunkt steht." Ibid. ,pp.386f.
90. "Dass Gott redet. Und 2war, dass er redet als der Herr.
Unser Verh&ltnis zu ihm hat xeinen anderen Grund ale den, dass
er, als der Herr, uns anspricht." Ibid., p.160.
91. CD 1/1. p.371.
92. "Darum ist Schleiermacher kein Freund des Alten Testa-
mentes, weil er in dem nach seiner Meinung no rt beherrsenen den
Begriff des Gesetzes die Trennung zwischen Himmei una hrde,
zwischen Gnade unci Sttnde sieht." Die irotestantische iheologie,
pp.403f•
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in this matter; fir; t Brunner: "It is necessary at least briefly
to touch on the question about the relation of the Bible to mys¬
ticism. The opposition to mysticism in the Old Testament is es¬
pecially clear. There is notning palpably further from mysti¬
cism than the Old Testament.Then Barth: "The Old Testament
like tne New Testament is tne witness to revelation, wnicn is
decidedly to be regarded as a free, utterly once-for-all, con-
94
crete action of God." Deviations from this line of thought
must be avoided. The divine revelation in the Old Testament is
ever a self-relation to a specific nation whioh, nevertheless,
periodically confronts God in certain individuals through whom
9b
He is pleased to act in His sovereign freedom. Delete the Old
Testament with its witness to this fact, as Schleiermacher sou¬
ght to do, and we delete the very foundation on which the Chris¬
tian Church is built. The Old Testament is not merely a prole¬
gomenon to the New Testament which we may now lay aside or
replace.
Both Brunner and Barth hold that the Ola Testament cannot
even be made equal in value to the other religious records or
histories, and that therefore it is not possible to substitute
for it wherever or whenever deemed necessary. Barth says: "«ve
cannot eliminate the Old Testament or substitute for it the re-
97
cords of the early religious history of other peoples." Brun¬
ner remarks: "So far as the 01 Testament is characterized by
the Covenant with God, by the election of Israel from among the
other nations, there is a very marked contrast between the Old
93. 'Es ist notwehdig, die Frage nach dem VeriiSltnis der
Bibel zur Mystik wenigstens kurz zu streifen. Ganz besonders
deutlich ist der Gegensatz zur ystik im Alten Testament. Es
gibt nichts handgreiflich mystikferneres ais das Alte Testament."
Mvatik. p.386.






Testament religion and all others." Therefore, according to
their evaluation of the Old Testament, Schleiermacher is evi¬
dently wrong in giving a limited value to tne Old Testament, a
value equivalent to that of other religious records.
Schleiermacher was not alone in interpreting tne Bible
as a documentation of a specific history, of tne spirit of tne
Biole as the spirit of this history. Several of the 18th Cen¬
tury rationalists also attempted this, perhaps such a proce¬
dure gained^these men a more concrete view of the Bible in its
human form, but it blinded them to what Barth calls "the Know¬
ledge of the free grace of God as the unity of Scripture and
99
revelation." It was even argued that tne Bible could not ac¬
curately be called the *vora of God. In this connection, Brunner
also reminds us that if the mystery of revexation is interpreted
in terms of immanence, tnen one must not forget that this approach
presents a meaning directly opposite to the original one by sub¬
stituting a content from tne world of thought for what the au¬
thors of the Old Testament meant Therefore Brunner complains
that ^ohleiermacher has rejected the faith of tne Reformers and
not interpreted the revelation in the Bible at- they understood
it: "In the Bible as well as for the Reformers, revelation is,
of course, just that which Schleiermacher declined: the communi¬
cation of a wonderful, supernatural knowledge of God and divine
things; and faith is nothing but the acceptance that these divine
communications are true even in contradiction to human experience
101
and apprehension." It may be seen that Barth, more or less,
98. The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption,
Dogmatics II. (London: Lutterworth Press, 1992), p.232.
99- CD 1/2. p.526.
100. The Theology of Crisis, pp.104f•
101. "In der Bibei wie filr die Reformatoren xst Offenbarung
allerdings geratie das, was Schleiermacher ablehnt: Mitteilung
eines wunderbaren, tlbernatdrlichen Aissens von Gott and gdttii-
chen Dingen, und der ulaube nichts anderes 8.1b das Pdrwahrhaiten
dieser g5ttlichen ,4itteilungen in. Gegensatz zu nenscnlicher Er-
fahrung und VerstMndigKeit." xystik, p.81.
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agrees with Brunner here: "Schleiermacher has reversed the order
of the Reformers. I'he question of the aot of man over against
102
Cod interests him." And he signs at 'Achleiermacher' s over-
confidence in man: "In any case one can master Christianity, in¬
sofar as, having the disposal of the insight tinherent} in one's
nature and Cone's human} worth, one can handle the Bible and the
10*5
dogma in unchecked freedom."
Finally, concerning the attitude toward reading the Scrip¬
tures, Barth gives us a corrective reminder tnat man must not be
over-confident of his powers of apprehension, but rather had
better be prepared to listen to the »Vord of God which might be
imparted to him in a way quite contrary to his own ideas or feel¬
ings. Man is wrong, we find, "if he stubbornly insists on trying
to know for himself in what everything will consist if it is im¬
parted to him." Man must, instead, steel himself against the
realization that what actually is imparted to him may come in a
way entirely opposite to what his own ideas and feelings may have
dictated, but a way entirely grounded in the word of God itself.1^
And on this point Brunner agrees with Bartn by saying that:
Faith is not only an assurance of a content whicn was already
known and understood before, but at the same time also a now
apprehension. Everyone wno has come to faith will describe
his experience with the word of the Bible: as an illumina¬
tion, an arising of sense-light where before there was sense-
darkness, the apprehension of something before unapprehended.
105
102. "Schleiermacner hat die reformatorische Anordnung um-
gekehrt. Ihn interessiert die Frage nach dem fan des Menschen
Go11 gegenilber." Die Protestantische Theologie, p.411.
103. 'Man kann das Christentum jedenfalls insofern meistern,
als man, verfiigend tlber die Einsicht in sein «esen und seinen
>ert, mit der Bibel und dem Dogma in ungeheramter Freiheit umgehen,
schalten und walten kann." Ibid., p.39y*
104. CD 1/2. p.733.
103* "Der Glaube ist nicht nur ein Gewissweroen eines vorher
schon bekannten unu verstandenen inhaltes, sondern zugleich auch
ein neuer Verstehen. So wird jeder, der zum ulauben gekommen ist,
seine Erfahrung mit dem Bibelwort beschreiben: als eine Erleuch-
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4. The mystery of revelation cannot be solved.
Mow we turn to further discussion of Brunner'a and Bartn's
critique of Schleierm&cher'e relativistic approach to the Chris¬
tian faith of revelation. In the first instance, tney disagree
with Schleiermacher's attempt to understand the eternal truth
as if it were intelligible by means of a relativistic analysis.
Brunner criticizes him thus:
Accordingly limited by the once accepted category, ne con¬
tents himself witn the only differeutiation wnich is possi¬
ble here: strong and weak, of Jong or short duration, ease
or restraint in the'process of becoming efficient' {inicraft-
tretens}. In short, trie description throughout corresponds
to the principle that we have to deal with a 'process', a
dynamic occurence to which, therefore, only sucn expressions
can be applied which also can be used in the whole realm of
causal events: slowing down and speeding up, strengthening
and weaxeaing. To these merely quantitative concepts is
with a few exceptions all that life reduced which Protes¬
tant dogmatics understands by the super-qualitatively meant
words: sin, repentance, forgiveness, justification, redemp¬
tion, rebirth etc. 106
As long as Scnleiermacher believes in this xind of inter¬
pretation, that man can explain to himself the meaning of faith
tung, ein Aufgehen von Sinn-licht, wo vorher Sinn-dunxel war,
das verstehen eines vorher Unverstandenen." Voa uerk dea Heili-
gen delates, p.1o.
106. "Er begatigt sich, unter dem Zwaag der einmal angenom-
menen Kategorie, aucn mit der eiazigen Diff• renzierung, die
hier mdglicn ist: starx und scnwach, lang- und Xurzdauernd,
Leichtigkeit und Geneamtheit des Inxrafttretens, xurz die Be-
schreibung entapricht durchaus der Grundlegung, daes es sich
um einen 'Prozess,' einen dynamisenen Vorgang handle, auf den
also nur die AusdrlcXe Anwendung haben, die dberall im Gebiet
kausalen Geschehens Anwendung haben, Verlangsamung und Beschleu-
nigung, VerstMrkung una Abschwdchung. Auf cliese rein quantita-
tiven Grhssen ird, von Ausnahmen abgesehen, all jenes Leben,
das die evangelische Dogmatix unter den uageheuer qualitativ-
gemeinten Worten: attnde, Busse, Vergebung, Rechtfertigung, iSr-
ldsung, .vidergeburt usw. begreift, zttrficxgefuhrt,... " Mystik,
p.85.
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or revelation in terms of idealism or relativism, he will only
be confused in himself and he will surely not understand the
true or original meanings of these terms. Me can only look to
himself for himself. As a result, the conclusion is: all is in
man, all he has to do is to see* what is possible in a self-re¬
ligious man and work it out from within.Berth notes now,
from this viewpoint, too much attention has been focussed upon
human needs and problems in time, and particularly upon mankind's
positive possibilities. ..hat has become central to an under¬
standing of God's eternity was God's actual relationship to time
in its duration, along with His presence in and reign over the
world and the soul and the religious experience of the individ¬
ual.^^8 Brunner notes that in the realm of faith, all idealistic
approaches made by man should be clearly demarcated, and no con¬
fusion made with idealism. "This is itself a matter for the de¬
cision of faith; experience of faith and its truth is not the
109
truth of an idea but truth as personal encounter."
Barth, trusting to the Christian faith grounded in reve¬
lation, regards the attempt to gain freedom from illusion by
means of human possibility or idealistic truth as but a real il-
usion of our own, 'if Bible and Church are considered apart from
the revelation which constitutes them or if by revelation, with
Schleiermacher, is meant merely the peculiar beginning of the
religion which happens to be our own."'1"18 i?'or Barth quotes Lu¬
ther and affirms that no way leads to heaven save the way point¬
ed out by Christ and prepared and reserved for us through His
107. Barth, Die Theoio&ie und die Kirene, p.207.
106. CD 11/1. p.632. Brunner also asserted that "Christian
faith, however, is concerned with something very different...a
knowledge of God. which in no way is founded in man...It is know¬
ledge of God from beyond all human poss ibilities." Tne »ord and
the World, p.16.
109. Hev. la t ion an a Reas- on, p. 39 3 •
110. CD 1/1. p.176:
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Word, lest otherwise we be treading on air. x Peeling is not
to be confused with faith: feeling does not help us to fly up
to heaven; in fact, taking it seriously and by itself, it is
even un-Christian also. Barth continually quotes uutner to the
effect that there is an essential difference between the Chris¬
tian view and the pagan:
This then is the difference between the Christian ana the
pagan that a godless man and a pagan departeth liice a cow,
peeing, opining, and judging all things according to the
old birth as what he feels and grasps. But a Christian
followeth not as ne eeetn, but followeth as he seeth not
nor feeleth and abideth by the witness of Christ, heareth
what Christ saith, whom he followeth rignt into the dark¬
ness. 112
Evidently, what has been discussed here is that faith is
a venture, not a human discovery; it is a matter of decision,
not something it is possible to invent. Therefore the modernist
has obscured the true meaning of revelation and of faith. ycCon-
nachie has shown that the very concept of revelation as God's
Aord has come, in sortie quarters, to be so vaguely and generally
applied (,e.g., to science, art, and even human love) as to have
no longer any well defined meaning. It meant any human experi¬
ence wnich cut deeper than common, everyday occurrences. Also,
divine revelation and human discovery came to be viewed as merely
113
two sides of the selfsame coin of experience. Brunner, simi¬
larly, points out: "For trie modernist, faith is an empirical dis¬
coverable datum; for tne Reformers, tne opposite of that. They
xnow that one cannot speaK of faitn psychologically, but oniy
theologically, i.e., from faith.And he goes on to explain
111. ibid., p.194.
112. loc. cit.
113. Reformation Issues To-day, Reformation Old and New,
(edited by Camfield), p.107.
114. ,,r)en Modernen ist Glaube ein empi^isch vorfinabares
Datum, den Reformatoren das Gegenteil davon. Sie wissen, dass
roan auch vom Glauben client psychologisch, sondern nur theoio-
giech, d.h. aus Glauben, rede.n kann." Mystik. p.35<3.
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that in Christian faith we confront something very different in
nature; for Christian faith, so far from being merely general
in nature, consists of a certain relation to Gog's ,.ord in Jesus
Christ. Christ does not point out a general door or pathway
within the human soul, but affirmly avers: "1 am the Way, I am
the Door." The way to God lies, not in tome human moral, meta¬
physical, or religious framework of tne intellect, but entirely
lib
outside of man in an historical, yet once-for-all vent.
Thus, it is advanced that the real truth is in Jesus
Christ, and that we know Him fir t before we really know oursel¬
ves. As weber puts it, according to Barth:
The 'really special events in our life...are not those we
can affirm as being humanly demonstrable in this way.' On
the contrary, they are 'absolutely identical with our par¬
ticipation in the great deeds of God in his revelation'...
Believers do not know by themselves, neither are they
'igndrant.' They are 'co-knowers.' 116
It is God who reveals Himself to man, who, nonetheless, has sepa¬
rated himself from Him; and it is tie who speaks to us in His
fiord, which is a mystery to us. This mystery is not the peculiar
growth of our inwardness or the product of our introspection,
nor can it be equated with the knowledge of our experience.
Thus, drunner anu Barth oppose Schleiermacher with the
charge that his orientation of theological method is basically
not responsive to the Word of God; but that it sets man up as
the centre and subject of the concept of idealistic interpreta¬
tion of his own imaginary titanism on one hand, and as the ob¬
ject of the process of psychological analysis of his own humani-
zation of life on the other. As Brunner points out: 'It left
Schieiermacher no other possibility than to exenange for the
115- The Word and the World, p.19* The Philosophy of Reli¬
gion. p.50.
lib. Karl Barth's Church Dogmatics, pp.65f.
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rejected 'dramatic' of redemption the 'pure interior' lyric of
117
'religious excitability.'" As he says that -chleiermacher
always thinks himself as the subject of religion: "Only the
subjectivity itself, the pure being-in-itseif, the pure inferi¬
ority without object, in which no objective foreign substance
is to be found, could be the essence of religion; only there
could the pease and happiness be found which are the goal of
"j I Q
piety." One may say that in his whirling in the current of
119
doubt, the very core of Christian faith, i.e., revelation
which comes from outside of one's soul, is swept or explained
away and the mystery of it is resolved by the kind of interpre¬
tation which generalizes its concept, which is opposed to faith
and is fundamentally and wholly different from the original
meaning of revelation. Barth attacks Schleiermacher because "he
suspends its ([Christian revelation'sj position for Christianity,
its judgment of truth and the very absoluteness of Christian re-
120
velatioa for thi3 moment." " The haughty position he takes up
Barth himself described: "One can be a Christian and a theolo¬
gian, in the same way as a philosopher or an artist: namely one
can confront these things and illuminate, penetrate and shape
them, creatively, systeraatically and in their essential princi-
121
pies, according to man's own peculiar authority." * Brunner
117- "Es blieb Schleierraacher keine Mbgiichkeit, ale fttr
die weggeworfene 'Oraraatik* der zrldsung einzutauschen: die
'rein innerliche* Lyrik der •frommen Krregung.'" Mystik, p.276.
HQ. "Nur die Subjektivitat xseibst, nur das reine msicn-
sein, die reine Inner.Lichxeit onne Gegenstand, in der nichts Ob-
jektiv-Fremdes mehr zu finden ware, konnte da;: -vesen der Reli¬
gion sein, nur in ihr konnte jene Rune una Seligkeit gefunden
warden, die das Aiel der Frdmmigkeit ist." Idid., p.57; of.
p.174.
119 • Barth: "Man wird im uegeiteil sagen milssen, dass inr
durch die Art, wie er sie vertreten hat, nacn ail den Verdachten,
von denen eie von Anfang an umgeben war, auch noch der des Spino-
zismus, oder allgemeiner: der Verdacht eines pantheistisch-natur-
alistischen Monismus zugezogen worden ist, dass er sie also in
den Augen aller guten '"enschen noch mehr und erst recht in den
Bchatten gerdckt hat." KD III/3. p.132.
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explains "the true meaning of revelation; for "genuine revela¬
tion is something totally different. It is a prophetic word
from beyond this human and personal plane of existence of) exis-
122
tence." Therefore, he criticizes the mystical view of re¬
velation, which attempts to discover an eternal principle in
tne totality of nature and tnus presents the meaning of revela¬
tion purely from tne subjectivistic point of view, Revelation,
under such a category as the so-called "higher" relation to God
i.e., the speculative and mystical aspects one encounters in
tne ultra-sophisticated "religion of educated people" comes
to signify merely the emergence into consciousness of the eter¬
nal oasis of all phenomena, and an apperception of "eternal
truth" or of the growing awareness of a Divine Presence. Reve¬
lation, properly viewed as the oojective element, and religion,
properly tne subjective, are fused into one and the same thing
and referred to all too generally as "the essence of religion,"
which man could identify and recognize easily enough were he not
123
hampered by the limitations inherent to his sense-environment.
But note wnat Barth says of all this: "'To be eternal in a single
moment,* as Schleiermacher said at the close of his second Ad¬
dress for a whole age attempts seemed to be made to compress
into this ail that they had to say about the eternal God, and
significantly it was not said about Him at ail but about reii-
124
gious man.
120. 'Er suependiert fdr diesen Augenblicx seine Stellung
zum Christen turn, sein IJrteil Giber die Wahrheit Oder gar Absolut-
heit der christlicher Offenbaruag." hie Protestantisehe Xheolo-
gie, p.396.
121. "Man kann Christ and Theologe sein, wie man Philosoph
oder kttnstier ist: man kann n&mlich aucn diesea Stoff schOpfe-
risch, systematise/!, trinzipiell durchleucntena, durchdringend
und gestaltend aus eigenster voilmacht fegenubertreten." Ibid.,
p.399.
122. The Memlator, p.266.
123. Ibid.", "p.22.
124. CD 11/1. p.632.
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Brunner criticizes Schleiermacher's system as being fund¬
amentally a system, not of spirit and truth in "dialectico-para-
doxical motion," but a system"of repose, of balance and of neu¬
trality" ; not a system of antithesis and opposition and action,
12b
but a system of continuity and indifference and passivity.
And he sums up: "The paradoxical reconciliation of the absolute
antithesis through the divine act is the fundamental character
of Christian faith, just as the principle of continuity is the
■j n/
fundamental character of Schleiermacher's system." ° One may
asks what is this principle of continuity which Brunner ascribed
to Schleiermacher? Again, it is nothing else than his principle
of reconciliation operating through the religious consciousness.
So far as berth understands it, it is nothing else than "the
great formal principle which is, at the same time, the material
127
principle of the theology of Fchleiermacher."
POSTSCRIIT
Barth, then agrees with Schleierruacher that the content
of Christian doctrine must correspond to or be relevant and cur¬
rent for present-aay conditions in the Christian world. He also
125- "Aber es ist nicht das System der #ahrheit und des
Geistes mit seiner dialektisch-paradoxen Hewegtheit, sondern ein
System der Ruhe, ties Gleichgewichts und der weutralitcitj nicht
des Gegensatzee, sondern der StetigKeit, nicht des Wider-spruchs,
sondern der indifferenz, nicht der Tat, sondern der lassivit&t."
■lystitc. p.275.
126. "Die paradoxe VersOhnung der absoluten Gegens&tze durch
gBttliche Tat, das ist der Urundsch&rakter des christlichen Glaub-
bens, ebenso wie das Stetigkeitsprinzip der Grundcnaracter aes
Fchleierraacherschen Fystein ist." Ibid., p.335«
127. Das grosse Pormalprinzip ist zugleich das Material-
prinzip der Schleiermacherschen Theoiogie." Die Protestantische
Ttieolopie. p.409*
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acknowledges that Schleiermacher actually was conscious of one
limitation: viz., that the task of dogmatics belongs to the
realm of historical theology, and that dogmatics therefore has
to develop the doctrine which is current in the Church at the
specific time under consideration, and which corresponds to the
Leitmotiv or guiding principle of that period, fchleiermacher,
Barth adds, taught this, but this fact had subsequently been
1 OC'3
ignored and finally forgotten.
128. CD 1V/1. p.333.
CHAPTER VII
THE CREATOR AMD THE CREATURE
VS. A MYSTERIOUS WHOLE
In this chapter tie writer will attempt to show how Brun-
ner and narth emphasize the qualitative and fundamental (not
quantitative and gradual) difference between the Creator and the
creature over against Scnleiermaeher,^ who thinks human nature is
at bottom divine, and that therefore man ultimately is cognizant
of the divine.^ Barth begins:
But meanwhile under the decisive guidance of Scnleiermacner,
one had all along the line made the discovery that trie real
theme of theology in human religion and piety consists in
its assertion about itself. One had meanwhile become accus¬
tomed when saying 'God' to think simply of an objective con¬
tent of the pious human consciousness. 3
Brunner explains Schieieraiacher's key to religion:
Within our feeling, we have the equilibrium which outside we
only realize in the relativity of antinomies. Here is the
common basis of all the subjective, of all spiritual acts
and at the same time the common basis, of all objective real¬
ity: the God-consciousness which is, at the same time, God's
existence in us. This system of equilibrium can accordingly
only fulfill itself in some form of mysticism, as on the
other hand, this mysticism demands the thought of identity,
the unity of all things which can be experienced within our
feeling. 4
1. Brunner, Die i.ystiK und as .»ort, (Tdbingen: Veriag von
J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), I)2A), the Pirst Edition, cf. p.366.
2. Mystik, pp.172; 177.
3. "Man hatte aber unterdessen unter der entscneidenden
Ptthrung ochleiermachers auf der ganzen Linie die Entdeckung ge-
macht, dars das eigentliehe Thema der Theologie in der menachli-
chen Religion und Prdmmigktit, in inren Aussagen Uber sic a sel-
ber bestehe. Man hatte sich unterdessen daran gewdhnt, bei der
Vokabei •Gott' an einen blossen 'Objektgehait' des frommen men-
achlichen Bewussteeins zu denken." KD Iii/2. p.f2. As Barth under¬
stands it, according to Schleiermacher: "FrOmmigkeit sucht nicht
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1 • The self-revelation of God vs. trie immanental system
of mysticism.
According to Brunner and Barth, Scnleiermacher here in¬
troduces the speculative system of a semi-pantheistic view. The
origin of this system is rooted in his anthropocentric probing
of an imaginary structure of a mysterious whole whicn soars
above the sphere of reality, and in his attempt to incorporate
a
the human with the divine through a hazy light of mysticism;
the Creator and the creature were thus identified by pondering
one's own mystical experience for itself ana within itself.0
nur,hofft nicht nur, erwartet nicht nur, betet nicht nur an,
sondern i3t jene Mitte, jener Friede, der hbher ist als alle
Vernunft. Darum heisst Gott verktindigen filir Schieier/nacher die
eigene Frflmmigkeit verkdndigen." Die Protestantische Theologle,
p.406; cf. p.413; same passage is found in Die Theolo&ie und
die kircne, p.163*
4. "Hier, im Geftlhl, haben wir das Gleichgewicht, das wir
draussen nur in der Relativitat der GegensA'tze erkennen. flier
ist der Einheitsgrund ailes Subjektiven, aiier Ueistesakte und
zugleich der Einheitsgrund aller objektiven ■<> irklichiceit: das
Gottesbewusstsein, das zugleich ein Sein Gottes in una ist. Die¬
ses System des Gleichgewichtes kann sicn also nur in einer Art
von Mystik vollenden, wie umgekehrt diese Mystik, die im Geftihl
erlebbare Einheit von allem, den Identit&tsgedanken fordert."
Mystik. p.329 •
6. von Balthasar, "Sie verf&lscht die Schdrfe una Akuitdt
der Offenbarung ale echter Tat zwisohen Gott und Menach, indem
sie alles in eine nebelhafte mystische konteraplation verschwim-
men lSsst, an Steile von •Gespr&ch, Drama, Kampf* das ganze Ver-
hdltnis in einen ailgemeinen pantheistischen Brei aufldst, worin
es kein Ich und kein Du mehr gibt." Op. cit., pp.97f. It is in¬
teresting to not that Brunner even ascribes tnis artistic and
plastic perception of mystical unity of a feeling to our situa¬
tion whicn is somewhat actual in this way; "Mature is permeated
by divine spiritual forces, nature is always both, divine and
immaterial, sensual and material. Reality is, like ourselves,
animated body and materialised soul, divine nature und materi¬
alised divinity. Nature-forces are divine forces and deities
are nature-forces. The one changes into the other, nay, the one
is the other. This is also a feeling of many of our own day,
expressing itself in tne art and poetry of recent times in a
most elementary way: reality is deeper tnan materialists thiax,
The situation, as Brunner explains it, is that "there dwells all
that is individual and vital, all that is creative and inspired,
in tliat sphere where nothing has yet hardened in the moulds of
clarity." He continues: "Once again the philosophy of immanence
shows its connection with mysticism, as the real religion of the
8
Glaubenslenre.'' And he adds: "For chleiermacher, the relati on
to God is not faith, but feeling, not trust in the paradoxical
truth of the divine Promissio, but tne possession and the enjoy-
meat of God which is actually sensible." Is it not that chlei¬
ermacher postulates a point of continuity between the human and
the divine by psychologizing the mental state of a religious
mind as if one can ascertain oneself that it lived on the same
plane of the divine re. ion?Thus, Brunner writes: "It would
give a point, or, rather than a point, an experience, a mental
happening, where God would be man, and man God, Creator would be
our senses grasp only its surface, not its depth. Or better, sur¬
face and depth are one, the visible i: the invisible and the in¬
visible is the visible, dust this mystical unity is reality...
This nature, identical witn God, is reality. The Christian under¬
standing of reality is of a very different Kind, totally unlike
all these conceptions. It is determined by the thought tnat God
is the Creator and tne world Hie creation. God therefore is the
primary reality. Whatever else we call real is secondary, depend¬
ent reality." Christianity and Civilization, (First Part: Founda¬
tions. London: Nisbet and Co., Ltd., 1948), pp.l7f.
6 • The tVord and tne florlu, p. 60.
7. God and Man, (Transl. with an Introduction by David
Cairns. London: Student Christian Movement Press, 1936), p.144.
8. "Noch einmal zeigt sich die immanenzphiloaophie in
ihretn Zusammenhang mit der Mystik, als die eigentliehe Religion
der Glaubenslehre." Mystik, p.l45«
9. "FUr Scnleiermaciier ist Beziehung auf Gott nicnt Glau-
be, sondern Geftthl; nicht das Trauen auf die paradoxe »ahrheit
der gtJttlichen Promissio, sondern gegenwfirtig-ftihlbarer Gottes-
besitz, Gotte3genuss." Ibia.. p.274.
10. urunner, "Dass der 'eased in sich oelbst heiiig, in
sich selbst gdttlicnen rtesens teihaftig wird." Vom Aerk des
Helligen. Geistes, p • 3 b •
ll39
creature, and creature Creator, where our existence would melt
with the divine being, a bit of human life which does not need
forgiveness and redemption, but is already redeemed.""*"'" There¬
fore this process wojld eventually involve two alternative pre¬
suppositions: either bringing down the divine to the human lev-
12
el or deifying the creature. It is no wonder that brunner
points out how religionism can only result in a depersonalized
relationship between God and man* "An impersonal cod and an im¬
personal man are tne necessary and inevitable consequence of a
religion of immanence." He goes on to explain that "a personal
Cod and a personal faith are not possible when our knowledge of
cod is the result of an interpretation of the world and the
13
Ego." Brunner further explains and affirms that the true
knowledge of a personal i*oa cannot be found in our tnought but
must be given in revelation through faith: "Personal faith and
knowledge of a personal God wno is Lord of trie world can be
14
gained only when God reveals nimseif personally." Barth com¬
ments on this: "The psycnological expression of tne idea of God
11. "Dass es doch einen Punkt, o nein, viel mehr als einen
unkt, ein Erleoen, ein seeliscn.es Geschehen gebe, wo Gott
Mensch und Mensch Gott, wo der Schtfpfer Kreatur und die Kreatur
Schdpfer sei, wo unser Sosein mit dem gOttlichen Sein zusamraen-
falle, ein Sttick menschlichen Lebens, das nicht der Vergebung
und Erlbsung bedtirfe, sonderri bereits erldst sei." Mystik, p.188.
12. Die Myatik und das frort, 1924, pp.367f. cf. "Das Ziel
ist die Vergottung, d.h. das Einswerden mit jener letzten »irk-
lichkeit, ob sie nun Gott heisse oder nicht, der Zustand, wo
'Subjekt und Objekt, er ehnend und ersehnt eins sind,' die 'Er-
hebung des ganzen Selbst bis zu der Stufe, wo eine bewusste und
dauernde Vereinigung mit dem Absoluten stattfindet,' die Eini-
gung, das wahre Ziei der mystischen Suche,' 'das vergottete
ceben,' die Vergottung oder ganzliche Umwandlung des Selbst in
Gott.'" Mystik, p.369»
13- The Theology of Crisis, p.31. Similarly Barth under¬
stands Schleiermacher: "Aus der intellektueiien Reflexion auf
das fromme Selbstbewusstsein ergeben sich dis Aussagen tlber den
fromrnen Gemhtszustand als solchen und an sich. Aus der Reflexion
auf das fromme Selbstbewusstsein ergeben sich die Aussagen tlber
Gott." Die Protestantische Theoiogie, p.408.
14. The Theology of Crisis, p.31.
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is, therefore, a mere form of trie inherently impersonal and ab¬
solute process of spirit, it is not true in itself, but it has
conceptual value. When put in tni3 logical way, tne doubtful-
15
ness of the whole approach becomes apparent." Barth directly
and completely rejects this most confused kind of presupposition
when he says that "the creature which conditions God is no longer
God's creature, and the God who is conditioned by the creature
is no longer God." "If we start from this point we will cons¬
tantly lose sight of both the reality of eod and the reality of
16
the creature." Barth insists that God is a free Lord; no imma-
nental attempt will be able to comprehend Hissovereign act. He
stresse that while God enters into the closest of relationship
with other beings, He does not form such a synthesis, or become
so wholly identical, with it as to be thus immanentiy comprehend-
17
ed. On the other hand, we find that Brunner holds to his cho¬
sen-point for criticism as he says:
For mysticism thrives only in 'mysticai twilight.' The
clear light dissolves it. it lives by tne undetermined and
the undeterminable. Therefore it escapes from the word.
What is word, when one has music! .«hat need has one of day,
when the twilight is so splendidly suited for dreaming the
dream of spirit? Where word is, there is day-bright clarity
...either mysticism or the Word. 18
Thus, Gchleiermacher's unwarranted speculation and arti¬
ficial abstraction is wholly unacceptable to Brunner and Barth,
15- GO II/l. p.538.
16. Ibid., p.580.
17. Ibid., p.312; cf. Die Theologie und die Kirche, p.153.
18. 'Denn Mystik gedeiht nur im 'mystischen Haibdunkel.*
Da3 iclare Licht Idst sie auf. Sie lebt vom unbestimmten und Un-
bestimmbaren. Darum flieht sie das «ort. Was it «ort, wean man
vusik hat! «>as braucht man Tag, da das Halbdunkei sich so ner'—
lien dazu eignet, den Traum vom Geist zu trSumen! wo oort ist,
ist taghelle Klarheit... Gntweder aie ..4'ystik Oder aas «art."
Mystlk, p.5.
who hold that uod dwells in unapproacnable light; His Lordsnip
transcends the world-whole which ne has created. That i3 why
Mackintosh writes:
In short, and in theology this is unpardonable sin he
makes only what r&ay be called a quantitative difference
between man and God, thereby suggesting that tne revela¬
tion of God in Christ is merely a more excellect way tnan
others, instead of proclaiming tnat it is the true and
only way, all other ways being dross and illusion, nothing,
Barth finds, is more characteristic of Schleiermacher* a
ultimate attitude than his tendency to make a fetish of
'continuity', and therefore to gloss over man's worst
troubles with a. veneer of isamanentism. The dogma of con¬
tinuity might be called the real foundation of the -tore
recent European pantheism, consisting as it doe3 in the
assertion of the homogeneity and the continuous connexion
between all parts of the universe. In the last resort,
there is an unbroken line of development from matter to
life, from life to mind, from man to God. Thus in reli¬
gion the measure of ail things is man, not the sovereign
God who has spoken in His »Y'ord. 19
This statement by Mackintosh, one may imagine, is to be
applied only to Barth'a criticism of the earlier viewpoint of
Schleiermacher. The writer would like to point out that the
statement quoted above is actually applicable to Brunner's crit
icism. In Berth's case, it may be right to say that it is
Schleiermacher's philosophical approach whicn he criticizes,
one must be reminded that Schleiermacher insists that Gou (or
the concept of God only) is purely transcendent. Then what is
this "continuity" which Schleieraseher tends to make? It is
obviously difficult to apply such a criticism to his semi-theoi
ogical approach, or to the feeling of absolute dependence.
Barth reminds us that even in Schleiermacher's early years, in
his Speeches, he has not treated his doctrines only in a specu¬
lative manner:
19. Types of Modern Theology, p.271.
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The other one [the other apologetic motive] is, already
in Reden and still in Glaubenslehre an attempt though de¬
finitely limited, in the direction of a positive proof,
in the direction of a demonstration of the logical neces¬
sity of the Christian propositions. 1 say in the direction
and more one would not be allowed to say without saying
something wrong and entirely 'Unschleiermacherisches.*
Schleiermacher has not proved theology, the Christian pro¬
positions speculatively, i.e., he has not understood and
treated them as propositions to be necessarily derived
from the idea of human Knowledge. 20
According to Brunner and Barth, God is the Wholly Other
One, who can be Known only through His self-communication, and
through Himself alone; as Brunner says: "The living God is not
known through thought, nor through conclusions drawn from the
structure of the universe, nor through profound meditation on
the nature of the Spirit; He is Known through revelation alone.
As Barth says: the Knowledge of God does not originate with hu¬
man capacity to apprehend it, but is given to man by God Himself.^
Obviously this means that "God is Known only where He Himself
maKes His Name Known. Apart from this self-manifestation He is
unKnowable; from our point of view He is remote, inaccessible...
It is a Knowledge which in the strict sense of the word can
23
only be given." Therefore, one cannot apply any immanental,
20. "Das Andere ist, schon in den Reden und noch in der
Glaubenslehre ein allerdings oestimmt umschrfinKter Verauch in
der Sichtung eines positiven Beweises, in der Richtung des Auf-
weises der Benknotwendigkeit der christlichen S£tze. in der Rich¬
tung, sage ich, und mehr dSrfte man nicht sagen, onne etwas Ver-
Kehrtes und ganz Unscnleiermacherisches zu sagen. Schieiermacher
hat die Theologie, er hat die christiichen S&tze nicht spekulativ
begrtlndet, d.h. er hat sie nicht als notwendig aus der Iaee des
menschlichen wissens abzuleitende Sfitze aufgefasst und behandelt."
Die Protestantische Theologie, p.399•
21. Revelation and Reason, p.44; cf. The Divine-Human En-
co inter, p.34; The Mediator, p.21; God and Man, p.60. Also:
"Either God is the Other One, the wholly Other One, not as a neu¬
ter but as a person, or He is not really God; ana it is He alone
who can disclose His secret." The ftord and tne .iorld, p.29.
22. CD II/1. p.44. "
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general, or undifferentiated i eas about God, as though one
could know about Him apart from His gracious act of His self-
revelation in Christ. Barth says: "The being of God is either
known by grace or it is not known at all."2^ This conception
seems somewhat ecclesiastically dogmatic or aggresively arbit¬
rary in regard to our general way of thinking, but the true
meaning of this term "Creator" must not be dissipated away,
Barth affirms: "Creator means one who alone exists and every¬
thing else only as trie work of His will and Word. Creator means:
creator ex nihilo. But within the sphere of the ideas possible
2b
to us, creatio ex nihilo can appear only as an absurdity."
Brunner says the same: "As Creator He is the beginning and the
ground of all existence, the source of ail life," and ne ex¬
plains that the Knowledge of the Creator is only possible in a
reflective way: "To meet God the Lord means that we acknowledge
that we are creatures. It may seem tautological to say: To Know
27
God the Creator means to know ourselves as creatures." Since
|D
"Creator" means that He is the source of all being, therefore
the knowledge of this Creator-God, in no way, ia grounded on
the knowledge of creature-man but He is known only by faith.
Barth points out the way in which the knowledge of God, as a
Knowledge of faith, is unlike ail other knowledge in focussing
23. Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God, Dogmatics I.
(Transl. by Olive Ayon, London: Lutterworth Press, 1949). p.120.
cf. The word and tne norid, p.123: The Mediator, pp.21if.,454t
201; Revelation and Heason, p.24.
24. CD II/l. p.27.
23. Ibid., p.76.
26. The Divine Imperative, p.122.
27• The Christian uoctrine of Creation and Redemption,
Doga rat ice II. p. 53.
28. von Balthasar: "Als Grand alles sonstigen Bxistierens."
s.a. "Wie die Airklichkeit des Schdpfers darin von aller andera
nirklichxeit verschieden ist, dass er una er aiiein ourch eicn
selbst una also ursprdnglich existiert." op. cit. , p.150.
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its primary attention upon the living Lord and Cre tor of cog¬
nitive man, who comes from this Creator as a living being even
29
before he has any chance to Know Him. A God who could be
known in any other way than through His own self-revelation,
3arth warns, would thereby eo. ipso betray Himself as not the
only One, and therefore not God, but solely one more principle
underlying our human systems and scnemes a principle inevita-
"50
bly identical with man himself.
Our knowledge of this fact is definitely limited. Since
God is the Cfeator and Lord of all things, He can not be devel¬
oped by our reason as if He were represented by our extended
ideas. narth writes: "God does not stand under any alien law,
any general truth and possibility and presupposition embracing
and conditioning and limiting both Himself and the world and
man. It would be a futile undertaking to try to measure Him by
any such law when answering the question of His right.Brun-
ner even asserts that, "He is not at our disposal as an object
of knowledge. He proves himself as Lord in tne fact that He,
we alone, gives the knowledge of Himself, and that man has no
power at his own isposal to enable him to acquire this xnow-
*52 55
ledge." God is not man's infinite extension of man himself.
Thus He is the Creator; man is His creature, i.e., God is God,
35
man is man.
29. CD II/l. pp.21; cf.45, 190, 601.
50. The Knowledge of God and the Service of God. (London:
Bodder « Stoughton, 1938), ~p.20.
31. CD IV/1. p.529-
52. Revelation and Reason, p.24.
33. Camfield, Reformation Old and New, p.61.
34. It is interesting to observe Hrunner's view on man:
"«5an is not loving God who 'first loved' him; yet the 'theolo¬
gical structure of human existence, as .it has been created by
the Creator, is not anni .ilated by the hostility of man to the
will of the Creator, although it is perverted in its operation."
aian in Revolt. (London: Lutterworth irese, 1939), p.105.
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Schleiermacher would certainly not deny that God is trans¬
cendent, but he does not go any further in this respect. On the
other hand, we see that Brunner admits that God is the Creator,
which originally means that in His very Being, He is supreme and
unique, mysterious and impenetrable. Therefore He absolutely
-z-l
transcends the world. Barth also does not agree with Schieier¬
macher that we ought simply to keep silence about God because He
is transcendent. According to Bartn: "The Christian doctrine of
God has to face and answer questions put to it by the God who
37
confronts man and not by the man who confronts God." Brunner
points out that "for his (Schleiermacher's} original plan of the
doctrine of God is indeed not based upon the .Vord, the truth of
God revealed in Christ, but upon the romantico-mystical concept
of religion."^®
As Schleiermacher develops his ideas in this area, God is
reflected or termed as Infinite; man is finite. Srunner and
Barth promptly reject this Kind of relativised appelation. Cam-
field, taking a page from Barth, points out how the concept of
infinity per se denotes a negative, sinoe it bespeaks a God not
limited by space and time. Man, of course, is finite rather
than infinite; but how is such a statement to tell us anything
really penetrating about God, even if we add that we are limited
65' Barth: "The frontier is a real one. On the one side
there is God in His glory as Creator and Lord, ana also in the
majesty of His holiness and righteousness. And on the other side
there is man, not merely the creature, but the sinner, the one
who exists in the flesh and who in the flesh is in opposition to
Hia." CD IV/1. p.82.
56. cf. Brunner, The Philosophy of Religion, p.16; Revela¬
tion and Reason, p.92.
57. CD 11/1. p.464.
38. "Denn sein ursprtlnglicher Plan der Gotteslehre 1st ja
gar nicht auf die in Christus offenbarte Ootteswahrheit aufge-
baut, nicht auf das rvort, sondern auf den romantisch-mystischen
Religionsbegriff. " "ivstik. p.140.
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in an infinite way? Barth himself derides this empty chain
of thought which is, at bottom, self-deceptive. If man is truly
alone, he is not occupied with God at all, but only with himself,
fie is absolutizing his own being and nature and projecting them
into an infinite reflection of his own vainglory, ouch thought
is, to Barth, a mere game which cannot possibly help us arrive
at any closer knowledge or understanding of God.^
God is free from ail limits imposed on Him, even such a
negative one infinite. He is beyond the process of our think¬
ing: "God alone is the absolute mystery.Therefore, eventu¬
ally it is self-deceptive when man attempts to know God by des¬
cribing his own pious soul. He is not to be identified with the
content of the soui;^ He is rather the Absolute une, not vice
43
versa, lest He become "the reflection of creaturely unities."
He must be the sovereign Lord, or He is no Lord; He is not forced
44
to give His glory to another.
According to Schleiermacher, as Brunner uts it: "The
point of contact of the absolute and the I in consciousness,
45
therefore, is feeling. ' "There indeed feeling is the presup¬
position of all consciousness, it is the absolute itself, there-
A
fore it cannot be exposed." In this direction, as Barth sees,
59• Reformation Old and New, p.61.
40. cd TT7I. p.71.
41. Brunner, Revelation ana Reason, p.92; cf. 'All is
yours, but ye are God's. Of all the trees in trie garden ye shall
eat, but from this one tree ye shall not eat. All is in subjec¬
tion to us that is the concept of the world save one thing
only, u-od Himself. All things can become object of our thought
and be fitted by us into a system, save one thing only, God
Himself." God and Man, p.53.
42. The Theology of Crisis, p.32. cf. "He should exhibit
in its peculiarity what lies beyond the object-Subject antithesis,
the encounter between the self-revealing God and the man who, be¬
cause of this revelation of God, surrenders himself. Hence his
'subject' not his thinking about it lies beyond what can be
comprehended by means of Object- abject correlation." The Divine-
Human Kncounter. p.58.
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ocnleierraacher only attempts "to understand God decisively from
man instead of man decisively from (iod."'1'^ According to Brunner
and Bartht man's feeling, in no way, can be identified with the
existence of God. The important aspect involved here is that in
the relation between uod find man, the "uncon itionai priority
belongs to Him. As Barth says: ".Vhat must be said is that the
self-declaration of God is true and real, which means that God
Himself is God,"^ i.e., He is in Himself. "He is the only one
60
of His kind." God possesses absolute freedom; He is free from
all natural necessities, out of His good-pleasure, though He
could grant co-existence with man's feeling without falling into
61
contradiction of Himself, but this could not at all mean that
feeling Is defined as co-existent with God or corresponding to
the existence of the gracious God who speaks to man in His Word,
Barth says: "Man who hears, as the object of the purpose of God
who speaks, is included in the concept of the «ord of God as a
factual, but not as an essential necessity. " He is not co-exis¬
tent in it, like Schleiermachi-r' s God in the feeling of absolute
dependence. it is God's free grace that he is co-existent in it
62
as a factual necessity. Brunner says that "God's being ia the
6 3
being of the Lord who posits everything and is not posited.
It is simply because God must be primary, not secondary; and
43. CD 11/1. p.448.
44. Isaiah 48:11.
46* "Der iierdhrungspunkt des Absoiuten und des icn im Be-
wusstseins ist also das uef&hi." Myatik, p.59*
46. Brunner, "'.Das' Gefdhl iet ja dort Voraussetzung alie3
Bewusstseins, es ist das Absolute selbst, eo kann also nicht
'auosetzen*." Xbia., p.219*
47. UD II/2. p.641.
48. Brunner, The Divine-Human Encounter, p.34.
49. CD 11/1. p.670.
50. Ibid., p.442.
51. Ibl ♦. p.463
52. CD 1/1. p.159.
53. Christianity and Civilization, I. p.19.
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feeling must therefore be secondary, not primary. Schleier-
macher is wrong for he holds that, "in the human spirit itself
and in the nature of man itself, this God-consciousness is
55
grounded.
To return to the samepoint: God must be the Lord of all
56
things; they are all but His creatures. Tautologically, nei¬
ther nature nor tne process of nature is to be identified with
Him or regarded as co-existent with Him or mistaken for His pre¬
sence in it or for His movement. Thus Schleiermacher is actually
57
talking about nature and man, not God. It is generally a way
which religion and philosophy take to seek the "becoming one"
(Einswerden) of the finite and the Absolute; or of God and the
58soul. They start from man and return to man. As Brunner says
that "inasmuch as the world unfolds Itself to him, it is his
59
thinking self v,hich unfolds itself therein." And Barth points
54. Barth explains this: "If we apply it to what in our
terminology we call tne doctrine of the «ord of God, it would
mean that real knowledge of the «ord of God is the realization
of a special potentiality of knowledge proper to man as such.
If we affirm this statement, then we must acquiesce in xhe ans¬
wer to the question of ability, with which we are here occupied,
being given from an anthropological point of view, where it is a
matter of secondary importance." CD i/l. p.220.
55* Brunner, "Im Merischengeist seibst, im «esen des Menscnen
selbst ist ienea Gottesbewusstsein begrtlndet." Mystik, p.l73« •
Barth, "The modernist view against which we have to fix our limits
goes back to the Renaissance and partial larly to the Renaissance
philosopher Cftrtesius with his proof of God from man's certainty
of himself." CD I/l. p.222.
56. Barth: "He is not at any point limited or determined
by them, but at every point He limits and determines them. He is
tne 'King of kings' as their true Creator and Preserver or as
their righteous Judge. Thus none of them can escape Him, but ail
must serve Him and will definitely serve Him in one way or
another." CD 11/1. p.533.
57. Barth questions: "fthen we have established this limited
and defined condition of ours, have we really said anything about
God? Have we not again said something about ourselves, even if
only negatively? Have we not simply heightened or deepeded the
concept of reality which is distinct from uod, which really tells
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out that this psychological orientation can arise only when we
maxe an arbitrary attempt to force the being of God to corres¬
pond to and conform with the being of man. God may not be re¬
garded simply as the absolute human expression, but the empty
formalism of such reasoning is evident when one recalls a point
made earlier: viz., that no matter what we say about feeling,
knowing, and willing generally, nothing is really declared
about God.^ In such an event we deal, not with God, but basi¬
cally only with ourselves;^ because the idea we think we have
of God, as the object of our most intimate feeling, is out the
idea we have of the world and of man, our own hypostatization
c 2of our triought and reflection arid language. ^ Our reason, feel-
ing, or experience cannot reach God. It is significant to be
reminded here that both Brunner and Barth hold that tnere is no
way to God, but only a way from God to man. That is His aord,
in wnich man must believe; no theory of reflection can be valid
to reach Him. Did Schleiermaeher pick up the wrong end of the
6 5
stick? for he thinks that his Speculative theory of reflection
can produce a kind of knowledge for tne apprehension of the uni¬
verse behind which God somehow stands, brunner demolishes his
theory by 3aying: "Reflection is the essence of the Fichtean 1
us notnlng aoout Godr Por if the finite is in fact limited by
the infinite, the opposite inevitably holds good too." Ibid..
p•466.
53 • -fv-st Ik. p. 3; of. "Jfor ail philosophical systems pre¬
suppose that man is in his inmost nature, one with God." God
and Man, p.10.
^9• God and 'Jan. p • 4 7 •
60. CD 1171. p.338.
61. Ibid., p. 11.
62. Ibid.. p.228.
63. Cushman, Barth*s attack upon Uartesianisa ana the
Future in Theology, The journal of Religion, (XXXVI. no.4. Oct.
1956), p.215.
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and out of this reflection arises all objectivity including the
Knowledge abouth this knowledge, i'ne I is the basis of ail
being.
The Knowledge of God actually means to listen to His «ord
65
not to strive to be united with Him in our soul. * In fact,
Brurmer even attacks Schleiermacher'e earlier thought in his
Speeches which is romantic enough to strive for tne unity with
the Universe: :,Above all, we may point out here tne only too
well known analogy of religious experience to 3exual experience.
Brunner further discusses the characteristics of mysticism when
he says:
It is always the tendency to a certain inner state, but not
always to God. Its goal is always the removal of the limit¬
ation of the I, the self, the soul; it is the removal of
the limitations which delimit the human I from where?
from God, from tne Universe, from tne unconditional or the
absolute, from the unity beyond all antitheses. 67
As Barth says with reference to Schleiermacher1s discovery of
tiie religious reality in man which is generally demonstrable,
and his application of this reality to tne interpretation of
Christianity:
64. "Reflexion is das Wesen des Pichteschen Ich und aus
dieser Reflexion entsteht alle Objektivitdt, samt dem Wissen
ttber dieses tfissen. Das Ich — der Urgrund alles Seins —1st."
■'.fystik. pp.H4f. of. p. 220.
65. cf. Ibid.. p.52.
66. "Vor allem w&re hier die nur allzubekannte Analogie
des reiigidsen rait dem sexuellen Erlebnis zu nennen." Ibid..
p.53.
67. "Sie iat iaimer die xendenz auf eine gewisse innere 2u-
st&ndlichkeit hin, aoer lioht immer auf einen Gott hin. Ihr Ziel
ist iiamer die Entschrflnkung des Ich, des Selbst, der Deele, die
Beseitigung der Grenzen, die das menschliche Ich abgrenzen —wo¬
ven? Von Gott, vom All, vom Unbedingten Oder Abaoluten, von der
Einheit jenseits aller Gegens&tze." Ibid., p.369.
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It is...Schleiermacher who, for tne first time, quite fun¬
damentally connects this newly-discovered and independent
reality of religion with a coresponaing possibility gene¬
rally deraonstrable on anthropological , rounds, and who for
the first time quite fundamentally undertakes to interpret
Christianity itself in the form of a concretely historical
analysis of human existence alone'', the lines of a general
doctrine of man: 1. Man's meeting with God to be regarded
as a human religious experience historically and psycholo¬
gically fixable; and 2. This experience to be regarded as
the realization of e religious potentiality in man generally
demonstrable. 68
As Brunner sees it, the genuine Christian outlook can only be
diluted with the mystical feeling:
This relativism is the dim-light, in which all sharp con¬
trasts disappear, especially those which are the charac¬
teristics of Christian faith. But this knowledge of tne
abolition of all contrasts is grounded in a consciousness
which in itself is not knowievige: in the consciousness of
that absolute unity or identity in 'feeling.' The subjec¬
tive correlation of that absolute point of identity is the
mystical feeling, in which the basic contrast of subject
and object is abolished, therefore in which 'somehow' the
absolute divinity and the I are identical. 69
Brunner is conscious of the fact that one mu3t not follow the
basic ideas of mysticism so that by the inward-look of the soul,
the deepest self and God are united in one, i.e., the higher
self-consciousness identified as God-consciousness where he
says: "God-consciousness is just another name so often substituted
70
for the conception of the 'higher seif-consciousness.'"
68. CD 1/1. p.219.
69. "Dieser Reiativismus ist das Mmmerlicnt, in dem aile
harten Gegens&tze verschwinden, insbeeondere jene, die das Cha-
rakteristische des ohristlichen Glaubena sind. Dieses wi3aen um
die Aufhebung aller Gegensfitze a'oer gr&ndet in einem Bewus3tsein,
das selbst kein Aissen ist: im Bewusstsein jener absoluten Bln-
neit oder Identitat, im 'Geftthl.' Das subjektive .\orr iat jenes
absoluten Identit&tapunktes ist das mystische GefUhl, in dem der
Gru iiigeg nsatz, aer von Objekt una Subjekt, aafgehoben ist, in
clem also 'irgendwie' das absolute Gdttiiche und das Ich icsen-
tisch sind." Mystik, p.329-
172
71
'•./-lain: "Mysticism always deals with the soul, not with Goa."
And still further:
But the dangerous ana corrupting force of mysticism is the
assertion of its possession of God. The desire for God
tempts it to obtain the fellowship with God even deifica¬
tion surreptiousl.y. It knows a secret way to God; it tea¬
ches to go this way. it is always the human soul which is
on the way. From it the movement proceeds as far as there
i3 a movement at all, as far as the unity is not asserted
as already existing. 72
Thus, Schleiermacher is criticized by Brunner and Barth
for seeking a deep and abiding continuity between the human and
the divine via his mystical feeling which tends to break through
trie limits by its immeilateness. There -abject is approximated
to object, and object subject; Creator to creature, and vice
versa. Unceasingly nrunner continues to criticize this religion
of immanence:
It knows of God only so far as it knowa of itself, ttoa con-
frontsit not as a Judge; not as its goal; not as its content
which transcends and disturbs the empirical as the ultimate
reality, ror 'we only have a concept of God in so far as we
are God, i.e., have Him in us.' God does not confront the
religious 3tate as tne other one, but dissolves in it. 73
70. "Gottesoewusstsein ist nur ein anderer same i'dr den so
oft an seine Stelle gesetzten uegriff 'hdneres Belbstbewusst-
sein.'" Ibid.. p.179. cf. pp.186, 275.
71. "Mystix hat es imraer zu tun mit der Seele, aber nicnt
immer mit Gott." Ibid., p.368.
72. "Aber das GefMhriiche und Verderblicne der hystik ist
die Behauptung ihres Gottbesitzes. Die Gottessehnaucht verleitet
dazu, sich die Gottesgemeinachaft, ja die Vergottung zu erschlei
chen...Sie weiss einen neimlichen .»eg zu Gott, sie ieitet an,
inn zu gehen; es ist immer die menschliche Seele, die auf dera
Weg ist, von wo die hewegung ausgeht, sofern tlbernaupt Bewegung
ist, sofern nicht die Einheit als schon seiend benauptet wird."
Ibia.. pp.393f-
73* 'Sie weiss von Gott nur sofern als sie von sich seib3t
weiss; Gott ateht ihr nicht als Richter, nicht ala ihr Siel, als
ihr, das Empirische transzendierender und beunruhigender Inhalt,
als das eigentlich uemeinte gegeniiber. Denn 'wir haben nur inso-
fern einen Begriff von ihtn, als wir Gott sirid, d.n. inn i.i uns
haben.' Gott stent nicht dem religitJ en Zustand als der andere
gegentlber, aondern < eht in ihm auf." Ibid., p. 179.
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And he points out that "the God of this piety is merely a god
of religion, but not the Creator of heaven and earth, not Me
who redeems (peopleJ from the border of hell and death.
Thus Schleierrnacher*; doctrine of religious feeling is
regarded as wholly immanent; it is interiorising (Verinnerli-
chen); it implies no crisis and no transcendence. As Brunner
says;
Thi3 unbroken, non-dialectical positive conception of re¬
ligion or thus, according to Schleiermacher's meaning:
of faith is possible on the ground that religious feel¬
ing as a pure state i3 bare of all self-critical function.
There is no intrusion in it, because tnere is no reaching
out of itself. Religion dees not transcend itself, it does
not mean something else than itself; it means itself alone.
This is religionism, the religion whicn sets itself as its
goal; therefore it gratifies itself alone. 75
In this line of thought, Bartn points out that the transcenden¬
tal object of theology i3 thus transformed into the immanental
sphere of the self-interpretation of man:
In accordance with the increasingly definite demands of
the scientific consciousness since the Renaissance, to
transfer the object of theology from a Beyond which genu¬
inely confronted man's position to the sphere of man Him¬
self. This object need not, but it could be thought of as
embraced and conditioned by toe general truths of man.
So an attempt could be made to regard it or the pos. ibi*-
lity of it as lying within the self-interpretation of man.76
74. "Der Gott diesor Frdmmigkeit ist ein blosser fteligions-
gott, nicht aber der Schdpfer Himmela una der Erde, nioht der,
der erldst aus den nanden der HOlle und aes Toaes." Ibid..p.165.
75« "Diese angebrochen, undialektisch positive Auffassung
der Religion — oder also, nach Schleiermachers Meinungs des
Glaubens — ist dadurch mdglich, dass das religidse Gefdhl als
relne ZustSndlichkeit jeder selbstkritischen runktion bar ist.
res ist keine Beunruhigung in ihr, weil K.ein ftber sich Hinaus-
greifen. Religion trenszendiert sich nicht selbst, sie meint
nicht etwas Anderes als sicn; sie meint sich selbst. Das ist der
Religionismus, die Religion, die sich seibst ais ihr Ziei aetzt,
die sich darura selbst genieaot." Ibiu., pp.l78f.
76. CD 1/1. p.219.
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faith in the Word of God is totally different, it relies
on or points to something outside of a natural man, like an ar¬
row shot out in a direction. Brunner says:
...in it only! God Himself speaxs His Word which is identi¬
cal with the word of the Scripture, its £.faith's^ essence
is just this, that it points to something which is not it¬
self. Therefore, above all, it is the crisis of all reli¬
gion, the non-self-sufficiency of religion, the opposition
to religionism which identifies redemption with religion.77
He explains that our relationship to God is grounded in the di¬
vine Word which is a mystery to us.
for the God who speaks to me, is He who himself to me is an
unknown, absolute mystery. He is the Creator, over whose
thought I would have nothing to say from my viewpoint. That
the relationship to God is grounded in the divine word
means that we men are not God, we know Him not out of our¬
selves, and are even according to our deepest nature not
continuous with God. The word of God means that there is no
way from us to God, but only from God to us. 78
Therefore, to speak of the Knowledge of God in this manner is ac¬
tually to admit that between God and man there is an impassable
gulf, a definite non-transgre«sable limit. Brunner writes that
"the knowledge of God as communication from God is wnat charac¬
terizes man as finite creature. Only in that he is dependent
77. "...in inm allein! — Gott selbst sein Wort redet, das
identisoh ist mit dem Wort der Bchrift. Sein Wesen ist eben dies,
dass er auf etwas zielt, was er selbst nicnt ist. Sr ist darum
vor allem auch die Krisis aller Religion, das Hicht-sich-seibst-
Gentlgen der Religion, der Gegensatz zum ReLigionismus, der Brld-
sung mit Religion identif iziert." iViystik, p. 132.
78. "Dean der Gott, der mich anspricht, ist der, der mir
selbst unbekannt, s chlechterdings Geheimnis ist. bis ist der
Schdpfer, tlber dessen Geaaaken ich von mir aus nichts zu sagen
habe. Dass das GottesverhMltnis auf gdttliches Wort begrflndet
ist, heisst, dass wir Menschen nicnt Gott sind, aus uns Gott
nicht kennen una auch nach unserem tiefsten wesen nicht *mit
Gott kontinuierlioh* sind. Es gibt — das bedeutet Wort Gottes
— keinen ..eg von uns aus zu Gott, sondern nur von Gott aus zu
uns." Ibid. , p. 598; cf. hilosophie una Of fen bi. rung, p.12.
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upon hearing; he becomes aware of the border-line between him-
70
self and the Creator, he acknowledges his 'not-being God'."
This means that man must not be too confident of his own reli¬
gious instinct lest he merely interiorizes his empty, object¬
less theoretical knowledge of God.
it is obviously seen that Brunner here simply takes the
opposite position of Schleierraacner's that he must renounce the
self- ufficiency of his self-consciousness and only rely on the
word of God as coming from the outside, not from the inside of
the soul, the immeaiateness of the static feeling. As arun-
ner says:
But the ».ord, the meaning which is given and communicated
to man, the meaning wnich comes to him from outside, not
from inside, from the incidental happening, not the con¬
tinuous being, which really comes to him, not from him,
the word as claim and revelation pulis him out of his il¬
lusions about God and his loneliness of thought. 80
Thus, faith in the ford of God actually means that in spite of
the miserable situation of our rejected existence, the absolute
Q"|
separation between God and us, against ail experience, there
stands our faith against all results of illusions, God can
op
only be believed. ' On the other hand, one can see that Brunner
has al30 pointed out that "man in the depth of his 3oul is not
good, not divine, and above all not God. i've know this only
79. "Wissen von uott als Mitteilung von Gott aus: das cha-
rakterisiert den Menschen als endliches Geschttpf. Brat dadurch,
dass er auf das Hdren angewiesen ist, erkennt er die urenze zwia-
chen sich und dem Schflpfer, anerkennt er sein Nichtgottsein."
Mystik. p.95.
80. Das ..ort aber, der dem Menschen mitgeteilte, gegebene
Sinn, der Sinn, der ihm von aussen, nicht von innen, aus dem Zu.-
f&llig-Geschehenden, nicht aus dem Ewig-Seienden zukommt, der
wirklich auf ihn zukommt, nicht aus ihm herauskommt, das wort
als Anspruch und Offenbarung reisst ihn heraus aus seineaa Gott-
Wahn und aus seiner uenkeinsamkeit. Ibid., p.9b.
81. cf. CD 1/1. p.227.
82. cf. Mystik, pp.ldBf.
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through the revelation of God in His «ord, only througa Jesus
Christ."85
Therefore, the mystic is wrong because he tries to deli¬
mit all by the removal of all limitations and think out a way
in which the human can reach to the divine or cause the divine
to be united with our soul. In doing so, he is seeking an un¬
broken continuity or an eternal principle as his theory of ap¬
proximation. On the contrary, according to Brunner: the Word
of God is unfathomable and irrational in this aspect. Human
reason alone cannot understand Him. He cannot oe cleverly con¬
ceived or analysed into tnought; He cannot be vaguely integrated
into human consciousness. Therefore, our religious experience
cannot identify its co-existence with Him. What Brunner describes
as our "self-directed effort of toougnt and interiorization"
cannot make Him become a part of us through tne divination of our
immediate feeling. Brunner defends tne absoluteness of the seif-
differentiation and self-authentication of God as but evidence
of His unconditional claim to lordship over all of human life,
and of His will and its absolute exclusion of any tendencies
which would tend in any manner to usurp His sovereignty, i'he Bi¬
blical term for the divine self-affirmation is "the holiness of
God."85
Consequently, Schleiermacher*s imagination is but an illu¬
sion; his feeling can only derive ideas of God, not God. Brunner
says that "the God whom we should find in the leptns of our soul
or mind, would not be Himself... because the thought of God is
reached...from the human Ego." ' Barth pays little attention to
83. ass der Menech auch im tiefsten Grund seiner deele
nicht gut, nicht gdttlich, una vor allem nicht Gott 1st: das
wissen wir nur lurch die Qffenbarung Gottes in seinem Wort, nur
lurch Jesus Chri tus." Ibid.. p.397.
34. The mediator, p.212.
85. Ibid., p.460.
86. xhe fiord and the florid, pp.29f; of. The v. ed la tor, p. 268.
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Brunner's criticism of ochleiermacher as a mystic, but he agrees
with him that this kind of illusory conception means eventually
depending on nothing, but hanging in the air; it cannot even be
true to our own natural or general knowledge and the human hon-
onr
esty of our being is thus also denied.
Brunner and Barth correct this point of illusory contin¬
uity by pointing out that the true spiritual relationship of man
and God is this: "Our * I* is grounded in the divine address, it
OQ
is an answer to this calling."' McGonnachie explains that, ac¬
cording to Barth, God's original stance in re His creation is a
personal stance best expressed by the term "word." That is, by
this God reveals His personal nature, always in the address of
a Thou to an I (these being the two cnief spiritual realities in
life) which, in turn, is understood only in relation to the Thou,
in the final analysis, man's spiritual relation to God is the re-
lation of the true Thou to the true I. Does Schleiermacher pay
attention to this calling of the Word? No! According to Brunner:
"Not only where he escapes from the Word but also where he uses
it, it appears that the Word is strange and unknown to him. The
Word which is one and tne all of faith, without which he falls
into nothing like the mountainer whose rope, on which he hangs
90
over the precipice, breaks." Is this situation described
here not true to Schleierm&cher's interpretation of one's reli¬
gious consciousness? According to JBrunner and Barth, conscious¬
ness is but immanent and subjectivistic: it is tne outcome of
87. UD 11/1. pp.71f.
88. 'Unser Ich ist gegrttndet im gdttlichen Du-sagen, es
ist Ant-wort auf i.iese "Berufung." kystik, p.97.
89- Reformation Issues To-day, Reformation Old and New,
p.109. ~ ~
90. "Nicht nur da, wo er das Wort flieht, sondern auch da,
wo er es braucht, erweist es sich, dass ihm das Wort fremd und
unbekannt ist, das des lilaubens Bin und Alles ist, ohne das er
ins Nichts stttrzt wie der Bergsteiger, dera das Seil zerreisst,
an dem er tiber dem Abgrund h&ngt." Mystik, p.119.
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the 'I.* Subjectivization of one's consciousness i.e., the
contemplation of the soul mean3 that one eventually wiii get
nowhere. Brunner says that "the localization of religion and
Q1
revelation in feeling means its complete subjectivization."
Barth holds also that one's feeling of dependence cannot pre-
92
suppose a knowledge of the Absolute.
Therefore, concerning Schleierrnacher' s propositions of
faith, .Brunner says: "Rightly understood in Schleiermacner'a
sense, tney have no content of knowledge at all. They do not
mean what they say. They say 'the attributes of God,' but they
93
mean 'human states.'" In Schleiermacher's thinking, all hu¬
manly distinguishable attributes of the God whose being receives
exhaustive definition in the concept of causality denote, not
something distinctive in God Himself, but rather something dis¬
tinctive about the manner in which we relate to Him our pure
feeling of dependence at various points along the road of our
94
religious self-consciousness. The difficulty involved Here,
91. "Die uokalisierung der Religion und Offenbarung im Ge-
fiihl bedeutet ihre viJlligste Subjektivierung." Ibid., p.174.
92. KD III/3. p.132.
93. "Sie haben, recht, d.h. im Sinn Schleiermacners ver-
standen, auch gar keinen Erkenntnisiahalt. Sie meinen nicht
was sie sagen. Sie sagen 'Gottes Eigen;chaften', aber sie meinen
•rnenschliche Zustande.'" M.vstik, p. 117.
94. cf. Christian Faith, s30; CD lx/1. p.327; ef. "<»e have
seen how Schleiermacher tried to interpret the attributes of
God as an objectir'ication of the individual aspects of the re¬
ligious seif-consciousness. According to him there results from
this consciousness itself (apart from the antithesis of sin and
grace) God's eternity, omnipresence, omnipotence, and omni¬
science. from the religious consciousness in antithesis (i.e.
the consciousness of sin) there results God's holiness and jus¬
tice. And from the religious consciousness of a resolution of
this disharmony (the consciousness of grace) there results God's
love and wisdom." Ibid., p.338.
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according to McConnachie' s explanation of the modernist view,
is that it pictures eacn man as being in touch with God at the
centre of his own personality, and therefore as being able to
pass from the known (experience) to the unKnown (God) ana find
peace by his own effort in the context of his own religious
9b
experience. ^ Thus, according to this kind of interpretation,
God becomes the object of speculation or human sentiment. As
Brunner says: "God becomes integrated into human thought; He
becomes part of a great whole, subordinate to a higher authority
96
the caricature of God." And he point3 out that the result
is completely different from the Biblical and tne Reformers*
witness , "...omniscience, which is, e.g., decisive for the
personal concept of God is ailuted to a concept of absolute ani-
97
mation of the divine omnipotence."
QA
In this situation, man only contemplates;^ he is alone,
there is no personal relationship with God for his language and
99
tnought does not participate in a dialogue, but appears as a
soliloquy which is really Schleiermacher's theology.Similarly
Earth writes: "Modernist thought hears man answer without any
101
one having called him. It hears him talk to himself." God in¬
terpreted in this sense, is no living Lord; nor is there any
95. Reformation Issues To-day, Reformation Old and New,
p.107.
96. "Gott wird dera menschlichen Denken eingeordnet, er
wird sum Teil eines grdsseren Ganzen, zura untergebenen einer
ntJheren Autorit&t — zum Spottbild Gottes." .Vlystik, p.102.
97. "...die Allwis3enschaft z.B., die Mr den persdnli-
chen Gottesbegriff entscneidend ist, zum Begriff der *absoluten
Lebendigkeit aer gdttlichen Allmacht' verddnnt wird." ibid..
p.553.
98. Barth: "It is the quiet religious possession. It is
the contemplation of the universe and the creative power of tne
individual feeling which gropes after it in its nameless and
formless and unrealised oneness." CD 1/1. p.524.
99. Mystik, p.211.
100. Ibid.", p.598.
101. CD 1/1. p.68.
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communication or personal fellowship between uod and man. Theol¬
ogy* when elaborated in this manner, will not provide any basis
for txhe iVord of God of revelation, and is therefore but a des¬
cription of the contemplation of a lonely soul. Brunner depicts
the situation for us: "Its wings are cut; the bow which snoots
the arrow of desire to another shore is broken, the man is re-
102
ferred to himself, to his own self-consciousness." Barth
corrects this view when he says that man is not left all by his
loneliness (as mystical theology would ultimately have us be¬
lieve), but ratiner stands before God and God before him in the
miracle of faith and revelation; and man then may know God and
conceive of Him even in all His inconceivability
Therefore, the divine command is never taken seriously,
for Schleiermacher's God never speaics to or condemns anybody.
The First Commandment means nothing to him: "There is no First
Commandmexit for Schleiermacher and there can never be, if there
were, his whole system the philosophical as well as the theolo¬
gical would collapse (Brunner).Barth comments at this
point with a conclusive and definitive statement:
Schleiermacher speaks forcefully of God when he describes
Him as the source of the absolute dependence of our cons¬
ciousness, and therefore not only the ground of all reli¬
gion, but at tiie same time and as such the ulterior ground
of our whole self-consciousness, the mysterious centre of
our intelligent and active existence. Schleiermacher more
plainly perhaps than any of his spiritual confreres knows
how superfluous is a particular concept of God to describe
102. "Die Flilgel sind ihr beschnitten, der Bogen, der den
Ffeil der Sehnsucht nach dem anderen Ufer schiesst, ist zerbro
chen, der Mensch ist auf sich selbst, auf sein h'igenes, sein
Selbst-bewusatoein gewiesen." lystix, p.179.
103. CD 11/1. p.197.
104. 'Gibt es fiir Schleiermacher xein erstes Gebot, kann
es, darf es iceines geben, wenn nicht sein ganzes System, das
phiiosophische wie das theologische, zusammenstdrzen soil."
> ysti k, pp.lb3f; cf. p.137.
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the moving power of spirit and nature, and above all of
man as such. In fact, Schleiermacher takes so little ac¬
count of a force moving us from outside, ana above all
self-moved, that he purposed to give his system a final
form in which it would be a clear presentation of the
self-motivated Christian-religious self-consciousness as
such: an undertaking which in view of the instruction
it would have give us we can only say unfortunately
his death prevented from further prosecution. 10b
2• The Creator-Lord of nature vs. the speculative illusion
of continuity.
Schleiermacher, as an unsound rationalist, wishes to fill
in his empty concept of God; he has to speculate on the world
with some general contents of nature. Since the concept of God,
according to the result of his method of reflection, consequent¬
ly is but an empty proposition of the vague Infinite, he must
now direct his attention to the world-whole and apply a Kind of
1 Of*
"semi-pantheistic philosophy" to modify his conception of a
de-personalized uod as if God exists with the framework of the
orders of nature and as if tnere is an organic connection in
the relationship between God ana the world-wiiole. Thus, God is
107
necessarily dependent on the world as it is on Him. But we
see that Brunner demolishes his speculative illusion by saying
105. CO II/1. p.270.
106. Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology, p.41.
107. Brunnert "Since this consciousness fGod-consciousness3
is no longer a moment of man's return and answer to God's ap¬
proach, this original relation to God, having lost its connex-
tion with selfhood, becomes an impersonal unspiritual passive
impression of uod, a givenness of God in feeling; in a word, a
mystical feeling in which man seeks identification with God and
the world." God and Man, p. 170; Iwand: "Gott und *velt nicht zu
trennen und die Ethik zu erldsen aus der Beziehungslosigkeit,
in die sie <furoh jede Trennung von yatdrlichem und Geistigem ge-
raten muse." Schleiermacher als ..tniker, Evangelische Theolo, ie,
11. Jahrgang, Heft 2. August 1951. p.50.
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that "we don't know Him througn the world, but we *cnow dim as
108
the One who comes into the world." Barth fundamentally holds
the same position: "His (God's) relation to the world cannot on
any account be understood and interpreted as a combination, amul-
100
gamation or identification of God with the world."
in this line of thought, it is significant to point out
that the purpose of dchleierinacher' s deification of nature is
actually to bring God down to the level of nature. That is why
his doctrine of creation, being pressed along this line, id un¬
christian. Because his doctrine of creation and preservation
110
is thus mixed, God, the Creator, and His creation are inter¬
preted in no Christian sense. Brunner says: "that the author
of the Glaubenslehre does not teach creation in the Christian
sense of the word is clear to anyone, as soon as he has read the
statement *all that God knows exists* and as soon as he under¬
stands the argument of sb4,2,where it is written that no distinc¬
tion may be drawn between the actuai and the possible in God."1"^
On the other hand, Brunner assures us tnat the God of Christian
faitn is the Giving God who, having created the natural order,
is assuredly its Lord, ana not the God postulated by Schleier-
macher as One whose actions are identical with natural processes
112
and phenomena. This Creator-Lord disposes freely o£ the
creature, who therefore most assureuiy does not bind Him. God
108. The Theology ot* crisis, p. 32.
109. CD Il/l. p.446.
110. 'ystiK, p.340.
111. 'Bass der Verfasser der Glaubenslehre Keine Schdpfung im
christlichen Binne lehrt, ist senon dem kiar, aer nur erst aen
Satz gelesen hat 'alies ist, was Gott weiss' una die Abhandlung
des sb4,2 versteht, wo es heisst, lass zwischen 'irklichem una
.vGglichem in Gott nicht oilrfe unterschieaea werden. " »',ystiK.,
p.339.
112• The Christian Doctrine of Ore-:tion and Kedemptian,
Dogmatics, II, p.188.
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may consider or disregard, preserve or terminate the course of
the nature which he has brought into being, entirely as He wills.
1'he Bible, in teaching the divine freedom of God from natural
processes, stresses the non-identity of the divine will with the
causality of nature, and thus reinforces His sovereignty as ab-
113
solute Lord ana Living God.
Barth, quite similarly affirms, at this point, that uod
is the absolutely free Lord. He first asks: "As the living God
as distinct from all the godheads of philosophies end reii-
<< *'*" "J "J i
gions is He not free and able to justify Himself?" Of
course such a divine freedom cannot be conditionally confined
or even adequately defined. God is infinite, exalted, absolute,
active, impassable yes, all this; He is transcendent Lord.
But He is also One who loves freely in His own freedom, and who
cannot possibly be discribed as His own prisoner. Yet He also
embraces the opposites of all these concepts even while free
from them. This world which he has created is a reality entire¬
ly distinct from Himself, yet affirmed as His world because
willed by Him. He may be, and is, God in both a relative and
an absolute way, in both a humble and an exalted fashion; acti¬
vely yet passively, transcendently yet immanently; and of course,
115
ultimately, divine yet also human.
Barth feels that Schleiermacher understands too little of
all this in his one-sided approach to God's true majesty and free
will. It is true that the sin of mankind affecte and offends God
by its very absurdity; but Schleiermacher does not see that God
does all this in and because of His high majesty as Creator and
Lord (even though he rightfully affirms that we cannot encroach
upon Him) even throughout all of His merciful dealings toward us.
113. The Christian Hoc trine of God, ooginatics, 1. p. 250; cr.
Dogmatics, II. p.161.
114. CD IV/1. p.567.
115* Ibid., p.187; cf. pp.214f.
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''He dose not will to be God, high and majestic, without us who
1 1
have fallen victim to it." The crux of distinction here
lies in the realization that God's omnipotence is that of a
truly free love which, as such, cannot be equated v»ith any sys¬
tem or order of His works, and which is not to be abstracted in
such fasnion if we are seriously and credibly to understand
those divine works in all clarity as the manifestations, not
117
merely of God's activity, but of God Himself.
The core of Earth's criticism of Schleiermacher in this
respect is: "God is His own prisoner because the identity of His
attributes is understood only as something single (in Schleier-t
macher as the source of the utter sense of dependence, itself
lift
without utterance or act)." Thus, Earth's criticism of him
is for his imprisonment of God within His own attributes. In
this respect, LtJffler compares Schleiermacher with Bultmann:
Bultaann. has said often enough that lie did not mean to dis¬
solve this significance of the activity of God. The ques¬
tion is only whether he can escape this consequence, if he
took over an epistemological proposition which excludes all
objective activity of God outside my existence. The epis¬
temological proposition which proceeds from a separation
between objective and non-oojective being which we have met
in Schleierraacher as well as in Bultmann, does not originate
only from Schleiermacher. It is the basic proposition of
idealism as such whlcn could be traced back to kant. 119
To criticize Schleiermacher's idea of God, one must not
116. ibici.., p.411*
117. CD H/l. p.531.
113. Ibid., p.550.
119* "Cass Bultmann aieae Bedeutung aea Handelus Gottes
nicht auflOeen wollte, hat er selbst oft genug gesagt. Die Frage
ist nur, ob er dieser konsequenz entgenen karm, wean er einen er-
kenntniatheoretischen Ansatz ttbernimmt, der axle3 gegenspiindliche
Hnadeln Gottes ausserhalb raelner Bxistenz ausschliesst. Der er-
kenntnistheoretische Ansatz, den wie bei Schleiermacher wie bei
Bultmann angetroffen naben, der von einer Trennung zwischen ge-
genstSndlicnera und nicht-gegenstHndlichem Sein ausgeht, stammt
nicht erst von Schleiermacher. •r ist dbernaupt der iiealistische
13 b
go too for from this point. One must be reminded that Schleier-
macher, too, admits the impossibility of adequately describing
the divine in human terms. Consequently, ochleiermacher*s at¬
tention is centralized on man. As LtJffler puts i.t: "All com¬
prehension of God outside the self-consciousness is only sym¬
bolically possible, indeed, but as the reflection of self-cons-
120
ciousness"; and Barth adds: "It was at least understandable
that Schleierraacher preferred simple silence about the concept
121
of the personality of God." Barth virtually recognizes his
interest in man could be used as one of the starting points in
elaboration of a theology when he says: "This shifting of in¬
terest does not necessarily mean: man without God, man in his
own world; it could also mean: man in the presence of God, his
act over against God's act. It is legitimate for theology to
122
bulla up from that point."
jut the decisive point in the argument is that 'chieier-
maoher neglects the fact that this God is a living and personal
1 ,03
God, the Creator-Lord who is alive and active.' " as Brunner
says in opposition to him: "The Christian faith is anti-mystical,
because it takes seriously the knowledge that God i a personal
will. He i. th< will of trie absolute, tne unconuitionaiiy free,
the sovereign Creator and Lord.He also denies Schleiorma-
cher's assertion that the v.orld is in correlation to God, like
Grundansatz und geht auf Kant zurflck." Selbstbavmsstseln and
Selbstverst&ndnis als theologische rinzipierx bei Bchleiermacher
u..od Bultmann, llerygna. and Uo^.na, (Zeitscdrift fflr tneologisohe
Forschung und kirchliche Lehre). 2 dahmm?, Heft 4, Oct, 1956),
p."513.
120. "Alies Erfassen Gottes ausserhalb Jos Selbatbewusat-
sein ist nur symbolisch mdglich, und zwar als Reflection des
Selbstbewusstseina. " Ibid., p.307.
121. CD I/i. p.411.
122. "Diese Verschiebung des Interesses brauchte nicht not-
wendig zu bedeuten: der -1en sen ohne Gott, der Mensch in seiner
eigenen belt, s konnte auch bedeuten: der '.enseh iua Angesiehte
Gottes, sein Tun dem Tun Gottes gegenttber. bchte, recnte Theoio-
gie konnte von aa aua aufgebaut werden." Die Protestantiache
Theologie, p.411.
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some terrestrial Left to God'a celestial Rignt. Rather, the Goa-
world relationship is one-sided, in that the world derives from
126
God its Source,and is determined by Him, not vice versa. "The
world does not exist as Hia alter ego, as His eternal double, as
the necessary correlation, the other si^e of God. It exists oe-
cause God wills it; it is His creature. Therefore, there is no
continuity between God and the world; for it is being-composed,
1 P&
and He is the composer."' Barth also affirms the divine lord¬
ship over nature which means that uod Himself or His omnipotence,
cannot be iaentified with nature or natural processes. God and
His omnipotence are not to be equated witn the powers that have
been created, or with their sum and substance, as is perhaps the
usual course when we think of human and worldly events. All
such forces are servants and subjects o; the Divine Will; God
it Lord over ail events no matter how we might interpret other-
God's sovereignty is high above; absolute freedom belongs
to Him and to Him only. So far as uod Himself is concerned, he
123. Torrance: "what is important is not what man thinks
about uod but what God thinks about him! Karl Barth, 'l'ne Exposi¬
tory Times. LXVI. Oct.1934—Sept.1953* p.207.
124. "Her christliche Glaube ist antimystisch, well er mit
der Erkenntnis "rnst macht, dass Gott Personwiile ist. Er ist
der absolute, der unbedingt freie, souver&ne Schdpfer- und Herr-
enwille." Mystik, p.384.
123. The Christian Doctrine of God, Dogmatics, i. p.223.
of. Mystlk. p.339.
126. "Die welt existiert nicht ala sein alter ego, als
sein ewiger Doppelghnger, als da3 notwendige Korrelat, die an-
dere Seite Gottes. Sie existiert, weil und wie uott sie will;
sie ist seine Kreatur. Darum gibt es keine Kontlnuitdt zwischen
Gott und Welt; denn sie ist gesetzt, and er ist der Oetzer."
■Ivstik, p.384. cf. 'God is absolutely free will, free in such a
way that the world, His creation, is at every moment conditioned
by His will. Its being is like that of - soap bubole which exists
only because and as long as it is blown by the blower." Chris¬
tianity and Civilization, I. p.19.
127. CD Il/l. pp.339f.
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is quite independent ox the world, tne fact is tnat He is wholly
self-sufficient and in no way He is conditioned by the world.
God, from eternity to eternity, is 'tne Subject, the Person, who
establishes Himself and is founded on Himself(Barth). ' He Him-
~L
self is master of Hi- own existence and essence. The Creator
is the incomparable One who stands beyond tne comparison with
His creature.
It is true that, in tne second edition of his fLystix,
Brunner re-evaluates ochleiermacher to a certain extent and ad¬
mits that his pantheistic tendency is not a deification of the
129
creature. He also takes into consiaeration that -chleierma-
cher asserts: "...in his exposition of Christian faith, (that
it is assumed) not to have any philosophical presuppositions at
all. His dogmatics is not based on speculation, but tne obser-
130
vation of the real Christian life of faith." Yet, when more
closely examined, Brunner remarks:
The thought of a system which secretly determines every¬
thing obtrudes itself forcefully, and chleiermacher's own
protests against the assertion that his Glau benslehre is
dependent upon a philo opnical system are all the less able
to remove this suspicion as they are confronted by complete¬
ly different statements about the relation of theology ana
philosophy. This suspicion becomes certainty if it can be
proved in the opposite, synthetical way, how the whole
theory of chleiermacher according to structure, content
and method is determined by such a system, indeed is nothing
but a system of philosophy of religion in christian ais-
guise. 131
128. The knowledge of uod and the -ervice of God, p.31.
129* "Das Charaxterietische Mr den •Grundgedanken' ist in
der Tat nicht die Vergottung der Kreatur, sondern: uie ainheit
fiber den Gegens&tzen, Oder die gegensatzlos Einneit, die *In-
aifferenz* van Natur and Geist, Idealem und Healem in Jenem ua-
erkennbaren X, das aier Gott hei&st." Mystix, p.328.
130. "...in seiner Darsteliung aea chrlstiichen Glaubeus
gar keine philosopnischen Voraussetzungea zu naben. Micht Specu¬
lation, sondern die Beobachtung wirklichen christlichen Giaubens-
lebens liege seiner Oogmatik zugrunde." Ibid., p.324.
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Obviously, the nature of God as Creator is sharply de¬
marcated from the nature of His creatures, witrtout any transi-
152
tion's taking place from one to the other. However, even
after revising some of his criticism, Brunner still regards
Schleiermacher* s idea of God as obscure: "The feeling as the
point of indifference between Knowledge of will, is the subjec¬
tive correlation of the objective point of indifference; it cor¬
responds to the point of unity over the antitheses of the world,
13*5
that unknowable X which is called, God."
fohleiermacher cannot escape Brunner's criticism of his
knowledge of God, which not is only impersonal and non-Biblical
but actually also romantic and mystical, reflecting the vagaries
of his own soul and his own speculative imagination. He imper¬
sonally regards God as the "Ground" of the world and the soul
alike, the "All" of the mystic. It is no coincidence that mys¬
ticism and idealism habitually express their God-concepts in neu¬
tral terms. The living uod is not this type of a God, but tne
One who names His own name and wno alone reveals Himself as Crea¬
tor God, who alone stands over against humanity and the world.
131. "Der Gedanke eines heimlich aiies bestimmenaen Systems
drfingt sich also zwingend auf, und die elgenen Verwahrungen
Schleiermachers gegen die Behauptung, seine Glaubenslehre sei
von einern philosophischen System abhfingig, kdnnen diesen Verdacht
um so weniger beseitigen, ais ihnen ganz andere Aeusserungen ttber
den Zusammenhang von Theologie und Philosophie gegentlberstehen.
Der Verdacht wird aber zur Gewissheit, wenn auf dem umgekehrten,
synthetischen n'ege nachgewiesen werden kann, wie die ganze iheo-
rie Schleiermachers nach Aufbau, Inhalt und Methode durch eln
solches System bedingt, ja sogar nichts anderes ais ein christ-
lich verkleidetes religionsphilosophisches System ist." Ibid.,
p.325.
132. The Christian Doctrine of God, Dogmatics, I. p.159-
133. 'Das GeCUnl, ais Indifferenzpunkt zwischen Erkennen und
Wollen, ist das subjektive Korrelat des objektiven Indifferenz-
punktes; es entspricht dem Binheitspunkt tiber den «eitgegensStzen,
jenem unerkennbaren X, das 'Gott' heisst." Myetik, p.173.
134. The Mediator, p.269.
Id9
Thus, all subjective ideas of imagination or speculative
description of nature have no corresponding reality in God.
Nor must we confuse Creator and creature, as (e.g.,) when we
ascribe to Goa our created nature. God's thoughts and Spirit
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ere not ours (Isa.55:8f. ). Therefore, God cannot be concei¬
ved in this v/ay as on the same level with man or nature, or
even as the passive object of our thought. God is not a neu¬
tral object, likie the substance of a chemical experiment or the
scientist's dissection table. He does not manifest Himself as
an object would. He is person: that is, He is a Spirit who com-
136
raunicates Himself to man with a word of address. This is
simply "because He as the Lord, is precisely the absolute Sub-
137
ject, unconditioned Person." In this connection, Barth ex-
1 plains that it was only natural for Schleiermacher to consider
it impossible to impute to God a state of feeling particularly
excited by suffering, and giving rise subsequently to efforts
to assist others in their woes. Thus, Schieiermacher tried to
divorce the idea of divine mercy from its tpxe dogmatic context
and transfer it to one of homiletics and poetry tcf. Per chris-
tliche Glaube. s85)« »here is the heart of compassion in the
source of a feeling of absolute dependence? But the personal
God of Christian faith has a heart to feel and be affected, an
assertion which in no way contradicts or belies His immovability
by outside, extraneous powers. Bather, God is stirred and moved,
135. CP II/l. p.266.
136. God and Man, p.114.
137. Hevelation and Reason, p.24; cf. Christianity and Civi¬
lization. I. p. 39* Also: Whitehouse, "In an unconditioned act of
Fatherly Lordship, God established the act of the creature pre¬
cisely as the act of the creature. If we try to say something
about how this happens, and worx with the analogy of inter-crea-
turely acts, we fall away into a 'mechanistic', picture, or else
we begin to talk of 'emanations* or 'infusions' of the divine
being." Providence (An Account of Kari Barth's Doctrine), cot-
tish Journal of Theology, IV. 3. Sept.1951. p.249.
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not in poweriessness as are human, beings, but in His own free
power and His own innermost being.
Certainly both Brunner and Barth would invite Schleier-
maoher to renounce his method of reflection which merely sub-
jectivizes his own illusion. It must be remembered here that
we are fallen and sinful, miserable creatures; in this hopeless
159
situation only God's mercy is able to come to rescue us. God
is the Creator-Lord, His authority ov r the world cannot be
known through the created world even though all the true reali¬
ties of it are based on "God's omnipotence as the only true pos¬
sibility." Barth points out how our Christian knowledge of God
states that God alone has all real power. Some would limit such
a statement to all the real power tnat man encounters, but this
is a blind deification of nature or history or fate wnich leads
ultimately to an equally blind deification of man himself, ?>e
must reject such thinking on the grounds that even though God's
true reality is based upon His omnipotence, we cannot in any a
priori fashion determine exactly what that true reality ia.^^
Brunner indicates that the view that God may be known from the
world He has created, is itself a pagan view of divine-human
continuity and a denial of xhe real, personal, and living Crea¬
tor God."^"*" Schleiermacher is criticized for thus depresonali-
zing the living God in terms of the reality of this worldt
God, the Lord, who stands in sovereignty over the world
which He created out of nothing, .-hose will is never ex¬
hausted in the reality of the world, but who remains
133. CD II/1. p.370.
139. Torrance: "Like tie sheep overwhelmed in the snowdrift
trying to keep itself alive by feeding upon its own wool, modern
philosophy and theology suffered from a cancerous subjectivism.
Religious man was trying to keep himself alive by feeding upon
his own ideas, .vhat ho needed above ail was to breax through to
concrete relations with the living God." Karl Barth, The dxposi
tory Times, LXVI. Oct.1954— ept.1955. p.206.
'140.' CD II/l. p. 531.
141. The M e d iator, p. 2 o; c f. The word and the orId, pp. 29f •
Goo and Man, pp.oOf.
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within Himself mysterious and inexhaustible..., who gives
to tne world participation with Him as much as He pxeases,
but always remains inexhaustible, mysterious, free in His
giving. The living God of the Bible and of the Reformed
faith is unknown in the Glaubenslehre. 142
And he affirms that "Goa is the ground of all knowledge of truth.
All truth that we perceive and discover we perceive and discover
145
by virtue of the light that come from God."
Thus, any kind of negative search for God, or even any
blind deification of nature in which we ourseives are involved
or into which we actually are pressed, Is all in vain.144 Barth's
discussion about the word of God and experience may throw light
on the concept that God is independent of all the determinations
of our religious experience, for he points out that the effort
of man's self-determination could not at all define for hira a
synthesis of the relation between the divine and human. He speaks
of the very one-sided conceptions of religious experience which
can follow from such reasoning, flor would it really be necessary
to rationalize any sort of synthesis on the basis of such reason¬
ing, or on any sort of anthropological grounds. Man's complete
and utter dependence on the divine omnipotence may be established
readily enough without singling out any one facet of it (e.g.,
14b
the will or conscience or feeling). It is similarly pointless
142. "Gott der Herr, der souverSn fiber der von ihm aus nichta
geschaffenen Welt steht, dessen .ville sich nie in der weltwirk-
iichkeit erschdpft, sondern in sich selbst geheimnisvoil-unerschdp-
flich bleibt (Trinit&t), der der Welt Anteil an sich gibt, so viel
er will, aber immer im ueben unerschiJpflich, geheimniavail, frei
bleibt, der lebendige Gott der Bibel und des reformatorischen
Glaubens ist der Glaubenslehre unbekannt." My■tik. pp.34Gf.
143. Revelation and Reason, p.318.
144. iJrunner assures us: "A personal God and a personal faith
are not possible when our Knowledge of Gou is the result of an
interpretation of the world and the Ego. Personal faith and icnow-
le ge of a personal God who is Lord of the world can be gained
only when God reveals Himself personally. The mysterious God,
whom the world neither Knows nor shows, whom 1 uo not know and
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to go off on such anthropological tangents as have been fol¬
lowed in the past.1^
It should be said, in conclusion, that Brunner continu¬
ally and justifiably criticizes ch1e iermao her primarily as a
philosopher. He tends to skip over Schleiermacher the theolo¬
gian when he even occasionally meets him. On the other hand,
Barth from time to time criticises not only the philosophical
but also the seaii-theological Schleiermacher whose theological
interpretation has been demonstrated to be definitely defective.
he have also noted that Brunner's basis for the rejec¬
tion of Schleiermacher's elaboration of a mysterious whole is
the existence of a great distinction between God and man, «ord
147
and world; therefore a Mediator between them is absolutely
necessary.According to Brunner and Barth, "^^the gulf sepa¬
rating God and the natural man is not only deep, but actually
unfathomable and bottomless. It is impossible to speak of the
relation between them in terms of approximation and continuity.
whom the inner man does not reveal, must reveal his mystery to
the world musx tell his own name by 'piercing* into the
world. He must assert Himself over against tne world as a being
who is not-world, not-ego; who reveals his true name, the secret
of his unknown will which is opposed to the world, contrary to
our experience and, above all, to the thoughts and intents of
our own heart." The Theology of Crisis, p.31.
145. CD 1/1. p.230.
146. ibid., p.231; cf. Christianity and Civilization, j.
p. 30.
147. cf. Tne Mediator, p.548.
148. which remotely reflects how this reaction of Brunner
caused him to name his books by such titles as God and ,tan. »vord
and "Qrld, Mediator»
149. Barth, in this aspect, develops his thought most con¬
sistently. arunner appears a little different from Barth in ac¬
cepting a very limited natural theology for convenience'& sake,
for reasoning at the expense of a contradiction of what is here
nis basic and fundamental viewpoint.
CHAiToH VIII
THE DIVIDE REBEL V... A "MOT YET"
Brunner criticizes hchieiermacrier for noicing a superfi¬
cial and optimistic theory of evolution rooted in a monistic
tendency"*" which naturally does not irect him to a serious know¬
ledge of evil. Prom the viewpoint of evolutionism, one should
not lose sight of this proposition that the concept of ein is
always taxen as a "not yet." It is due to his immanent mystical
experience of religion and his idealistic philosophy of history
which prevent his having a realistic approach here. Brunner
begins: "There is no rent in t e life of history as such which
could not be healed by the historical process itself."^ In fact,
he goes even further when he says:
Even death itself is included in this optimistic approach
for the death of tne individual is not able to hinder the
progress of the whole. Even in spite of sin the world is
good, 'as the development of the power of uod-consciousnes3
which is only gradual and imperfect, (according to Scnieier-
aacher, identical with sin), belongs to the conditions of
the stage of existence on which humanity stands.' That this
stage of existence together with the conditions which be¬
long to it could stand in opposition to the idea of the
good creation of God, and therefore become a problem—this
central Christian thought disappears in Bchleiermacher's
optimism of development, just as entirely as the Christian
conception of sin. The idea of a continuous development is
the theodicy of Bchleiermaoher. 3
1. cf. Myatik, p.242; God and '<Ian, pp.63ff.
2• The Mediator, p.138.
3. "Aueh aer Tod ist in diese optimistische Betrachtung
eingeschloasen. Derm der Tod des Einzelnen veraiag nicht den rort-
schritt des Uanzen zu hindern. Ja, trotz der Sttnde ist die ;»eit
gut, 'da die nur ailmMhiiche und unvolikommene Entwickiung der
Kraft des Gottesbewusstseins (nach Echleiermacher identisch mit
StLnde) zu den aedingungen der Exiatenzstufe gehdrt, auf welcher
das menschlicne Geschlecht stent.* Dasa dlese Existenzstufe
saat den zu ihr gehdrenden Bedingungen mit den uedanken der gu-
ten Sohdpfuag Gottes im widerspruch stehen und daruai zurn problem
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therefore, blindness to the fact of sin is the notion upon which
all forma of mysticism and idealism, together with all beliefs
of modern theology, rest. chleiermacher and others who try to
ignore the all-pervading fact of sin (as, e.g., via some imrna-
nentist ae11anachauung) will .meet their Waterloo when tney strike
'the solid rocx of in and guilt."4 B&rth comments thus on tne
situation of being a sinner; "Though he rebels against Him [God},
he cannot escape from Him, though he abandons hitnseif, he is and
remains held by God. Though he becomes blind to God, yet God
5
does not become blind for him." Brunner also explains tnat a
mystic does not realise this situation at all, for he prefers
seeking to abolish the limits of divine and human, the separation
between God and man, by attempting to approximate to one another
or metaphysically identify the differences in the Universe.0 The
knowledge of sin is an expression to intensify the conception of
discontinuity. Brunner says that "the strongest expression to
describe this discontinuity is just sin. Sin is the gulf which
7
separates God and man." It really involves a serious break and
werden kdnnte diese zentrale christliche Gedanxe gent in Schl-
eiermachers Bntwicklungsoptimismus ebenso unter wie her christ¬
liche Sttndenbegriff. hie Idee der stetigen Entwicklung ist die
Theodizee Schleiermachers." ivstik, p.343.
4• The Theology of Crisis, p.17. cf. The Divine Impera¬
tive. p. 75.
5. "Rebelliert er gegen ihm, so kann er ihm doch nicht
entrinnen. Gibt er sicii selbst preis, so ist und bieibt er doch
von Gott gehalten. >< ird er blind ftlr Gott, so wird doch Gott
nic.nt blind ftfr inn." fCD 111/2. p.33.
6. cf. Iwaadt "Unci aucn das wagt Bchleiermaoher, man
ky.nnte fast meinen, u:n der «¥ is sense haft den Spiegel vorzuhaiten,
darait aie nicint vergesse, dass aile ihre GegensStze nur relativ
sind: *Wie im hdchsten Sein Natur Vernunft ist und Vernunft Na-
tur, Idee Brscheinung und Erscheinung Idee und im httchsten .. is-
sen Ethik Phyaik und Physik Ethik, das Speculative zugleich em-
pirisch und das Empirische zugleich speculativ fast ladcnte man
dazwischen rufeu; bei der Auferstehung der Toten, dena so ist
es ja gemeint!" op. cit., pp.54f.
7• The Mediator, p.291.
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signifies that the continuity has been broken.^ Thus we find
that Brunner writes:
'..'ysticism does not know the problem of guilt; the problem
of finitude and imperfection take its place, .there guilt
is, all continuity is abolished, from our viewpoint, the
separation cannot be abolished, for guilt is the broken
fellowship which can be re-established only through a new
beginning from the other side: through reconciliation
which must be tne act of Him to whom I have been indebted.
To speak of God, to see* relationship with Him, bypassing
our guilt means non-seriousness, regardlesenees, indeed,
forgetfulness of God. 9
Why does Schieiermacher not possess a serious conception
of sin? If it were really the case that sin, from the point of
view of reconciliation, is not taken seriously, the writer would
venture to suggest that since the divine element co-exists in
one's immediate feeling, as Schleierm;oner int rprets it, taen,
naturally he will taxe up this non-serious concept of sin, aim-
ply because the reconciliation taxes place in the religious
feeling. Therefore, as a result, man is not only just neutral
as if he were a spectator in that situation as Brunner says witn
reference to an individual:
In the depths of his being he is convinced that he tends
towards good and not towards evil; this being so he finds
it impossible to taXe the whole problem of evil very seri¬
ously, at least so far as he is concerned as an individual,
it is impossible to combine trie consciousness of sin with
the sense of immanence of goodness which characterizes mo¬
ral Idealism and its immanent 1 theories. 10
8. Brunner: "it i; tne breaking of a personal relation¬
ship. Hence tne most appalling thing about sin is tnie: that
t..rough it the original personal relation between the Creator
an, the creature has been distorted. Guilt now lies between man
and God. God can no longer admit man to hie "presence, .dan has
cast away the grace of God. 'Guilt' is tne t*.rm whicn expresses
the broken fellowship." Ibid.. p.147.
9. "Die ystik xennt das Problem ner ochula nicht; an
seine Stelle setzt sie das Problem der Sndlichkeit una Unvoll-
kommenheit. Schuid hebt alie KontinuitSt auf. wo Schuld 1st,
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But he may even aesthetically interpret sin as a possible element
in relation to grace; or evil as a normal proceas in relation to
good in the optimistic view of development.
According to Brunner and Barth, sin means a revolt against
the Creator-Lord; a claim of independence before His sovereign
majesty. Therefore it causes a seperation or discontinuity be¬
tween God and man. Sin la rebellion against God's grace. As
Barth holds that sin as disobedience against the will of God ia
11
the renunciation of God's grace ana its command. A sinner is
in conflict with God aau therefore is defined as a divine rebel.
Even being a sinner, he is God's creature as belonging to God.
and he sins against God arid his sin is opposition to Him. Sin
in this relation to God actually means ungodliness.^
Therefore, Barth criticizes Schleiermacner for his misap¬
prehension of sin:
Sin...in his thought...consists for him merely in the 'in¬
superable lack of potency in God-consciousness' (i.e. the
God-con3ciousness of the natural nian). It ia not understood
as the enmity of man towards God, an enmity to which God's
wrath is the answer and which involves a real and fundamen¬
tal darkening of this natural man before God. According to
Schleiermacher, the communion of man with God established
by creation is not seriously coaipromised by sin. 13
kann von mir aus aie Trennung nicht aafgehoben werden. Schuld
ist die zerbrocnene Gemeinschaft, die nur durch eine neue 3et-
zung von der anderen eite neu begrdndet werden kann: durch Ver-
sdhnung, die die Tat de sea sein muss, an dem ich schuldig ge-
woruen bin. Von Gott reden, nit Gott si.cn in Beziehuag setzen
an der Schuld vorbei, das ist Unernst, Leichtsinn, ja Gottver-
gesseaheit." M.ystik, p. 396; cf. The mediator, p.l31«
10. The Mediator, p.210; cf. "This superficial evaluation
of our human situation is, however, exactly that false optimism
which was the reproach of the past century. To see our reality
from the view-point of 'not-yet' is an optical illusion."
Christianity and Clvilization, 11. p.36.
11. KT> XI1/3. p.350.
12. CD II/l. p.401; p.503; The Divine-Human Encounter,
p.97; -'.an in Revolt, p. 11?; The Mediator, p.444.
13. CD 1/2. p.134.
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according to Barth, tne nature of sin is due to the fact that
when man turns away from the grace of God, ne perverts his own
nature;
Man is called to hold to the grace of tiis Creator, to be
thankful for it, to bow to it and adapt himself to it, to
honour it as the truth. And the essence of sin is that he
does not do this. He denies and despises and hates grace
and breaks its commandment, the law of the covenant, it
is in this opposition that sin takes place, that it has
its place and reality; as man's turning aside from God,
and therefore as the perversion of his own nature; as the
abuse and disturbance and oestruction of the possibilities
of his creaturely being and the radical compromising of
his destiny. 14
Therefore sin, interpreted in this sense, would be really an in¬
explicable concept. Brunner points oat the very irrational
character of this concept;
Sin is something wnich we cannot explain, something which
will not fit into any reasonable scneme at all. for it is
the primal fact of non-reason. Tne more we try to explain
evil, the more we deny its reality, and tne more superfi¬
cial we become. The snore anyone Knows what evil is, the
more inexplicable does it become. 15
Evidently, man does not even have the ability to know this spir¬
itual enigma;"^ because he himself is in an obstinate, unrecon¬
ciled situation which produces a problematical, unresolved dis¬
turbance for himself. According to Barth; "That man is evil,
that he is at odds with God and his neighbour, and therefore
17
with himself, is something which he cannot Know of himself."
14. CD IV/1. p.140; cf. p.523; CD il/l. p.595-
15. The Mediator, p.144.
16. Brunner; "Hence the conception of 'sin' is not a phi¬
losophical, but a religious idea. The philosophical idea is
called 'evil.' But evil is never so bad as sin. For it is not
rebellion, it does not mean the sever' nee of our relation with
our origin, but it simply means opposition to the norm or to
the Idea." Ibid., p.462.
17. CD IV/1. pp.359f.
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i»hen referring to sin, Barth goes on to explain: "Its actuality
is the man who sins, who can recognise and confess but not ex-
1 O
plain and understand himself as such.'' Brunner pr&ctially
holds the same view: "Sin means that I am in wrong relation to
God and that I have torn myself away from an original divinely
19
given possibility." He goes on: "it is an alienation, a dis¬
rupted relation, a having left the Father. The contradiction in
our existence can be recognized only as an impenetrable mys-
20
tery." Barth continues to explain that this is because "men
preoccupied with themselves have no eyes to see this or cate-
21
gories to grasp it."
Thus, one may ask whether a general Knowledge of sin is .
possible? No! According to Brunner ana Earth, the true Knowledge
of sin is a gift of God which is possible only through the reve¬
lation of God in Christ on the Gross there the Reconciler reveals
the seriousness of sin; the re 1 conflict between man and his
Creator. At this point, Barth insists: "v»e maintain the simple
thesis that only when we know desus Chri t do we really know
that man is the man of sin, and what sin is, and what it means
22
for man." Brunner denounces also any way other than this of
knowing our sin:
The christian faith knows absolute guilt. But it knows it,
not mainly because it penetrates even deeper into the hu¬
man heart but because it recognizes in revelation, in that
13. Ibid., p.410.
19• The Theology of Crisis, pp. b4 f.
20. ibid., p.bb; cf. The Divine-Human .encounter, p.97.
21. CD IV/1. p.360; cf. 'He may be aware ox the problema¬
tic nature of his existence as man. But this does not mean even
remotely that he is aware of his being as the man of .sin, at
odds with God and his neighbour and himself. The imperfection
and the problematical nature of nis existence is not as such
sin." hoc, cit.
22. ibid.. p.389; cf. pp.397, 400, 403. KD IiI/2. p.29.
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which God does to man, tand} what He does for man, how
great is the gulf between man and the Creator. It recog¬
nizes the pondus pecoati through the Cross of Christ.23
To open discussion on the theory of relativism which
:chleiermacher used for the apprehension of tne nature of sin,
we note that Brunner deems it too defective a description for
trie Christian interpretation of the nature of sin. Thus, Brun¬
ner thinks at least this narrow tneory must be expanded or its
relativistic character must be transformed into an absolute
character. According to Brunner's criticism of Schleieraiach -r*s
approach, the doctrine of sin or evil is merely relativistic:
from the viewpoint of more or less, weak or strong, incapable
or capable, lower or higher, sensuous or spiritual. "In the
course of development toward speculative Idealism moral common
sense is replaced by the Neoplatonist idea that sin is non-exis¬
tence," says Brunner, "in Schleiermacher, to the fact that the
sense element is stronger than the spiritual forces, or to Weak¬
ness of the consciousness of God, to the fact that tne existence
of the spiritual has 'not-yet* taken place, or that the animal
element 'is stiiL* present." ^ Thus, what is implied in this
viewpoint is that a quantitative abstraction of difference with
a presupposition of continuity lying between their spheres. But
when Brunner traces back the true nature of sin as due to "tne
2b
nature of man as a whole," he affirms that sin cannot be in¬
terpreted superficially in this quantitative sense:
23. "Der chrietliche Glaube Remit die absolute Schuld. iir
kennt sie aber nicht vor allera darum, weil er noch tiefer in des
fenschen Herz hineinschaut, sondern weil er in der Offenbarung,
in dem, was Gott am enscnen, Mr den Menschen tut, ermisst, wie
gross die Kluft zwiachen inm una dem ochdpfer ist. iSr erxennt
das pondus peccati lurch das Kreuz des Christus." Mystix. p.397.
Revelation and Reason, pp.30, 106; The Mediator, p.130;
God and n, p. 151.
24. The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption,
Dogmatics II. pp.llof. of. Mystik, pp.333; 342f.
25- The Mediator, p.141.
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?ian does not only do wrong, lie does not only commit sinful
acts, but he is bad, he is a sinner. A sinner is not a hu¬
man being who has sinned a certain number of times; he is
a human being who sins whatever he is doing, bo iong as
this is not perceived the gravity of sin is ignored, and
the point of view remains superficial. 26
And Brunner, wishing to strengthen the Christian opposition to
the hidden unity in this theory of relativism, expands its very
relativistic view:
Between ail Christian antitheses is that 'great gulf fixed,'
which cuts off a continuous way of 'more and more,' from
the 'leas and less.* Between Creator and creature, sin and
grace, election and rejection, wrath and reconciliation,
there are no continuous passages at all. for having become
existentialiy personal, the antitheses yes and no has been
enlarged here a thousand times. There is no continuity be¬
tween salvation and non-salvation, therefore, there is no
as-well-as, but only either-or. 27
Brunner means that "through the double limits of the crea-
tureliness and sin, all continuity from man to God is made impossi¬
ble. Therefore, there is no such a way, a gradual approximation
which all mysticism would characterize." He explains the origi¬
nal meaning of guilt as the true separation between God and man
26. ibid.. p.142.
27. "Zwisehen alien Christlichen GegensStzen ist jene 'tiefe
Kluft befestigt,' durch die xein stetiger ii'eg ties 'rnehr und mehr,'
des 'weniger und weniger' ftlhrt. Zwisctien SchSpfer und Geschdpf,
Sonde und Gnade, Krwghlung und Verwerfung, Zora und Versdhnung
gibt es keine stetigen Ueberg&nge, ftberhaupt ceine Ueberg&age.
Hler ist tier Oegensatz ja—nein tausendfach gesteigert, weil exis-
tentiell persdnlich geworuen. Zwischen Heil und Unheil i3t kein
kontiauum, also kein Sowohl-als-auch, sondern nur das Sntweder-
oder." -ystik. p.334. cf. p.335* Also: "Entweder ist der Glaube
einzig und allein als die Beziehung zu Gott zu verstehen, d.h.
also so, dass man Gott schlechterdings voraussetzt, ode.r dann
gibt es keinen Glauben." Brl bnit. orKenntnis und Glaube. (Zvveite
und dritte, neubearbeitete Auflage, 'Mbingen: Verlag von J.C.B.
Mohr (Paul iebeck) 1923), p.90.
28. "'Damit ist durch die doppelte Schranke der Kreattfrlicn-
keit und Sttnde jede Kontinuit&t vom Menschen aus zu Gott unmdglich
gemaoht. Es gibt also das nicht, was alle Mystik cnarakterieiert:
einen *v'eg, stufenweise • nn&herung." Mystik. p.3B4.
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and he assures us that it is onl/ the free act of divine grace
which comes to action to restore the broxen relationship:
Guilt, taken seriously, means there is no way. Between you
and God lies tne block which you cannot remove, the swamp
you cannot wade through. Guilt means there is no way from
man to God, no way of interiorizi ig to God, of an ascent
or climbing in one's own depth, but only through the divine
act which happens indeed inconceivably, unexpectedly, 'in¬
cidentally,' unnecess ry, really irrationally free, just
as sin which really happens also inconceivabiy. Therefore,
we cannot but wonder at the reconciliation that proceeded
from God and accomplished by God. 29
In Brunner' criticism of Schleiermacher': doctrine of ori¬
ginal sin, he points out that Schleiermacher'e thought returns
to this self-same theory of relativism when he assumes a neutral
analysis of human nature and divides the "I" into two states:
"flesh" and "spirit" which are alien to each otner^as if it were
a sort of conceivable struggle between two powers in its interes¬
ting drama. Brunner criticizes him for his doctrine of original
sin, which deviates from the language of the bible, and aubstitu-
31
tes for it an idea of evaluation which seems characteristic of
29* "Schuld aber, ernst genommen, heisst: es gibt diesen
eg nicht. 2wiachen dir und Gott iiegt der Block, den du nicht
heben kannst, der Sump, durch den du nicht hindurchzuwaten ver-
rnagst. Sehuid heisat, es gibt keinen .eg vom Menschen zu uott,
sondern nur: das Wunder a r von eott ausgehenden, von Gott seibst
vollzogeuen Versbhnung. Bs gibt also nicht ein zu Gott kommen
auf dem Weg der Verinnerlichung, des in die eigene Tiefe Stei-
gens, des xlimmens, sondern nur durch gttttliche Tat, die ebenso
unbegreiflich, un.erw8.rtet, 'zufSliig,' nicht-notwendig, frei,
irrational-wirklich geschieht, ais die Sttnde unbegreiflich-wirk-
lich geschieht." Ibid., p.396.
30. "Sie zerrelsst das Ich in zwei einander fremae, nur
kausai aufeinander bezogene H&lften (Bremse una Had), sie macht
dadurch das ftort Ich zur inhaitlosen Schale." Ibid., p.223.
31- Brunner: "He tried to conceive the meaning of the ec¬
clesiastical doctrine of Original Sin in evolutionary terms by
applying the idea of the after-effects of the earlier stages of
evolution to the present stage of evolution." 4an in Revolt,
p.400. Note: this term "evolution" is used, of course, in a phi¬
losophical sense rather than in a biological one.
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his age. Therefore the question may be asked here: Is Schleier-
oiacher dealing with sin at all, or with something else? Brunner
does not hesitate to point this out that Schleienaacher's doctrine
of original sin has arrived at this view that man, at every new
stage in nis development, feels that ne has been hindered by the
previous sta.es, and yet Schleieruacher sees these hindrances as
determinative factors which arise from the "sense-nature,1 i.e.,
the "flesh". But one may question him for the usage of this Bi¬
blical expression whether he has distorted its original meaning
or not, because the conflict of a personal decision between the
spirit and tlie flesh becomes a dynamic dialectic of the "sense-
nature" and the "spirit-ideal" in the human development, tie sees
original sin as a Kind of atavism; it means the spirit, failing
to Keep pace with tie other elements in the process of this de¬
velopment. <Ve can see that Schleiermacner could not at all solve
this problem of original sin tBrbsdnde) afresn, for he has actu¬
ally turned it to another direction by means of "an idealistic
evolutionism with a strong naturalistic tinge." Therefore, we
are certain to say that "Sohleiermacher is not dealing with sin
32
fit all, but with stages of development.
According to Brunner's criticism, in Schleiermacher's
thought in merely involves one's mental attitude wnich arises
from the subjective reflection on something negative, and there¬
fore it only means a psychological element. How futile this
kind of interpretation is which eventually does not contribute
anything substantial to our knowledge of the true nature of sin
in the Christian sense. As Brunner says:
Our knowledge of the growth of humanity or of the £ ingle
human being may possibly enrich our conception of tne ac¬
tual, concrete forms of sin, but they can never in the sli¬
ghtest degree make any contribution to our Knowledge of tne
32. Ibid., pp.!25f«
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nature of sin itself, the fact of the sinful decision as
such. 53
And he concludes at this point that "man's creation in the image
of God, and also his 'contradiction,' are facta which do not lie
upon the empirical plane, but through the genuinely historical
they impinge upon it, and manifest themselves within it.
Barth cannot entirely agree with Brunner* s criticism of
Schleiermacher's conception of original sin. Prom Barth's view¬
point, it is true that for Schleiermaoher, original sin involves
something original in man ana manifested in history; but it is
not actually so passive as it has been described, that is, from
the psychological point of view merely as a stage in the course
of development. Any does Brunner not take notice of how Schleier-
maoher relates this situation to actual sin and to the corporate
35
act of the human race?
When referring to the concept of evil, we find that Brunner
criticizes Bchleiermacner thus:
What one otherwise calls evil is the natural, nece sary pre¬
supposition of the whole ethical process, and of the whole
human life. All the differences between good and evii are
therefore completely relative. The good is only known as a
gradual growth and the evil a gradual disappearance. Good
and evil merely denote stages on the long course of develop¬
ment . 36
As Brunner understands it: "The contrast between evil and good
is further declared to be as nothing otner than the negative and
53* Xoxa., p.40x.
34. hoc, cit.
35. KD IXl/3. p.372, and Christian Faith, pp.286, 320.
36. "Das, was man sonst das Bdse nennt, ist die natdrliche,
notwendige Voraussetzung des ganzen sittlichen Prozesses, des
ganaen menschlichen Lebens. Aile Unterscniede von Gott und Bds
sind daruia vdilig relative. Das uute ist nur bekarmt ais ein all-
mahlio.n vserueaues und das Bdse als ein allmflhlich verecnwindendes.
Gut und BOs beaeichnen bloss Stationen auf uem langen *eg der Ent-
wieklung." Mystik, p.285.
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positive factors in the process of the union of nature arid
37
spirit. Thus, evil is interpreted sinply from tne idealis¬
tic point o¥ view as something negative: being the not-yet good,
or the absence of something, and is only developed as a metaphy¬
sical principle or an ethical process which is conceived as neces¬
sary in the totality of nature, for it appears to Schleiermacher
as a determinative factor in the furthering of the wnole. The
origin of its existence is quite vague and questionable. As Brun-
ner puts it: "Kvil is only something which is negative: as the
shadow, the non-existence of light; as tne weakness, the non¬
existence of power. Thus evil is simply the non-existence or
not-yet existence of good.""^ Brunner similarly applies this
concept of negation to Schleiermacher's concept of sin: "Bven
thus tne concept of sin is still a purely negative one: the non¬
existence of God-consciousness. Sin therefore does not mean
that something exists which should not be there, a tremendous
39
dreadful reality, out only that something is not there.''
Seen from these pa sages quoted above, the writer would
suggest that Brunner is not quite doing justice to Schleierma¬
cher* s conception of sin- or world-consciousness ana God-cons¬
ciousness and their relation to each other. As Berth understands
it, they are actually not two separate or independent nodes of
existence but two elements in one and the same consciousness.
One must carefully consider what Schleiermacher really aeans and
37. "Der Gegensatz zwischen gut and bds, wird weiter aus-
gefuhrt, sei nicnts anderea als der positive und negative,
Faktor ia frozess der Vereinigung von Natur and Geist. •' Ifeid..
p.218.
38. "Das Bdse ist nur etwas Negatives; wie der Schatten
das Kiohtdasein ties Liehtes, wie Schwachheit das Nichtdasein der
Kraft, so ist das Bdse einfach dan Nichtdasein oder Nochnichtda-
sein das Guten." Loc. cit.
39. "Aucn so noch ist der uegriff der Stlnae ein rein nega-
tiver: has Nichtdasein deo (Jottesbewus;t ein. Sdnde heisst also
nicht, dass e$wa3 da ist, das nicht da sein sollte, eine unge-
heure furchtbare Realitfit, sondern bloss, dass etwas nicht da
ist." ibiJ.. p.220.
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not be led aside by his dialectical analysis of the one and the
came religious consciousness, iiarth defends Schieieriaacher:
Therefore one cannot even say that sin, according to Schl-
eiermacher, exists only in that man is 'not yet spirit':
'Mature is that which is not yet spirit.' One does not con-
rider Schleiermacher's presuppositions at ail if one thinks
that the nature could become spirit. Indeed this could
mean that the human world-consciousness (40) as being tran¬
sformed into the pure God-consciousness. But here Schleier-
io&cher'e idealistic interpretation of the human conscious¬
ness is not that of a pure God-consciousness and therefore
of a pure spiritual existence, but that of a world-conscious¬
ness which is Ctamped and filled, penetrated and dominated
by a God-consciousness: of a world-consciousness with all
the attributes ana signs of a God-consciousness. 41
Thus, Brunner aeems to have overemphasized Schleiermscher*s ne¬
gation of the reality or existence of sin when he relates
Schleiermacher's concept of sin to this concept of negation
which he applied in his criticism of Schleiermacher's concept
of evil. This can be attested by comparing the following passage
of his own, also in this passage, we take notice of his further
explanation of Schleiermacher'o possession of such an indefinite
and non-serious concept of sin and evil. He says:
40. here world-consciousness, as Barth understands it, i.e.
sin: "Derm einme.l versteht Schleiernacher unter SinnlichAeit
nicht etwa nor die spezifisch physischen 'iriebe, sondern das gan-
ze menschliche Sein bzw. Bewusstsein mit Einschluss der Ffihigkeit
und f&tigkeit des Yerstandes und des wiilens, sofern dieses als
Weltbewusstsein von des -ensohen Gott esbewusstsein in seinera Ge-
gensatz zura Gottesbewusstsein zu unterscheiden ist." KD IIi/3.
p.371.
41. "Man kann darum auch nicht sagen, dass die Stlnde bei
Schleiemacher nur darin bestehe, dase der raensch 'noch nicht
Geist* sei: "Natur, die noch nicht ueiat ist.* Dass die Ifatur
Geist werde, kann nach Schleiermachers Voraussetzungen gar nicht
in Prage komaaen. Das wtirce neissert, dass des Men sohen welt¬
bewusstsein sich vorwandle in lauter Gottesbewu; stsein. Nun ist
aber Schleiermachers Idealbild voro naenschlichen Bewusstsein.
nicht das einee reinen Gottesbewusstseins und also eines reinen
Geistseins, sondern oas eines voa Gottesbewusstsein beherrschten,
durchdrungenen, erf&llten und geprMgten Weltbewusstseins: eines
eltbewusst seins mit alien Eigenschaften und dermalen des Gottes¬
bewusstseins." ibid., p.372.
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The spirit in man is free from sin. That in ua which icaov/s
of God, is not that which is to be made responsible for
sin. The evil has its seat not in the centre of man, but
in the periphery; not the heart, the noblest part, is af¬
fected by sin, but only the limbs. A3 where the God-cons¬
ciousness is localized, so is also siin localized, and
thereby it is made harmless. 42
Is it not true that as Brunner says: "As where the God-conscious¬
ness is localized, so is also sin localized"? it is evident that
this is contradictory to what he has said in the aoove.
Judging from Schleiermacher's concept of evil and sin, it
is seen here that Bruriner is right. According to Schleiermacher,
evil or sin really has its seat only in the periphery not in the
centre. Therefore, evil or sin is taxen by him in a light sense
and it is never a serious thing to deal with.
Brunner clearly states that his own conception is differ¬
ent: "The origin of evil is the defiance, the usurping of the
divine right; the attacK of the divine singular authority, the
a 3
will of being like God." Barth, to a certain extent, agrees
with him: "the question about the possibility of sin as the act
in which, in defiance of the sovereignty of God, the creature ar¬
rogated to himself not only his own reality but independent reai^
44
ity, an absolute independence, and therefore makes himself God."
According to Brunner and Berth, sin or evil must not be
42. "Der Geist in Menschen ist frei von Bflnde. Das in uns,
was von Gott weiss, ist nicht das, was Mr die Stlnde verantv.ort-
lich zu machen ist. nicht im Zentrum des Densehen hat das 3dse
seinen Sitz, sondern in der Peripherie. Nicht das Herz, der ©del¬
ete Teil, ist von der Sdnde ergriffen, sondern nur die Glieaer.
Wie das Gottesbewusstsein lokalisiert ist, ist nun auch die Stlnde
loicalisiert and darait narmlos geraacht." gyetik, p.222. of.
pp.225f♦
43. "Der Ursprung des Bdsen ist der Trotz, das Greifen nacn
dera gdttlichen Recht, die Antastung der gdttlicneri Allein-Autori-
t&t, das . einwollen wie Gott." Ibid., p.224. cf. lie Christian
Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, Dogmatics, II. p.13.
Credo, p.36.
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interpreted as the disturbance of the religious consciousness;
it is the pride of man, the revolt against his Creator-Lord.
That is why Brunner reminds u; that concerning the divine wrath
and punishment, dchleiermacher has nothing to say; tneoaicy to
him, simply means a continuous development. Brunner points out:
"It is obvious that the conception of the Divine sv'rath.. .causes
great embarrassment to a rationalist of the Enlightenment school,
or to a theologian like Schleiermacher, with his pantheistic
45
tendencies." It can be seen why Brunner thus criticizes chl-
eiermacner because of hie impersonal concept of God.^" As a re¬
sult, the Divine ftrath can only be presupposeu as elements of
thought fragmentarily reflected by the human situation. Therefore,
unless sin is taxen seriously as a personal act against a per¬
sonal God, the Divine sVrath cannot be understood as the reaction
47
of God to sin. 'Thus Brunner criticizes Schleiermacher's view:
"The doctrine of Divine Wrath and punishment does not cause any
disturbance in the system of continuity, bchleiermacher has ob¬
viously no place for a doctrine of Divine >«rath. He merely in¬
dicates that he must reject it as an anthropomorphism, and si-
48
lently and completely omits this theme elsewhere." According
to Brunner and B&rth, God'3 anger is real enough so as not to
be denied or explained away; but it is not the ultimate reality.
45• The Christian Doctrine of God, Dogmatics, I. p.167.
46. "Tested by this conception of sin ("as rebellion) it
soon Becomes clear whether the Idea of God is really personal
or not. It is never personal "where God is merely an object of
thought, wnere Knowledge of God is based upon Knowledge of the
world and philosophical reflection." The Mediator. p.462.
47. Ibid., p.518.
48. "Die Lehre vom gdttiicnen worn und der Strafe, bringt
keinerlei Stifrung in uas Stetigkeitssystem. Denn eine nehre vom
gtsttlichen Zorn gibt ea eelbstverstSndlich fflr Schleiermacher
nicht. Er deutet bloss an, dass er sie ala Anthropomorphismus
ablehnen mil sete, und ilbergeht ira Ubrigen dieses Thema mit vOlii-
geta Dtillschweigen. " i4yati k, p. 34 5.
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Rather, it is the divine reality which corresponds to sin, ins¬
tead of the essential reality of Uod.^ One may ask now Schleier-
.liacher can do away this doctrine of divine wrath so easily? Here
Mackintosh comments on the situation of that time, i.e.,
when the doctrine of the sinful nature of man fell away,
and man was declared capable of finding his own way to the
God who had made him. It is a mood which unconciously has
affected many who in set terms would disown it. Barth holds,
not unjustly as I think, that the all but openly professed
purpose of much contemporary theology has been to satisfy
the human intelligence its religious, moral, and even aes-
thic assumptions rather than to understand, obey, and set
forth the Word of God. 50
One can see that the modernist possesses an illusory auto¬
nomy and therefore he is self-satisfied and even grace-defiant;
he relies on the irmnanental thought of idealism rather than on
the redemptive act of God in the Biblical sense of tne term; he
does not need forgivess, he has no room for God's forgiveness
for he does not believe in the serious break between God and man;
51 52
at bottom, he is seif-forgiven and self-justified, fully belie-
53
ving that basically he tends toward good rather than evil. As
Brunner says that "all non-Biblical doctrine ma^es evil harmless
and excuses man, whereas the Bibie shows up sin in all its terri-*
54
ble character and makes man 'inexcusable.'" Along this line of
49» The Mediator, p.319*
50. Types of Modern Tneology, pp.269f«
51. Brunner: "There is only one thing that decides whether
we believe in Christ or not: either we know that we are sinners,
who need the forgiveness of sins, or we believe that we can deal
with our sins quite well by ourselves." The Christian Doctrine
of Creation and Redemption, Dogmatics, II. p.256.
52. Brunner: "Schleiermacher z.B. konnte von seiner subjek-
tivistischen Grundstellung aus unraiJglich Raum naben fttr den radi-
kalen Gegensatz zu allem Subjektivismus, fdr die Rechtfertigunga-
lehre." Erlebnis, Srkenntnis und ulaube. p.33.
53. The Mediator, p.210.
54. 'an in Revolt, p.131.
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thought, we also find that narth depicts for us the self-pitying
situation of a self-excused man:
He may not be a complete stranger to something like remorse.
But cen he not still give to this reaiorse the form of self-
pity, and because of the very sincerity of this pity think
that he is excused, or even justified, and therefore at bot¬
tom good? Within its limit the nature created by God is in¬
deed good and not bud. within tne sphere of the self-know¬
ledge not enlightened and instructed by tne word of God
there is no place for anything worthy of the name of a 'know¬
ledge of sin.' 55
According to Brunner's skilful explanation, in the Christian
sense of the word:
Justification means that God speaks to the godless man who
belongs to Him. No •outpouring' of grace takes place, but
only the claim of grace. Therefore grace here i3 really
grace and not a concealed continuity, therefore a concealed
disappearance of the antithesis, the antithesis is abolished
by the Word, which is accepted by faith and which creates
this acceptable faith. 56
And he points out that 'for Schieiermacher tne problem of guilt
does not exist at all justification is merely the subjective
57
reflex of the beginning of redemption."
Schieiermacher, as we nave noted, has been charged with
frivolity when dealing with tnis serious issue of sin or guiit,
58
for it is not taken as enmity against God, but as imperfection,
55. CD IV/1. p.360.
56. "Rechtfertigung heisst: Gott epricht den gottiosen
Menachen ale zu ihm gehdrig an. Keine 'Bingiessung* der Gnade
findet statt, sondern der Spruch dor Gnade. Darum ist hier Gnade
wirklich Gnade und nlcht heimliche Kontinuit&t, also heimiicne
Abschw&chung des Gegensatzes. Uater volier Anerkennung des Gegen-
satzes wird der Gegensatz aufgehoben durch das wort, das vom
Glauben empgfangen wird und das diesen empfangenden Giauben
schafft.' Myatik, p.335.
57. The Mediator, p.438.
58. Brunner remids us: "The centre...of tni; di oruer is
the human heart, the false attitude of trie human ego to his
Creator." Ibi i.. p.553.
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in constructirig his theology. According to Brunner and Barth:
man's sin is before God and against His will. Sin is the desire
for freedom from Him by asserting one's own understanding of
freedom; i.e., autonomous in self-isolation, not theonomously
free in faith. Barth explains: "For against God's grace he
sins: in that he rebells against it, and so against God, in that
he does not want to live by God's grace, but rather, he wants
to live in another freedom, his own freeaom and righteousness;
5 4
therefore he entangles himself in contradiction to himself."
Brunner adds: "But the Christian conception strengthens the cha¬
racter of guiit: it is guilt before God, in the presence of uod,
A0
the Lord, therefore it is a positive defiance." Then Brunner
and Barth go on: "Sin in its unity and totality is always pride
CBarth). It is disobedience to God, unbelief in Him;^ it is
self-determination, tnerefore, as its result, seif-aiienation or
contradiction even to his own cre&turely existence, for ne is no
longer authentic to his origin and he has, in fact, turned away
from it:^ "As a sinner man is no longer true man; in some way
59« ,f)enn an Gottes Gnade rflndigt er: indem er gegen sie
und so gegen uott rebelliert, indem er nicht von uottes Gnade,
indem er in einer anderen, in seiner eigenen Sreiheit und ue-
rechtigkeit leben will, verwickelt er sich in den »iderspruch
mit Rich seibst." nD 111/2, p.36.
60. "Die cnristiiche Auffassurig aber potenziert den Charac¬
ter der Schuld: Es ist Schuld vor Gott, 1m Angesicht liottes, des
Herrn; es ist also positiver iroz." ystik, p.224. cf. This is
the presupposition for the eschatological character of the scrip¬
tural faith in revelation: the fact that sin is taken seriously,
that this gulf is seen to exist. Neither Speculation, Idealism,
ysticism, nor rational Moral ism see this gulf. They do not tafce
sin . eriously. Above aii, they do not tace it seriously in its
personal centre: guiit." The Mediator, p.291.
ol. Ck 17/1. P-413.
62. cf. Ibid., pp.414f.
63. whitehouse: "it must be admitted that we cannot pene¬
trate past sin (as past a mere accidental determination) to reaci
undisturbed human nature. Man's nature cannot be traced from
'surviving lineaments,' nor can it be inferred dialectically from
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or another he is 'in-human' (Brunner), "°^for the reaaon, "whoso-
o 5
ever comaiitteth sin is the servant of sin." "It ie true that
sin is a determination in which man is estranged from himself,
by which he ie betrayed to a foreign sphere and foreign power."
Therefore, Brunner criticizes chleiermacher for his having di¬
luted this fact of sin as contradiction by substituting a concept
of sensuousness alien to the Biblical conception:
According to the Biblical conception, there is indeed no
sin as sensuality, (in the sense} low urges of the soul.
On the contrary, the so-called lowness has only become low
through the sin of man, but sin itself is disobedience.
Sin is sin in being contradiction, and therefore, it is no
accident, but arises fro . the nature of the case, that
there should he no place for it in Behleiermacher*s inter¬
pretation. 67
Thus, sin is lot only viewed as a revolt against the di¬
vine will, as disobedience, but also as a compromise of the
ground of human existence as contradiction. Therefore, even
from the viewpoint of the Christian understanding of sin, it is
<! "• •"5
paradoxical and its form mythological. Sin is acxuaiiy a po-
o
sitive negation, a negative relation to God. Kven "forgiveness
knowledge of sinners." The Christian View of Man (An examination
of Karl Earth*a Doctrine). Scottish .Journal of Theology, li.no.l.
"ar.1949, pp.59f.
64. The Divine Imperative, p.485; cf. Kevelation and Reason
p.74.
6b* dohn 8:54. cf. Brunner: "Freedom in solitude, life on
one's own resources, belong? to cod alone, and the attempt to
reach this freedom if the nybris of man which plunges him into
slavery to evil. Every freedom other than that which is found in
dependence upon God is illusion and slavery." God and :<!an, p.85«
66. CD IV/1. p.405? cf. pp.406, 455. The Mediator, p.4o5.
Man in Revolt, p.254.
67. '"■Jach biblischer Auffaesung gibt es gar keine StSnde
der Sirmlichkeit, der niedrigen 3eelenkr£tfte. Im uegenteii, das
sogenannte Niedrige ist nur niedrig geworden durch die Silnde dea
Men sohen, diese selbst aber ist Ungehorsaau 'tinde ist Sftnde ais
<»iderspruch, darum etwas, was in der Auffassung Schleiermachers
nicht zuf&llig, sondern notwendig keine Steile hat." alvstik,
p.224.
68. Ibid., pp.555, 585.
212
is the absolutely paradoxical union of that which cannot be com¬
bined: guilt exists, yet it exists no more, it (forgiveness) is
the sovereign act of the free God who nevertheless through His
70
freedom does not abolish the eternity of His law, His truth."
why is its whole conception so paradoxical? Because there is
the judgment of God over sin, yet the grace of God stands behind
it, therefore it is also the forgiveness of God which justifies
trie sinner. That is why Barth says: "liven God's judgment of man
which is accomplished and reveals itself in the $ord of God be¬
longs to His activity as the gracious God."^"'' It is no wonder
that Brunner writes:
All paradoxes of the Christian witnesses and all dialectics
of theology have their origin here in this insoluble basic
paradox. In the insufficient, yet unavoidable form jf 'my¬
thological* conceptions the fact of the brokeiiness of exis¬
tence finds its expression: The cleft in tne world is no mere
appearance, but in spite of the original goodness of God's
creation (which is still present in its corruption) is re¬
cognised as objective reality. Therefore the doctrine of sin
is the point where the Christian or non-Christian doctrine
of faith distinguishes itself. 72
Therefore, in order to present its absurdity, sin is inevitably
69 • Revelation and Reason, pp.2b, 26, 29.
70. "Vergebung ist das absolut paradoxe Zusammenbeatehen
des Dnvereinbaren: Die Schuld beatent, aber sie besteht doch
nicht mehr. 3s ist die herrentat des freien Gottes, der doch
durch seine Freiheit nicht die Ewigkeit seines uesetzes, seiner
»»ahrheit aufhebt." MystiJk. p.238.
71. "Bs gehflrt ja auch das in Gottes ort sich vollziehende
una sich offenbarende Gericht Gottes dber den Menschen zu oeinem
Handeln als der gnfidige Cott." KD 111/2. p.36.
72. "Alles Paradoxien des christlichen Zeugnisaes und alie
Dialektik der xheologie haben hier, in diesem unauflflsbaren
Grundparadox, inren ursprung. In der unzulflngiichen, aber unver-
meidlichen Form 'mythologischer' Vorateliungen kommt nier die
xatsache der Gebrochenheit der Existenz zum Ausdruck: Der Riss
in der delt ist kein Schein, sondern xrotz der guten Sohdpfung
Gottes (die aucn in ihrer Verder'onis noch vorhanden ist), ais
objektive ..irklichkeit anerkannt. Darum ist die Lehre von der
Ctinde der Punkt, wo 3ich die Christlichkeit oder Richtchristlich-
keit einer Glaubensiehre entocheidet." Pystik, p.341.
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explained in the form of myth. Brunner assures us that "the doc¬
trine of the Fall is not a theory which is intended to explain
the existence of evil; on the contrary, it is the idea in which
the inexplicable character of evil finds its clearest expression.
Barth virtually agrees with this point that the story of the Fall
aa far as its form is concerned, is absurd; but it is really ab¬
surdity which illustrates the terrible absurdity of sin: "Sin is
that which is not, described in the Genesis story as his nearken-
ing to the voice of the serpent, the beast of chaos. Sin exists
only in this absurd event."''4
Brunner even more severely criticizes Schieiermacher's
doctrine of sin:
Here the basic error of Schieiermacher' s conception breatcs
forth in grotesque clarity: that God-consciousnesa must be
faith. On the contrary, God-consciousness is rather the pre¬
supposition of unbelief. For unbelief is not non-conscious¬
ness, but negation of the conscious, negation of the claim
of God which is heard. The opposition of faith, merely higher
self-consciousness is not sensuality but unbelief, disobedi¬
ence, and faithlessness. 73
In criticizing Schieiermacher's doctrine of sin, Barth
takes a stand somewhat different from that of Brunner. As a mat¬
ter of fact, in some or many respects, he energetically defends
Schleiermacher. One cannot lose sight of the fact that Barth's
own doctrine of sin is obviously developed, to a large extent,
by following the direction in which Schieiermacher has pointed.
Barth admits: "In the thesis of the knowledge of sin in the know¬
ledge of Jesus Christ we follow the remarkable hints found in
73. The Mediator, p.144.
74. CD IV/1~. "p.410. cf. CD II/l. p.336.
73. "Hier bricht der Grundfenler der Schleiermaoherschen
Auffassung geradezu in grotesker Deutlicnkeit hervor: Dass Got-
tesbewusst ein Glaube aein soli, .velt entfernt davon ist Gottes-
bewusstsein vielmehr die Voraussetzung des Unglaubens. ;enn Un-
glaube ist nicht Nichtbewusatsein, sondern Ueinsagen zum Bewuest
sein, Neineagen zum gehOrten Anspruch Gottes. Der Gegeasatz zum
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our survey of Neo-Irotestant theology first in Uchleiermacher."
when one closely examines and compares their doctrine of sin
(to a certain extent, we have actually done this;, it is seen
that Barth attributes trie knowledge of sin to the revelation of
God in Christ on the Cross, Schleiermacher to one's God-conscious-
77
ness. Here they hold in common that sin has no definite cha-
*1A
racter, therefore no independent reality. Actually Sehleier-
macher has a good starting-point in his doctrine of sin hut he
is unable to develop it. On the other hand, we see that Barth
is not only corrective to Schleiermacher but also supplementary.
It may not be completely wrong to say that this typical charac¬
teristic could even be generally applieu in the relationship of
Barth's theology to Schleiermacher*s theology, but in the doo-
79
trine of sin (including tne devil, evil etc.), this is evident¬
ly* typically and unreservedly characteristic.^^
Viewed from this point, it is significant to compare tneir
differences and similarities in this area in order to apprehend
Giauben bzw. hdheren Oelbstbewusstsein heisat nicht Sinnlichkeit,
sondern Unglaube, Ungehorsam, Untreue." M.vstik, p.225*
76. CD IV/1. p.391.
77. .Barth: "Man kann aber nicht leugnen, dass er der Sflnde
iejenige Realit£t zugeschrieben hat, die er ihr im Rahmen sei¬
ner exklusiv subiektiven feetrachtung des christlichen Bewusat-
seins ais solonen zuschreiben konnte. Diicht dass er eie in der
Tat als Shnaenbewuestsein beschreiben hat, ist zu beanstanden,
sondern dase er das caristliehe Selbstbewusotsein (zuerst als
Gnadenbewuestsein und dann auch als Stindenbewusstsein) nun doch
nicht in dem Gegensatz zu interpretieren wusete, in welchem Gnade
und Stinde sich im erk aes Heiligen ueistes am Menschen als der
Subjektivierung des objektiven fortes Gottes aei es denn also;
im 'christlichen helbstbewusstsein' darstellt." KD II1/3. p.371.
76. cf. CD IV/i. p.410. also: "Die eigentumliche Realit&t
auch der Silnde konnte er so nicht sichtbar machen: weil er so
auch die der Gnade-nicht sichbar machen konnte. Aber aass er das,
was er als S&nde im Gegensatz zu dem, was er ais Gnade verstehen
konnte, als eine RealitSt siohbar gemacht hat, das sollte man
ihza nicht abstreiten." KD 111/3. p. 371.
79» Barth: "The devil is that oeiag which we can define
only as independent non-being." CD IV/1. p.422; cf. CD 11/1.
p.560.
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their real differences and the real criticism of Schleiermacher
made by Barth. in this line of thought, it is important to
note that even Barth himself carefully and tirelessly presents
81Schleiermacher' s doctrine of sin in his Dogmat ix." According
to .Barth: "It must not be a doctrine of sin which is autonomous,
which considers the matter and investigates and presents it in
op
a vacuum, -nd therefore again abstractly." " Therefore, one can¬
not simply judge Schleiermacher too light-heartedly for tne se¬
rious reality of the nature of sin. It is easy enough to pre¬
sent the doctrine of sin, as Barth says, "in a vacuum," save to
fill this emptiness with the concept of evil. One may not in¬
sist on or even assert its worth as an autonomous reality, when
admittedly, to a certain extent, this autonomy is actually re¬
flected by our rebellious existence. In this respect, one cannot
understand the true nature of sin. According to Barth:
Sin is a reality as the antithesis to God it is so almost
as God Himself is, sui generis. But it is not an autonomous
reality. As the Mo which opposes the divine Yes, it is only
a reality related to and contradicting that Yes. Therefore
it can be known and all the horror of it can be known
only in the light of that Yes. In all its reality and hor¬
ror it can never be a first word, nor can it ever be a fi¬
nal word. 85
Certainly Barth departs from Brunner's critique here.
Barth agrees with Brunner that sin is a negation of God's omni¬
potent grace, but disagrees with his failure to understand that
80. The writer thus ventures to characterize Barth's theol¬
ogy as corrective and supplementary to Schleiermacher's. In fact,
this implies that there are actually included differences (in
thought-content) and similarities (in thought-form) between tnem
in their theology* e.g., revelation in "Barth is a corrective to
the role of intuition in Schleiermacner; faith corrects piety;
Holy Spirit corrects the common spirit; the v«ord of Cod corrects
the feeling of absolute dependence, in this respect, he would
lime to recommend von Balthasar who expertly traces these out.
Bee von Balth&sar, op. clt.. pp.215ff«
81. KD 111/3. pp.365-370.
82. CD IV/1. p.139.
83. Ibid., p.144. cf. K.D II1/3. p. 331.
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the Nihil is real too. Notice 3runner*s presupposition:
In order to perceive this (gulf between God and man} clear¬
ly we need to assume that sin is taken seriously, that it
is not regarded as a merely accidental element in human
existence, but that is seen in its real character, as Ori¬
ginal Sin. To be a human being means to be a sinner. 35
The following passage even more evidently testifies that Brunner
takes sin as an independent reality: "This autonomy of man, this
attempt of the Ego to understand itself out of itself, is the
lie concerning man whicn we call sin."1 It might be said that
for Brunner, sin is a revolt against God*a revelation and evil
has only reality as a denial of God's will. But if he holds
that there is a manifestation of God'B will in creation, then
sin or evil will have reality apart from the revelation in Christ
which Barth will certainly deny. Thus, the difference between
Brunner's and Barth's view of Nihil es entialiy lies in their
different interpretation of revelation.
Indeed, if we expound Barth's view of Nihil, we discover
37
that it is, to a certain extent, similar to Brunner's. Accord¬
ing to Barth, Nihil has no autonomous reality; it depends upon
or is related to what God does not will:
The Nihil is what God does not will. It only lives by the
fact that it is what God does not will. But just by this
it lives: because not only uod's willing, but also God's
non-willing is powerful and oan therefore not oe without
correspondence in reality. The correspondence in reality
of the divine non-willing is the Nihil. 88
84. cf. KD 111/5. p.575.
35• The Mediator, p.498; cf. p.146. The Divine Imperative,
p.62. God and *fian, p.157.
36. The Word and the World, p.68; cf. p.75.
37. No wonder we see Barth criticizes 'Cchleiermacner for
his interpretation of the original nature of sin from the point
of view of creation but not from that of the redemption in
Jesus Christ, cf. Infra, p.217.
88. 'Das Nichtige ist das, was Gott nicht will. Nur davon
lebt es, dass es das ist, was Gott nicht will. Aber eben davon
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narth affirms sin as tne excluded element in God's will and worx.
Therefore, it only plays a negative part in it. le explains that
God and sin. are mutually exclusive. in has no positive place
in God, and therefore plays no active part in lis will and work#
In fact, sin, living only from what God has rejected, is not
cr -ated by God but arises only as the exponent of what God does
89
not will. 7 Barth, then, criticizes Sohleiermacher because his
doctrine of sin. confuses redemption witn creation: "in this way
'cnleiermacher regards sin quantitatively as a mere deficiency,
and consequently reconciliation (redemption) as the crowning of
90
creation." And ne continues to criticize him for his asser¬
tion that God could have something to do with the origin of sin
by pointing out that one roust not say that God willed and crea¬
ted these impossible possibilities such as sin, evil, death and
devil, otherwise their entire reality and character would be
misapprehended. If we wisher to keep true to the facts, dogma-
91
tics has to be here "logically inconsequent. Barth reminds
us that their existence is not to be perceived from creation,
but only from God's grace in besus Christ. As he understands
it, we know sin, evil, death and the devil "as an accompanying
92
sign of His revelation." Therefore, sin is only to be under¬
stood as God's negation which appears to us as if it were or¬
dained by Him. Barth affirms this: "without this divine ordin¬
ance, sin could neither have being nor existence. And just
lebt es: weil und indent nicht nur Gottee swollen, sondern auch
Gottes Nicntwoilen kr^ftig ist und al30 nicht ohne reale Ent-
sprechung sein kann. Die reale ntsprechung des gdttlichen uicht-
wollens ist das aiehtige." KD I1I/3. p.406. cf. p.375*
89. CD IV/1. p.409. Bruaner, in this respect, more or less,
agrees with Barth. See The .Divine-Human Encounter, p.98.





tnia ordinance is, according to Schleiermacher'8 meaning and. ex¬
planation, not to be understood abstracted from the fact that
the will of God is the redemption of man, that it is therefore
93
a good will."•" Barth even suggests that the conception of God's
negation, if it is to be applied to the doctrine of Christoiogy,
would have profound significance for the understanding of sin as
a reality when it is related to his negation on one hand and for
the understanding of grace ae His omnipotent act in this negation
on the other. However, Schleiermacher has missed this important
and significant point here, rso wonder Barth thus says about him:
And now one would like to suppose that unknown to Schleier¬
macher himself, this has had its importance for his peculiar
doctrine of sin. For from the point of view of Christoiogy
it could indeed be clear that one had to understand sin
first of all and decisively as from God, as the work of a
mighty divine negation: as a reality which is not created
but (as Schleiermacher says: 'ordained'), by the fact God
opposes it. 94
According to Barth, the true nature of sin in the Bible is an in¬
definite cause or an alien power operating on the ground of rebel¬
lion. In Rom.5:12. we are told that sin, even in ail its fearful
reality, has only "entered into" the world. It is at a disadvan¬
tage when compared with even the most moaest creature. Therefore,
93. "Ohne diese gdttliche Verordnung xonnte auch die Stlnde
weder <>esen noch Existene haben. und eben diese Verordnung ist
ja nun nach Sehleiermachers Meinung und hrkl&ruag nicht abstra-
hiert davon au veretehen, dass der rVille Gottes des Benechen Br¬
io sung, dass er also ein guter diile ist." KB 111/3. p. 374-
94. "Und nun mhcftte man vermuten, dass das fttr Schleier-
machers eigentttmliohe Lehre von der Stinde, ihm seiber unbewuset,
seine Tragweite gehabt hat. Von der Christologie her xonnte es
ja klar sein, dass roan die Stlnde vor allem und entscneidend von
Gott her, nH alien als das Aerk einer mSchtigen gdttlichen Ver-
neinung zu verstehen hat: als eine Realit&t, die dadurch —
nicht geschaffen, aber eben gesetzt (wie Schleiermacher sagt:
' verordnet') ist, .iaes Gott sich ihr entgegensetzt." 40 Ill/3.
p.376.
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nil is not created by God. Though it can be present and active
within the creation as an alien, it does not belong to it. Thus
sin has no appointed place in God's creation but is only an xa-
qc
terloping force against the creative will of God. Berkouwer
comments on this point:
It becomes plain why, for berth, sin is a mystery. This
mystery, this enigma, has nothing to do with the limits of
our understanding, in the sense of the noetic incomprehen¬
sibility of sin. The mystery consists in the fact tnat sin
is something which in the very nature of the case cannot
be. This is the heart of Berth's doctrine of sin, which
can be summarized in that strange expression: the ontolo-
gical impossibility of sin. 96
Can, therefore, the knowledge of tin be developed from
our religious consciousness alone, if sin is not created by God
but is revealed by Him in Jesus Christ? As Barth says that "the
knowledge of sin can relate only to what we are told concerning
our being and activity by Jesus Chri t a the Mediator and Gua¬
rantor of the atonement, to what we have to say after Him, if
97
that knowledge is to be serious." Thus, one must be reminded
98
that one cannot come to a general knowledge of sin. In fact,
Barth has affirmed that if the doctrine of sin or evil really
has any Christian meaning at all, it must not be autonomous:
We must state: if anytning in Christian knowledge and in
Christian witness cannot be absolutely abolished, but only
understood in connection with God's grace and in subordina¬
tion to it then (it is J certainly evil. It opposes creation
99. CP IV/1. p.139.
96. The Triumph of Grace In the Theology of &arl Berth,
pp.229f•
97. CD IV/1. p.141.
98. Barth: "Sin cannot be recognized and understood and
defined and judged as sin in accordance with any general idea of
man, or any law which is different from the grace of uod and its
commandment, the law of the covenant. If it takes place as a
breach of trie covenant, and not in any other way, it can be known
only in tne lignt of tne covenant." Ibid., pp.l40f.
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and the covenant of God radically, but not independently.
It exists not in itself, it exists only in this opposition.
•Therefore it exists indeed only 'alongside with good.' Sot
this statement as such as the darkening in Sohleiermacher's
teaching, [hut J that he stated this so emphatically is ra¬
ther the illuminating thing which -must not be overlooked or
denied by any critic of his teaching however necessary, and
justified fhis criticism} may be. 99
The writer would suggest that here Barth's statement is not un¬
justifiable, e.g., in Brenner's case, one can see that he affirms
the solidarity of sin: "To deny the solidarity in sin is an ego¬
istical perversion." As a consequence, one also can see that in
what follows he must add this: "This solidarity in sinfulness
1 nA
cannot be proved empirically." According to Barth, the inde¬
finite conception of sin together with its dependent notion is
all due to its very vain characteristics: it is "the self-surren¬
der of the creature to nothing" on one hand and "it exists and
is only in opposition to the will of God and therefore in oppo¬
sition to the being and destiny of His creature" on the other.
"It can only say No where God says Yes, and where in its own
very different fashion the creature of God can alto say Yes."^"*"
99. "bir aidseen aber feststellen: wenu in der christiichen
Erkenntnis und im christiichen Bekenntnis irgend etwas nicht ab-
solut gesetzt werden darf, sondern nur im Zusammenhang mit Got-
tes Gnade und in der Unterordnung unter sie ~u verstehen ist,
dann destimmrt das ndse. bs steht der SchtJpfung und dem Bund Got-
tes radikal, aber nicht selbctflnuig gegenttber. Es ist nicht an
sich, ea ist nur in dieser uegens&tzlichkeit. Es ist also in der
Tat nur 'am Guteru ' Nicht dieser 3atz als solcher ist die Ver-
finsterung in Schleiermachers Lehre. fase er dieeen Satz so ener-
giech vertreten hat, das ist vielmenr das Erleuchtende, das bei
keiner noch so ndtigen und berechtigten Kritik seiner Lehre dber-
eehen und geleugnet werden dttrfte." KD III/3. p.331.
100. The Mediator, p.145. of. The Christian Doctrine of Crea¬
tion and Redemption, Dogmatics, II. p.106. s.a. Brunner's doc¬
trine of the Devil; ">■ hat the Bible says plainly it. this: that
there is a power of darkness, and that it is of great significance.
As a force of a super-human kind it stands over against man. It
is an 'objective reality,' i.e., it is a reality which is object¬
ively encountered, not merely a reality within the mind." ibid.,
p.143.
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Sin, explained in this sense, means the "dark prelude or coun-
102
terpart to the divine covenant and work of grace," arid not
only has to do with God who is in covenant with man, but also
has to do with man himself even as a sinner who is in covenant
103with God. As Barth says: "indeed, the covenant partner of
God can breaic the covenant. The real man can deny and darken
his reality. And he concludes with this point: "Sin is the¬
refore not merely an evil, but a breach of the covenant which as
such contradicts God and stands under His contradiction. Sin is
10b
man's denial of himself in face of the grace of his Creator."
Therefore, Earth has the following passage which might serve to
correct Schleiermacher'a concept of evil and his attempt to
trace its causes:
.nhatever evil is, God is its lord. »*e must not push our at¬
tempt to take evil seriously to the point of ever coming to
think of it as an original and indeed creative counter-deity
which posits autonomous and independent facts, competing
seriously with the one living God and striving with Him for
the mastery, vii is a form of that nothingness which as
such is absolutely subject to God. s*e cannot legitimately
deduce this from a mere contrasting of the idea of evil with
the idea of good. But we can say it in the light of the fact
that in Jesus Christ in Mis aeath (the meaning of which is
shown in His resurrection to be His victory and the libera¬
tion of man), we see evil overcome and indeed shattered ana
destroyed by the omnipotence of the love and wrath of God.
106
101. CD IV/1. pp.l39f. ef. p. 7 9. s.a. "£s jcaan uns, wenn wir
es in jener Beziehung, in seiner :.ntgegensetzung zu Jesus Chris-
tus sehen, nicht irgend ein grenzenlos adchtiges und wirka&mes
Fabelwesen, kein zweiter negativer Gott sein. Es ist auch in die-
eer Hinsicht nicht absolut. Gott ist ihm gegenftber zuerst und zu-
letzt auf dem Plan. Es exist! ert ja dberhaupt nur uurch Gott, nur
in der Kraft aer gdttlichen Verneinung and Verwerfung, des gdt-
tlichen Gerichts. Is hat nur den von ihm beat imarten Raum. Es ist
nie flber, immer nur unter ihm. Das Michtige begrerizt inn nicht,
sondern er begrenzt das iichtige. Seine Gnaue ist ottchtiger ais
Stride, Ubei und Tod." KD IiI/3. pp.3ci0f.




Evil in all its forms, even when it is unmistakably and
incontrovertibly evil, might still be regarded as an ac¬
cidental and external and improper and transitory deter¬
mination of the being ana activity of man. For it is quite
true that it appears only in certain attitudes and actions.
It is not always or in all men equally blatant or wide¬
spread or dangerous. 107
Thu3 far, judging from Barth* a presentation of evil and the mean-
ing which underlies it, he cannot entirely agree with Brunner';
ver ict on Schleiermacher'r complete rejection of the concept of
10c>
the divine wrath, but he implicitly agrees with him that
Schleiermacher did not relate evil to divine love and wrath as
he himself did: "ne see evil overcome and indeed shattered and
destroyed by the omnipotence of the love and wrath of (iod."^^"^
Actually, Schleiermacher relates his idea of evil to good and
sin; Barth to the omnipotence of the divine love and wrath.
104. "Gottes Bundesgenoese Kann ja den Bund brechen. Der
wirkliche Mensch kann seine oirklichkeit verleugnen und verfins-
tern." KD II1/2. p.244.
105. CD 1V/1. p.140.
106. Ibid., p.408.
107. Ibid., p.403.
108. "So iat auch das eine greifbare Ungerechtigkeit, ihm
vorzuhalten, er habe dem Begriff der SGndeastrafe 'ausweichen'
wollen, Seine ganze Lehre vom Obel und von der Gerechtigkeit
Gottes spricht dagegen. flan kann ium vorhaiten, dass er den Be¬
griff des tibels zu eng mit dem der Ottnde verkndpt habe, dass er
das Ubel flberhaupt nur unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Sdndenstrafe
ina Auge fassen wolite und dass er es besonders durch die Art,
in der er es retan hat—es besteht nach ihm ttberhaupt nur in
einem durch die Sdnde veranlassten menschlichen lissverst&ndnis
der in sich vollkommenen .«elt—im Grunde geleugnet habe." KD
III/3. p.373.
109. cf. The .for, iator, pp.518f.
110. CD IvTTr p.403. cf. KD III/3. p.377.
111. In this line of thought, naturally, Schleiermacher will
attempt to relate his idea of evil to its co-ordinate, good and
thus arbitrarily to ascribe this antinomy of good and evil to God
as its absolute divine causality. But to Barth, "whatever evii is,
God is its Lord." Evii as the negative element must be subject to
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The writer things tnat one question may be asxed of Brunner:
does Schleiermacher have a doctrine of evil; does this really
imply nothing as to his true or complete rejection of the doc-
112
trine of divine wrath as mere anthropomorphism? one must be
reminded that Schleiermacher relates sin to evil as cause and
effect (cf. Supra, pp.bOf.); Brunner regards the divine wrath
as the reaction of God to sin (cf. Supra, p.207.). Thus, evil
(in Schleiermaeher*s interpretation) takes the place of the di¬
vine wrath (in Brunner's interpretation). The real problem in¬
volved in this aspect is that Schleiermacher has explained away
the concept of • personal God, which is essentially different
from what Brunner accuses him of. Evidently, in this respect,
Brunner has promptly and directly reacted to Schieiermacher
without takir^g notice of what Schleiermacher really had in mind,
which Schleiermacher himself was perhaps not fully aware of.
Brunner is, of course, acute enough to be able to point out that
113
the mystic sometimes does not mean what he says; tout why, then,
is this implicit inconsistency involved?
God's will. It means what God has not willed and will not will.
Barth, in order to evolve from this theory of negation a theory
of more substantial character, has to point to the fact that it
is Jesus Christ who fully illustrates this negation of God's om¬
nipotent grace, i.e., God's wrath and love is seen in His death
and in His Resurrection. But Schleiermacher, because he neglects
to apply this fact of the historical revelation in Jesus Christ
as the true and only reconciliation brought about by God to his
remarkable theory of negation, is forced to work out a relativis-
tic theory, in which sin and grace, evil and good are strictly
related to each other as co-ordinates on the one hand, and sin
and evil, grace and good co-related to each other as cause and
effect on the other.
112. Mystik, p.343.
113. cf. Ibid.. p.117.
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According to Schleiersnacher, sin or consciousness of sin
is derived from tne consciousness of God. i'o a certain extent,
Barth seems to admit the truta of this process: "It is true
enough that trie knowledge of God alone includes within itself
the knowledge of sin, and that this knowledge arises only in the
confrontation of man by the majesty and holiness of God.
lib
tfrunner seemingly admits the same. Ho doubt, iirunner and
iiarth principally or essentially agree with cnleiermacher at
this point, but they think that the way he develops or presents
it is wholly different or even wrong, for this tends to attri¬
bute to God the causality of sin. Barth asks how a will moved
by the divine will can be a free will. if God's will be assumed
to move the human will in any and ail circumstances, is not God
inevitably interpreted and understood as the author of sin?"^®
Even Brunner also says that "it is true that Sin and Creation
117
remain distinct." tiowever, at this point, Bartn is much more
cautious and doe3 not connect sin even remotely with creation;
he rather recognizes the process that the knowledge of sin is
derived from th" grace of Goa, which means that the knowledge
of sin is exposed in the light of reconciliation. This is true
as it is understood in the sense that the extreme pride of the
sinner is clearly exposed by the most profound humiliation of
the Reconciler. In this respect, Barth has virtually quoted
Kfihler, saysing:
114. CD IV/1. p.363. of. "Und indem unser Sein und Tun tat-
sflchlich vom Gottesbewusstsein her so bestimmt, durch Gottes
allm&chtige Unade so verneint ist, existiert die Sitnde, indem
wir selbst existieren." KD IIi/3* p.37b*
115- "Knowledge of sin is pos ibie only 'in the presence of
God.' Thus we really know ourselves only when we really know God.
It follows that the witness of Christian faith indicated a single
point as the place where real God meets real man; where man be¬
comes real to himself, because God becomes real to him; and this
takes place here because in meeting God he recovers not only uod
but also what was lost." The }hilosophy of Religion, p.73. cf.
The Mediator, pp.265, 444. The Christian Doctrine of God, dogma¬
tics, i. p.17.
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He tells us that the key which unlocks the secret of the
basis of salvation 'must not be sought in the anxious self-
judgment of man left to himself, as though this could mea¬
sure tne need for salvation and settle in advance the cor¬
responding reassurance. Par only tne revelation of salva¬
tion can throw Light on the state of alienation. It is at
the cross of Christ that the justified man measures the
significance of human sin.' 118
Brunner says similarly that sin can only be correctly under-
119
stood in the light of Christian revelation. Both Brunner and
"Sarth hold that from lis revelation of gracious mercy and divine
holiness alone we know we are sinners! ,<e sin against God:
120
"Against Thee alone, have I sinned!" It is no accident that
Barth inverted the traditional order of Law-to-Gospel to the
Gospel first and Law the second.'*'^
Pursuing tnis from another point of view, sin oan be
turned to serve the divine purpose since it has to do with the
revelation of God. Caml'ield explains this: "Sin which ration¬
ally speaks of discontinuity and alienation now comes tj speak
of a new continuity and communion. He discovers the nearness
of God, the nearness which is grace, in the very act which ra-
122
tionally speaks of farness, that is, in the sense of sin." w
But, as Barth has pointed out, once again, Schleiermacher puts
it in a different way: "Sin...being the supporting element in
the imperfection which still provisionally encumbers the whole,
is a reality.
M
Brunner concludes his argument by saying that the Bibli¬
cal view of sin, however, replaces the phrase 'not-yet' by 'no
longer.' Sin is not the primary phenomenon, it is not the
116. CD II/l. p.671.
117. The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption,
Dogmatics, II. p.18.
118. CD JLV/1. p. 592.
119• 'l'he Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption,
Dogmatics, II. p.89.
120. Psalm 51:9.
121. Berkouwer, op. cit., p.521.
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beginning, but it is a turning-away from tne beginning, trie aban¬
donment of the origin, the break with that which God had given
and established."^"'"^
Because man is understood as the covenant partner of
125
God, Schleierraacher is criticized by Barth for not regarding
the reality of sin as it actually takes place in an encounter
and in the history of the relationship of God and man, so that,
since betv/een God and man there is no personal or direct con¬
flict, naturally enough, sin has no serious character. And the
negation of God's omnipotent grace only takes place in the God-
consciousness of a religious mind. It is really a pity that
Schleiermacher has missed developing this most significant point,
when one notices how Barth writes:
what a prospect would be opened up if 3chleiermacher were
thinking of the negation which comes to man in his confron¬
tation by Jesus Chrirt understanding sin as that wnicn is
excluded and condemned in Him, and therefore by tne grace
of God; as that which in its own dark way is real in his
negative relation to Him! But as he sees it, the negation
in which sin has its reality takes place only in our cons¬
ciousness of God, not in an encounter and history of man
with God. For "chleierraacher there is no sucn thing as a
Christian in wnom this encounter and history take place,
who is therefore anything more than the embodied idea of
an undisturbed and powerful God-consciousness fulfilling
and controlling our consciousness of the world. The result
is that God Himself has no direct or personal part in the
negation which takes place in tne human consciousness.126
122. Revelation and The Holy Spirit, p.72.
123. CD 1/2. p7l34.
124. The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption,
Dogmatics, II. p.91.
125« fthitehouse: "Man's existence is determined as the be¬
ing of God's covenant-partner. By nature we are covenant-partners,
but this is only true and only knowabie because, in the history
of Hi; free grace, God has made us His covenant-partners." The
Christian View of Man. (An examination of Karl Barth's Doctrine)
Scottieh Jounral of Theology, II. no.l. Mar.1949, pp.oof."
126. CD IV/1. p.376". cf. KD ill/3. pp.37bf.
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furthermore, concerning the mutual-conditioning of good
and evil, grace and sin, with the reality of sin appearing
alongside of the reality of grace, Barth points out that in
this situation, the inevitable result is, that "for all the em¬
phasis on its negative character 3in is thought of positively."1^
Barth then puts this question: "But is it real sin?" For "with
Schleiermacher the correct relativising of sin in relation to
grace becomes its co-ordination with grace, its appraisal and
1 PR
justification and even its defence as the complement of grace."
On the other hand, if Schleiermacher negates the reality of sin,
the reality of grace is equally undermined by his concept of ne¬
gation, because according to nim, sin and grace are related to
a position of co-ordination or as states on the same level.
Barth asks:
Can we say of real sin, as Schleiermacher says, that tnia
thing which has no place belongs to a definite stage in the
existence of man, and that in relation to this stage it was
willed and posited by God? Conversely, can a grace which
lives by its opposition to sin, which is referred and rela¬
ted to it, be real grace? Can a good which is only present
with evil be a divine good? Are we speaking of real sin and
real grace where there can be no mention of a real history,
a real collision and conflict, a decision between the two?
129
Barth can only see that Schleiermacher*s theorization ultimately
involves a serious dilemma: there could be nothing which is ne¬
gated; nothing which is affirmed as real! According to
127. CD IV/1. p.377.
128. hoc, cit. cf. "Hier tut sich in Schleiermachers hehre
offenbar ein Abgrund von Irrtum auf. Bier ist eben nicht geaehen
Oder vOllig vergesen, dass jene Beziehung, jenes Verii&ltnis von
Gnade und Sflnde, in welchem die Sdnde allerdings nur relatives
Dasein, nur relatives VerhSltnis ist, so.ndern ein Verhdltnis der
Entgegensetzung und des Streitea — des siegreichen otreites der
Gnade gegen die Sttnde, des ohnmSchtigen Streites der Stlnde gegen
die Gnade, aber des Streites una in gar xeinem Sirxn ein Verh&lt-
nis des rriedens ist." KD ill/3. p.382.
129. CD 1V/1. p.377. cf. KD ill/3, p.382.
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Schleiermacher, neither sin or evil is really negated nor grace
or good affirmed as real in spite of his strenuous effort at ne¬
gating the one and affirming the other. For all his negations
and affirmations exhaust each other by his theory of relativism
between these two opposite concepts; and also oy the strict co¬
ordination of their relation to each other, Schleiermacher's
failure lies in the fact that he does not interpret it in terms
of history and apply this wonderful theory to Christology.
Therefore, instead of letting Jesus Christ bear this contradic¬
tion of sin and grace, Schleiermacher himself (or his theory
itself) is caught in this contradiction. That is why Barth does
not hesitate to write:
But in what is understood of the pious Christian conscious¬
ness by Schleiermacher, the opening in this direction is
missing. In the reserved area into which alone he wanted to
look, even the divine No to sin as such, as the No of God
Himself and the divine Yes of grace as uod's own Yes could
not become visible. Therefore neither the danger of sin,
the nihilness of the Nihil, nor the sovereignty of grace
could be in it. Both could not be recognized in their truth,
i.e., not in their encounter and history, Dut only in that
peace which was really a poor one and not the peace of God
which is higher than ail reason. 130
Barth consequently sees in Schleiermacher*s doctrine of sin no
room left for either real sin or grace, at least not in the realm
of Christian consciousness absolutely posited by Schleiermacher
151
as the source of all theological knowledge.
130. "Aber dem, das Schleiermacher unter christlich frommen
Bewusstsein verstand, fehlte nun einmal die Offnung nach dieser
Richtung. In dem verschlossenen Raum, in den er allein hineins-
tarren wollte, konnte ja schon das gdttliche Rein zur Stinde als
solches, als das Nein Gottes seibst und das gdttliche J& der
Gnade als Gottes eigenes Ja nicht sicatbar werden. In ihm konnte
darum weder die Gef&hrlichkeit der Sdnde, die Nichtigxeit des
Nichtigen, nocn die Herrlichkeit der Gnade, konnten beifie nicnt
in ihrer Aahrheit, d.n. nicnt in ihrer Begegnung und (ieschichte
erkennbar werden, sondern beide nur in jenem Friedea, der nun
wirklich ein fauler Friede war und nicht der Friede Gottes, der
hdher ist als alle Vernunft." K.D III/3. p.333. of. p.39B.
131. CD IV/1. p.377.
CHAPTER IX
THE RECONCILER VS. THE RELIGIOUS EXAMPLE
In the first instance, it is important to point out that
the basic argument here is the distinctive difference between
Srunner's and Barth*s interpretation of Christ and that of
Schleiermacher is that according to Brunner and Barth, God be¬
came man Christ as God and man, therefore the appearing of
Christ is a mystery; whereas according to Bchleiertaacher, God
is in Christ who is a man, and therefore, He is a cult of per¬
sonality.^"
Barth, from the very outset, significantly points out
that the work of reconciliation is a divine activity and the
only true Reconciler is God Himself. As he says: "But it is
God who is Subject, the Actor in this event. Hot man, not God
2
and man, but God alone. The Word became flesh." It is His
3
majesty who has done something new and secured for fallen men
in their lost condition of diaastrous misery, something which
is said to be qualitatively different from the accumulations or
culmination of human achievements. Similarly, irunner holds
that Christ Himself as the Word of God is not to be regarded as
the highest development of human existence, but a new category.^
In this work, which is unique, man is unable to be a co¬
partner of God. In the sphere of reconciliation, all attempts
and efforts to divide this worx of salvation between God and
man are vain. It is God Himself alone who can achieve this vvorx,
1. The Meuiator, p.80.
2. Credo, p.66. cf. CD 11/1. p.562.
3. Lflffler, op. oit., p.313*
4* The Mediator, p.226; cf. p.-36.
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Barth says that tne divine reconciliation as a uni.ue event
ac.nieved alone in the revelation of God in Jesus Christ must be
maintained. It is God who reconciles the world to Himself once
and for all in Jesus Christ; it is also He who discounts our ef¬
forts to reconcile Him to the world and replaces our attempts
5
to participate in His own redemptive work. Brunner explains
that the true meaning of this work of God must not be diluted,
for God has given the world something which is absolutely new,
something which is decisively different from all the historical,
ideal and human. Therefore, we can hardly describe this Jord
of revelation in adequate terms but only respond to or believe
it.6 Barth also points out that God's reconciling work is very
different from all idealistic optimism on the basis of nature
and history or human experience. God as Keconciler is not to
be deduced from all these as a mere rational object of ours, or
7
as the principle of synthesis in our relation to the world.
Camfield further explains that this divine event of revelation
in Christ interrupts the temporal se;juential settings in history.
Though Christ enters into history, He is discontinuous with his¬
tory.^
Therefore, Barth directs our attention to the reconciling
God and His own redemptive work in Christ: "This one God and His
one work and Word is Jesus Christ. He, the Son of the Father
(in the unity of the Holy Spirit), is the face of God, the name
q
of God, the form of God, outside which God is not God." It is
because God has revealed Himself as the only Reconciler that all
other reconciliations have been radically compromised by Hie
5. CD 1/2. p.308; cf. God and Man, p.80.
6. The word and the World, p.45*
7. CD 11/1. p.77.
8* Revelation and the Holy Spirit, p.96.
9. CD 'IVTTT p.363."
231
revelation. He Has set up His righteousness and peace which the
world itself cannot have. He Himself is the origin and the cli¬
max of all true reconciliations.^ Therefore, God is the foun¬
dation of all reconciliation and redemption. Thus far, in what
has been discussed above, iirunner agrees with Barth by saying
that the aim of Christology should define how God establishes
communion with man and seta up His Lordship over us in jeauo
Christ.And he adds: "genuine Christian revealed religion is
an immediate encounter with God, but it is an encounter with
God in trie historical revelation of Jesus Christ.
It is God who indirectly reveals or directly attests Him¬
self in Jesus Christ; God Himself is the content o? this revela-
1 ■> n J
tioa, the rejected and the elected, the true Reconciler who
Himself is the righteousness of God. One must rely on Him or
2L
His sovereign grace only and not ply on the sentimental cheri-
A
sning of our Christian piety as if it were of the first import¬
ance or the inner significance in the work or in the doctrine
of redemption. Barth here criticizes Schleiermacher: "Theology
in general and with it the doctrine of the atonement could oniy
be the self-interpretation of the pious Christian self-conscious-
lb
ness as such, of the homo roligiosus incurvatus in se." or of
the unreal self-deceptive schematism of imagination which is at
bottom ex-human speculative vision. «e must simply recognize
jesus Christ as the revelation of God and accept it as truth.
10. CD II/l. p.78.
11• Revelation and Reason, pp.113f• of. The Christian
Doctrine of Creation and Redemption. Dogmatics 11. p.322; p.349*
12. Revelation and Reason, p.253•
13. cf. The Divine-Human lincounter, p. 104.
14. Barth: "In God's eternal counsel the election of re¬
jected man did not take place without the rejection of elected
man: the election of Jesus Christ as our Head and ttepresenta-
tive, and therefore our election as those wno are representee




He is 'the event1, as He is also, in tne absolute sense,
'tie ord'. For He breaka through ail futility; He gathers
up all human longing for the unattainable; He ia the mean¬
ing wnich ail history vainly sougnt; in Him tne Bternal en¬
ters time; He ia the fulfillment of all human desires* in
Him the destiny of man is achieve i, the goal ia attained.16
Barth affirms that this revelation of God ia truth in itself:
It is desus Christ, who is God's revelation, and tne reality
of this relationship in ueaus Christ is the work of the di¬
vine good-pleasure. God's revelation breaks through the emp¬
tiness of tne movement of thought which we call our Know¬
ledge of God. It gives to tnis Knowledge another aide, seen
from which it is not self-deception but an event in truth,
because it happens by the truth. 17
Thus, the difficulty here is twofold: one cannot sensually
idolize Jesus Christ by either setting up the boundaries of uod's
presence in Him or denying the freedom of God's immanence in Him.
Barth says:
God is free to be wholly inward to the creature and at the
same time as Himself wholly outward: totus intra et totus
extra and both, of course, as forms of His immanence, of
His presence, of the relationship and communion chosen,
willed and created by Himself between Himself and His crea¬
tion. This is now He meets us in Jesus Christ. Id
Therefore Barth has to affirm that the aivine truth and freedom
is in jesus Christ:
It is truth as the revealed knowledge of God. It is truth
in Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ does not fill out and improve
all the different attempts of man to think of God and to
represent Him according to his own standard. But as the
self-offering and self-manifestation of God He replaces and
16• Revelation ana Reason, p.II0.
17. CD 11/1. p.74. of. CD IV/1. p.53.
18. CO II/l. p. 315. of. Th-r .Mediator, p. 308.
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completely outbids those attempts, putting them in the
shadows to which they belong. 19
.Barth maintains the view that, while there is a way from Chris¬
tology to anthropology, there is none from anthropology to
Christology.^ Our knowledge, then, can in no way define this
revelation of Uod; our knowledge of Jesus Christ can in no way
identify or master this mystery of revelation as if it could be
explained in general terms. And he criticizes Schleiermacher:
It cannot be overlooked that the attempt of Sehleiermacher
to insert tiie Biblical and traditional Christology into a
certain part of his system which harmonizes the antitheses
of the finite and pne infinite, and of the spirit and nature
which was undertaken with so much love and art can hardly
be called successful especially under this presupposition
of a world-view. 21
Barth assures us that a simple trust in Christ is required: since
Christology can only proceed from the fact of Jesus Cnrist, on
wnich a proper awe for the mystery of Christmas is based, its
function is to denote the event of Incarnation as one specific
point in the world.^1'herefore, this event cannot be fully ex¬
plained in decisively terms because we have no knowledge of any
23
human possibility to comprehend this mystery. Brunner holds
similarly that it must be 'through Cnrist, who Himself is the
absolute wonder of God, the 'only begotten Son of God,' through
His act, which is the unique reconciliation for ail times and
19. CD 1/2. p.308.
20. CD I/i. p.143.
21. "Be tann nicht tlbersehen werden, da.es der mit so viei
Liebe und jurist unternommene Versuch Schieierm&ehers, die bibli-
sche und kirc.oliche Christologie seinem System der Harmonie der
Gegensdtze des Sndllchen und dee Unendlichen, des Geistes und
der iatur an bestimmter .'telle einzugliedern, gerade aucn von
dieser weitansohaulichen Voraussetzung her ais gelungen be-
zeichnet werden kann." KD 111/2. p.10.




all raen." "* Barta agrees with him where ae writes; "it is one
thing in the incarnation of the Word, in the once-for-all and
unique assumption of human nature into unity with His eternal
05
Son, into communion with His divine being."'
Earth points out that Scnieiermacher's mistake here is
due to nis doctrine of aixi which is not interpreted as a rebel¬
lion against Bod, and therefore as a result the relation between
God and man is not discontinuous:
According to Schleiermacner, the communion of man witn Goa
established by creation is not seriously compromised by ain.
Therefore neither need the worK of Christ consists in dead
man being made alive again, nor need tne unity of God and
man in Christ be a new creation, yor him Christ means sim¬
ply the continuation and completion of the development ini¬
tiated b.y tne creation of man in the direction of an ener¬
gizing of his God-consciousness. 26
Thus^Heconciler can only be interpreted by Schieiermacner as
an ethico-reiigioua hero wnose personality is typical for ail
men, his importance and significance to tnem is due to his in¬
fluence over them. It is no wonder that Brunner's words here
take on a severe tone: theologians cannot scientifically reduce
Messiah-Jesus to a mere extraordinary man. The depreciation of
the Person of Christ is not simply a matter of intellectual
foundations, but of prejudices, arguments derived from unbelief
which shelters under tne name of ''science." Consequently, there
would be no room left for the category of revelation in the New
27
Testament sense. Therefore, Brunner's verdict is: "Thus the
24. 'Purch den Christus, der selbst das absolute Gottes-
wunder, der 'einsiggeborene Sohn Gottes' ist —, durch seine
Tat, die die einmalige Ver30hnung fflr aile Zeiten und alle Men-
schen iat." Mystik, pp.334f.
25. CD II/l. p.315-
26. CD 1/2. p.134.
27• The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption,
Dogmatics, II. p.253* cf. "It is therefore just as false to main¬
tain that faith is born out of the historical picture of Jesus
as it is to claim that it can arise apart from the picture of
Jesus altogether." The Mediator, p.160.
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Jesus Christ spoken of by Schleiermacher, is never the Christ
of the Biblical and Reformed faith, but that of Schleiermacner,
i.e., an unrecognizable, distorted Christ accomplished by the
23
romantic concept of religion." Brunner judges that Schleier¬
macher sees, in jesus, religious behaviour represented in ideal
perfection, all on the plane of human possibilities, with Jesus
still holding a comparatively singular position as the highest
representative of human religion, still on our side but hardly
over against us as the revelation of the "wholly other" word of
29
God. Along this line of thought, JBarth also points out that
the Incarnation as mystery is not grounded, upon any human neces¬
sity or historical possibilities:
The becoming Ctne Word was made flesh! asserted of Him is
not, therefore, to be regarded as an element in the world
process as such. It rests upon no inner necessity of human
history, nor is it to be understood as having its source
in any such necessity. There is no condition of the world
or man which can form the basis of a claim or capacity
whereby this becoming can have been predicted. This becom¬
ing cannot be brought into connexion with creation. It can¬
not be regarded as one of its evolutionary possibilities.30
Brunner and Barth hold that although tnis mystery of re¬
velation has actually happened as a free event within the tempo-
31
ral and historical sphere, yet its true and original meaning
28. "So ist doch der Jesus Christus, von dem Schleiermacher
redet, niuimermehr der Christus des biblisch reforiaatorischen
Ulaubens, sondern ein Schleiermacherischer, d.h. ein durch jenen
romantischen Religionsbegriff volistandig, bis zur Unkenntiich-
keit, ver&nderter Cnristus." flystik, p.197.
29 • 'i'he jiord and the world, p. 39•
30. 0D~l/2. p. 134. cf. "Der Christiiche (ilaube ist nun ein-
mai ein hiiement, das sich, wenn es mit den weltanscnauungen ver-
mischt wird, auch in den grdssten 7er*diinnungen bemerkbar, una
zwar stdrend, zersetzend, als Bedrohung ihrer t'undamente, bemerk¬
bar macht. hofern er Glaube an Gottes Wort ist una sofern er
sich alo solcher auch nur in einem Brucnteii treu bieiot, kann
er .ja nicht Glaube an die flilder, die Weltbilder werden, wird er
diesen immer nur widersxehen xdnnen." KD II1/2. p.10.
31• The Mediator, p.30; cf. Revelation and Reason, p.31;
also: CD II/I. pp.10, 643-
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must not be obscured or violated by human co-oroinates or inter¬
preted in terms oi' the parallels of modern jargon which pretends
to be able to comprehend it directly or to master the original
and proper content of it as a Kind of knowledge which underlies
"52
human experience. Thus the freedom of aiviae immanence is fro¬
zen by our self-legitimized theory. Barth, 011 the other n&nd,
sees Christoiogy as the indispensable basis and criterion for in¬
terpreting and apprehending God's freedom. Any theory of God's
relationship to mankind and the world may be tested in light of
whether it also may be understood as an interpretation of the
fellowship and relationship which is created and sustained in
35
Jesus Christ. it may be seen why Brunner criticizes ail the
C-
philosophical or religious doctrines implying no divine intru-
'K A
sion as the Saving-history into history, tfundaamntally Burth
holds the same view, for he says that Christology meets the doc-
trine of sin like a vertical line crossing a horizontal. Srunner
continues his criticism by pointing oat that the divine activity
is consequently dissolved into time process, substituting the
eternal principle of the temporal sphere for the eternal trutn.^°
ho wonder Barth also asks: "How could Christ ever become possible
as the product of an immanent wori evolution? ho, the word's
becoming flesh is not a movement of the creature's own. Lixe
creation itself, it is a sov reign divine act, and it is an act
of lordship different fro creation." As he said: 'God's ord
37
becoming a creature must be regarded as a new creation."
32. cf. CO JLV/i. p.417; CD Ii/1. p.319-
33. CD 11/1. p.320.
34• Hevela tion and Reason, p.397.
55. CD iv7i. p.643-
36. rtevelation and Reason, p.397.
37. CD l/2. p.134- cf. Torrance: 'The most characteristic
asp ot of Berth's theology ie his emphasis upon the new numanity
in Jesus Christ incarnate, Crucified, and Hi.en, and who will
come again to renew the heaven ana the earth." Karl Bartn. The
Expository Times. LXVI. Oct.1954-Sept.1955. p.209.
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Therefore, in this respect, Barth points out that Schieiermacher's
starting point is wrong, and Brunner points out that the funJa-
mental mistake in Schleierrnacher' s Christology is not vsimply that
he is blind to the tact that Jesus Christ is a KdiVf] f^ZicriS
by God, but that he has reversed the proper order of what is first
and what is second. This mistake, of course, is rooted in his
concept of revelation. (As has been pointed out, it is but human
discovery.) Naturally ochleiermacher will follow hie basic prin¬
ciple and arrive at this conclusion. Brunner writes: "There tne
subjective is the first, and the objective if there is such
a thing at all is the second. But here without doubt, the
objective is the first, and the subjective even {/when} this
(is} not a feeling is the second. The <»ord is the first and
5Q
faith, the attitude towards it, is tne second."
38. 'The being of Jesus Christ is deduced and interpreted
from the being of man and the world instead of the other way
round, if we derive the atonement from creation instead of crea¬
tion from the atonement, if we described as tne first and eternal
ford of God that w.nich we think we can recognize, i.e. postulate
and maintain as the final word on the evolutionary process of
finite being and development. No ideas or pronouncements on a
supposedly attainable or attained teloe of the immanent develop¬
ment of creaturely being can do justice to the telos and there¬
fore the beginning, revealed in Jesus Cnrist. »*e can not over¬
look the fact thi t in relation to Jesus Christ tne New Testament
speaks of a new creation (Gal.6:15, II Cor.3:17), of a new man
created by God (Eph.4:24), not of a continuation of man but of
a 'new birth' (Jn.3s3)» and indeed of a new heaven and a new
earth (Rev.21:l. II Pet.3:13). And Jesus Christ is not regarded
as the fulfilment and highest form of the first Adam, but in
sharp antithesis He is described as the last Adam ("Trie first
man is of the earth, earthy, the second man is the Lord from
heaven," I Cor.l3:44f)." CD IV/1. pp.49f-
39. "Dort ist das Subjektive das erste, and das Objektive
wen.n es denn flberhaupt so etwas gibt — das zweite. Hier aber
ist ohne alien /.weifei das Objektive das erste, und das Subgek-
tive — auch dies *tein wefdnl — das zweite. Das .ort ist das
erste und der Glaube, die otellungnahme au inm, das zweite."
Mystik, p.132.
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It is clearly seen that both Brunner and Barth emphasize
that the appearing of desus Christ is a historical revelation,
a unique event, and tie is not a figure of historical develop¬
ment, the sura of human achievements, nor the religious ideal,
nor the living symbol of ethics which is represented by His pu¬
rest and most complete humanity as an example, but it it a new
conception to raanxind, a divine mystery,revelation of God
in time,^^the very God and the very man. It is God himself who
enters into humanity. Thus although this Son of God, who is the
Word which was made flesh as the flesh of our flesh,^among men
as man, the true and actual man, the crucified and risen, yet
all attempts or efforts to equalize or to determine His being
as the rational object of our theoretical faith in terms of the
plane of human level or in the xenotic sense of tne theory^are
not only illusory but also bound to fail.^ The decisive argu¬
ment here is that the Incarnation is a divine act, at bottom, a
divine secret. It is God Himself who originates this mystery,
man has no right to question God's rignt. Man, after ail, is
His creature, he must be obedient to hi3 Creator-Lord and simply
accept euch an event as truth in faith. Thus Torrance writes
that "the great heart of Earth's theology is the doctrine of
uesus Christ. In Him who is true God and true Man in one person
we are confronted with a mystery that is more to be adored than
40. The ediator, p.211; cf. The Christian Doctrine of
Creation and Redemption, Dogmatica, II. p.535-
41. urunner: 'He Himself is the Hevelation. Divine revela¬
tion is not a boox or a doctrine; the Revelation is something
that happens, the living history of God in His dealing witn the
human race." Revelation and Reason, p.8. cf. ;hiiosopnie und
OfiVenbarung. p.16.
42. CD 11/1. p.403.
43. K.D IV/2. p.93.
44. The Mediator, pp.3o0f« cf. D.M. Baiilie, God was in
Christ, (An Essay on Incarnation and Atonement). London: Paber
and Paber Limited, 1955, pp.94ff.
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expressed." Indeed, man can argue with man, but here he has
no choice; he cannot argue with God. This belongs to the very
nature of Christian faith, bays Brunner: "we are summoned to
stand in humble, reverent silence in the presence of a real mys-
A f
tery, not in the presence of an illusion." And he adds:
It pleased God to make known to mankind the secret of His
will in Jesus Christ, to reveal Himself in trie Incarnate
word, wut this revelation, although it was given once for
all, remains God's right and God's deed, and hence reser¬
ved to Himself alone. It is not and never can become some¬
thing at man's disposal. 47
According to Schleiermacher*s doctrine of Christ, there
is no need for the unity of God and man in Him as a new creation,
because he only ascribes to desus Cnrist tne causality of reli¬
gious feeling, as far as His work is concerned. In this case,
Jesus Christ is only viewed as a religious example, and man ul¬
timately possesses a kind of iramanental value, and Jesus Christ
is but conceived as the "Original image" (Urbild) of piety.
Brunner says: "This idea of he perfect example does not reveal
a divine mystery to man; rather, here man merely sees the perfec¬
tion of his own religious or moral faculty or possibility."^
In this direction, Barth can only see that one result is inevi¬
tably involved, i.e., deification of the creature. He employs
this term against Modernism. First he explains;
For when we are speaking of Jesus Christ, this word does
not possess its human-ness as an 'object of manifestation'
alongside itself. It is God's revelation to us in its hu¬
man-ness; inseparable from it, but in such a way that this
human-ness is not only inseparably linked with the word
on its own account, but also receives its character as
45- Karl Barth, The Expository Times, LXVI. Oct.1954-Oept.
195b. p.208.
46* The Mediator, p.276. cf. p.528.
47. The Divine-Human Encounter, p.16. c£. Revelation and
Reason, p. 51. Vom kerk des Heiligen Geistes, p. 2d.
40. Revelation and Reason, p.100. cf. p.505.
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revelation and its power to reveal solely from the word
and therefore certainly cannot in itself, abstractly and
directly, be the object of faith and worship. Where it is
made, such an object, recollection of really intended
•material object' is a belated revelation void of force.49
Then Barth criticizing the modernist view which makes Jesus
Christ a mere religious hero, rejects it as the deification of
creation.
The objection which Brunner and Barth make against Sohi-
eiermacher is that he rather appeals to the analogies of natural
process or human possibilities, ana does not know that Jesus
Christ is the revelation of God, a mystery which is enigmatic
51
to human discovery. According to them, certainly the histori¬
cal revelation, tnis Incarnate Word of God, includes all these.
Brunner says that "so far as the historical and visible side of
52
His life is concerned it is uite natural and historical."
But the way Scnleiermacher presents it is elective or surely
liable to cause misunderstanding. Barth, of course, admits the
complete humanity of Jesus who is a greater man than all the
others, but he ha3 to emphasize that He is qualitatively differ¬
ent from all of them because His singular person differentiates
53
Him from them as their true Lord. Barth then affirms his own
viewpoint and criticizes Schleiermacher for his defective view
of Christ which insufficiently presents a correct picture of
this special work of God:
Our first point is simply that although this new work (his¬
torical revelation) takes place within the sphere of the
creation and continuous presentation of the world, it is
still a special work, and not directly coincident with the
other. Nor can it be understood merely as the continuation
49. CD 1/2. p.138.
50. iioc. cit.
51. CD Tl/1. p.56; cf. CD IV/1. p.81; MystiK, p.143.
52. The Mediator, p.317.
53. CD IV/1. pp.l59f; cf. p.203.
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and crown of the work of creation (as Schleiermacher would
have it) although it certainly is this as well; for neces¬
sarily God the Creator is alive and active in it, continu¬
ing and completing His work. On the contrary, God so sur¬
passes himself in this new work that it is only here that
He can really be known, as it were retrospectively, as God
the Creator. 54
;»e see that Brunner virtually holds the same:
It is also true of the miracle of revelation that it too
includes all the 'lower' spheres of existence, and does
not eliminate or exclude them...It is possible to describe
the life of Jesus in purely human, natural 'immanental*
terms, although in so doing it is not revelation that is
described, 'l'his description is not false; only just as
in the case of the work of art it misses, precisely, the
decisive point, namely, that desus in the Christ, that He
is the revelation. 55
Those who interpret this Incarnate word of God merely in
a rational and ethical sense ought never to stop at this level
of the temporal and historical, but must go further. Basically
it is presupposed that this divine mystery is beyond the range
of our thought, an inconceivable wonder; otherwise there would
be no faith and revelation, but only theory and discovery. Ac¬
cording to Brunner and Barth, the knowledge of Christian faith
actually means acknowledgment. xhey 'botn hold the same view:
our knowledge of desus Christ could not at all determine its ob¬
ject, but rather, is determined by it, if the incarnation of the
>»ord is objectively real for us. Therefore, the knowledge of
this kind actually means acknowledgement and its expression is
termed confession (Barth). Thus, Jesus Christ is the incar¬
nate Word which is alive and above us. To acknowledge Him as
57
the living Word of God constitutes the Christian faith(Brunner);
54. CD 11/1. pp.506f.
55• Revelation and Season, pp.305f• cf. The Divine Impera¬
tive, p.241.
56. CD 1/2. p.175.
57. The Theology of Crisis, p.37•
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what does all this actually mean? Does this really sug¬
gest that God's truth is far more true than our truth; God's
<;ord is greater than man's word, so that His truth necessarily
appears as a mystery or even paradox to us? Can we at least
say in our human language (this poor language) that God is even
other than our extended "l"? Here there is no doubt, according
to Brunner and Barth, tney cannot start and stop at this level
as Schleiermacher does, but they must carry out tneir conception
further: even in this event of Incarnation, He is no other than
the Creator-Lord. Actually from the Christian's point of view,
his faith in revelation does not mean that it must be rationally
explainable to him, if faith really means faith at all.
Finally as -Barth asserts: "At all costs we must mane it
clear that an ultimate mystery is involved here, it can be con¬
templated, acknowedged, worshipped and confessed as such, but it
cannot be solved, or transformed into a non-mystery."Camfield
points out that the unique origin of Christ cannot be explained
in terms of rational truth or the universal law of life because
it is the transcendental eternal appeared in the temporal and
contingent.oJ" Thus, the appearing of Christ is, at bottom, to
be regarded as the concealing of His true being as the Son or
£ -J
.iord of God. Brunner affirms the original character of this
miracle as unique and incomparable: since Jesu3 is the "Only Be-
63
gotten," He can only be One of Hi3 kind. Therefore a paradox
53. Kierkegaard assures us: "This position cannot be media¬
ted, for all mediation comes about precisely by virtue of the
universal; it is and remains to all eternity a paradox, inacces¬
sible to thought." Fear and Trembling and Tne Sicxness unto Death,
(Translated with Introduction and Notes by waiter bowrie) Double-
day Anchor Books, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1954. p.66.
■Vl'/stik, p. 144.
60. CD 1/2. pp.l24f.
61. Revelation and the Hol.v Spirit, p.74; cf. The Chris¬
tian Doctrine of Creation and rteaemption, Dogmatics, II. p.333.
62. CD IVTTT p. 163. ~
63. Revelation and Reason. p.lOl; cf. The Mediator, p.248.
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is possible because it means one solitary fact, in this con¬
nection it is worth while to note that the aesthetic approach
in the interpretation of religion rooted in individuality is su¬
perseded. Brunner writes:
The miracle of the revelation in the person of Jesus Christ
is the unique historical event which has taken place once
for all; it is therefore without comparison, and, because
it is without comparison, 'without security' it stands
there, confronting thought. This implies the possibility
of rejecting it as 'folly' and 'offence.' 64
Therefore, Canifield states that tfod and man united in Jesus
Christ is the divine-human communion in which Cod meets man in
His sovereign grace, and man meets God in faith and his obedi-
ence. Brunner concludes at this point by saying that in prin¬
ciple no matter how true or profound are those human interpreta¬
tions of Jesus on the historical plane, they differ entirely
from the original witness of Christ in the New Testament which
can only be gained through the sovereign grace of God and our
humble faith which illuminates us for seeing this vision of His
special grace.00
Barth insists that the origin of this divine mystery of
revelation is really supernatural and the Virgin birth is the
sign of the occurrence of such a mystery. Schleiermacher merely
neutralized the special and distinctive concept in this aspect
of the mystery, and the sign as a miracle which is here designa¬
ted is thus explained away. Barth therefore criticizes him:
He simply comment: 'The general concept of a supernatural
generation' is quite enough to denote what Schleiermacher
means by the mystery of Christmas as he sees it, namely,
the miraculous manifestation of a creative activity united
to the activity of tne human species to produce the peculiar
64. Revelation and Reason, p.307. cf. The >Vord and the
world, pp.36f; The Mediator, pp.184, 240.
66 • Reformation Old and new, p. 7 5 •
66. The Mediator, p.76.
thing Jesus Christ. In other words, this thing signified
needs no sign at ail. a ha t Schleieraiacher calls 'a new
creation* is really the completion of the creation of the
human species, a completion the riece eity of which v-e may
know a priori, no the achievement of which may tnerefore
be postulated in the union of the divine with the human
in Christ as 'a supernatural generation.' Of this we are
not forced to say that it is new, and so it does not re¬
quire a sign. 67
Barth does not line Schleiermacher's denunciation of the
credal statement about the two natures of Christ. He nas done
injustice to the simple ana plain expression of "Primitive
Christology" and his misunderstanding of the purpose in the
formula is clearly seen by Barth:
Its purpose in this formula was to fix trie fact regarding
the subject active in revelation. Its purpose was not to
explain this fact. Neither by the formula itself, nor by
its pronouncement upon the miracle of Christmas, did it in
any sense pretend to have mastered the mystery of revela¬
tion. The purpose of this formula and of its narrower ex¬
planations and of its pronouncements upon the miracle of
Christmas was simply to state that (even in nis thinking)
man has no power over this reality. At this point he can
only begin to think, and only describe tne beginning of
his thinking. 68
Thus, Barth points out that Schleiermacher's denunciation here
is inadequate and mistaken, tie judges the credai expression of
natures according to nis own exposition of the word "nature,"
and thus his critique of it does not come to the point, for eacn
intends a different meaning of the word. In tnis connection even
the Scriptural usage of "nature" is different from that of Mod¬
ernism. Along these lines, Barth again criticizes Schleiermacher
It (Primitive ChristologyJ found Him (Jesus Christy attested
in the New Testament as uord of the complete man, as bringer
of life to both sides of his existence, as the Reconciler of
man's being. It was this being of man in its unity and in its
totality that was meant when it spoke of the 'human nature'
67. CD 1/2. p.180.
68. Ibid.. p.126.
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in Christ; and, on the other hand, the divine being in its
unity and in it3 totality, when it spoxe of the 'divine na¬
ture in Christ. These two basic concepts have therefore no¬
thing to do with the narrower concept of'nature', of which
the modernist Protestant is 'the sum of everything that is
corporeal, that goes back to what is elementary, in its va¬
rious divided appearance, in which all that we denote by it
is mutually conditioned, over against wnat is divided and
conditioned, in this way, we posit tfod as the unconditional
and absolutely simple* (Schleierinacher, Der Chr. Glaube s96.
1.). But what he calls 'nature' in this sense is contained
in the concept of early dogmatics, 0^'S^ natura divina,
only so far as Uod, because He is God, is also Lord over the
physis in this narrower sense. And what ne calls 'nature' is
contained in the concept of civ<^>u>7T.y>1 Stta'is natura humana♦
in the sense of early dogmatics, only so far "as man (because
he is man) is not only soul or spirit but body too, because
he exists not only spiritually and morally, but corporeally
also. Quite simply, then, it was an optical illusion, when
modern theologians, themselves interested only in the spirit¬
ual and moral, thought they could catch out the primitive
theologians (who were admittedly also interprested in the phy¬
sical) in an exclusive interest in the physical. 69
Brunner warns us: "Every attempt to destroy this quality of His
Being, which is defined in the 'Two Natures' doctrine, weakens
and finally completely destroys the scriptural belief in revela-
One may ask whether Brunner agrees with Earth's criticism
of Schleiermacher on the supernatural generation of the Redeemer?
Ho! Brunner departs from Earth's opinion on the doctrine of Vir¬
gin birth. He states that he is indifferent to this explanation
of the mystery: "We have no desire to attempt to explain the way
in which God works nis marvels; we simply stand amazed before the
Pact itself, without thinking it necessary to combine with this
71
certain inquisitive biological ideas." One cannot lose sight
of the fact that Brunner's rejection of "the theory of Virgin
birth," as he calls it, reflects, even remotely, a true sign of
the relationship of hia theology to that of Schleiermacher. it
69. Ibid-, p-128.
78. The ediator, p.248.
71- Ibid., p.326.
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is not only reactionary, but to a certain extent, even similar.^
Now we turn to discuss the fact that Jesus Christ is the
true Mediator who is the living Saviour of eternal night. Brun¬
ner says: man is no longer'h fixed star shining by its own light,
as he before imagined himself to be, but a star with borrowed
73
light." This is important, for there is no other way in which
that Jesus Christ can be described as a Mediator in the true
sense of the word. Otherwise it is certain that one will hold a
superficial concept of inuaanental value and it is not difficult
to expose this. Thus 3runner writes:
The religious hero will always be honoured, it is true, for
through him alone will a thousand others first perceive
What the religious life reaiiy means, But he himself will
desire that all snouid become what he is, and his influence
will be shown by the fact that others wiii become more and
more independent of him; ail that he has to do is to 'waxe
them out of their first sleep' (Schieiermacher). He is a
'mediator* only until others have reached sufficient inde¬
pendence and maturity, xhis we express by saying he has no
authority. He is only primus inter pares. 74
In this discussion, one important point is involved. Is this
Mediator a living person or a nistorical religious hero who has
long since been dead? Barth first questions this variant
approach:
This would be a fantastic ana not very helpful statement
if it simply meant that He is something like this for cer¬
tain men of His own age, and tnat He can be something of
72. Concerning the Life of Jesus: of. Nevelation and trea¬
son , p.189; The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption,
Dogmatics, II. p.257; The 'Divine Imperative, p.241; with Chris¬
tian Faith, pp.63, 387f, 427. Concerning the Virgin birth: of.
The Mediator, pp.322ff. with Christian Faith, pp.404ff. In this
respect, the writer would suggest that particularly in The Media-
tor, also in many respects, in The Divine Imperative, innumerable
examples could be found to illustrate the fact that Brunner's
theological thought in its form is reactionary and similar to
that of Schlei-rmacher's. of. infra, pp.
73. God and Man, p.82.
74. The Mediator, p.219; of. p.89.
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the same for certain men of other ag s by their recollec¬
tion of Him, by the tradition end proclamation concerning
Him, by a sympathetic experience of His person, or by some
form of imitation of His worn;. He would then be alive only
in virtue of the life breathed into Him as a historical
and therefore a dead figure by the men of other age3. 75
To correct Schleieraacher we assert that Christ is the living
Saviour for all men of all ages. He is the resurrected Lord;
He has life in Himself (Jn.5:26). In His own omnipotence, He is
the same forever as the true Mediator between God and man because
7 £)
He is here and now a; He was there and then. Brurmer also cor¬
rects this with a statement that;
The existence of the God-man, as such, constitutes revela¬
tion and salvation. This is why He is called the Mediator,
not primarily on account of His worx, but because in Him
the eternal word la present, in Him the eternal Light enters
into our world, because in Him the eternal purpose of God,
the mystery of God becomes known, because in Him we can see
God. 77
Brunner further says in criticism that the mystic does
not need a mediator, all he needs is his mystical view and expe-
73
rience which is immediate and not mediated; "all that the mod-
70
era man expects from Jesus is assistance." As he says; "One
needs it for stimulation; however, once the interior life is on
its way, it unfolds itself from its native power and no longer
needs an alien help. Therefore it does not come to a dependent
OA
condition which is permanent and fundamental."
75. CD IV/1. p.514.
76. Loc. cit.
77. The Mediator, p.404- cf. The Christian Doctrine of
Creation and Redemption, Dogmatics, II. p.574.
73. v'y' titc, p.590; cf. The mediator. pp.51f.
79• The Mediator, p.89•
80. "Man braucht sie sur Anregung; aber ist erst einmal
das innere neben. im Gang, so entfaitet ee eich aus eigener
Kraft and braucht xeine fremde Hilfe mehr. Also zu einem aauern-
den und grundlegenden Abh&ngigkeitsverhSItnis kann es hier nicht
koramen." Mystik, p. 121.
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In this cace, JBrunner points out that the importance of
Christ, according to this conception, and the redeeming element
in His vork is the teaching of Jesus which stirs the depth of
humanity: it does not reaily apply to His person out to His tea¬
ching. It is primarily the teaching, the truth itself, as the
redeeming element. Brunner continues:
This process is conceived in such a way that the connec¬
tion with the Ferson is not necessary or unconditional,
and the personal element declines in proportion to the
strength of the interior life of the person concerned.
The distance between the productive and the receptive ele¬
ment is relative; there are degrees of approximation until
complete assimilation has been attained. Here the thought
is the same a: that expressed by Schleiermacher in his
fifth Speech, where he says that religious heroes in gen¬
eral are needed so long an we are not strong enough to
stand on our own feet. Q1
in the light of the above discussion, on the v/hole, Barth
notices that it is because Schieierm&cher does not present the
true meaning of tne Biblical revelation that he thinks that one
can comprehend the Person of the Redeemer, i.e., the presence of
God in Christ, from the viewpoint of His humanity by an interpre¬
tation of continuity, JBarth writes:
The '.fairest Lord Jesus' of mysticism, the 'Saviour' of
pietism, Jesus tne teacher of wisdom and friend of man in
the Enlightenment, tiesus the inner meaning of exalted hu¬
manity in Schleiermacher,...Iooks at least pretty doubtful
in the light of what in the Old Testament sense is a sacri¬
legious profane intrusion, whereby it was believe: possible,
so to speax, to come to an understanding about the presence
of God in Christ, to take possession of it with the aid of
a few conceptions emanating from the humanity. -»'e may at
once conclude from the fact that such attempts as seculari¬
sation are not undertaken in the New Testament that in it,
too, the humanitas Christl comes under the reservation of
God's holiness, i.e. that the power and the continuity in
which the man Jesus of Nasareth, according to the testimony
31- The Mediator, p.8b« cf. p.86.
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of the evangelists and apostles, was in fact the revealed
word, consisted here also in the power and continuity of
the divine action in this form and not in the continuity
of this form as such. 82
"According to Schleiermacher," Barth adds, "Christ is. the Revea-
83
ler and Redeemer insofar as he causes the higner life." Brun-
ner also points out the modernist view of Jesus Christ:
The union of Christ with God is purely ethico-religious.
Thus in so far as the problem of His Person ia considered
there is no idea of a revelation in the biblical sense of
the word at all, hence no idea of decision, of the essen¬
tial ana unique, of the crisis in history which either
happens once or not at all. The man Jesus is in no sense
realiy the Redeemer. For no human being can be a redeemer
since he himself atanaa in need of redemption. 84
iVhen traced back to Schleiermacher* a original interpreta¬
tion of Christian life, the reconciliation is not based on the
forgiveness of sin but actually on the aestiny of a gradual pro¬
gress of human development wnich is due to the influence of the
ethico-religious life of Jesus, i.e., his historical greatness
85
in terms of relative magnitude. Therefore, it is also Brun-
ner's criticism that ail modern men expect, at bottom, is not a
forgiveness of sin based on the fact of atonement, but a forget¬
ting of sin based on the approximation to the example set up by
uhri«t. Thus, as far as our Christian life is concerned, sin is
not to be forgiven, but forgotten:
82. CD 1/1. p.371.
83. "Christus 1st naeh Schleiermacher insofern der Offen-
barer und Rrldser, als er das hdhere .beben bewirkt." Die Frotes-
tantische xheologie. p.413. cf. Caiufield, Reformation Old and
New, p.71.
84• The Mediator, p.277.
85. Barth: "Schleiermachers Christologie gipfelt in dem
Nachweis einer quantitativen Oberlegenheit, ftttrde und Bedeutung
Christi gegenttber unserer eigenen Christlichxeit, wobei eben da-
mit , dass es sich bei inm nur urn ein unvergleichlich grdsseres
Quantum dessen handeln soil, was wir als unsere Christlicnkeit
auch in una selbst vorfinden, gesagt ist, dass dieser Naohweis
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According to Schiciermacher, reconciliation through Christ
consists in the fact that under tne influence of Jesus the
'frustrations of life* which are caused oy ein, are increa¬
singly overcome, and that * tne longer and the more continu¬
ously we are led by Christ the more we forget sin* (Gil.II.
sl08.12j. Thus in this view reconciliation tor atonement)
consists in the removal of the difficulties and frustrations
of ordinary life. Guilt is something hich is best forgotten.
8b
Barth has also pointed out that Schleiermacher presents the per¬
son of Christ as the religious dynamic and that ills redemptive
work is due to His influence over tne religiouss
For the dignity of Christ consists in Hi' absolutely powerful
God-consciousness which is co-existent with His self-conaci-
ousness and excludes all in. That the religious conscious¬
ness is a Christian one mean; that it is one related to Christ,
and that again means that what in Christ is realized in ori¬
ginal and. perfect form (ideal) shall gradually also be impar¬
ted to it. This is redemption through Christ. 87
Thus, according to Cchleiermacher: "Christ's function Is simply
to expound and assert the continuity of human nature, which was
originally good and unbroken in it God-consciousness."
Obviously, Schleiermacher is opposed by Brunner and Bartn
with a charge that he has taken a different view of nan here.
It is the natural man who relies on nothing from outside except
the first stimulation; then he can work things out according to
a principle which is universal wit:in the sphere of immanence.
letztlich an die Behauptung, die Selbstbeh&uptung unserer eige-
nen Chriatlichkeit gebunden ist." Die Trotestaatiscne Iheolosie.
p.422; cf. The Mediator, p.88.
86. The christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption,
Dogmatics, II. p.288. cf. The ?»ord and the World, p.50.
<87. "Christi «firde bee-tent ruBmlicn In dem in seinem Selbst-
bewusatsein mitgesetztan, schlechthin kr&ftigen, alle SUnde aus-
schlieesenden Gottesbewusstsein. Dass das fromme Bewusstsein ein
christliches ist, will sagen, dass es ein auf Christus bezogenes
ist, und das wiederum will sagen, dass ihm das, was in Christus
in ursprtlngiicher una vollxommener uestalt (urbildlich) wirklich
i t, allradhlica eben falls mitgeteilt v/ird. Das ist die grid sung
duren 0hrir- tue. " Die frotestantische Tneologie, p.416.
88. CD 1/2. p.134. '
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With thie view Schleiermacher has turned the authority of the
word into relative and historical significance for he has reser¬
ved room for that which can redound to the natural man's credit
and merit. But both urunner and Barth see that the Word of God
is "not an impersonal 'principle,' nor an Idea of hod, but it
gq
is the personal Being of God, the Divine logos." First says
Drunner:
Christian faith is not without relationship to the self-
manifestation of God in the Word in time. Christian faith
is faith in Jesus Christ. This implies that the becoming-
one which is meant in faith, tne reconciliation, is such
a persona... event that in it the personal relationship re¬
mains a relationship and does not become a substantial
union or just an identity. 90
Then Barth:
What we see in Jesus Christ is that creation, too, and re¬
conciliation and redemption are a real act, but that they
are the real act of God's free love, we learn this in faith
and obedience to Him, to His person and work. We recognize
it in the grace of His revelation and reality. 91
And Barth makes the following objection to Schleiermacher: "For
the proper and primary objection to Schleiermacher's conception
must be to the effect that what he calls redemption through
Jesus Christ is not a free, divine act of lordship. The Word of
God is not seriously regarded by him as the Subject of the re-
92
deeming act, but as one of the factors in the world-process."
89. The edia tor, p.297. cf. CD IV/l. p»53«
90. "Christlicher Glaube ist nichts ohne Beziehung zur
Selbstoffenbarung Gottes in der Zeit, zum Wort. Christlicher
Glaube ist Glaube an Jesus Christus. Damit ist gesagt, dass die
Einswerdung, die im Glauben gemeint ist, die Versdhnung, ein
solches personhaftes Ereignis ist, in dem die persdnliche Be¬
ziehung eitie Beziehung bleibt und nicht zur substantielien Ver-
einigung oder gar zur Identitat wird." .ystiK, p.333. cf. The
Mediator, pp.216, 227, 232.
91. CD ii/l. p.514.
92. CD 1/2. pp.134f•
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Thus, in their critic!an of Gchleiermacher here, both
Brunner and Barth emphasise that God is a personal God; the re-
latiolahip between God and nan is a living and personal relation¬
ship wnioh really involves the divine act of free love. God can-
hot be reduced or replaced by a redemptive principle of inmarien-
tal eternity. He is not to be identified as the universal law,
but the Creator-Lord, the Divine Word of revelation in person.
The suffering of .Jesus Christ, according to Brunner and
Barth, is the omnipotent God condescending in self-humiliation,
in order to exalt mail. It is • the Judge woo is judged, for those
who deserve judgment. As Barth 3aysi
The Holy One stands in the place and under tne accusation
of a sinner with other sinners. The glorious One is covered
with shame. The One who live3 for ever has fallen a prey
to death. The Creator is subjected to and overcome by the
onslaught of tnat which is not. In short, the Lord is a
servant, a slave. 93
\nd Brunner adds: "God Himself gives Himself in the Son; the
suffering of Christ is the act of Goa, namely, His giving of
94
Himself, by which Ie establishes fellowship." Therefore, it
is God Himself who suffers for us men; the Holy One takes our
place as a sinner, through His own expiatory sacrifice, the for¬
giveness of sin is credible; through this objective atonement,
93
the justification of a 3inner is possible.
Jesu3 Christ is the true Lord, He is even free to be a
sinner among sinners and to suffer Himself for them in order to
96
be true to Himself. Brunner affirms that tne dimension of
93. CD IV/1. p.176.
94. The Divine-Human Encounter. p.l05« cf. The Mediator,
p.497» God and 7an, p.81.
95• The Mediator, p.524.
96. Barth: "Jesus Christ enters human existence as the
great joy which shall be to all people. He breaks down this re-
sistence to grace by Himself appearing as grace triumphant, as
the royai removal of our sin ana guilt by the action of God Him¬
self. Because our sin and guilt are now in the heart of God,
253
this Atonement is not historical, but super-historical.^' It is
Christ who has fulfilled all the righteousness of God, because
he Himself is the grace of God itself.^5
Brunner and Barth are most aware that Jesus Christ is the
living Lord of the resurrection. Brunner writes: "iVe believe
in the insurrection of desus because through tne whole witness
of the Scriptures He attests Himself to us as the Christ and as
qq
tne hiving Lord." Barth explains: "For by the resurrection of
Christ we have received our life from God as life in Him, the
risen Lord.""*"^ There is no fantastic or sensuous notion in the
Kesurrection as Sehleiermacher puts it. They admit that indeed
there is no objectivity in this event of the resurrection. Eas¬
ter is not an "historical event" which can be recorded, nor is
it an "occult process" which would be idealistically described
t>y a group of eye-witnesses under strict supervision (Brunner
What then is Easter? It is indeed a divine mystery. Burtn says
102
that its sign is merely tne empty tomb. Barth's thought here
turns back to the origin of this mystery and he treats tnis in
the same way as he did the Virgin birth.
they are no longer exclusively ours. Because He bears them, the
suffering and the punishment for them are lifted from us, and
our own suffering can be only a reainiscense of His." CD ii/1.
p.374.
97. Brunner: "The Atonement, the expiation of human guilt,
the covering of sin through His sacrifice, is not anything which
can be conceived from the point of view of history. This event
does not belong to the historical plane, it is super-history; it
lies is the dimension which no historian knows in so far as he
merely an historian." The ;>.jediator, p.504.
98. CD IV/1. p.550; cf. CD 11/1. p.150.
99• The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption,
Dogmatics, II. p.370. cf. The Mediator, p.563-
100. CD II/l. p.437.
101. The Yeaiator, p.575; cf. pp.578f.
102. Barth: "Again there is a full account of how Jesus
suffered and was crucified and died, but there is no real ac¬
count of His resurrection. It is simply indicated by a reference
to the sign of the empty tomb. Then it is quietly presupposed in
the form of the attestations of appearances of tne Resurrected."
CD IV/1. p.334.
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Barth insists that the death and resurrection of Jesus
Christ must be explained together in order to speak of it ri-
103
ghtly. One may tee that trie following expository statement
by Brunner could possibly reflect Schleiermacher's interpreta¬
tion of the suffering of Jesus Christ:
If all that happens in the Atonement is that men are set
free from the false idea that God is a judge, and they thus
gain confidence in a God who is kind, then all God has to
do is to overcome human error, a human fact is needed sim¬
ply in order to give men an illustration of the Divine Love.
The Death of Jesus has a purely demo.nstrative meaning. No¬
thing actually happens, but we are shown that nothing need
happened, that God always might have been known as Love.i04
Brunner tends to charge all those who minimize the significance
of Christ*s death to merely a demonstrative act. It can be in¬
ferred from Schleiermacher's doctrine of Christ that he shares
the above view. In that case, he has not fully understood the
meaning of Christ's death. No wonder, resurrection is regarded
by him as fantastic and sensuous. Barth affirms that the resur¬
rection of desus Christ certainly involves "a decision of faith,
10b
not for the acceptance of a well-attested historical report."
Therefore, he has said that "the event of master must be under¬
stood as tne true and original and typical act of revelation,
and therefore as an act of God sui generis a free act of grace,
free even in its innermost divine basis, according to the New
I Ad
Testament evidence."
103. Barth: "we can and must explain each of these two move¬
ments by the other. »ve do not speak rightly of the death of Jesus
Christ unless we have clearly and plainly before us His resurrec¬
tion, His being as the Resurrected. He also do not speak rightly
of His resurrection and His being as the Resurrected if we con¬
ceal and efface the fact that this living One was crucified and
died for us." ibid., p.343.
104. The Mediator, p.486.
105- CD IV7T7 p.335-
106. Ibid.. pp.304f.
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Brunner and Barth also discover with penetrating insight
that Schleiermacher actually possesses two soteriologles, but
their ways of presenting their opinion on this are different,
(since Berth's criticism of Schleiermacher differs from that of
Brunner to a certain extent). According to Barth, one cannot
simply taice Schleiermacher as a mystic par excellence. Barth,
in fact, emphasize that Schleiermacher has an apologetic purpose
in mind, therefore, he prefers to say that Schleiermacher posses-
107
ses "two motives." Brunner holds that Schleiermacher's system
i© but one of mysticism, therefore, he prefers to ©ay "two ele-
108
meats." First let us present Brunaer's criticism: "ue have
seen in Schieiermacher*s principal theological work of a later
time, two heterogeneous elements striving for precedence: his
mystical system of philosophy of identity ana the Christian
109
faith." Brunner points out that with Sohleiermacher in his
later years, the second element in his scientific theology is
dominant,^^and notes how aifficult it was when onleiermacher
tried to combine them in his Glaubenslehre. For Brunner sees
that Schleierraecher so delicately elaborates his thought in his
finding of the essence (»«esen) of religion as the common ground
of all religions and his attempt to amalgamate his philosophy
of religion with trie Christian faith. Brunner also notes that
they simply cannot be combined: "That Schieiermacher needed, such
an operation of thought, in order to relate hia concept of re¬
ligion to Christian faith, shows clearly enougn that the two
principles are absolutely uncotabinable. Secondly we see
107. 'he i rotestantische Theologie, pp.386; 402.
108. Systix, pp.363; 346.
109. "Sir haben gesahen, dass in Schleiermachers massgeben-
dera theoiogischem 3pSt- and Hauptwerk zwei heterogene Eiemente
urn den Vorrang kSmpfen: sein identitytsphilosop.hisch-mystisches
System und der christiiche Glaube." Ibid., p.365.
110. hoc, cit.
111. "Dass Schieiermacher eine solche Gedankenoperation nd-
tig hatte, urn seinen Religionsbegriff mit dem christliohen Giau-
ben in Beziehung zu setzen, zeigt docn wohl deutlich genug die
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Barth's view:
One cannot subsequently speak christologically, if Christo¬
logy has not already been presupposed at the outset, and in
its stead other presuppositions have claimed one's atten¬
tion. On the contrary, one must h ve the experience of Mt.
6:24, of either hating the one or loving the other, or of
cleaving to the one an.; despising the other. And so Schleier-
macher's romantic conception of history...on the one hand,
and...fhis^ christocentric efforts on the other, could only
render each other unworthy of credence. 112
Schleiermacher was charged by them for having a system
which involved a serious theological disjunction between theol¬
ogy and Christology, for his Christology is seen against the
background of his theological thought. Barth writes:
In Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre, his Christology is the
great disturbance, thougn not a serious or active one,
however, a disturbance, what he meant to say, perhaps it
could have been said better, clearer, more conclusive, if
he had said it in the form of a circle with one centre, in¬
stead of an ellipse with two foci. 115
Barth goes on to explain that taking ail the basic statements of
Church dogmatics as a whole, Christology must either be percep¬
tible and dominant in all tnese statements, or else It is not
ChristologyBrunner however admits tnat "thus Schleiermacher,
is throughout, even as a 'Christian1 theologian, a representative
115
of the immanent conception of religion and of revelation."
And he points out:
absolute Unvereinbarkeit der beiden Frinzipien." Ibid., p.l29»
cf. p.359.
112. CD 1/2. p.123.
113. "Die Christologie ist die grosse Stdrung in Scnieler-
machers Glaubeaalehre, vielleieht keine allzu wirksame Stttrung,
aber eine Stflrung. was er sagen wollte, ware vieileicht besser,
einleuchtender, geschlosaener gesagt wordea, wean er es in form
eines kreises mit einen Mittelpunkt, statt ia Form eiaer Ellipse
mit zwei Brennpunkten h&tte sagen kdnnen." Die Protestantiaohe
Theologle, p. 385. cf. pp. 4191* •
114. CD 1/2. p.123.
115« 'Schleiermacher ist also auch als 'Qhristiicher'
Theologe durcnaus ein Vertreter der immanenten Religions- and
Ofienbarungsauffasung." jystlk, p.173.
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But, in theology, as trie years go by, trie disturbing ele¬
ment, <jesus Christ as the only Redeemer, lae penetrated
into nis system of continuity. Now the question, is: which
force of disturbance and breaKing-tnrough proceeds from
tnis new elementv ...At the first gl; noe the intrusion
seems to be a moat powerful one, for the whole Glaubens-
lenre is made up 'chriatocentrically.' The condition Cof
man} apart from the redemption in Christ is the theme of
the first part; the redemption through Christ is that of
the second. Therefore, desus Christ is the centre which
links and determines all.
We have, however to ask, Brunner continues, whether tie content
of the teaching corresponds to tnis external structure. Tne
conclusion is No! 'The christocentricism here as can be pre¬
sumed from tne analysis of the first part is quite a different
one from that of the Christian faith, indeed, it is a misappre¬
hension.
Thus, Schleiermaciier's theology appears chrit tocentric,
in spite of the fact that it contains some revolutionary thought
opposed to his romantic conception of religion which is due to
his being deeply influenced by his contemporaries. Nevertheless,
according to the final analysis of Brunner and Barth, this is an
unreliable presentation of Christ. For Barth noias that only as
we begin with the Knowledge of Jesus Christ, can we elaborate a
theology in which a distinction between the aivine and the human
116. "Aber in der Theologie dr&ngt sicb .it den jahrexi immer
mehr das stdrenue Element, Jesus Christus als der ainzige, als
der Eldser, in das System der Stetigkeit hinein. Die Frage ist
nun, welche Kraft der SttJrung und Breehung von diesem Neuen aus-
geht...Auf den ersten Blick scheint der Einbruca ein ganz gewal-
tiger zu sein. Denn die ganze Claubenslenre ist ja •christozen-
trisch' aufgebaut. Der Zustand, abgesehea von der Erldsung in
Christus, ist das Thema des ersten, die ErlOsung durch Christus
das des zweiten Teiles, Jesus Christus also die zusaauaenhalteade
una bestimrnende Mitte von ailem." Also: "Der Christozentrismus
ist hier, wie aus der Analyse des ersten Teils zu vermuten ist,
ein ganz anderer ale im christlichen Glaubea, ja, er ist ein
MissverstHndnis." Mystik, p.346.
25b
it worked out automatically; in this any attempt to replace the
order A-B by the order B-A will become naturally impossible. If
one wishes to elaborate a wholly christological theology, a
theology of revelation and grace one must emphasize the Christo-
logical nature of it from the very beginning and all the time;
117
only thus can it be conclusive and truly effective. As he
says:
Luther and Calvin did not need to aim at a *christocentric'
theology, like Schleiermacher...because their theology was
chrietocentric from the very outset, and without trie singu¬
lar attempt to make or call it so. It did not need to be¬
come Christocentric. And how can theology or piety or church
life become christocentric, if it is not so at the very out¬
set? The strainings and the unhealthy zeal and historical
and systematic devices by which the moderns have tried to
become christocentric bear clear and eloquent testimony that
they were not christocentric at the outset and therefore
cannot be. 113
Therefore, Brunner concludes his criticism:
Schleiermacher*s Christoiogy is a desperate struggle with
this tough consequence. He conceived Christ only histori¬
cally, i.e., only as nii-torical force; nevertheless [the
effort of 3 His activity was to be an infinite one, He ex¬
pounded Him as tne product of development, nevertheless He
is claimed to be perfect. The whole discussion about Christ
is a series of acts of violence, in which Schleiermacher
the Christian struggles against CSchleiermacherlj the philo¬
sopher. Precisely his Christoiogy remained therefore uniruit-
ful in the 19th Century, and that category alone was effec¬
tive, under which he shelters all: the causality of the his¬
torical force, the relativistic hittoriciem. 119
117. CD 11/1. p.583.
118. CD 1/2. pp.3b0f.
119. "Schleiermachers Christologie ist ein verzweifeltes
Ringev mit dieser stahlharten Konfcequenz. Er fasst Cnristus nur
historisch auf, d.h. nur ais gesohichtliche £raft; trotzdem soli
seine .Virkung eine unendliche sein. Er stelit inn dar als Pro¬
duct der fintwicxlung, trotzde soil er vollxoiamen sein. Die
ganze Ausfiihrung fiber Christus ist eine Kette von Gewaltakten,
mit denen der Christ Scnleieriaacher sich gegen den Denver wenrt.
Gerade seine Christologie ist darum im 19« u&hrhundert unfruchtbar
25 9
Finally, B&rth can only see now human efforts at systematization
are in conflict with a true faith in the objective reality of
revelation. It is thus seen that Schleiermacher went astray in
hi3 effort to reach Christ and so failed in hie attempt. But
this modernist tradition is still far too active amongst us.
Should we try to follow Schleiermacher we would be likely to
find ourselves in the fallacy of proving Christ by a system of
our own. If we believe that this is perhaps not the conclusion
at which Schleierrnacher has arrived, we surely involve ourselves
120
it the possibility of being misunderstood from all sides.
geblieben, und wiritsam war ailein die Kategorie, unter die er
alles stellte: die Urs&ohlichkeit der geschichtiichen Kraft,
der relativistische Historismus." Mystik, p.206.
120. CD 1/2. p.9; of. 1rotestantische Theologie, p.421.
CHAPTER X
THE CHURCH OF CHRIST VS. CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
1. The Church is based on the Word of God, not
the essence of human community.
Brunner and Barth set forth the doctrine that the Church
is a community which is based on the Word of God, and not on
any other bases.^ Otherwise, as Barth aaysj
Those who believe in their Church and theology, or in chan¬
ged men and improved circumstances, are on exactly the same
road, the road to uncertainty. This is betrayed by the fact
that all of them, incidentally but quite openly, and with
the unteachable ferocity of a secret despair of faith, have
to take refuge in reason or culture or humanity or race, in
order to find some support or other for the Christian reli¬
gion. But tne Christian religion cannot be supported from
without, if it can no longer stand alone. If it aoes stand
alone it does not allow itself to be supported from without.
Standing alone, it stands upon the fact of God which justi¬
fies it, and upon that alone. There is therefore no place
for attempts to support it in any other way. Such attempts
are a waste of time and energy. 2
On the other hand, it is equally significant to take notice of
what Brunner says here: "The Word of God can be found only in
the message of the Church. And man can share in truth only by
becoming a member of that communion.In this connection, as
Mackintosh puts it, "Bartn's only purpose is to let it be seen
that no other criterion can be a substitute for the word of God.
All Churches profess to accept the .ord of God as the supreme
rule of faith and life. Shall we not, he asks, maxe an effort
1. The Word and tne »<orld, pp.llbf. God and Man, p.109*
CD 11/1. p.622.
2. CD 1/2. p.357.
3* The Word and the world, p.119.
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to take this profession seriously?"'* To quote Berth*3 own
words: "It is not nan as he is going to maice something of the
Word of God, but the Word of God as it i3 going to make some¬
thing of man. Of man yes, with all the problems of his be-
haviour and therefore in the whole range of his activities."
Brunner and Barth certainly realize the importance of
the human community to individuals as Schleiermacher does.
/f
"Humanity means fellowship." "Man cannot be man *Dy himself';
he can only be man in community." Brunner further explains that
love can only operate in community, and only this operation of
love makes man human. Actually the individual's present exis¬
tence is enriched and renewed by the human "Thou" wnich condi-
7
tions his own existence and is not an accident of it. There¬
fore, Barth says, regarding tne faith of the Church in its re¬
lationship to the significance of community:
it is faith as it lives by and for and in and with this
fellowship the faith of tnis fellowship and as such the
faith of individual Christians. Just as a man would not
be a man in and for himself, in isolation from his fellow-
men, so a Christian would not be a Christian in and for
himself, separated from the fellowship of the saints. With
his personal faith he is a member of this body of Christ.8
Brunner and Barth's decisive opposition to Schleiermacher
here is that the essence of human community is not the basis of
the Christian faith on wnich the Church builds herself. Neither
the progress of culture is to be identified with the advancement
of the Church nor the religious spirit of the collective life
Q
with tne true meaning of the Christian fellowship. Barth says
about Schleiermacher that "trie Kingdom of God, according to
4» Types of Modern Theology, p.270.
b. CD Il72. p.546.
6. CD IV/1. p.778.
7. Man in Revolt, p.106.
8. CD IV/1. pp.750f. cf. p.778.
9- cf. KD III/4. p.691.
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Sehleiermacher, is absolutely and unequivocally identical with
the progress of culture.Brunner and Barth think that they
must point out that the distinctive difference between the opin¬
ion they hold and that of Schleierraaeher"^ is that the Church
is a spiritual reality. It represents the work of God in the
world in its temporal and historical, earthly and visible form,
but this work among men is different from the work of man,
though it is in tne world and in the community of mankind, yet
the true meaning of our Christian life does not lie in its social
characteristic itself, but Zv we trust ourselves in Him.
They affirm time and again that the Kingdom of God is not built
by men. Pirst says Barth: "In its humanity it is one histori¬
cally feeble organism with others, but it is the redeemed commu¬
nity justified by the divine sentence and honoured with the know-
12
ledge of tne justification of the world." "It is not by the
obedience, the freedom, or even the love of these men that the
Church is built up and lives. It lives wholly in trie power of
15
ita Lord and His Spirit." Is it not important to point out
here that the Church lives in the Holy Spirit? According to
Barth, it is the Holy Spirit which turns what is objective to
14
subjective. Certainly without the Holy Spirit it is unthinka¬
ble that our faith could become our experience. No wonder
Schleiermacher so emphasizes the significance of the community
and unity of the people, or the human spirit this Christian
spirit of the Church. His purpose^Here is just the same as that
10. "Das Reich Gottee ist nach Schieiermacner mit dem
Portschritt der Kultur sohlechterdings und eindeutig identisch."
Die Protestantische Theologie, p.5<iB.
11. i)ie I'heoloKie und die Kirche, p. 180.
12. CD IV/lT p.151.
15* Ibid.. p.152.
14. von Balthasar, op. cit., p.216.
15« Barth: "Wenn Schleiermacher Uber Chriatus und den
Christen und ihr gegenseitigea Verhfiltnis spricht, dann hat er
zunflchst weder diesen nooh jenen, sondern einen diese beiden
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of Barth seeking a way of transiting what is objective (the
reality of revelation) to subjective (the experience of our
faith). But Schleiermacher is appealing to the essence of human
community as tne medium which is common in the experience of the
individual, i.e., the feeling of a man which connects man to hu¬
manity. In other words, Barth appeals to the Holy Spirit, the
Spirit of God, for the transition of what is objective to sub-
1
jective; Schleiermacher to feeling, the essence of man, for
the transition of what is subjective to objective opposite to
Barth's. Once again, it is clearly seen that they both stand
here in diametrical opposition to each other as far as the con¬
tent of their theological thought is concerned. Then says
Brunner:
We must nave a live Cnurch which has an actual word to
speak in our muddled condition. But what is tne use of a
Church which, in order to be up to date, has ceased to be
a Church? we are losing tne foolisuness of Ine Gospel oe-
cause we are ashamed of it; and we are substituting for it
a modern religious ethical programme which seems to be
better fittea to our generation, but wnich, in fact, is
only the wisdom of man, has no moving power, and ends in
mere fussiness. 1'7
umfassenden Begriff vor Augen, ndmlich das 'Gesaratleben*, die
Menschheit, die Geschichte der 'menschlichen Hatur.* Es gent in
dieser Geschichte urn die 'Erldsung' der menschlichen Natur."
Die irotestantische Theologle, p.416;ef. C. Welch, The Trinity
in Contemporary Theology, (London: SC l Press Ltd., 19b3), p.5*
16. Barth quotes Schleiermacher's sermons: ''lamer geht die
erteilte Belehruag darauf hinaus, dass es gelte, dieee Gegensfltze
in ihrer Relativitfit, in ihrer bloss quantitativen Gegenafltzlich-
keit zu verstehen, in ihrer Mitte oder Gber ihnen das 'gemeinsame
(Jeftihl* oder den 'ausgleicnenden gemeinsamen Ton,' das *Eine, was
not tut,' die 'g&rizlicne Rune der Seeie in Gott,' das 'Gute' (des-
sen Merkmal es ist, eines zu sein, w&hrend das Bdse ein Mannig-
faltiges ist), die *Gemeinschaft,' die 'Einheit,* die 'Gleichheit,'
die ' Einfalt des Gemcites desu' zu finden, der Ort, wo wir z.B.
'den i*rieb unseres eigenen Uemdtes und die Eingebung and das nierk
des hi. ueistes nioht mehr zu unterscheiden. vermtJgen.' 'Notwendi-
gerweise muss die Wahrheit, die Gott will, muss diejenige Gestai-
tung die es Verhflltnisses, in der sein wille erfdllt werden Kann,
in der Mitte liegen zwischen beiden.'" Die Theologie und die
Kirche, p.147.
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According to Brunner, the moving power is not the objective
spirit of Idealism, which is not based on a personal idea of
1 R
freedom, but 0:1 the universal life of 3pirit. Faith in the
Word of God is different, it is the Spirit of God who speaics
1 q
to our heart and activates our decision in faith. ^ Therefore,
the objective spirit of Idealism cannot be equated with the
Spirit of God.20
Fundamentally Brunner and Barth both take a severely cri¬
tical view of this rationalistic connection of individuals which
in based on the common ground of the people as if the existence
21
of a community is caused by a natural unity. First let us see
the direct way in which Brunner reacts to this:
:.;an stands in the context of Spirit. But that too is not
community but unity; that which is essential in the one hu¬
man being is essential in tne other. This one essential ele¬
ment, therefore, in the last resort, makes the one independ¬
ent of the other. He can always 'tell himself' what the
other could tell him. He has no need of the other. The unity
of reason is ultimately a principle of independence, of
self-sufficiency; to it, to be dependent upon others and
connected with others seems to be something accidental or
transient. Thus community is not established. 22
17* The Theology of Crisis, p.90.
18. "The relation of the individual to the community in
the system of objective Idealism...is not the idea of freedom
which predominate*, but that of the universal life of Spirit,
of the 'objective Spirit.'" Man in tevolt, p.296.
19. "This decision is a gift, th highest activity of the
self is the gift of God. This echo of the word of Christ in our
heart, as the speech of God in us, is Holy Spirit." The iedlator,
f.283.
20. "The spirit of man is not to be understood from below
but 'from above,' tne human spirit has a permanent relation
with the Divine Spirit; but it is not the Divine Spirit." Man in
Revolt, p.236.
21. As Bultmann puts it, according to Schleiermaoner:
"Everyone has an •Empffinglichkeit' (susceptibility) for all
others." History and .sohatolo* v. (.The Gifford Lecture 1936.
Edinburgh: The University Press, 1937), p.111.
22. Man in Revolt, p.437. cf. The Christian Doctrine of
Creation and Redemption. Dogmatics, II. p.173*
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Secondly, let us see the way B&rth corrects and denounces this:
There are here, varying courses taken by religious enthusiasm,
which wishes to submit Christian life to the dictation of what
is called the Spirit, or of an "inner light" which is alleged
to be divine, or simply to the dictates of the conscience of ail
individuals. This is based on the erroneous belief that the or¬
dinance governing the Church life is committed into man's hands.
When viewed from the standpoint of the basis, the power and the
essence of the Christian life, and from that of the true service
p-z
of God, this form cannot be substantiated or justified. On the
other nand, Barth. affirms that the fellowship of the Christian
life is not a mechanistic one, but a living community: Christ
does nop assemble iJiaividuaxa or preserve the Christian fellow¬
ship as a group of uniformity, but as a particular community in
which one can recognize his own individuality and by His power
one can confess that "I am a living member of the same, and will
be so for ever." Thus, it is a matter of correspondence, reflec¬
tion and repetition in the relationship between the objective
ascription and the subjective appropriation of salvation within
24
this community of problems. Tirelessly, Barth analyses the
views of modernist thought in conclusion at this point:
To it therefore proclamation is a necessary expression of
life for the human community called * the Church,' anjex¬
pression in which one man, in the name and for the advance¬
ment of a number of other men, drawing from a treasure com¬
mon to him and to them, gives forth, for the enrichment of
this treasure, an interpretation of nis own history and
present state, as evidence of tne reality alive in this
group of men. 2b
Srunner seems to have agreed with Barth w.nen he says:
This conception of the religious society, like the general
Tne Knowledge of God and the Service of God, pp.l2bf.
24. CD IV/l. p.149.
25. CD 1/1. p.68.
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conception of raan and trie particular conception of the re¬
ligious man underlying it, is a throughly individualistic
one. The primary thing is the religious experience of the
individual, which leads him to his neighbour, in order
that it may find expression for itself. 26
Therefore, as a result, Mackintosh comments on this point that
the proclamation of the Church is eccentric, removed, from the
centre of its proper criterion; "So Modernist Protestantism lost
the proper criterion for Church teaching, the standard set over
against it. The conscience of the preaching; Church was gone,
and other criteria derived from xmmanentist philosophy, science,
27
or the conception of sound civilization, put in its place."
It is no wonder that Berth so affirms the necessity of obedience
to God's command which is the true service of the Church: no re-
ligious necessity or human capacity is to take part in the Church
service, but only "the necessity of obedience to the gracious
will of Jesus Christ present anu active in their midst a neces-
po
;ity which unites them into the Church."
Seen, from these passages ,.uotea above, botn Brunner and
ttarth sugguet in one way or another, that Schleiermacher actually
absolutizes, human beings and human actions. His approach is al¬
ways man is primary, uod is secondary; therefore, no doubt, ex-
pq
perience is first, and faith is second. But according to Brun-
ner and Sarth, the Church has its origin in the revelation of
God, for it is constituted by and bound to His ssord; it has, in
fact, its supernatural dimension hidden from the world and this
must not be explained away, as Barth says: "The coming of the
Kingdom of God has its trutn in itself, not in that which does
26. God and Man, p.103.
27. Types of v.oder.i Theology, p.270.
28. The Knowledge of God and the service of God, p.XXVII.
29. "The mystical experience of identification lies in the
direction of knowledge, but it does not lie in the direction of
faith." The Divine-Human encounter, p.110.
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or does not correspond to it on earth."
2• Tne object of faith is a mystery of revelation, not
the principle of human development.
According to Brunner and Barth, the terrible mistake
31
which Schleiermacher has made here is that trie ODject of faith
32
ia not a mystery or the revelation of God, but a religious
truth or ethical programme on the psychological or sociological
level formed or adopted from a general and normal process of na¬
ture and of history which can be phenorne.nologicaily perceived
33
or conceived. Thus this natural and ethical interpretation
of the Christian faith deviates from the divine revelation and
this is intolerable:
To be sure, even in the framework of an ethics which gives
man an answer to his own questions many profound and true
and serious and fruitful things are said, things which we
do well to ponder...But the fact remains that an ethics of
this kind spreads a veil over its relationship, and man's
relationship, to tne revealed command of God, and that this
veil has only to be seen to be recognized as intolerable.34
Therefore, in this chapter, the writer is going to discuss fur¬
ther the concept of revelation, from time to time, when it
30. CD IV/1. p.312. cf. "it has to know the third dimension
of its existence. Yet it also has to know that it is defenceless
against the interpretations to which it is subject on this two-
dimensional view." Ibid.. p.653.
31. Barth: "When we understand the Christian life in the
light of its origin ana object, it is simply and without reser¬
vation the life of Jesus Christ Himself, so far as men through
God's Holy Spirit are unite > with Him in faith, so far as His
life becomes theirs and their life His." The Knowledge of God and
tne Service of God, p.13). cf. p.l55»
32. Brunner: "The Church knows that she lives on the divine
revelation, which is Truth...the divine revelation alone is both
tne ground and the norm, as well as the content of her message."
Revelation and Reason, p.3• cf. Barth: "The mea gathered into
the community and acting as such still stand in need of the grace
of God, i.e. of their invisible Lord and His invisible Spirit;
that it is Fie who controls the Church without in any sense being
controlled by it." CD iV/I. p.633.
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relates to the object of faith of the Churcn. Brunner reminds
us: "we must first treat of the word of God, of tne divine seif-
35
revelation, if we wish to understand what the Church is." In
this line of thought we first consider how McConnachie writes
with reference to Modernisms
Revelation was everywhere, if only v»e had eyes to see it.
History was tne gradual progressive revelation of God in
the human spirit. Divine revelation completed itself, not
in a break with the natural and spiritual conceptions of
man, but in a continuation of them. It consisted in extend¬
ing, deepening, and clarifying the religious consciousness.
36
tilth the advent of modernist knowledge, man's position in nature
and the world has been re-defined. He is called to discover the
true significance of the world-whole by ascertaining his own re¬
ligious consciousness.
The basic argument involved is that according to Schleier-
maeher, the work of redemption is not regarded as done by God
Himself alone through His gracious mercy in the historical reve¬
lation in Jesus Christ but as a tasx to perform and an aim to be
realized by a group of men united and called the "Churcn." Thus,
the essence of faith, or the <vord of God is reduced to or becomes
equivalent to the values of the spiritual and moral efforts of
man on one hand and the culture of the people or tne knowledge
of nature is idolized as the object or the counterpart of Chris¬
tian piet.y on the other. This is why .Brunner has pointed out
that:
33. Barth quotes bcnleiermacher's sermon that the Church
is the perfect revelation of tne highest being in the world.
Die Theologle und die Kirche, p. 177.
34. CD II/2. p.545.
35. God and Man, p.113.
36. Reformation Issues To-day, Reformation Old and Hew,
p.108.
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These are all unsuccessful attempts, to add to and combine
with the mystico-aestheticai concept of religion the ethi¬
cal character of the Christian faith. How could it be
otherwise? A'hat does not come under the category •word,'
al30 can not have the quality of'seriousness.* What is not
heard cannot be obeyed. 37
Barth explains the situation that involved Schleiermacner in the
superficial view of the philosophical optimism. It was the
idealist philosophy which led Schleiermacher to consider man's
existence as a sum of impulses in his immediate self-conscious¬
ness, and to discover an original disposition or foundation for
the piety which was to be realized in history. Thus, the prin¬
ciple of knowledge in dogmatics simply means the self-interpre¬
tation of this definite piety which is historically real. Con¬
sequently, the whole presupposition of human existence here is
far too naive, when viewed from the standpoint of its real pro-
Ci
bleras. It can be seen that in a slightly different way Brunner
agrees with Barth's criticism by saying that it is:
Schleiermacher who has, above all, undertaken an attempt in
a great style, logically to establisn and justify the com¬
promise of a mysticism of this kind and culture. Ae have
already become acquainted with this synthesis: It is nothing
else than the combination of the fundamental conception of
the philosophy of identity with an idealistic teleology. 39
37. "Es si id alles missgltlckte Versuche, mit aem mystisch-
Msthetischen Religionsbegriff dem ethischen Charakter des ehris-
tlichen Glaubens nachtrdglich zu verbinden. <Vie Kdunte es anders
sein? Aas nicht unter der Xategorie ' #ort' steht, kann auch
nicht die Qualit&t 'Ernst' haben. Das kein Hflren ist, kann auch
kein Uehorchen sein." Mystik. p.138.
38. CD 1/1. p.39.
39. "Schleiermacher vor allem, der einen Versuch ira gros-
sen Stil unternomraen hat, den Ausgleich von Mystik dieser Art
und Kultur gedanklich zu begrdnden und zu rechtfertigen. Wir
haben diese Syntnese bereits kennengelernt: Sie ist nichts &n-
deres als die Verbindung der identit&tsphilosophischen Grund-
idee mit einer idealistischen Teleologie." Mystik. p.392.
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Therefore, revelation is thus reduced to merely an imper¬
sonal principle, a datum dependent upon human discovery. The
existence of the Church is only justified for the function of
the community and unity of th people and it is appraised as
just one of many other common human activities, as if the Church
were advancing in her strides in the sphere and context of their
spirit. In this respect, one would venture to ask what eventual¬
ly is the difference between the advaxicement of the Church and
40
the development of culture?
In fact, according to Brunner and Barth, in Schleier-
macher's presentation of the Church, it is not the Christian
Church which he is talking about, but he has actually degraded
/ 1
her to merely a human institution, a religious club,1 founded,
progressing, and built on the common interest or the moral ac¬
tivity of the religious. First Brunner says; "The so-called
Church then comes Into being through the impulse of the individ¬
ual to unite himself with others for tne further culture of the
religious life."^ Then Barth; "In this moment he views Chris¬
tianity together with other educated people, placing it on a
level with other "religious fellowships,' under the point of
view under which "religious fellowship* may be seen from there.
Thus he views the Christian Church as "a fellowship which arises
only by the free actions of man and can only continue by these.
40. "Er hat n&mlich in seiner Darstellung der verschiedenen
Richtungen des christiichen Handeins das Haadein der Kirche und
in der Kirche dberall an die erste und beherrschende Stelle ge-
setzt. Auf de;n Hintergrund seiner Grundanschauung hat das freilich
einen anderen Sinn ale dea, in welchem wir das in uneerem Zusara-
menhang getan haben. Die Kirche ist nflmlich bei Schleiermacher
ganz einfach die frundlegende una umfassende Kulturgemeinschaft."
KD III/4. p.5dl.
41. cf. Tiie Philosophy of Religion, p. bO; u-od and Man,
pp.l07f: CD IV/1. p.65b» 42. God and Man, p.108.
43. "Er betrachtet das Christentura in die.sera Augenbiick
mit den anderen Gebildeten zu3aminen in eine Reihe gestellt mit
den anderen ' frommen Gerneinschaften, ' unter den Gesichtupunkten,
unter denen 'fromme Gemeinschaften" von dort aus zu sehen sind.
271
It is objectively the universal spirit that draws them together
on one hand and it is subjectively their own desires or spiri¬
tual impulses that constitutes or pushes forward their progress
on the other. Even Barth recognizes this movement which
Schleiermacher originally meant to be the moral activities of
the Christians only: Schleiermacher especially emphasizes that
the locus for those activities is the Church, the community of
those who share the Christian outlooK.^ However, in spite of
Schleiermacher's extra effort in affirming it, Barth questions
this variant approach:
But to explain what is Christian, do we not have to say
things which cannot be said in a frameworx of a concept of
human action generally, however deep? To reach the Chris¬
tian understanding of the goodness of human conduct, is it
not indispensable that there should be a distinctively
Christian way of understanding, and therefore a characte¬
ristic form of theological ethics as such? Is it not in¬
evitably that the Christian understanding of this matter
will be severely curtailed if, through taxing things for
granted (as was surprisingly the case from Schieiermacher
to Schlatter), ways are entered and trodden whicn in them¬
selves can plainly lead to very different destinations?^
Barth can only see that consequently the Church is identified in
a natural form as a general ethical fellowship or as the genuine
locus for cultural incubation.Yet we Xnow that Barth, in
fact, in this aspect of the criticism, does not go so far as
Brunner and he is conscious that Schleiermacher has been busily
Er betrachtet also auch die christliche Kirche als * eine Gernein
schaft, welche nur durch freie menschliche Handlungen entsteht
und nur durch solche fortbestehen xana.'" Die Irotestanti3Che
Iheoloffie, pp.396f.
44. CD I1/2. p.525.
4-5. Ibid.. p.545
46. "Sie weiss also, dase auch ihre Arbeit vom ersten
Schritt an nichts anderes sein xann als schlecht und recht Kul-
turarbeit, Streben nach Gestalt und VerwirKlichung, Suchen nach
Humanit&t an einer sehr merxwttrdigen, sehr exponierten Htelie
im ganzen der menschlichen Gesellschaft, gewiss, aber Kultur-
arbeit im uahmen der menschlichen Gesellschaft." Die Theologie
und die Kirche, p.386.
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engaged in apologetics. riven in this case, from Barth's view¬
point: "The attempt to establish and justify the theologico-
ethicai inquiry within the framework and on the foundation of
the presuppositions and methods of non-theological, of wholly
A fj
human thinking and language" is eventually not successful,
because what is the natural or general cannot presuppose to
dominate what is the theological. Therefore he criticizes
Schleiermacher by pointing out that Schleiermacher, as an apo¬
logist, maintains the general religious-consciousness (not the
specific Christian-consciousness), with its moral content or
moral orientation, as a necessary element in the general philo-
sopnico-ethical enquiry. In so doing, he attempts "to justify
Christian ethics at least indirectly before the forum of philo-
4.R
sophioal ethics. Thus, Barth's criticism of Schleiermaeher:
dogmatics cannot be "Glaubensiehre in the sense of Protestant
Modernism (the exposition of tne faith of the men united in the
Church) that we have decided by our opposition, which, in view
of the Biblical sign, must be made good only factually and not
by proof." In a passage where Barth criticizes the modernist
faith, he points out in part how this situation is connected
with Schleiermacher's orientation of theological tnought:
It began to evolve its own dogmatics, it also expounded
from its own side, in tne doctrine of 'religion' which is
such a feature of the 18t.n and 19th centuries, its thorou¬
ghly characteristic approach to tae matter, as it felt it
had to understand it. The significance of Schleiermacher
consists above all in his naving, in his doctrine of Chris¬
tian piety as the essence of the Church, given this heresy
a formal basi3 which fulfilled the time preceding him, as
well as foretold tne time succeeding him. He is not the in-
augurator, he is the great ripe classic of Modernism, which,
if it understands itself, will never let itself be turned
away from following him. bO
47. CD 11/2. pp.520f.
48. hoc, cit.
49. CD 1/1. p.504.
50- Ibid.. p.53.
273
One may ask how oa.n the Churoh or the Kingdom of God be
identified as a fellowship for cultural development, or the
Christian faith and the Biblical revelation be diminished to "a
hi
positivistic historicism aid psychologism?" It is that the
modern man does not believe revelation. According to Barth,
Camfield writes: "Revelation means a real coming of God to the
world. It is not an inner mystic illumination granted to indi¬
vidual souls. It is therefore in that sense historical, and
the word of it can only reach us through the witness and confes-
52
sion of a concrete institution and soceity." But to the mo¬
dernist, in a quite different sense of the word: "Revelation
means something timeless and general: the universal 'miracle' of
the natural order, the universal 'miracle* of the moral law, of
humanity, of morality, o.f thought and ideality; the general
sense of the meaning of history as a picture-book to illustrate
the text-book of ideas." Brunner continues his criticism:
Schleiermacher, as an idealist, interprets revelation in terms
of illusory optimism of his time by concretizing the universal
idea which is believed to be divine. By applying this idea to
Nature and human spirit, he secularizes Christian eschatology,
for its basis in faith is transferred into the sphere of Ideal¬
ism. Having lost its decisive character in the idea of judgment,
it has to express an idea of becoming as a constant approximation
of all to perfection. Indeed, this making concrete of the uni¬
versal idea can only be 3een as a faith detached from its founda-
54
tion. Barth also points out that as regards the meaning of
the revelation of redemption in the concept of Modernism, both
the accomplished atonement and the coming redemption are distor¬
ted by an absolutization of human nature and being, therefore,
51. CD 11/1. p.73.
52. Revelation and The Holy Spirit, pp.I26f.
53. The Mediator, p.38.
54. Ibid.. pp.37f.
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Modernism degrades to a nori-Christian faith:
The former has become a dim historical memory and the lat¬
ter the equally vague goal of a gradual progress in the
direction of this memory; neither of them has any real sig¬
nificance for those who exist in the interval. All that is
left to them is faith. But without this twofold reference
to the ftord as its proper object, and deprived of the power
of the 'Glory alone to God on high,' this faith can only
be a special mode of human capacity, will and activity,
and therefore, in comparison with Christian faith, only a
false faith, 55
Here Barth is conscious that the time of the Church is actually
the time "Zwischen den Zeiten." And one can see how on the con¬
trary, nrunner unfolds the modernistic view of redemption which
is essentially but an awakening of humanity. Here one confronts
a basic presupposition of the entire German idealistic philoso¬
phy of history: viz., that the entire process of history is the
redemptive process of the growth of the Kingdom of God. Just as
one's awakening fron sleep involves an infinite number of succes¬
sive stages of becoming more and more awaie, so trie wnole of his¬
tory is an awakening of mankind and Christ is that "Moment" in
whicn humanity comes fully awake. Here is redemption: here is
the Kingdom of God. .vithin all this process there seems no real
change, since all flows on evenly and uninterruptedly, and the
r£
non-redemptive state gradually gives place to the redemptive."'
Christian redemption thus would be one of many waves, like an
electrical power current, in the collective evolutionary process.
Man is in the center of the stage: though an object of an empi¬
rical and universal process, ne plays a role which is also causal.
In such a context, redemption frankly becomes little more than
57
an interior line of general cultural development. Brunner sees
55. CD 1/2. p.692.
56. i'he Mediator, p.37.
57. ..vstik, p.289-
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that Schleiermacher's conception here has arrived at a view of
the world and of history, in which human capacity could finally
come to its own goal: the modernist believes that "somehow or
53
another in uhe end everything must work out well for everybody."
Is this Biblical or doctrinal"? Along this line, Barth 3ays:
we are not somehow engaged in trying to persuade ourselves
that we are capable of arriving finally at our own goal,
of pressing forward to the truth and to God Himself by ab¬
solutizing our own being and nature, which is a way of self-
deception, because even though we refer to the Bible and
dogma, it it? all of ourselves and therefore otherwise than
by the truth? The peculiar and exceptional thing that we
think we have discovered is not that of a most audacious
Sic volo sic iubeo! at the conclusion of our movement of
thought, which is just empty, i.e. objectless, at the end
as it was at the beginning? 59
This is a very distorted and naive view of redemption,
and a serious over-evaluation of the potentiality of man because
it maintains that all man needs is to develop a higher life from
f 1
the inner significance of his existence and so to fulfill his
being and nature, rte need not rely on the redemption in Jesus
Christ, but the example of His spiritual experience on one hand
62
and the possibility of human achievement on the other. As
53. The Mediator, p.489.
59. CD II/l. p.72.
60. McConnachie: "Modern liberal theology, in Barth's view,
yielded too easily to tne spirit of the Age which led it to take
a very exaggerated estimate of the potentialities of human na¬
ture. The Jesus of History was preached as a Teacher and Reformer
rather than as a Saviour. The urgency of Christianity, as a Gos¬
pel of Redemption, was obscured." Reformation Issues To-day, Re¬
formation Old and New, p.107.
61. Barth: "Das *hdhere Leben* bedeutet: die Sntwiokiung
unserer Bxistenz, und, well unsere Existenz entscheidend in un-
serem Existenz- oder Selbstbewusstsein stattfindet, unser Seibst-
bewusstsein aber entscneidend als frommes Selbstbewusstsein bes-
timmt ist: die Entwicklung unserer Frdmmigkeit." Die Fro testan-
tische TheoioHie. p.418.
62. Barth: "Erldsung ist das ndnere Menachheitsieben des
Christen, das nicht mit der Scridpfung, nicht in Adam, sondern
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Mackintosh puts it, Barth maintains that culture, under God,
could he "a parable full of promise," but Sehleiermacher is blind
in principle to this positive truth because he regards human
culture as holy and not pervaded by sin.^ Therefore Barth him¬
self concludes at this point: "We can only say that this is a
mistake especially of Neo-Pio testantism. For it sets man on a
plane which dispenses with the horizons of the accomplished atone¬
ment and the coming redemption.Brunner adds:
Thus the Cnristian thinking confronts itself here in diamet¬
rical opposition to Schleiermacher's system. For what he
calls the Heavenly Kingdom, 'That perfection of the Church,
whose final end would be the absolute perfection,' and which,
it is therefore 'an approximation, something gradually grow¬
ing!' i.e., something which never attainable in reality. One
must reverse this form word for word into its direct opposite
in order to arrive at the evangelical [Protestant} Knowledge
of the Heavenly Kingdom. 65
Once again, it has to be pointed out that both Brunner and Barth
will not allow the concept of revelation to be dominated by a
historical representation, lest the most important task of theol¬
ogy be neglected or simply allowed to degenerate into a philoso¬
phy of history. Consequently, Barth, thinking of losing the real
theme of theology, regards all anthropological emphases as harm¬
ful, because ne fails to see how to avoid tne danger of handing
A
over theology afx»esh to some sort of philosophy.0
die Schdpfung vollendend und krtJnend, sben erst in Christus sei-
nen Anfang nalrn und das nun ale Impuls, als Bewegung als das
Leben des Geistes Christ! in seiner Gemeinde auch den Christen
erreicht." Ibid., p.416.
65. Types of Modern Tneology, p.271.
64. CD 1/27 p.692.
65. "So stehen sich auch hier christliehes Denken und
Schleiermachers System in schroffstem Gegene&tz gegenttber. Er
nennt das Iiimmelreich 'diejenige Vollkommenheit der Kirche,
deren letztes Snde die absolute Vollkommenheit sein wUrde,' und
die also 'eine Approximation und also etwas alim&hlich wachsen-
des,' d.n. in itfirklichkeit nic Erreichbares iot. Man muss diese
Formel Wort ffir wort ins Gegenteil umkehren, um die evangelische
Erkenntnis des Himmelreichs daraus zu machen." iystik, pp.299f«
66. CD 1/1. p.145.
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3. The Saving-history cannot be identified with
evolution of history.
In this section Brunner begins: "we must not confuse this
standpoint of 'saving-history* with that of the 'evolution of
history.* Saving-history is God's institution of revelation,
which takes human development into account, out is not itself
fin
the product of development." He has also pointed out that
"one of the most fatal errors in the history of theology is the
identification of the Biblical idea of the kingdom with the ra¬
tionalistic evolution of the optiaiistic theory of progress of
the 13th century. It was Kant who started this unfortunate busi¬
ness; it was Schleiermaeher, and after nim Hitachi, who continued
63
it." Brunner also calls our attention further to tne fact that
the victory of the Kingdom of God can in no way be identified
with the rationalistic evolution:
One cannot speak of an evolution of tne Kingdom of God...
for evolution is continuous: this movement is not. Evolu¬
tion is growth from within, but this growth is from with¬
out. Evolution is always immanent; the Kingdom, from the
beginning to the end, is transcendent, for faith rests
alone on that which God does. Evolution is direct; the
growth of one tiling means the leasing of some otner. 69
Thus, Brunner criticizes Schieiermacner for his relativistic
theory of optimistic evolution which not only results in a reli¬
gion without a v'ediator, but even results in a doing away with
the function of the Church. The situation is that as one side
grows, the other side is weakened, as if it were a condition of
relativized boundaries. And Brunner affirms that the growth of
the Kingdom of God is different or remains hidden. Although
this Kingdom, iiKe the true Church itself, is an historical
67• Revelation and Reason, p.291.
6Q* The Theology of Crisis, p.111.
69. Ibid, ."p. 110".
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reality, no statistics is available for Knowing its progress,
for it declines the emphasis on decision. Therefore, it seems
that evil and good both increase at the same time, just as "the
tares grow with the wheat until the harvest. Then only will the
70two be separated." Brunner takes this parable seriously in
his opposition to Schleiermacher*a clear-cut view of history:
The understanding of history in the New Testament wnich is
essentially the same as that of the Reformers is denoted
in the briefest form by the parable of tares among the wheat
It is thereby signified that it is ambiguous, bi-lineal,
broken, dialectical, and behind it stands the most dreadful
repulse of all singular-lineal optimism of progress, the
threatening word: judgment! with its: 'to the right, to the
left,' its 'enter thou into the joy of thy Lord and 'cast
him into outer darkness.* In other words: there is no possi¬
bility for us to ciefine historical things unequivocally, and
to let the wnole of history come to an end in one line alone
71
Brunner further explains that the conception of logical develop¬
ment in history is not fruitful to the reality of historical
movement:
The real movement of history, which passes through act and
decision, is presented to the rational interpretation of
history as a logical movement, in which, properly speaxing,
nothing is done, because everything was already there from
the outset. It does not matter whether it was already
'there' in a teleological or in a causal sense, in both
cases something which was already there is inevitably un¬
rolled liice a map which has been rolled up, or a film which
70. The Mediator, p.616. cf. The Theology of Crisis, p.Ill
71. "Das Geschichtsverst&ndnis des Neuen Testaments, das
in allem wesentlichen das der Reformatoren ist, ist am k&rzesten
zu bezeichnen durch das Gleichnis vom unkraut unter dem <»eizen.
Damit ist angedeutet: £s ist zweideutig, zweilinig, gebrochen,
dialektiech, und hinter ihm steht, als furchtbarste Abwehr alles
einlinigen Portschrittsoptimismus, dae drohende wort: Gericht!
mit seinem: *Zur Rechten, zur Linken,' seinem 'Gehe ein zu dei-
nes Herrn Preude' und Vserfet inn hinaus in die Musserste Piaster
nis.' Mit anderen A'orten: Es gibt far uns 'enschen keine Mdglich
keit, gesohichtliche Dinge eindeutig zu bestiramen, geschweige,
die ganze Geschichte in eine Linie auslaufen zu lassen." Mystik,
p.296.
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was already complete. Here there is no room for the element
of real history, for the solution of contradictions in act
and decision. 72
Thus, the growth of the Kingdom of God is understood as a para¬
doxical development. It remains hidden from relativistic analy¬
sis. Therefore, it cannot be determined or identified in terms
of optimism or evolution. Harth also strongly criticizes this
cultural-Protestantism (&urturprotestantismu3), saying: "And how
utterly in the end, when the great moment came in which at le&gt
to some extent a 'theology of revelation' should have distingui¬
shed itself from the theology of civilization as based upon the
relativity of everything human, did it go hand-in-hand with it,
7 3
in ethos and in ethics!"
Certainly the Church is a group of united men and it is
t-t i
a historical phenomenon, but there is something more than
simply a religious communion, aometning hidden which cannot be
understood purely in terms of our conceptual world. Here Sartn
analyses the two sides of its nature: i.e., differentiate Chris¬
tina faith from Christian religion:
Christian faith is not in any s rise a fact and phenomenon
which is generally Known and which can as such be explained
to everybody. The Christian religion is a fact and pheno¬
menon of this kind. As such it can be considered and esti¬
mated historically, psychologically, sociologically and per¬
haps even pnilo3ophicall,y. But the Christian religion is
not as such Christian faith. Christian faith is something
concealed in the Christian religion (like the true Church
in its visibility). As such it can only be believed. It can
be known and confessed only in faith. 75
In this connection, another point nas to be discussed, indeed,
72• Man in Revolt, p.433.
73. CD 1/1. p.290.
74. CD 11/1. p.654; The Mediator, p.559; The Divine Imper¬
ative , p.523.
75. CD 11/1. p.741.
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it is impossible to have the Invisible Church without its being
manifested in the Visible Church.^ But a true Christian faith
is anchored in His .ford, the revelation of God, Its security
does not rely on the social character of any external for us of
human equivalence on one hand and the existing natural order of
the world can in no way identify the divine purpose for man on
the other. Indeed the work of God is manifested in the Church
as an earthly institution in order to reach man, yet its divine
origin as "the Kingdom" is concealed in the earthly, historical
veil; metaphorically speaxing, the Church is "the Kingdom" in
77
"the form of a servant." That is why the message or the na¬
ture of the Gospel is paradoxical: one must lose his life in or¬
der to save it. It is foolishness to the Ureexs and a stumbling
73
blocx to the Jews. It is because the work of God originally
is miraculous that the Church makes the attempt to interpret the
incomprehensible to man. The Church must always be conscious of
79
this and not seek a complete view of reality.
Brunner and Barth both emphasize time and again a new in¬
sight into the fact that this Church is "called out by Christ,"
QA
and is the body of Christ. The Churcn can neither be under¬
stood in the happy and comprehensive terms of universal
76. Brunner: "There is no Church, in any sense of the word,
apart from human action." The Divine Imperative, p.527; Bartn:
"In this concrete form it lives as His body in this world. It is
spiritual by nature, but it exists in terms of this world." CI)
1V/1. p.710. For further discussion, see The Divine Imperative,
p.52b; CD IV/1. p.669.
77. The Divine Imperative, p.526. ef. p.524-
78. Brunner: "The Kingdom of God is here; yes, in this
paradoxical form. One can truly share it, but only in a parado¬
xical way through faith, not through sight. Such is also the
character of the kingdom of God in the community of the saints,
the Church." The Theology of Crisis, pp.I08f.
79- "cConnachie, Reformation Issues To-day, Reformation
Old and New, p.103.
30. The Divine Imperative, p.177; The Theology of Crisis,




humanity'" nor in the theory of creative evolution. The pro¬
visional character of its existence "points beyond itself to
0-2
the fellowship of all men."' The Kingdom of Cod which exists
in history as tne Church is the fellowship of those who have
made the decision of faith. Christians must not believe the
progress of tne world, but the victory of this divine Kingdom
84
(Brunner)." Therefore, the Church must look beyond its tempo¬
ral existence, otherwise it will only find itself as merely the
religious community (Barth).®'> This clearly suggests that an¬
other dimension of thought must be both introduced and safe¬
guarded. Otherwise as Brunner warned: "If the Church has nothing
to proclaim but social ethics applied to public life, she is
drawing her own death-certificate. The Gospel is not an impera¬
tive; it is an indicative. The imperative which we have in our
own conscience does not give the strength to do wnat we ought to
do." Indeed, the Gospel does not demand, but give. It reveals
tne secret of God's loving purpose, giving to the world something
new. This divine message of reconciliation lays the foundation
for community.0 According to Brunner and Bartn, the fundamental
81. "Es komme fiir einen Jeden darauf an, zu entdenken, wel¬
ches Gebiet der Menschheit ihm angehtJre, wo der gemeinsame Grund
seiner Ausdehnung una seiner Schranken au suchen ist, den ganzen
Inha.lt seines eigenen '-.Ye sens zu ermessen, auf alien Junkten seine
Grenzen zu entdecken und 'prophetisch' zu erraten, was er noch
sei und werden kfJnnte — schliesslich: sioh in tausend fremde Bi-
ldungen hineinzudenken, uo desto deutlicher die eigene zu erken-
nen und ins neric zu setzen. — Das sind fteisungen, die in ange-
messener Obersetzung und Interpretation ihres wortlautos wohi
auen als *eisungen christlicher Ethik verstandea werden kdnnten."
KD III/4. p.440.'
82. "Noch am Anfang dea pahrhunderts natten die Idealisten,
hatte z.S. Schleiermacher als Ethiker den Sieg des ueistes tlber
Natur und Materie in gewaltlgera Anbruch befindliche gesehen. Das
Bild der wirkiichen Dinge begann sich doch den Vdlkern, und zwar
den ftlhrenden wie den goftlhrten Schiehten aller Kuiturvdlker mit
Ausnahme aer weiter tr&umenden Ihiiosophen, Foeten und Leider
auch Theologen, rasch ganz anders darzustellen." ID ill/2. pp.463f.
83. Weber, op. cit., p.98.
34. The Mediator, p.ol3«
83. CD il/1. p.161.
3d. The word and the ..orld, p. 123*
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concern is that tnere is no Historical sequence of relativistic
magnitude in the evolutionary sense of the term which can equate
or determine the genuine significance of the existence of the
Church, without maxing it subject to human judgment. Barth
declares:
The oeing of the community in its temporal character is
hidden under considerable and very powerful appearances
to the contrary. There is no direct identity between what
the community is and any confession, theology or cultus;
any party, trend, group or movement in the being of the
community as it may be generally perceived. 87
Thus, the Church must not be tempted to identify herself
with the religious movement of universal necessity. If Sohleier-
macher's great Glaubenalehre is to be regarded as a sort of
"fail" of Christianity, or as its "canonization," one notices
some evidence of this in the context of Schleiermacher's general
philosophy of nistory, in which on the basis of ethics we
meet a definition of "a pious society" which consists largely of
a "monotheistic form of faith related to the teleological direc¬
tion of piety," a form yet made unique by its connection at
every point to the redemption executed by Jesus of Nazareth. 'In
this definition," Barth states, "everything has been more or
loss correctly perceived. The only thing is that the third di¬
mension, in which the Church is what it is, is completely
4- SBabsent.
Brunner further remarks that an interest in history occu¬
pies an important place in the romanticists* thinking when ne
writes: "But the romantic idea shows it: elf even until to-day as
the stronger (impulse}. For out of it arises the historical in¬
terest and the enthusiasm for history. The historicism of
to-day is the romantic conception of history tempered by the
87. CD IV/1. p.657.
38* Ifrid.» p.656.
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ideas of development of natural science.Because tney seek
for truth within history, but according to Brunner, truth in-
90
eludes history, not vice versa. Is it not true, that the ro¬
mantic conception of the modernist has just reversed the proper
Q1
position. Here "truth" Brunner identifies as "God."3 One may
ask actually what would be the basic difference between Brunner's
concept and that of the "odernist besides the reversal of order
and his affirming that there is not a relation of God and the
world as a vis - a - vis?
Barth would affirm the absolute freedom of God rather than
simply reverse the order of the modernist: God is even free to be
constant because He has all power over time. Since He is God in
His eternity, the One who endures, we may simply trust Him as He
92
is. In a clearer and slightly different way, Barth presents
his conception of God's work in history:
So far from contradicting Himself God confirms Himself as
the Creator of the world by having a special nistory with
it in His work of reconciliation and revelation. It i3, of
course, clear that God introduces something really new,
distinct from the work of creation as such, in this history,
His history with Israel and the Church. 93
In order to develop further this view, it is significant to taKe
notice that in another passage God is emphasized as in Jesus
89. "Aber die romantische Idee erwies sich bis heute als
die st^rkere. Stammt doch auch aue ihr das geschichtiiche in-
terecse una die Begeisttrmg ftir die Geschichte. Der Historismus
der Gcgenwart iet die durch den naturwissenschaftlichen Sntwick-
lungegedanken temperierte romantische Geschichtsauffassung."
■Jystik, p.193.
90. Ibid., p.209.
91« hoc, cit. cf. also his explanation: "we must recognize
the God wno is active in history, who maxes Himself xnown, not
in a doctrine, but in historical action; the God who 'makes'
history with His people, the God -ho strides forward, the One
who 'cornea.'" Revelation and Reason, p.196.
92. CD IX7T. p.609.
33. Ibid.. p.303.
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Christ rather than as truth in the way that Brunner did here.
Barth writes: "But only as the Lord of the Church will it he
possible for Jesus to be manifest to us; as the Lord of the
world He is hidden from us. We cannot get a knowledge of His
government from the world's events, though we are certainly con¬
cerned there with none other power than His."^ It may be seen
here that Barth has set aside natural theology. According to
him, it is not only true that God and general history are not a
one-way traffic, but also that there is no tracing from the
96
world how (rod is to be found in it except in the special history,
equivalent to what has been mentioned above as Brunner's "Saving-
history." At this point Brunner essentially agrees with Barth
and says that God is an absolutely free Lord over Ilia creatures:
This uoes not mean, as Schleieraacher argues, that the di¬
vine providence is identical with natural causality. The
fact that this is not so becomes clear to us above all in
the fact that the Christian idea of ;rovidence includes
the divine power to work miracles, the divine sovereignty
over nature. The personal idea of God which is real, and
not imagined, implies the divine freedom over all causality,
over all necessity. Here/there is, no room for the idea of
Pate or Destiny
Thus, Schleiermacher cannot escape from the criticism of
94. Credo, p.191.
9b. Torrance: "He {Barth} warns us, for example, that we
have no right to deprive the natural man of his natural theology,
for it ie his only consolation in life and death, and, therefore,
our rejection of natural theology must not be any kind of meta¬
physical denial; rather must it oe grounded only upon the actual
event of grace as setting it completely aside for faith. There
is no room whatever for it in a Christian theology, precisely
because a Christian theology has to do with a new creation." The
vVord of God and The Nature of Man, Reformation Old and New, p. 13 b •
96. Prenter, Glauben urid Brkennen bei karl Barth. Kerygma
and Dogma. 2 Jahrgang, Heft 3, Juli 19bo, p.183.
97. The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption.
Dogmatics, II. p.lbb.
28!>
Brunner and Barth for his approach to eternal truth by way of
the empirical and the historical, Brunner writes:
The various people with their cultures and religions, in¬
deed even the great religions of the world themselves,
with Christianity at their head, are simply transitional
3tages in the process by which the human spirit becomes
aware of eternal truth. Similarly Schleiermacher the phil¬
osopher, regards the immanent, historical world process
as the universal transformation of nature into spirit,
which attains its goal in religion subjectively, as the
consciousness of the unity of all contradictions, and ob¬
jectively, in the final accomplishment of civilization,
whereas Schleiermacher the theologian, closely united with
the philosopher in personal union, tries to equate this re¬
ligion of timeless mysticism with the Christian faith, (.see
Mystile und das »ort) The grandeur of these theories of
philosophy of history, however, must not blind us to the
fact that in them all history is merely the setting for
religion; it is never the object of faith. Here this com¬
plete emancipation of Christianity from the mystical ele¬
ment, by means of the interpretation of revelation in sym¬
bols of the eternal, has only one unfortunate result: that
nothing of Christianity is left. 98
Once again, Brunner prefers to return to his criticism of mys¬
ticism where he points out that the real mistake is that mystics
always vaguely imagine that they can exclusively possess or prag-
QQ
matically experience religion. Therefore, at bottom, in this
98• Revelation and Reason, p.39'3.
99. urunner clearly states: "The Christian faith, faith
in the God revealed by Jesus Christ, is not 'one of the reli¬
gions of the world.'" And he adds: "The Christian faith alone
lives by the Word of God, by the revelation in which God imparts
Himself." He also clears this up: "A religious and geographical
survey of the world would of course include *Christinaity' under
the general concept of religion." rievelation and Reason, p.268.
cf. C 1V/1. p.671. Barth: "The Christian community and Chris¬
tian faith belong to the substance of the one confession which
has its centre in Jesus uhrist. In the Christian Church we have
to do with uan, hie history, existence and activity in this
peculiar but provisional form." CD IV/1. p.644; cf. p.652.
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way, in their immanent, mystical and r ligious interpretation
of Christianity, they lose truth and grace, and therefore, their
100
faith and hope in the Christian sense of the word. Brunner
thus criticizes!
This is tne real mystical experience, it is experience in
time; in this historical existence, the ultimate, the per¬
fect is reached. Indeed, though here too, in the realm of
'Christian' mystic, a certain vacillation enters. One has
the ultimate as experience, not as hope, as possession,
not as faith, as fulfillment of the longing for immediacy,
as vision of God; and yet a slight reminder restraints one
to call this ultimate really unlimited the ultimate. 101
Barth criticizes Schleiermacher in this respect by empha¬
sizing that Jesus Christ must be dominant or prominant in the
elaboration of a theology. He admits, however, this situation:
when we speak of the community and faith, we speak of human ex-
102
perience and action. One cannot simply venture the experience
103
with the spirit alone, as if the truth or grace of God is at
the disposal of man if he so desires to own it. He cannot possess
100. Brunner: "The Church proclaims as absolute truth that
which can be neither proved by the intellect nor verified by ex¬
perience." Revelation and Reason, p.6; also: "All that the Cnris-
tian community is, and all that she has, is never her own exclu¬
sive possession: all that she is and has she has received." Ibid..
p. 3.
101. "Das ist das eigentliche mystische Erlebnis. Eriebnis
ist es; in der Zeit, in dieser geschichtlichen Existenz wird das
Letzte, das Vollkommene erreicht. Zwar tritt au.cn hier wieder,
im Gebiet der 'christiichen' Mystik ein gewisses Schwanken ein.
Man hat das Hbchste als Eriebnis, nicht ala Hoffnung, als Besitz,
nicht als Glaube, als Erfttllung der Sehnaucht naon Unmittelbar-
keit, als Gottscnauen; und doch h&lt einen eine leise Erinnerung
zurtteh, dieses Letzte auch wirklich uneingeschrdnKt das Letzte zu
nennen." Mystik, pp.372f.
102. CD IV/1. P-645.
103. Barth: "Man darf aber nicht dbersehen, dass es auch in
ganz anderer vveise aufgenommen und uurchgefiihrt werden kbnnte,
als Schleiermacher seibot es getan hat, n&mlich als eine i'heoiogie
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it without realizing that truth and grace can only be sought or
found in uesus Christ. Therefore, Barth truly understands
Sehleiermscher with reference to nis classical attempt to affirm
a specific Christian content in the general religious experience:
In its true and strict historical sense it can be under¬
stood only as a summons to rebellion against the grace of
God. This rebellion does not become less heinous if later,
perhaps, it proceeds to make the grace of God an object of
human self-reflection, self-understanding and self-respon¬
sibility, to make it a special content of human self-cons¬
ciousness, and therefore to give to this self-consciousness,
among other things, a religious or even a supposedly Chris¬
tian content, as in the classical attempt of Schieiermacher,
the Christian apologist among the Idealists. Jhat begins
with the human self cannot end with the knowledge of God
and of His command. Nor can it end with the knowledge of tne
real man in his real situation. 104
Thus, barth criticizes Schieiermacher for the same thing in a
different way, in a way which is more positive and christocentric
in approach. According to Barth, when Christian theologians ela¬
borate their theology, they must neither venture with the first
article alone, sketching a theology of God the Creator abstractly
and directly, nor simply with the third article, sketching a
theology of experience psychologically and ethically. If tney
want to keep themselves on the right track, they must centralize
their thought on the second article, the declaration of what
10b
Jesus Christ our Lord means for us men. It is seen here that
der subjektiven firklichkeit una MSglichkeit der Offenbarung,
die deren objektive .Virklichkeit und Mdglichkeit nicht aus-, son-
dern einschliessen wtlrde: ais eine solche Theologie vom Menschen
her, die sich selbst als eine Theologie des Heiligen Geistes ver-
stfinde." KD III/3. pp.370f. cf. As Barth understands Schieier¬
macher from his sermon: "Alles, was wir tun vermdge der geistigen
Kraft, mit weieher Gott das menschliche Geschlecht ausgerdstet
hat, wird ein V/erk Gottes, von dem die Gabe kommt." Die Theologie
und, die Kirche. p. 133.
104." CD 11/2. p.341.
10b* Dogmatics in Outline, transi. by G.T. Thomson, (London:
SCM Press irtd., 19bb)» pp.6bf. cf. Die Pro testantische Theologie,
p.422.
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Barth orients our thought to jesus Christ, in order to return
to what is primarily important for Christian faith. However,
according to Brunner, the fact is that the modernist believes
that his religious experience is much more important than what
is to be regarded as historical: "It is religious experience
which the modern man seeks. He conceives the Christian faith
as an embarrassment and as a burden of the past.""*"^
Finally, in regard to the future redemption, in the first
instance, it is significant to trace some steps backward. Ac¬
cording to Brunner's critique: Sehleiermacher's basic concept
of religion is crude and self-sufficient; the latter holds that
one*8 religious feeling does not need to reach out and grasp
107
the revelation of God, and he does not hold Him to be the
true Mediator. Barth has criticised Schleiermacher's anthropo¬
logical approach to religion, which holds that truth or reality,
problem and answer, are ail but products of the human heart. In
other words, all is in snan.^'^ Brunner points out: "Indeed it
has nothing "before* or "over' itself, it shoots no arrow of
desire to the otner shore, as it is pure present-in-itoelf. It
rests; it enjoys itself; it is blissful; "it is happy in itself."
It is like a caterpillar on a leaf which does not look beyond
10Q
the leaf." 7 But let us return to Barth, once again, who states
106. "Dieses religiose Erleben aber ist es, das der moderne
Mensch sucht. Den christlichen Giauben empfindet er als Verlegen
heit und als Last der Vergangenheit." M.vstik. pp.5f.
107. Ibid.. pp.l74f.
108. Die Theologie und uie Kirche. p.207; cf. Brunner: "He
puts the question, but it is he too who answers it to himself."
God and Man, p.47.
109« "Br hat ja nichts *vor' sich oder "tlber" sich, es
schiesst keine Pfeile der Sehnsucht ans andere Ufer, da es rein-
es Beisichsein ist. Ss ruht, es genieest sich selbst, es ist
selig, 'in sich selbst vergnttgt." <*ie die Raupe auf exnem 81att
nicht Gber das Blatt hinausaieht." Mystik, p.166. cf. pp.llYf.,
p.179.
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more positively that the proclamation of the Church is involved
and since it has received the promise that this phenomenon is
identical with the fiord of God:
It is this promise which will not allow us to remain con¬
tent with a system of doctrine like that of Schleiermacher.
For there toe phenomenon of Church proclamation is finally
understood from and in itself, that is, from and in its
connexion with very different types of human proclamation,
and its relation to man as historical being in general.
And it is always criticized arid rectified from the stand¬
point of it3 own immanent laws. 110
Schleiermacher holds that there is no coming redemption
for him; there is an "eschatological hole (das eschatoiogische
111
Loch)." He is only conscious of the fact that it is this life
that matters. He sees that the character of the Christian reli¬
gion has only to do with this life. As Brunner understands it:
In this religion one possesses God, one does not hope for
Him; one experiences redemption, one does not believe in a
redemption which would be more than the religious conscious¬
ness. One is satisfied with the 'ease' and 'virtuosity,'
with which the pious feeling combines with the other func¬
tions of consciousness; but one does not long for new crea¬
tion, does not look out toward the new world. 112
Brunner concludes hi3 discussion by pointing out that Christi¬
anity possesses a view which is even more optimistic than that
of Idealism, for there is a future complete redemption. Chris¬
tianity does not only xnow of a progress within history, but
also of the eternal Kingdom, of the resurrection from the dead
115
and of the fulfilled redemption. Indeed, man in his visible
110. CD 1/2. p.799.
111. Myetik, p.256.
112. "In dieser Religion besitzt man Gott, man hofft nicht
auf ihn; man erlebt Gridsung, aber man glaubt nicht an eine
Erldsung, die mehr w&re als das religidse Bewusstsein selbst.
Man ist zufrieden mit der 'Leichtigkeit' und 'Virtuosit&t,' mit
der sich das frorame Gefilhl mit anderen Funktionen des Bewusst-
seins verbindet, aber man sehnt sich nicht nach der neuen SchOp-
fung, schaut nicht aus nach der neuen »>elt." Ibid., p.186.
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appearance cornea and goes just as civilizations and cultures
its temporal characteristics, but he is destined by the Creator
for eternity. Since the Gospel is the revelation of eternal
1 1 A
life, man as a person is not meant to pass away.
in this respect, in Berth's thought, one surely does not
lib
become sensationally interested in vague ideals of immortality,
in an uncertain promise which might be created for him by man
116
or by circumstances. Rather one ought to recognize the limit¬
ation of this life and believe in the work of recoxic illation ac¬
complished by God as "fundamentally a new work as compared with
the work of creation because it consists in the opening up of
this depth or perspective for creation, the vision of the resur¬
rection of the body, eternal life and the new heaven and the new
117
earth." Torrance comments on this: "It is the risen humanity
of Christ which forms the very centre of the Christian's hope,
for it is the ground and basis of his own renewal and indeed of
1 IB
the renewal of all creation." According to Barth, one must
look beyond for help and trust and hope for the coming redemption.
Thus, he has correctly observed that:
113. The Mediator, p.614; cf. "They [Christians] are not
the victory over the world, for the best Christians are sinners
and become ill and die; but they are signs ana anticipations of
a victory won in the r^alm of the invisible world, a victory
that some time will become, but is not now, visible." The Theol¬
ogy of Crisis, p.110.
114. Christianity and Civilization. II. p.140.
113- "The fact that He is our coming Redeemer, must above
all be perceived ana recognized witn gratitude as sometning
special. This will not conflict with the gratitude which we owe
Him already as our Creator, it will be the proper gratitude to¬
wards the One who has revealed Himself as our Creator and also
as our Redeemer because He is in fact both, and not the first
without being the second." CD 11/1. p.blO.
116. CD IV/1. p.39b.
117. CD II/l. p.310.
118. Karl Barth, The Expository Times, LXVI. Oct.1954-Sept.
1933. p.209.
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The error in this outlook is twofold, it consists in the
optical illusion that the plane on which the believer
exists is unbounded, and without horizons; he does not
notice the direct proximity of the hiiis before and behind
him, whence comes his help. And it is also the acoustic
error that the word * faith* still means Christian faith
even though the trust and hope and daring of the human
heart which it signifies has lost its direction to these
hills, instead of being a promising trust and hope and da¬
ring in this direction. 119
Thus, revelation is true only because we believe in this
coming redemption and faith is real only because we live in this
trusting hope. Barth says: "Christian hope is a present being
in and with and by the promise of the future, a being which is
seized by the promise of Cod and called. If a man does not seize
this hope, apprehend it, conform himself to it here and how as a
man who belongs to the future, he is not one who has christian
120
hope." Certainly, Barth thinks of the Christian hope or pro¬
mise as having to do with the present; it has to be apprenended
121
in the temporality of this life by us in our trusting in it.
His attack on Schleiermacher culminates at this point: "<«e be¬
lieve that what we found in the teaching of Schleiermacher was
the theological kernel of a Christianity-of-tne-present compa¬
tible neither with the Bible nor the real world. We were con-
122
vinced that we must oppose this."
In conclusion, we note that Brunner and Barth oppose
Schleierraacher's relativistic view of historicism and affirm
that the history of the -world is different from "Saving-nistory."
This dimension of thought is totally absent from Schleiermacher1s
123
theological thought. It is not that reconciliation is a human
119• CD 1/2. p.692. cf. Mystik. p.337.
120. CD IV/1. p.121.
121. For detailed discussion, see CD II/l. pp.624f; CD IV/1.
pp.995, 600, 602, 604f.
122. CD 11/1. p.634.
123. Ldffler: "Eine Heilsgeschichte als Geschicnte des
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achievement of uniformity; the coming redemption is not the sum
total of human development. According to Brunner and Barth, the
work of God is not to be identified as the cultural progress of
man.
Schleiermacher's incorrect or defective view of revela¬
tion, which is but a general one and which indeed may possess
intelligible worth for knowledge, becomes opaque when it comes
to faith.
Handelns Gottes, die unabhSngig vor der Sntwicklungsgeschichte




With regard to prayer in the Christian life barth holds
that "the hearing of believing prayer is not to be reduced to
the general truth that we are to live before Cod in humility
as His servants and in gratitude as His children. We should re¬
cognize that in the realization of this general truth we partici-
124
pate in the special."
Since the Church is commissioned to witness to the mes¬
sage of the Gospel before the world, it must also be taken into
consideration that "the individual human being cannot be united
with God apart from an organic connection with the fellowship of
125
the Church and its tradition." Brunner and barth agree with
Schieiermacher that "mission work does not arise from any arro¬
gance in the Christian Church; mission is its cause and its
life," and Brunner goes on to explain that "the Church exists
by mission, just as a fire exists by burning, where there is no
mission, there is no Church; and where there is neither Church
1 PA
nor mission, there is no faith." Barth agrees with him: The
community "lives by the freedom in which when it hears this
word it is pledged in advance of the world but also to the 'world.
It lives by the fact that Jesus lives, and therefore for the
127
task of telling this good news to all people."
In the knowledge of faith Barth agrees with Schieiermacher
1
that the Church is "stronger than the world and overcomes it,"
124. CD 11/1. p.512 This passage perhaps is toe best for
correcting Schieiermacher*s doctrine of prayer. As Barth under¬
stands him from his sermons: cf. Pie Iheologie und die Kirche.
p.182.
125. Revelation and Reason, p.147.
126. The Word and the <vorld. p. 108. cf. Revelation and Rea¬
son, pp.138, 148.
127. CD IV/1. p.347. cf. CD II/1. p.172.
128. CD IV/1. p.727.
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and he also admits that "there is no perfection" in the Church
but only a "deep and radical imperfection of the cry, 'Abba,
129
father.'" Brunner agrees with Bartn: "The Church ana per¬
fection are mutually exclusive ideas; the Church is the commu¬
nity of those who are still 3i:iners; therefore, the Churcn is
150
always an imperfect community, permeated with sin."
In regard to tne unity of the Church ia the necessary
form of multiplicity, narth holds that "the one Church exists
131
in its totality in each of the individual communities," and
he continues to assert that this form must not be reduced to a
mere principle as if multiplicity is necessary apart from geo¬
graphical separation: "we must not try to explain ana justify
it as a development of the riches of the grace given to man in
Jesus Christ, a development which derives from the Holy Spirit
and which is therefore normal and acceptable." Furthermore: "we
must not deduce this plurality of Churches from some principle,
as though the contradictions were necessities of the una eoclesia,
132
as though this Church had to be divided." Brunner fundament
tally holds the same and he concludes at this point with a piti¬
able view:
It would taice a very romantic mind to see in this fact the
delightful variety of a spontaneous manifestation of life.
Certainly uniformity is not a sign of life, not even of
genuine spiritual life, nut here we are concerned not with
the variety of i.ere forms but with fundamental antitheses
in the understanding of the gospel, and therefore not with
a variety of organs, each of which has its own function,
but with a terrible and also inevitable fight against each
other. 133
129. Ibid., p.738.
130. The Divine Imperative, pp.326f.
131. CD IV/1. p.673.
132. Ibid.. p.677. cf. p.671.
153. The Divine Imperative, p.643•
EPILOGUE
A MANY- IDED ESTIMATE OF THEIR CRITIQUE
AND THE THEOLOGY OF SCHLEIERMACHER
1• The deoiaive difference in their theological positions in¬
volves tne distinctive diversities in their points of
departure, together with summaries of their different
approaches.
To understand Schleiermacher's theology, it is most im¬
portant to know the idealistic and romantic current of his age
in which he is involved. It is Schleiermacher who reconciles
the multifarious theories of his eventful days. Falckenberg
writes: "Schleiermacher is an eclectic, but one who, amid the
fusion of the most diverse ideas, knows how to make his own in¬
dividuality felt.""*" Thus, it is seen that Schleiermacher is
fundamentally a systematizer who knows how to choose a unique
position which is the most valid or defensible emphasis of his
time. Indeed, we have noted that Schleiermacher himself is tne
centre of his peripheral contemplation of the universe. On one
hand, religious experience to him is his ail in ail: it embraces
subject and object; it consists of problem and answer. On the
other, he believes that religious content rests upon a given
grounds it mediates God and feeling; it connects man ana humanity.
Schleiermacher'a engrossing method of "All-One" eventually lea¬
ves no difference between the knowledge of the transcendental
and that of the formal; or that of the speculative and that of
the empirical. According to him, they should ail be identified
1. Falckenberg, History of Modern jhilosophy, transi. by
A.C. Armstrong, (London; George Bell and Sons, 189b), p.4 (6.
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because they are all seem as essentially synthetical, with this
imaginary and speculative theory, Schleiermacher elaborated his
doctrine of the Great Whole which defines man in humanity, and
humanity in nature as the world-whole of trie finite which is in
the Infinite, for he contemplates reality within Reality, a whole
within a fthole.
In furthering this idea of the Great »Vhoie, it is affirmed
that all hindrances which occurred in life within the realm of
religious experience are mere forces of stimulation to a higher
life. They happened to be the proper process in human develop¬
ment. In this spiritual struggle, man is destined to win a vic¬
tory over all disturbances as the fulfillment of his own nature
and being.
Christ too, is a stimulation to human awaxening; He is
the Mediator in the sense of his influence abiding over the re¬
ligious that they will approximate themselves to this typical or
ideal example. According to Schleiermacher, the Church is nothing
more than an ethico-religious fellowship and her purpose or func¬
tion is to develop spiritual impulse (or religious capacity) in
man. This religious structure in humanity is to be incorporated
into a world-fellowship by the mission of Christianity.
But Brunner and Barth appear to us as corrective theolo¬
gians, because the.y( attack the secular liberalism of Schleier-
macher which degenerates theology &»to anthropology in which the
Church of Christ is degraded into a mere religious club. Taey
oppose it because they can only see the plain self-destruction
of the Protestant faith by this harmful liberalism which hands
over the task of theology to philosophy and so involves a seri¬
ously variant approacn. ue have seen that their theological
thought is then directly oriented to the opposite of this liber-
alistic Modernism: they think that they must replace Schleier-
macher's imaaanental religionism with the word of God; and the
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subjective religious experience with the objective reality of
revelation. In the relation between God and man, God is always
first, man second; for the unconditional priority belongs to
God, not to man. They must, therefore, explain that in this
relation our religious experience is not an essential necessity
but a factual one.
Taking seriously the qualitative difference between the
Creator and the creaturely, they affirm that God is the Creator-
Lord. His sovereign lordship over nature is incomparable with,
or transcends the creaturely of the world-whole. Therefore,
God Himself is the absolute mystery. It is God who reveals Him¬
self in Christ and this fact constitutes Christian faith. The
fundamental concern of revelation is God's condescension to
man. One must know that the original nature of Christian faith
is not an individual's own achievement. The self-revelation
of God to man is the key to understand Brunner's and Barth's
theology. The Word of God in revelation is truth in itself
the Truth of all truths, and it is entirely independent of any
human norm of truth. Therefore, the criterion of dogmatics is
only to be found in this Word of God and not in the general
truth of universal humanity; Christian theology must not be
grounded on a rational knowledge but on this revelation of God
in His Word. According to Brunner and Barth, faith actually
means a response to the Word of God which demands man's obedi¬
ence; therefore, the knowledge of faith means acknowledgment.
They see that salvation is a movement from above; it is a move¬
ment to the world and not from the world. Brunner and Barth
constantly assert and strenuously maintain that revelation is
God's free act, and absolute freedom belongs to God and God
alone, man must not attempt to solve the mystery of revelation:
The true or particular meaning of revelation is not to be gene¬
ralized by an exhaustive explanation of an uninspired
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rationalistic approach; neither should its original ideas be
represented by any scientific expression of empirical effort
nor imagined by any eternal principle of immanental mysticism.
1'he mystery of revelation as God's gracious act is not to be
comprehended directly by a naive self-interpretation of man,
and so the super-dimension of Christian life must not be vio¬
lated by the hurnanization of life from the ethico-religious
standpoint. All the idealistic or optimistic notions applied
to interpret the advancement of the Church from the point of
view of human potentiality is most confusing with the genuine
*
Christian outlook of salvation and thus even the Christian
hope of the coming redemption in Saving-history is diluted.
Therefore, according to Brunner and Barth, the revelation of
Christian faith must replace the universal human possibility in
religious experience.
Having summarized their different tneologicai positions
above, we must now develop their diverse points of departure.
We have noted that the philosophical Schleiermacher distingui¬
shed religion from knowledge and will, that is to say that re¬
ligion is not to be identified as philosophy or ethics. Thus
man is regarded originally as religious; religion being of hu¬
man nature and so on. Is Schleiermacher consistent in this
view? No, we may quote one example to illustrate his inconsis¬
tency, for we have found that the semi-theological Schleier¬
macher constantly emphasized a wording Christianity. In this
respect, he essentially agreed with Kant's ethicai principle
of the Categorical Imperative; and as we have seen he decisively
emphasized the ethical aspect of religion in his quest of the
ideal. As Dilthey says: "The Church is nothing other than a
human fellowship which realizes in herself the idea and the
p
task of mankind in virtue of an ethical process." Therefore,
2. Dilthey. 'Die Kircne ist nichts anderes als die
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shall we say, that Schleiermacher absolutely contradicts what
he denounces in his Speeches. But, our estimate of him must not
be too confident and over-simplified, for Schleiermacher's posi¬
tion is not only, as we have seen, central and unique, but in
the meanwhile, we recall that he wrote the letter to Moke
about his Glaubenslehre and explained that his dogmatics is but
a reflection of religious piety, otherwise there would not be
dogmatics and so on: "I, on my part, know nothing of such ideas
Coat of which piety should arise} and even less of the proofs
of the same, and not at all where a dogmatic should come from,
if piety was not there first.Therefore, we actually cannot
judge whether it is a real contradiction? Thus, eventually,
it would be best for us to leave this question open. Prom here
we turn to the question of whether Berth's denunciation of his
dogmatic method a method whose basis certainly involves a
sort of psychological approach, psychologism is legitimate.
According to what we have described in the above, we can only
affirm this denunciation in the positive.
Actually when we trace back Schleiermacher's theological
thought, his first soteriology seems to be a philosophy of reli¬
gion, his second one a semi-psychology of religion (semi-theol¬
ogical). Schleiermacher cannot escape from their criticism
that his theology has an anthropocentric emphasis. It is right,
therefore, to accuse him of explaining away the particular con¬
ception of revelation and faith; for if faith is not an invention
Gemeinschaft der Menschheit, welcne in sich die Idee und Aufgabe
der Menschheit vermdge des sittlichen Prozesses realisiert."
op. clt., p.793.
3. Schleiermachers Sendsohreiben (ttber seine Glaubenslehre)
an Mcke. "Ich hingegen weiss gar nichts von solchen Ideen und
noch weniger von Beweisen derselben, und dberhaupt niohts, wo
eine Dogmatik herkommen sollte, wenn nicht die PrdmmigKeit schon
da ware." p.17.
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or achievement but a gift, revelation is not a discovery out a
mystery.
in fact, according to Schleiermacher, God is ultimately
an empty concept; man is alone; his theology of psychologism
is but a soliloquy. All these criticisms of him are most valid.
If God is God, let Him be God! Schleiermacher cannot de-person¬
alize Him into a God-idea or a vague Infinite. It is right that
Barth denounces Schieiemacher's attitude, in his systematization
of Christian doctrines, as a master or a complete virtuoso.
Barth actually means that one should have an attitude of prayer
when one comes to express tnese things so as to elaborate a
theology and he should undertake this task as faithfully and
humbly as a servant.^ One must not be too self-confident or so
free in initiating, shaping, or systematizing and so on.
In order to be fair to Schleiermacher, we cannot conclude
this point too much; we must constantly weigh our criticism of
this great master so that it will not be, at bottom, "Unschleier-
macherisch." In this connection, it may be as well to point out
that it is strange to see that Schleiermacner never clearly de¬
fines his conception of feeling of absolute dependence. Brandt
assumes that if he clearly explained it, the importance of his
theology would not have been so great for he says: "Had he car¬
ried through a rigorous analysis of his concepts of 'feeling'
and religious experience, it is quite possible that the idea
would have proved less powerful." Therefore, we can see that
Schleiermacher too, Knows where to stop even he taxes up this
most defensible position which negatively means his advantage of
4» Dogmatics in Outline, p.11.
3. Brandt, The Philosophy of Schleiermacner, (The Develop¬
ment of His Theory of Scientific and Religious Knowledge) New
York and London: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1941. p.313.
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being vague, elastic or plastic and adaptable.^
Is it not true that Schleiermacher's concepts of God and
feeling are actually illusory? It is, according to him, impos¬
sible to define them even if they have any objective content at
all they will be explained away by him. That is why Schleier-
macher does not even attempt to further explain these God and
feeling. But from here Schleiermacher turned to the nature of
the world-whole, tie knows that he cannot afford to miss the
clue in this marvelous magnificance, ana he applies his concep¬
tion of nature as the contents of his propositions of faith in
God and in one's feeling. His doctrine of the world-whole is
important to him. .Vithout it, his concepts of God and feeling
both would go void. In fact, according to Schleiermacher, the
concept of the world-whole is the true mediator between tne di¬
vine and the human. It is right to criticize him for deifying
the creature on one hand and secularizing Christianity (or hu¬
manizing of spiritual life) on the other. One must know that
Schleiermacher is actually being pressed into this Kind of il¬
lusion; after all, what can he do since ne possessed 3uch empty
concepts of God and feeling?
Schleierma her' s philosophy of religion or his seini-
psychology of religion or even the combination of both is void
of content. It bears evidence that human attempts and human
efforts to systematize or initiate these things which he thought
could be traced back to God an impossibility eventually
prove vain. As Brunner calls it: "It is faith without a founda-
7
tion." It is clearly seen that Schleiermacher is forced to
combine or identify tne order of nature with the work of God in
order to make something out of this emptiness. If one considers
6. cf. Loc. cit.
7. The Mediator, p.37.
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that he is so naive and exaggerates the potentiality of man,
something for which Brunner and Barth criticized him, he has no
choice here. This mistake is due to his erroneous position which
he has taken from the beginning man as centre. Is it not true
that his position causes him these inevitable results in his ex¬
positions: when he explains things about man, they all become
identifiable truths to him; but when he elaborates things about
God, they all become gradually or eccentrically vague. Therefore,
all that is left for him is the world and the way of conceiving
it, i.e., the self-consciousness!
One question may be asked, does Schleiermacher shift this
position as it has been discussed above? We have learned that
uarth criticizes the unsatisfactoriness of his teaching which
provides "no shift of emphasis from teaching to listening."
Schleiermacher does alter his interpretation, at least, from the
approach of a philosophical one to a psychological (somewhat one-
sidedly Christian or semi-theological) one. His mistake is that
he does not emphasize the freedom of God. According to him, God
is purely immanent in his first soteriology and God is epistemo-
logically transcendent in his second eoteriology, therefore, he
prefers to keep silent about Him. Thus, it is seen that Schleier¬
macher has shifted his approach, but he has not altered his po¬
sition; man is still the centre of All. Had Schleiermacher al¬
tered his position from man as centre to God as centre, then all
their criticism of him would have become immediately invalid.
However, Schleiermacher has failed to do this, therefore, he must
take the responsibility of humanizing the Christian life.
Schleiermacher's mistake in filling in his empty concepts
is magnified in his conception of grace and sin. We have found
that he tries to work out two opposite concepts as interesting
contents in the process of cultural progress. But it aoes not
work out according to his purpose. Perhaps he originally means
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to decorate his monotonous exposition of human development. In
fact, it works out to an opposite result; it magnifies its emp¬
tiness. Barth's criticism of his theory in this respect is
thorough: nothing is affirmed as real and nothing is negated
for they exhaust each other Dy his sound theory of co-relation
and co-ordination and he oes not interpret this in terms of
history and does not understand that man is a covenant-partner
of God. Here it may be seen that Barth handles the one and
the same thing but in a right way: actually Schleiermacher
ascribes the process? of reconciliation to a religious mind and
applies this process in an optimistic way to the future; Barth
ascribes this process of reconciliation to the historical re¬
velation and applies this process to the historical fact of the
terrible crucifixion happened once and for all in the past.
For we have seen that Schleiermacher's theory in this respect
is intended first to divide, secondly to reconcile. He has for-
Q
gotten' the place of Jesus Christ who i3 the true Reconciler
when he speaks of these things of spiritual magnitude such as
grace and sin. Jesus Christ is the one who bears this contra¬
diction of sin and grace. In connection with Schleiermacher's
non-Christian view of Christ, the inevitable result is that his
theory is seriously caught in this contradiction which eventually
cancels his theory itself. One can see how the attempt of human
theory to usurp the divine place is unsuccessful. Brunner can¬
not discover this mistake of Schleiermacher for he constantly
criticises Schleiermacher*s psychological approach in his doc¬
trine of sin. In fact, it seems that he even invites Schleier¬
macher to exaggerate his magnifyixig method for his empty
8. cf. Supra, pp.200ff. In fact, schleiermacher prefers
to have the doctrine of sin preceded his Christology; Brunner
and Barth, undeniably, inverse this order to first Christology,
then the doctrine of sin.
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conception here. This unconscious error in Brunner is again
due to his direct reaction to Schleiermacher's theory of rela¬
tivism which he feels too defective to interpret or represent
the Christian antithesis of absolute character (cf. Supra,
p.200.). It is because Brunner does not realize Schleierma-
cher's effort to escape from the region of abstraction, that
he criticizes his relativistic view which implies a hidden
unity of continuity. Therefore, Brunner, seen as an expert in
immediate opposition to Schleiermacher (as he says: replaces the
"not-yet" by the "no-longer"), invites him to extend his illu¬
sory theory, because he has failed to take into consideration
Schleiermacher's conception which serves to magnify his empty
movement of thought. Barth acutely points out that Schleier-
macher's theory is rendering a very incredible service.
However, in spite of Schleiermacher*s weak spots caught
by Brunner and Barth, the principal question concerning their
different theological positions may be asked, if Brunner and
Barth can determinatively emphasize the super-freedom of God
because their theology is theocentric; then, why does Schleier-
macher not have such a similar freedom to emphasize the freedom
of man because his theology is anthropocentrie? For we have
learned, on a closer examination, there is no contradiction in
Brunner'8 and Barth's doctrines of God because according to
them, God is the centre of their interpretation. Therefore,
on the same and equal basi3, it seems that there should not be
any contradiction in Schleiermacher's theories on his hurnani-
zation of life (human development), simply because, according
to him, man is the centre of his interprets.tion. Is it not
true that this is due to such a central and unique position?
When this position is once adopted, all contradictions become
identifications because they are all reconciled to the focus
of this position. There is no wonder that Barth eventually
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admits that it is impossible to criticize Schieiermacher ade-
Q
quately. Indeed, unless one takes up Schieiermacher's posi¬
tion, in which case he would have become his disciple, his cir¬
cumscribed criticism can hardly be to the focus! Thus, it is
»thinkable that even Schieiermacher possesses half a dozen theo¬
ries of salvation, strictly speaking, from the views of their
starting-points, his position is still legitimate for putting
forward of these theories. Therefore, Brunner's and Barth's
criticism of his Christology against the background of his
theological thought is invalid from Schieiermacher's point of
view, but is correct from Brunner's and Barth's point of view.
It may be argued that if this is so, then no criticism of any
one can have more than an aesthetic value. But, is this not
true to our human situation of life? In attempting to prove
that this suggestion is right, the following situation could
be assumed: if Schieiermacher were living amongst us to-day,
he would also say to Brunner and Barth that they hold two or
even more doctrines of hod which are absolutely incompatible
v/ith each other, and that perhaps it would be better to have
just one doctrine of God and so on. We have already 3een how
Barth criticized Schieiermacher'a understanding of the identity
of God's attributes as something single.That this kind of
criticism hardly comes to the poiat is evident because each
holds a different position and criticizes the other whose posi¬
tion i3 different from his. Therefore, in this section, one
can see that it is right to criticize Schieiermacher for having
chosen a wrong theological position, but it is wrong to criti¬
cize his right development of id<;as from his points of departure
without considering his defensible position which virtually re¬
conciles all apparent inconsistencies.
9• cf. !)ie frotestantische Theologie, p. 380.
10. GD 11/1. p.330.
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2. The inner significance of Schleiermacher's theology evokes
the disparate results in their critique, together with
different emphases in Brunner and in Barth.
We have learned from both Schleiermacher's sermons arid
his theology of philosophical optimism on an ethical oasis: man
is both religious and social; culture is destined to be progres
sive; history has a purpose; everything works out towards good
for everyone in the course of time and so on. As he preached:
In this new creation which the Spirit of God establishes
in the hearts of men, and from which we more and more ex¬
pect, as time goes on, a new heaven and a new earth to re¬
sult, it might be supposed that all would go within right
limits, and that the new earth would be distinguished
mainly by this, that it should never again be the scene
of ruin and devastation, though only in appearance; but
that everything should progress in regular and successful
order. 11
Again, we find what he wrote in the Christian faith: "In all
gifts of the Spirit there is recognizable a definite basis in
human nature, causing it inevitably to taxe the form it does,
and throughout the entire development of the new man the kind
and the degree of progress depends on the development of nature
in the person concerned and on the character of his environ-
12
ment." ' Even if this non-historical idealism is taken for
granted as he believes it, he still has no right to assign the
merit and credit for the mentality and morality of the natural
man and thus encouraging his illusion and pride if the cnarac-
teristic of the Gospel is fundamentally set "not in the impera-
13
tive but in the indicative." How can man divide God's work
11. Nicoll, op. cit., p.219.
12. Christian Faith, p.383.
13. Baillie, Invitation to Pilgrimage, (Oxford University
Press, Lonoon: Humphrey ; ilford, 1942). p.51.
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of reconciliation and redemption by usurping the glory of God;
or how can man forsake the Christian outlook by obscuring the
original meaning of its witness of saivation;if he does not
identify the divine message of the Gospel with the secular
achievement of humanity. For we know that on one hand, the his¬
torical revelation is a unique event, ae Brunaer and Barth as¬
serted, and on the other, culture and civilization actually may
come and go such as to be replaced or abolished. Therefore,
Brunner and Barth are right in criticizing Bchleiermacher's
naive prophetical view of sanguine humanism which, at bottom,
does not really understand the existing complexity of human na¬
ture. According to Brunner:
We are not dealing with historical positivism, but with
something which does not lie within the possibilities of'
history at ail; with an event which has broken through the
surface of history, or, as Barth is fond of expressing it,
with a vertical message from above. We do not deny, of
course, that even tne prophet 'word,' in which tne Divine
word is plunged into the current of history is itself de¬
termined by history, and is manifested in a human ana im¬
perfect form; on the contrary, we recognize and affirm it.
Un this account, however, it still remains a 'word' from
the region which lies beyond all historical possibilities,
an authoritative word of revelation, lb
Brunner eeems to insist that these two categories of his¬
tory and word must not be combined. As we nave discussed that a
qualitative difference between them must be maintained. But we
cannot forget that in this aspect Barth emphasizes more than
Brunner that the Incarnation is an historical event although the
revelation of God in Christ is originally a mystery. Therefore
14. Baillie points out that "their (modern men's} diffi¬
culty has been that of understanding how tne climax of an up¬
ward process that is still going on could have come two thou¬
sand years ago..." Ibid♦, p.89. cf. pp.90f.
The Mediator, pp.22i£.
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his point of contact is centralized in this event of revelation.
As Berth says:
The reconciliation of man with God in Christ includes in
itself or else begins with the fresh establishment of the
lost 'point of contact.' This point of contact is, there¬
fore, not real outside faith but only in faith. In faith
a man is created by the Word of God for the word of God,
existing in the Word of God, not in himself, not in virtue
of his humanity and personality, nor from the standpoint
of creation, for what is possible from the standpoint of
creation from man to God has actually been lost through
the fall. Thus this point of contact also, like everything
becomes real in faith, i.e. through the grace of reconci¬
liation, can only be spoken of theologically, and not
theologically and philosophically. 16
when Barth speaks of man, he seems to admit a slight difference
in thought from his original interpretation of the mystery of
the Word. But he mediates his different standpoints by pointing
to the fact of the divine reconciliation in Christ on one hand
and our faith in this grace of reconciliation on tne other. How¬
ever, Brunner prefers to distinguish decisively the Word from
history and affirms that this event of revelation is super-his¬
torical. As he says: "It is neither Idea nor History just be¬
cause it is the decisive event but the unique (Einmalige) which,
as such, cannot be part of history, but which means the judgment
17
on and fulfillment of history." Actually Brunner and Barth
both hold the same view that the Word of revelation is a verti¬
cal message from above; this perpendicular movement of salvation
breaks through the horizontal plane of history. Owing to the
fact tnat these two categories (history and word) are qualita¬
tively different from each other, JBrunner and Barth think that
they have to explain the conception of a point of contact:
16. CD 1/1. pp.273f.
17. The Mediator, p.391.
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Barth affirms this point of contact as possible and real only
within the realm of faith and includes this point in the event
of revelation; Brunner, on the contrary, does not relate this
point of contact to this event as Barth does, but redound to
the natural, man his credit by establishing this point of con¬
tact in him as a possibility and relevancy to theology. fie
then can see clearly that both Brunner and Barth fundamentally
hold the same conception that the Word of revelation intersects
the horizontal plane of history. It may not be completely
wrong to say that Brunner prefers to be consistent witn human
interpretation in virtue of this point of contact, which he
elsewhere emphasizes, at the expense of the contradiction of
his original ideas of revelation; Barth. prefers to be consistent
with hie original interpretation of revelation at the expense
of the disharmony in thought from his original emphasis on re¬
velation as divine mystery. Brunner, in affirming this point
of contact in man, is not altogether inconsistent in his inter¬
pretation of revelation, for we understand that he prefers to
go farther from his discernment of the categories between his¬
tory and word. Barth, in incorporating this point of contact
in revelation, is not at all contradicting his emphasis on re¬
velation as mystery, for we have seen that he prefers to in¬
clude this point of contact in. the divine grace of reconcilia¬
tion.
Now let us turn in another direction and attempt to
examine Brunner's thought which appears somewhat similar to
Schleiermacher's: one can judge that if Schleiermacher's op¬
timism concerning human development, for which he has been
1 A
criticized, is non-nietorical, " then Brunner's concept of re¬
velation, as he has distinctly emphasized in the passage quoted
above, seems also non-historical and, as we have already shown,
his concept of the Kingdom of God is also non-optimistic out
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originally super-optimistic: Christianity holds a more optimis¬
tic view than that of Idealism for it possesses the hope of
iq
the eternal kingdom as the fulfilled redemption. J Furthermore,
if Schleiermacher's defective theory in his apprehension of the
nature of sin is relativistic, e.g., more or less, weak or
strong, lower or higher, capable or incapable, spiritual or
sensuous (cf. Supra, p.199), then in Brunner's critique, we are
surprised to find that his approach here is also originally re¬
lativistic and somewhat analogous to Schleiermacher's theory.
For he also applies such relativistic notions as Creator and
creature, sin and grace, election and rejection, wrath and re¬
conciliation, salvation and non-salvation etc. in his analyses
of the Christian antitheses (cf. Supra, p.200). Is hir- theolo¬
gical thought close enough to Schleiermacher's? Or, according
to the above discussion concerning the point of contact, is
Berth's theological thought genuinely christocentric? Here is
another piece of evidence which one can ji-sdge for oneself.
We must, turn back to the unfinished question of why Brun¬
ner's theological thought appears somewhat similar to Rchleier-
macher's? This is because Brunner eo constantly and directly
reacts to bim that his thought-form is vitally influenced by
Schleiermacher. As we know, as far as reaction to action is
concerned, it itself in an action, that is to say that unless
one has to penetrate one's understanding more deeply, it is in¬
evitably involved in the same level of thought. Particularly
when we are dealing with a man such as Schleiermacher, let us
remember wbat Barth says of him: he is a man very much like us.
Thus, it is simple enough that the involvement is great and one
is easily caught into this current of action-reaction. To this
18. cf. Brunner's criticism of Schleiermacher's clear-cut
view of history. Mystik, p.296.
19. The Mediator, p.614-
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extent, Barth's comment on this is right. This judgment, that
Brunner's background of theological thought is involved in this
reaction, from the rational point of view, is not fictitious,
Baillie says: "argument cannot begin except from some major
20
premise the truth of which is acknowledged by both parties."
Since we know that the argument of Brunner against Schleiermacher
in his book Mystik is great, thus the possible common basis
which lies between him and Schleiermacher, should undoubtedly be
wide, we also notice that an even more prominent or similar
situation happened between Brunner and Barth. $o one can deny
that their theological ideas are close enougn to each other, but
when Barth issues his "Nein!" Its expression is severe!
We ourselves do not ignore the fact that there is a dif¬
ference between Brunner's and Barth's theology: Brunner holds
that man even in his perverted existence, is still man, not ani-
21
mal, and that a face-to-face relationship between God and man
must not be denied; that he is a sinner who sin3 against God and
also compromises his own existence because he is still the Crea¬
tor- lord's creature-man, otherwise the real contradiction is not
22
even possible. Barth certainly will not deny this fact that
man as covenant-partner of uod, rebels against nod's grace.
Even as a sinner, he sins against God and this negative relation¬
ship between God and man exists, but he seems not to argue from
this point whether a sinner is able to compromise his own exis¬
tence or not, since the argument is based on the natural man's
point of view. For he questions the possible process of co-op¬
eration in the work of redemption, even in realizing man's own
20. Invitation to Pilgrimage, p.8.
21. hatur und Gnade, (Zum GespSch mit Karl Barth), Tttbingen:
Verlag von d.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1934. p. 10.
22. Loc. cit.
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need of being saved. Brunner insists however that this point
is possible and necessary, otherwise it would not even be re-
23
levant to theology, and from the dialectical point of view,~
24
as he asserts, revelation and salvation are even impossible.
2b
Therefore, a point of contact is presupposed to be valid.
This point of contact, interpreted in this sense, is nonsense
to Barth: for he holds when a person is drowning, it is not
worth while to count hi3 struggling in the water, even though
he is able to swim one or two proper otroKes while he is strug¬
gling. If he is drowning, he is in danger, and all he needs is
to be saved. But, according to Brunner, if Barth denies even
this limited natural theology, then his theology is non-Bibli-
27
cally exalted and wholly irrational, therefore, the whole
theological situation is possibly nonsense! For Brunner argues:
"As if we too were not aware that God the Creator upholds all
things by His power, that He has set the stamp of His divinity
28
on the world and created man to be His own image!" This is
roughly the most comprehensive point of their opposition to each
other: one prefers to set out this point of contact from the na¬
tural man; the other thinks that it is not worth while to argue
from this point. The reason for pointing this out is possibly
to throw light on the jifference in their critique of Schleier-
macher: Brunner's position is this that he accepts human reason
23• Man in Revolt-, pp.512ff.
24. Brunner: "Nur dass Gott urbildliches, der Mensch ab-
blldliohes Subjekt ist. Br hdrt auch als Stlnder nioht auf, einer
zu sein, mit dem man reden kann, mit dem auch Gott reden kann."
Natur und unade. p.10. Man in Revolt, pp.514f.
25- ffatur and Gnade, p.18.
26. flein! (Antwort an Bmil Brunner), Theoloffiesche Existenz
Heute, Heft 14, Chr. Kaiser Verlag - Mtinchen, 1934, pp.lSf.
27. 01 vine-Human Sncounter, p.41.
23• The word and the world, p.7•
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as part of the capacity for revelation, but, to Barth, revela-
OQ
tion is absolutely God's grace, no scholastic bargain can be
made here, but it is clear and decisive, final and definite.
As Camfield puts it: "Revelation could not speak to man on his
own ground...It could not permit natural theology of any kind
to share in the work which a theology of revelation alone could
30
accomplish." Prom the point of view of their theological op¬
position, it could be suggested that 3runner would look at the
things or explain the situations in the way they appear to him.
Undoubtedly he is fond of emphasising revelation in creation.^
And Barth would believe or look into the things or situations
beyond their appearance. We have seen that for which Brunner
actually criticizes Schleiermacher most is his method and the
content, no loubt, Schleiermacher is a mystic to him. Barth
criticizes Schleiermacher for his motive for putting forward
such a method and content. According to Barth, Schleiermacher's
theology should be termed "the religion of culture," rather than
32
"mysticism." Certainly Barth does not completely deny tnat
33Schleiermacher'a philosophical theology is somewhat mystical,
however, perhaps this is not Schleiermacher*s original intention,
but his age turns him or his thought in this direction; since he
is deeply influenced by the thought-form of bis age or seriously
involved in its movements, or bound up with his contemporaries
otherwise Schleiermacher would not be a mystic; and perhaps he
29. "Wir mtlssen es wieder lernen, die Offenbarung ais
Gnade und die (inade als Offenbarung zu verstehen..." dein1 p.3.
30. Development and Present Stage of the Theology of Karl
Barth, Reformation _01d_and_New, p. 22.
31. Brunner, Revelation and Reason, p.78.
32. Barth, Brunners Schleiermacherbuch, Zwiachen den Zeiten,
(Herausgegeben von Georg Merz) Heft VIII. Chr. kaiser Verlag
Mtlnchen, 1924, p.36.
33. cf. CD 1/1. p.371.
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is irrelevant to this category, if it is thinkable that the
Schleiermacher with the influence of his age is different from
the Schleiermacher without the influence of his age. For Barth
questions this: "If it were right to reduce the whole theology
of Schleiermacher to the one formula 'mysticism', on which the
anti-critics should now fall, then I would not really understand
how was it possible that a whole century could live theologically
35
from this heritage?" Therefore, according to Barth, Brunner
36
is unjust to Schleiermacher or too confident of his own critique
of him. This review of Barth seems correct, for Brunner did not
37
take care enough that Schleiermacher speaxs as an apologist.
Brunner has actually discovered Schleiermacher's inconsistency
in his sermons in relation to his theology, but he thinks that
his sermons should not be used for judging hie true theological
thought. Perhaps Brunner is not completely ignorant of Schleier¬
macher who lives in an eventful age? But, according to Barth,
just because Schleiermacher's time is eventful, therefore, ser¬
mons should be considered. Which is which? Brandt points out
that "Dilthey and Ritschl (Otto) claim that it is the sermon
38
which represents Schleiermacher*s personal views." However,
the wx*iter would like to call the reader's attention to the bi¬
ographical sketch prefixed to the Selected Sermons of Schleier-
macher, in which we find that, Schleiermacher'e sermons were
34. Barth: "Warum gleich die ankl&gerische tJberschrift
'Die Mystik und das Wort'? Warum nicht ganz trocxen: 'Schleier-
macher'? Brunners Schleiermacherbuch, Zwischen den Zeiten, p. 5 5 •
cf. p.56.
35- "wenn es richtig w&re, die ganze Theologie Schleier-
machers auf die eine Formel 'Mystik' zu hringen, auf die sich
die Anti-Kritiker nun sttirzen werden, so verst&nde ich wirklich
auch nicht recnt, wie es mdglich war, dass ein ganzes Jahrhundert
theoiogiesch von dieeem Erbe leben konnte." Ibid., p.56.
36. Ibid.. p.54.
37• Ibid., p.56.
30. The ihilosophy of Schleiermacher, p. 104.'
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later edited by someone else from the notes taken at different
times. It is said that Schleiermacher himself could never have
written his sermons before he preached:
It has already been said that Schleieraiaener considered all
sermons, and his own more especially, as intended only to
be neard, not read. The specialty in his own case arose from
the fact that his sermons were never written; all nis publi-
3hec|discourses being printed from notes taken during delivery.
They were very deeply thought out; but a few very brief no¬
tes were all that he committed to paper; leaving his already
well-defined thoughts to take shape as his feelings warmed
with his theme and took a special tone from the sympathetic
reflex influence of the people assembled before him. 39
Since Schleiermacher's sermons are not his original personal
writings such as the Speeches or the Christian Faith, the work
of a careful elaboration of his thought, the whole issue herein
discussed seems essentially vague. Nevertheless, the writer will
suppose that Schleiermacher's emphasis on a working Christianity
(in the Christian Faith) is close to the conception of his ser¬
mons. His philosophy of religion in the Speeches has a romantic
flavour and is, in some respects, different from the thought of
hi-8 Christian Faith. But all (including his philosophy of re¬
ligion in the Speeches, the Christian Faith, and his sermons)
are spoken with an apologetic motive. Since Brunner is fond of
criticizing Schleiermacher•s philosophy of religion and has a
bias against Schieiermacher's semi-theological approach in his
Christian faith, there is no doubt why he does not consider
Schleiermacher's sermons.
In pursuing this line of thought, we may now say that
Brunner is criticizing Schleiermacher's theology (or more exact,
his philosophy of religion); Barth criticizes Schleiermacher's
theology (or his philosophy of religion and his semi-psychology
of religion) and Schleiermacher himself. Actually Brurmer's
39* Nicoll, op. cit., pp.^bf.
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critique is more consistent and logical than Berth's; Berth's
critique is more to the point than Brunner's. Since Schleier¬
macher, apart from his own view, is not consistent from the
outset, therefore, Barth's critique is not inflexible. Thus,
going one step further, we may venture to say that Brunner not
only has discovered Schleiermacher's inconsistency in his ser¬
mons when related to his theology, but also in his philosophi¬
cal emphasis at his earlier period and his semi-psychological
emphasis at his later period. But tsrunner prefers to get hold
of one and let go the other. Should it be said that Brunner
criticizes more Schleiermacher*s Speeches than his Glaubens-
lehre? Brunner holds fast to Schleiermacher's philosophical
approach, but tends to skip over his semi-theologicsl attempt
(semi-psychological) of interpretation even he revised this res¬
pect of his criticism in the second edition of his book Mystik.
It seems that Brunner does not really revise his criticism of
Schleiermacher in this edition, for he constantly complains of
Schleiermacher's philosophical and religious (psychological)
approach to Christian faithbut implicitly revises his at¬
titude towards Schleiermacher in his later writings rather than
to change his standpoints of criticism after Barth's article on
his book. It seems that in The Mediator, end The Divine Impera¬
tive , Brunner thinks that it would be better to operate more
strictly with Schleiermacher's thought-form and thus widen nis
A 1
dialectical approach to theology, in order to avoid this at¬
tack by Barth. If this hypothesis that Brunner has widened his
theological basis is actually true, then, it may reflect that
Brunner's thought is originally not deep or perhaps its range
is not wide at all. One may even notice in his critique the
way he puts it as if there were only two rides in a predicament,
40. cf. Mystik, pp.324ff.
41. cf. The mediator. pp.p02ff.
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viz., Bither-Or. »7e have seen how aarth quoted a sentence
from hie book: "Either the Christian faith or the modern con¬
cept of religion.On the other hand, we have also learned
hov/ von Balthasar had pointed out that in one "way or another,
his background of thought is vitally influenced by Schleier-
43
fitscher. This evaluation of him is perhaps just. Brunner* s
exaggerated attitude towards Schleiermacher seems nonsense.
Por example, one may even ask who also adopts a similar tran¬
scendental system? In this respect, even Barth^ is also partly
inspired by this system. Or one may even asx who stimulates
their theological thought? Without Schleiermacher's stimulation
of thought, directly or indirectly, consciously or sub-conscious¬
ly, it is imaginable that both Brunner's and Earth's writings,
at least would not he so bulky in form and that they would not
be so rich in thought, and deep and wide in the range of thought.
Instead of unreservedly recognizing this merit of Schleiermacher;
or even properly emphasizing his credit in this respect, they
straightforwardly criticize him, Their criticism is all right,
but their severe renunciation of the whole content of his thou¬
ght is questionable. Actually their critique, taken as a whole,
seems unjust. He should be reminded how von Balthasar has
pointed out the importance of Schleiermacher's influence upon
Barth: "Prom Schleiermacher Barth arises: at the time of his
CBarth's) theological training, Schieiermacher gave him his con¬
ceptual tools, (and) even more, a tremendous intuition into the
42. "Entweder der christiiche Glaube Oder die moderne Re-
iigionsauffassung." Brunners Schleiermacherbnch, Ewiscnen den
Zeiten. p.ol.
43. Karl Barth, barstellung und Deutung seiner Theologie,
p.211.
44. In thin connection, it even remotely reflects the
fact that a comparison is to be made here: who says that reli¬
gion and music are twins? And who is a great theologian and
has the greatest passion for Mozart?
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unity, magnitude, (and] totality of theological science."4-5 He
also points out the inner significance of Schleiermacher's in¬
fluence upon Brunner: "On the surface, Brunner launches his
attack against mysticism from the basis of eschatology, but at
bottom, lie speaks from the basis of religious personalism which
gives Brunner his decisive categories, and from there he attacks
A /t
the transcendental systematica of the great idealist." In
fact, if the present writer should be permitted to express his
personal opinion, Schleiermacher's theology, no matter how de¬
fective his views are, permanently represents general (or one¬
sided) truth. As far as theology, or more exact, theology of
revelation, is elaborated by man, not by spiritual beings,
Schleiermacher has his own value; as far as theology expressed
in the form of human language, not any language of heaven (if
there is any, as the Arabs claim their own), Schlei ermacher's
value in this respect is permanent. They can so easily dis¬
agree with Schleiermacher, indeed, everyone can disagree with
every other one; but here, if we may be allowed to put it this
way, Schleiermacher more or less, seems to represent the human
expression of divine truth. The writer thinks that if Schleier¬
macher lived in this time, it is certain that it would be very
interesting to see what he would say (or at least those who
sympathise with Sehleierraacher's position should defend him)
43. "Von Schleiermacher kommt Barth her; Schleiermacher
hat ihm in seiner theologischen Bildungszeit das begriffliche
Rflstzeug geliefert, ja viel raehr noch: eine gewaltige intuition
in die Einneit, urdsse, Totalit&t der theologischen Wissen-
schaft." karl Bartn, Darstellung und Peutung seiner Theolo&ie,
pp.210f.
46. "Vordergrundig tr&gt Brunner seinen Angriff gegen
die Mystik von der Eschatologie her vor, aber iin Hintergrund
spricht er vora religidsen Personalismus her, der Brunner seine
entscheide.nden Kategorien iiefert, und greift von da aus die
transzendentaie S.ystematik des grossen Ideaiisten an."
loc. cit.
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about Brunner and darth. It is imaginable that in one way or
another, Schleiermacher would say to them: well, you emphasize
time and eternity which is qualitatively different, 1 won't
argue with you from that point, but I shall say that this is
of
the way of losing the meaningAsalvation: this is the true and
genuine method of diluting the original and proper content of
redemption, well, you accuse rae of inhuman basis (in Barth's
47 >
critique ) while tallcing about human things, as far as I can
3ee, you are talking about yourse] not me, because I cons¬
tantly emphasize this side. It ife you who point to eternity
(applied to Brunner's and Barth's critique). You turn my mys¬
ticism (in Brunner's critique) inside out to mystery of revela¬
tion and its outside in for your interpretation of faith in it.
I tell you that 1 am honest that I don't know the realm of
eternity, but I surely know that everyone has this life to live.
Is that possible for a man who has fantastic passion for a
square circle? Is it not true that even Confucius told us some
2500 years ago that "one does not even know this life, how does
he know the life hereafter." You complain that
I have toally shaded out this super-dimension of life. Yes,
indeed, because I do not know, and I don't even attempt to know
it. I am seeking truth, not illusory fantasy. Truth is always
true to me, therefore it is easy to identity, but to you, it is
just the inverse case, indeed, my sincere opinion becomes non¬
sense and naive to your perverted understanding of yourselves
and of my conception.
This, again, will fall seriously into a one-sided diffi¬
culty of the incomplete truth. We need not repeat tne whole
situation which we have already discussed in this thesis. There¬
fore, it is quite suggestive to read uarth's theology together
47. CD 11/2. p.553.
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with Schleiermacher's, a.nd, in order to understand their theol¬
ogy better, it is important to seek help from 13runner for his
theology neither appears as deep or pure as Barth's nor as
Aft
shallow " or secular as Schleiermacher's.
Actually the three differences of their theology between
Schleiermacher and Brunner, Brunner and Barth, Barth and Schleier-
macher could be arranged in a straight line like this:
Schl. Bruyner Barth
A B C
When Brunner sometimes explains that Barth's view and his are
essentially the same, he means the section AB in the straight-
line ABC. When Barth denies that Brunner holds the same as he
does, he actually means the section. BC. in this analysis of
their relation to one another, we can see how Schleiermacher and
Barth stand on the extreme ends of the pole with Brunner in the
middle: that is to say that Schleiermacher's conception of the
feeling of absolute dependence is parallel to Barth's the Word
of God; and again, it is parallel to Brunner's amalgamation of
the Word of God and the point of contact. Furthermore, Schleier¬
macher* s contemplation of the universe is parallel to Barth's
faith in the revelation of God in Christ; and it is, once again,
parallel to Brunner's combination of faith in the revelation of
God in Christ and in the manifestation of God's will in creation.
Should Barth actually be thanxful for Brunner's further exposi¬
tion for the concept of revelation? Perhaps Barth himself would
46. Brandt, op. cit., p.322. As Hegel thus evaluates
Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre.
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have explained the matter more, if Brunner nad not done it.
Since Brunner has done this, he thinks that he nad better carry
his concept further and let Brunner explain it for him. Brunner's
thought, even back to his earlier period, in one way or another,
has been, more or less, captured by Schleiermacher, and in addi¬
tion to that, by Barth at his later period. Brunner himself
perhaps is not aware of this: in a negative way he explains
49
both for Schleiermacher and Barth. Is it not true that Brun¬
ner's exposition of the point of contact as relevant to theology
quietly suggests Schleiermacher's legitimacy for putting forward
his key to Christian faith, i.e., feeling of absolute dependence.
This feeling is really analogous to his point of contact. It
might be argued that the Ankntlpfungapunkt is not a commonplace,
but relevant for tneology. If it were not possible, how would
it be relevant? But one must take notice that Schleiermacher's
feeling is one of absolute dependence. If it were not dependent
upon the Absolute, how would it be absolute dependence? Turning
to the other direction, we note how Brunner's interpretation of
revelation in creation as general revelation helps to explain
the conception that God is a true and free Lord. He is free
from any limited ideas of Christian revelation such as being de¬
fined in historical revelation in Jesus Christ (as Barth holds).
But out of the mystery of His absolute freedom, He could reveal
Himself once and for all in Jesus Christ as well as manifest
Himself in creation. If Barth truly holds the same view as
Brunner (apparently he does), that God is the absolutely free
Lord, he should agree with Brunner here. In that case, Bruaner's
concept herein discussed really serves to supplement Berth's
ideas of revelation. Barth certainly will not deny the oranicau-
sality of God as the only true possibility in this created world.
49. In one way or another, when Brunner opposes Schleier¬
macher he unwittingly joins ranks with Barth and vice versa,
when he opposes Barth.
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But he has left it out without attempting to explain it and
his attitude toward this is that he taxes it too much for
granted and not thinking it worth while to emphasize or to
carry on such a discussion from a secular or pagan point of
view. Brunner is certainly a typical professor of this century
(Schleiermacher is the typical theologian of the 19th C, and
Barth of our time). Brunner's mistake is due to the unstable
position he adopts: for while positively opposing Schleiermacher
he negatively explains Barth, likewise, explaining bchleier-
macher when he opposes Barth. This, of course, is due to his
method of direct reaction to his opponents. It is no wonder
that Barth criticizes him wrestling with Schleiermacher as if
50
he were his contemporary, and not conscious of the fact that
all theology will become historical theology in due course.
Owing to the historical limitation of the existence of the
Church, Barth does not hesitate to point this out: "Dogmatics
will always be able to fulfill its task only in accordance with
51
the state of the Church at different times." This is already
52
true of schleiermacher's theology. Brunner's theology cannot
escape this fate; similarly, Barth also realizes this fact
about his own theology. When the world is fully come of age,
the irrelevancy of Barth•s theology will grow. Barth admits
this destined possibility and he has reserved room for future
theological generations to say the things better:
Even dogmatics with the best Knowledge ana conscience can
do no more than question after the better, and never foi—
get that we are succeeded by other, later men; and he who
is faithful in this task will hope that those other, later
men may think and say better and more profoundly what we
were endeavouring to think and say. 53
50. Brunners Bchieiermacherbuch, ^wiachen den deixen,
p.55; of. pp.5If.
b1. Dogmatics in Outline, p.11.
52. Brunners Schleiermacnerbttch, Zwischen uen aeiten,
p.52.
53• Dogmatics in Outline, p.11.
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Of course, actually what Barth means is that they say the things
more relevant to their times.
Thus we may conclude that although in their critique,
Brunner's theological thought as he so emphatically affirmed is
in contrast to Schleiermacher's, yet, on a closer examination
we find that, as far 33 his thought-form is concerned, this is
not the case. .Barth's attitude is rather moderate to Schleier-
macher's thought and particularly sympathetic to his historical
position, yet, his own theological thought, as far as his
thought-content is concerned, is ultimately far more different
or diametrically opposite to that of Schleiermacher. Neverthe¬
less, it must be pointed out that although their theology in
relation to Schleierrcacher' s, is reactionary and corrective,
yet, Brunner oftentimes directly reacts to Schieiermacher, as
we have seen how he asserted his own reflection: "One must
reverse this form [of Christian thinking} word for word to its
direct opposite, in order to arrive at the evangelical
54
[ProtestantJ knowledge of the Heavenly kingdom.' Therefore,
the result of his theological thought is largely similar to.
Schleiermacher in thought-form but contrary in thought-content.
Barth soberly knows that theologians, when they set forth to
elaborate a theology, must inevitably operate with Schleier¬
macher' s thought-form which is fundamental and characteristic
C tl
to a modern man' living in a scientific age. Therefore, he
does not directly react to Schleiermacher, but his theology is
largely corrective to his in thought-content.
Finally, it is correct to say that Brunner's critique
of Schleiermacher's theology is comparatively consistent but
somewhat "Unschleiermacherisch." For we have seen that his
54. cf. Supra. p.276.
55. Die Protestantiache Theologie, p.380.
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critique, in the main, is logical, having chosen a single point
such as "mysticism" an the only object of his criticism, .but,
according to narth, if Schleiermacher speaks as an apologist of
his time, then surely Brunner's critique might involve an "Un-
schleiermaeherisch" approach, for he has left out this aspect
in his critique. Barth's critique is somewhat inconsistent but
more to the point. For we know from the outset, that Barth
does not regard Schleiermacher as a good theologian, and above
all, he points out that Schleiermacher's interpretation of re-
cr fi
ligion is not in the least Christian religion. But we cannot
forget that he also assures us that "however grave the question
one would therefore have to ask, one has unreservedly to take
57
into account that Schleiermacher was yet a Christian theologian."
With Barth'a more penetrating insight in his critique, he seems
to have involved himself in inconsistency which is not only due
to his taking Schleiermacher into consideration as a Christian
theologian and a philosopher of religion, but also due to his
emphasis that Schleiermacher speaks as an apologist. One must
be reminded, how aarth taking a full account of Schleiermacher,
presents him as a versatile person: being a modern man, a thinker,
moralist, philosopher of religion, philosophical theologian, apo-
legist, and finally dogmatician. Certainly, Barth criticizes
Schleierraacher, considering that he lived in the 19th Century
and became a victim to his eventful days. But he himself has
forgotten how to unify his various standpoints of criticism of
this great theologian in a more logical approach. One must yet
remember that Barth's statement about criticizing Schleiermacher
is final for he admits that it is extremely difficult to criticize
59
him; he is a man very much like us.
56. The Word of God and the ..ord of Man, pp. 195f•
57. cf. Supra, p.H5«
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